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ABSTRACT 
This thesis‟ central aim is the application of a Wendtian-constructivist expansion of 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) on a specific case study: the South 
Caucasus.  To that effect, three concepts of RSCT – amity/enmity, state incoherence, 
and great power penetration – are expanded and developed within the broader above-
mentioned ontological-epistemological framework.  Amity-enmity is elaborated into an 
integrated spectrum founded on varying ideational patterns of securitisation alongside 
objective characteristics, and encompassing conflict formations, security regimes and 
security communities.  States are conceptualised as ideational-institutional-material 
„providers of security‟; their incoherence is characterised over three tiers and two 
dimensions, leading to a distinction between vertical and horizontal inherent weakness, 
ostensible instability and failure.  Great power penetration is dissected into its objective, 
subjective and intersubjective elements, resulting in a 1+3+1 typology of its recurring 
patterns: unipolar, multipolar-cooperative and multipolar-competitive, bounded by 
hegemony and disengagement.  After the specification of a methodology incorporating 
both objective macro- and interpretive micro-perspectives, two working hypotheses are 
specified.  Firstly, that state incoherence engenders high levels of regional enmity, and, 
secondly, that patterns of great power penetration primarily affect transitions of regional 
amity/enmity between conflict formations and security regimes.  The framework is 
subsequently used to triangulate these hypotheses through an application of the 
theoretical framework on the post-Soviet Southern Caucasus.  An initial macro-
overview is subsequently provided of the Southern Caucasus as a regional security 
complex; the three expanded concepts are consequently investigated, in turn, from the 
discursive micro-perspective.  The South Caucasus is categorised into a „revisionist 
conflict formation‟, the nature of its states‟ incoherence is characterised, and existing 
patterns of great power penetration are identified as competitive-multipolar.  In the final 
chapter, the hypotheses are largely confirmed, and various scenarios as to the possible 
emergence of a regional security regime are investigated. 
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Timeline of Events in the South Caucasus 1988-2009 
February 1988: Demonstrations demanding the Autonomous Region‟s reattachment to 
Armenia take place in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh and Yerevan, Armenia; deadly 
anti-Armenian pogroms follow in Sumgait, Azerbaijan. 
June 1988: An open letter from sixty members of the Abkhaz intelligentsia accuses 
Georgia of a long-term policy of forcible assimilation 
June 1988: The harassment and expulsion of Azeris from Armenia escalates. 
April 1989: A massacre of pro-independence demonstrators by Red Army troops takes 
place in Tbilisi, Georgia. 
July 1989: Deadly clashes erupt in Sukhumi between ethnic Georgians and Abkhaz in 
reaction to a Georgian government decision to convert the Georgian-language section 
of Sukhumi State University into a branch of Tbilisi State University 
September 1989: „Ademon Nykhas‟, the South Ossetian nationalist movement, 
demands the reunification of the Autonomous Region with the North Ossetian 
Autonomous Republic, located in Russia. 
November 1989: The Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia demands that the 
Autonomous Region‟s status be upgraded to that of Autonomous Republic.  The 
Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR affirms its right to secede from the USSR.  Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia‟s „March on Tskinvali‟ results in armed clashes between Georgians and 
Ossetians. 
December 1989: The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR includes Nagorno-
Karabakh in its yearly budget, effectively annexing the territory. 
January 1990 (‘Black January’): Anti-Armenian pogroms and anti-Soviet 
demonstrations take place in Baku and are followed by a violent military crackdown.  
August 1990: A declaration of sovereignty is adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the 
Armenian SSR. 
September 1990: The Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia declares the region a fully 
sovereign union republic of the USSR, in effect seceding from Georgia. 
October 1990: Parliamentary elections in Georgia  -boycotted by most Abkhaz and 
Ossetians.- are won by Gamsakhurdia‟s Round Table–Free Georgia pro-independence 
bloc.  
December 1990: The Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR adopts a declaration of 
sovereignty. 
January 1991: Georgian interior ministry troops enter Tskhinvali; armed conflict erupts 
in South Ossetia. 
March 1991: The all-union referendum on the preservation of a reformed USSR is 
boycotted by Armenia and Georgia.  Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Azerbaijan 
participate and overwhelmingly vote in favour of the union. 
April 1991: Georgia declares independence. 
May 1991: Zviad Gamsakhurdia is elected President of Georgia. 
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May 1991: „Operation Ring‟, involving Soviet and Azeri Interior Ministry troops, 
attempts to disarm Armenian militias in and around Nagorno-Karabakh; ethnic 
Armenian villagers from the neighbouring Shahumyan district are forcibly displaced. 
September 1991: Armenia declares independence. 
September 1991: Ayaz Mutalibov is elected President of Azerbaijan. 
October 1991: Levon Ter-Petrosyan is elected President of Armenia. 
October 1991: Azerbaijan declares independence. 
December 1991: Nagorno-Karabakh declares independence following a referendum 
among its ethnic Armenian inhabitants. 
December 1991: The USSR is formally dissolved. 
December 1991: Zviad Gamsakhurdia is ousted as president of Georgia, in a bloody 
military uprising. 
February 1992: Hundreds of Azeri civilians are massacred in the village of Khojali, 
within Nagorno-Karabakh, during an advance by Armenian troops. 
February 1992: The Georgian parliament abolishes the Soviet-era constitution in 
favour of the 1921 Georgian Democratic Republic‟s, provoking disquiet in Abkhazia. 
March 1992:  Eduard Shevardnadze is appointed Acting Chairman of the Georgian 
State Council. 
May 1992: Sushi – Nagorno-Karabakh largest Azeri-inhabited town – falls to ethnic 
Armenian forces; the Lachin corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia is 
created; following a military rebellion, Ayaz Mutalibov is succeeded as president of 
Azerbaijan by the Popular Front‟s Abufaz Elchibey; Azeri-Armenian armed clashes on 
the Nakhichevan border elicit threats and counter-threats in Ankara and Moscow; 
Armenia signs the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS. 
June 1992: The „Sochi Agreement‟ establishes a cease-fire between Georgia and 
South Ossetia; a joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force is set up under 
Russian command. 
July 1992: Abkhazia declares independence. 
August 1992: Georgian armed military and paramilitary units try to reassert control 
over Abkhazia; the first Georgian-Abkhaz war erupts; Georgian troops book early 
successes. 
October 1992: The Azeri parliament fails to ratify CIS membership. 
December 1992: Following a successful counter-offensive, Sukhumi is besieged by 
Abkhaz and North Caucasian forces, amid reports of unidentified aircraft – strongly 
suspected to be Russian – aiding separatist forces. 
April-October 1993: Several Azeri districts around Nagorno-Karabakh fall to Armenian 
forces; in response, Turkey closes its borders with Armenia. 
June 1993: A military coup removes Elchibey and his Popular Front party from power 
in Azerbaijan; Heidar Aliyev is elected acting president by parliament. 
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September 1993: Azerbaijan rejoins the CIS, including its Collective Security Treaty. 
September 1993: Sukhumi falls to Abkhaz forces; Shevardnadze flees the city; ethnic 
Georgians are expelled from most of Abkhazia. 
September-November 1993: The return of Gamsakhurdia to Samegrelo (in Western 
Georgia) is followed by an armed insurrection centred on the region. 
October 1993: Heidar Aliyev is elected president of Azerbaijan. 
December 1993: Georgia joins the CIS, including its Collective Security Treaty. 
December 1993: Zviad Gamsakhurdia commits apparent suicide in Western Georgia, 
under still-unclear circumstances. 
May 1994: A Russian-brokered cease-fire halts fighting in and around Nagorno-
Karabakh. 
May 1994: The Moscow Agreement (brokered by Russia) establishes a cease-fire 
between Abkhazia and Georgia and provides for the formation of a Russian-led CIS 
peacekeeping force and UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). 
September 1994: Azerbaijan and a consortium of mostly Western oil corporations sign 
the „Contract of the Century‟, regarding the future exploitation of Caspian oil and gas 
fields. 
December 1994: France, Russia and the United States are appointed as co-chairs of 
the OSCE „Minsk Group‟ (tasked with finding a negotiated solution to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict) during the organisation‟s Budapest summit. 
March 1995: A military coup against Heidar Aliyev ends in failure. 
August 1995: An assassination attempt against Eduard Shevardnadze fails. 
November 1995: Eduard Shevardnadze is elected President of Georgia. 
April 1996: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia sign Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements with the European Union. 
February 1998: Another assassination attempt against Eduard Shevardnadze falters. 
February 1998: Levon-Ter Petrosyan is forced to relinquish power following a „palace 
coup‟ led by Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan 
March 1998: Robert Kocharyan is elected President of Armenia. 
April 1999: Georgia and Azerbaijan leave the CIS Collective Security Treaty; Georgia 
joins the Council of Europe. 
October 1999: Several MPs and government officials – including the speaker, Karen 
Demirchyan, and the prime minister, Vazgen Sargsyan – are shot to death in an armed 
attack in the Armenian parliament. 
January 2001: Armenia and Azerbaijan join the Council of Europe. 
April 2001: Negotiations between Robert Kocharyan and Heidar Aliyev in Key West 
reportedly come close to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
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October 2001: A group of Georgian (and, according to Russian claims, Chechen) 
fighters enters Abkhaz-controlled territory, but is repelled after skirmishes reportedly 
killing 40. 
November 2001: Georgia accuses Russia of bombing sites in the Pankisi gorge, while 
Moscow voices counter-charges of Chechen terrorist activity from Georgian territory. 
February-May 2002: US Special Forces advisors are stationed in Georgia; the 
Georgia Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) is instituted. 
October 2002: Armenia signs the founding charter of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation. 
October 2003: Ilham Aliyev is elected as President of Azerbaijan in polls deemed 
neither free nor fair by the international community; a crackdown against opposition 
protestors follows. 
November 2003: The Rose Revolution removes Eduard Shevardnadze from power in 
Georgia, in reaction to his perceived rigging of preceding parliamentary elections. 
January 2004: Mikheil Saakashvili is elected President of Georgia. 
May 2004: Aslan Abashidze, post-Soviet strongman in the Ajaria region of Georgia, is 
ousted following mass protests encouraged by the central authorities in Tbilisi. 
June 2004: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are included in the EU European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
October 2004: Presidential elections in Abkhazia result in a tense stand-off between 
Sergei Bagapsh and Raul Khadjimba, widely seen as Russia‟s preferred candidate. 
January 2005: A re-run of the presidential elections in Abkhazia results in the election 
of Sergei Bagapsh as president and Raul Khajimba as vice-president. 
May 2005: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline is inaugurated. 
June-August 2005: The closure of the Eregneti market, in South Ossetia, by 
authorities in Tbilisi is followed by armed skirmishes in the region. 
July 2006: Georgian forces reassert control over the Kodori gorge, in Upper Abkhazia. 
September 2006: The „Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia‟, 
recognised by Tbilisi at the legal government-in-exile of the territory, is moved to Upper 
Abkhazia. 
October 2006: Russia initiates a trade embargo against Georgia. 
May 2007: Following his defection from the separatist camp, Dimitri Sanakoyev is 
appointed by the President of Georgia as the „Head of the South Ossetian Provisional 
Administrative Entity‟. 
November 2007: The last Russian military base in Georgia (excluding Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia) is closed. 
November 2007: Opposition demonstrations in Georgia are violently suppressed; 
Mikheil Saakashvili calls pre-term presidential elections. 
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January 2008: Saakashvili is re-elected President of Georgia, whose population 
overwhelmingly votes in favour of NATO membership in a non-binding referendum, 
with 77% approving. 
February 2008: The contested win of the Armenian presidential election by Serj 
Sargsyan, the government candidate, is followed by opposition mass demonstrations in 
Yerevan. 
March 2008: Armenian security forces crack down on opposition demonstrators in 
Armenia with lethal force; numerous opposition figures are subsequently arrested. 
April 2008: Georgia fails to obtain a NATO Membership Action Plan during the 
organisation‟s Bucharest summit. 
June-July 2008: Clashes erupt in South Ossetia between Georgian and South 
Ossetian forces.   
August 2008: War erupts between Georgia and Russia. 
September 2008: The independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is officially 
recognised by the Russian Federation. 
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A Note on Transliteration and Toponymy 
I have attempted to phonetically transliterate the many languages of the South 
Caucasus as consistently as possible, usually according to previously existing 
transliterations in the regionalist literature.  In particular, I have avoided using the 
russified first and family names of individuals, as was often the case in the Soviet past, 
romanising as much as possible from the original Armenian, Azeri, Georgian, Abkhaz 
and Ossetian: „Heidar (Aliyev)‟ will thus be preferred over „Gaidar‟, „Mikheil 
(Saakashvili)‟ over „Mikhail‟.  As a rule, in view of the contested nature of many of the 
region‟s localities, and in the absence of any proper English-language variants, the use 
of place-names will be determined by the predominant usage in the media and 
literature outside the region proper.  Akhazia‟s capital will thus be called „Sukhumi‟ 
(instead of the more infrequently used Abkhaz Sukhum), Nagorno-Karabakh‟s 
„Stepanakert‟ (instead of the Azeri Khankendi), among others.  Many of these place-
names have moreover been modified in the post-Soviet period, and unless otherwise 
indicated, this post-Soviet toponymy will be applied throughout the thesis. 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
AIOC: Azerbaijan International Operating Company 
ANM: Armenian Pan-National Movement 
ARFD: Armenian Revolutionary Federation - Dashnaktsutyun 
BTC: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States 
CoE: Council of Europe 
CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy 
EU: European Union 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment 
FSU: Former Soviet Union 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GPP: Great Power Penetration 
GTEP: Georgia Train and Equip Program 
GU(U)AM: Georgia Ukraine (Uzbekistan) Azerbaijan Moldova 
ICG: International Crisis Group 
IPAP: Individual Partnership Action Plan (NATO) 
IFC: International Finance Corporation 
INOGATE: Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe 
KLO: Karabakh Liberation Organisation 
MAP: (NATO) Membership Action Plan 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
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NSC: National Security Concept 
NSS: National Security Strategy 
ODIHR: (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PACE: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
PAP-T: Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (NATO) 
PARP: Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (NATO) 
PfP: Partnership for Peace 
RF: Russian Federation 
RPA: Republican Party of Armenia 
RSC: Regional Security Complex 
RSCT: Regional Security Complex Theory 
RSSC: Regional Security Sub-Complex 
RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic 
TACIS: Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
TRACECA: Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia 
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is something of an awkward stepchild in 
the family tree of International Relations and International Security, embraced by 
neither orthodox neo-realists nor constructivists, yet claiming the parentage of both.  Its 
ontological pluralism and epistemological eclecticism has combined with lack of 
detailed theorisation to leave it exposed to charges of state-centredness (Hoogensen, 
2005) and incoherence (Acharya, 2007, p. 636; Taureck, 2005).  Left in between two 
important paradigms of International Relations and International Security, it has 
nevertheless often been applied almost off the cuff: its prima-facie utility to regionalists 
is quite obvious, despite the deficiencies pointed out by its detractors, deficiencies 
which are often filled-in „on-the-go‟, as empiricists work out ad-hoc methods of 
application that are not really based on thorough conceptual analysis, but rather, on a 
wide range of intuitive assumptions and intellectual leaps of logic. 
The main aim of this thesis is to provide an additional theoretical underpinning to RSCT 
by expanding three of its central concepts: Amity/Enmity, „State Weakness‟ and „Great 
Power Penetration‟, concepts which up to now have most often than not been used 
intuitively, without much further systematic reflection on their actual internal workings 
within the wider theoretical framework.  It will do so through both theorisation and 
empirical application, through abstract deconstruction/reconstruction and the 
deployment of the resulting conceptualisations on a case study: the Southern 
Caucasus.  The thesis will, as a consequence, have two distinct halves, one 
theoretical, the other empirical.  One could, of course, ask whether a case study is at 
all necessary, but the counter-argument would be swift and convincing: perhaps more 
than other theories, RSCT aspires to empirical relevance, and limiting oneself to 
ethereal thought experiments without demonstrating their applicability would therefore 
leave this job half-finished. 
A Genealogy of Regional Security Complex Theory 
Before moving on to dwell on these central theoretical and subsidiary empirical aims, 
however, it is perhaps best to start with a genealogy of the theory itself.  What is RSCT, 
where does it come from?  The short answer would be to point to the first brief mention 
of its very central concept – the [Regional] Security Complex (RSC) – in the first edition 
of Barry Buzan‟s “People, State and Fear”, the work that introduces a systematically 
sector based approach to International Security (Buzan, 1983, pp. 105-115).  There, a 
„security complex‟ is defined as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link 
together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be 
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considered apart from one another.” (p. 106), and the brief section continues with a 
short sketch of several such security complexes in the then Cold-War world. 
RSCT proper was left undeveloped for a relatively long period after its initial 
introduction: the Cold War did not really lend itself to regional theories of (in)security, 
as IR and IS were mostly conceptualised in systemic terms and regions very much 
remained the purview of „area studies‟ and those scholars concentrating on integrative 
processes.  On the demand side, bipolarity and globalisation diverted theorists‟ 
attention towards the systemic, away from the regional.  Regions were, as a rule, 
arbitrarily defined – if they were at all looked at – and theories focusing on regional 
interaction were virtually nonexistent.  As Buzan himself described the situation 
immediately following the end of „bipolarity‟, “there is also an important set of security 
dynamics at the regional level, and this often gets lost or discounted.  At that middle 
level, one finds only the hazy notions of regional balances of power and subsystems, or 
crude media references that use region to describe whatever location currently 
contains a newsworthy level of political turbulence” (Buzan, 1991, p. 187).   
The new post-Cold War world order presented itself as far more complex and 
regionalised than before, calling for theories that could grasp this new, clearly 
discernible reality, operating somewhere between the systemic and the domestic.  
Thus, in People, States and Fear‟s second edition, Buzan (1991, pp. 186-229) expands 
this novel idea of RSCs further in a new, dedicated chapter on „regional security‟, 
where „region-level subsystems‟ are seen, first and foremost, as constituted by the 
increased security interaction and security interdependence that results from 
geographic proximity.  The idea of securitisation is absent at this point, but Buzan does 
introduce the ideational „patterns of amity and enmity‟ as the principal element that 
must be added to power relations in conceptualising of these sub-systems.  At this 
stage, the definition of a „RSC‟ is identical to the one provided in 1983 (p. 190).  The 
thrust of the argument aims to paint clear contours for this hybrid ideational/material 
structure within an ontology that retains a strong Waltzian neo-realist bias1, while 
introducing cultural/historical factors into the argument.  Central concepts of the theory 
– overlay, higher/lower-level complexes (forerunners of great power complexes), 
internal and external transformations – are, among many others, also introduced. 
At first, RSCT then goes through something of a bifurcation.  David Lake and Patrick 
Morgan (1997) present a mainly material-positivist version of the theory in “Regional 
Orders: Building Security in a New World”.  They advocate a comparative, multi-variate 
                                               
1
 In fact, RSCs are described as „process formations‟ within the Waltzian international system (p.209). 
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approach going beyond „security‟ per se, with a strong positivist-materialist bias, 
apparent in their definition of RSCs, which, while echoing Buzan, eliminates the 
interpretivist-ideational element of “security concerns”: “a set of states continually 
affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic 
area.” (p.12).  Lake and Morgan‟s version of RSCT also blurs the boundaries between 
the systemic and regional levels, and the RSCs themselves – important in Buzan‟s 
version – by allowing for overlaps in membership between both.  States and great 
powers can thus simultaneously be members of several RSCs (sometimes quite distant 
ones in the case of great powers).  The authors also replace the ideational 
„amity/enmity‟ variable of „Buzanian‟ RSCT with the considerably more positivist 
„dominant patterns of security management‟.   
In the end, this version of the theory has proved something of a dead end, partly 
because of lacunae pointed out by Buzan and Wæver (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 78-
82), lacunae that seemingly prevented it from having a major impact on empirical 
practice: among others, a diversion of focus away from security towards the political 
and the lack of clear delimitation between and within levels. On the other hand, 
theoretical developments opened up the possibility for the development of the 
ideational aspects of the theory as initially proposed by Buzan: on the supply side, 
constructivist frameworks that were very much geared towards idealism and 
interpretivism had completed their migration from sociology into IR.  The emergence of 
the „Copenhagen School‟ and the idea of „securitisation‟ in preliminary works like 
„Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe‟ (Wæver, Kelstrup, & 
Lemaitre, 1993) ultimately led to the first attempts at an explicitly ideational revision of 
RSCT provided in „Security: A New Framework for Analysis‟ (Buzan, Wæver, & De 
Wilde, 1998).   
In this monograph – widely regarded as the Copenhagen School‟s foundational text – 
Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde provide the foundation for the theory as we know it today, 
developing its securitisation-based ideational half, and briefly outlining a „revised‟ (as 
opposed to „classical‟) version of the theory in the introduction (pp. 1-20).  There, a 
distinction is introduced between homogenous and heterogenous security complexes, 
according to whether one considers securitisations occurring within one or multiple 
sectors.   Secondly, it is suggested that an explicitly social constructivist approach 
would also be one way of moving beyond Classical Security Complex Theory, 
expanding the ideational aspects of the theory beyond the rather indefinite and macro-
perspective notions of amity/enmity or security interdependence towards the very 
specific, explicitly discursive phenomenon of securitisation: “an instance where an 
issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and 
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justifying actions outside the normal bounds of   political procedure” (pp. 23-24).   
Significantly, the introduction explicitly links RSCT to the rest of the volume, in effect 
making it an integral part of Securitisation Theory, as confirmed in the conclusion (pp. 
195-213). 
The contemporary, materially/ideationally hybrid RSCT received its first detailed, 
monographical formulation in Buzan and Wæver‟s „Regions and Powers‟ (2003).  In it, 
the authors place the theory within the existing literature and present an outline of the 
theory‟s main constitutive concepts – the analytical tools that give the theory its shape 
– before applying them to create a comprehensive, system-wide outline of 
contemporary regional security.  Regionalist theories of security like RSCT are seen as 
complementary to the globalist and neo-realist views that had dominated the field up to 
that point, providing them with an ability to conceptualise a regional level between the 
unit- and system-levels.  After presenting a differentiated view of system-level polarity 
(by setting apart superpowers, great powers and regional powers), the authors proceed 
to offer an outline of RSCs‟ main typologies and features based on a critical evaluation 
of the hitherto scattered work using the concept, aiming to “…integrate the lessons 
from existing and new case studies, fill in remaining gaps in the theory, produce an 
operational formulation of the theory, and empirically apply it to all regions of the world” 
(p.42). 
Buzan and Wæver conceptualise RSCs (as in the 1998 volume) as “a set of units 
whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked 
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another.” (p. 44). They subsequently differentiate between „descriptive‟, „predictive‟ and 
„revised‟ RSCT. The first uses RSCs in a descriptive exercise, reconceptualising the 
configuration of the international system in terms of these RSCs, whose essential 
structure consists of their boundaries, anarchic structure, polarity and “social 
construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity between the units.” (p. 53).   
Possible changes in these variables lead to „internal‟ and „external‟ transformations, the 
former based on modifications in their polarity, structure of anarchy or amity/enmity, the 
latter referring to shifts in their boundaries through their merging or splitting.  Several 
types of RSC are subsequently identified, including standard, centred, great power, 
supercomplexes, pre- and proto-complexes.  Predictive RSCT is introduced as a 
scenario-building tool, plotting possible „external‟ and „internal‟ transformations of 
RSCs, providing a more fine-tuned and diverse method than its power-focused 
intellectual ancestor, structural neo-realism.  Finally, revised RSCT emphasises the 
constructivist aspects of the theory by stressing RSCs as constituted by clusters of 
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securitisation on different levels and within/across different sectors (as elaborated in 
the 1998 volume). 
For the most part, the discussion remains an outline, a rough sketch of the dense 
terminology used within the approach.  Overlay, centred RSCs, insulators, patterns of 
amity/enmity, state weakness, great power penetration: the finer inner workings of 
these concepts so central to the theory are left undeveloped, or, alternatively, left for 
others to expand.  And developing the latter three aforementioned terms is precisely 
one of this thesis‟ central concerns.  As their operationalisation remains at the level of a 
general introduction and a preliminary discussion, there is indeed much to be 
expanded.   For instance, how exactly does one conceptualise the amity/enmity 
variable?  Buzan and Wæver refer to it as a “socially constructed dimension of 
structure” (p. 50), and suggest that “[t]hose of a Wendtian disposition can see that this 
social theory can easily be applied as a useful constructivist elaboration of the amity-
enmity variable in RSCT” (ibid.).  These patterns could thus, the authors continue, be 
conceived of in terms of Wendt‟s social structures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean and 
Kantian), based on what kind of roles (friend/enemy) actors internalise, but no 
systematic and explicit elaboration is offered in that direction.   
Similarly, much of the theoretical and practical side is left open regarding the concept 
of weak and strong states, briefly introduced in the first chapter (p.22) as a spectrum of 
„stateness‟ or „empirical sovereignty‟, and applied extensively but rather intuitively in the 
chapter on sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 224-229).  How exactly the spectrum is to be 
employed in a consistent and easily replicable way is also left open for further 
theorisation.  One final, under-explored issue are the precise and finer points of the 
interaction between the systemic and regional levels, that is, great powers or 
superpowers and the RSCs themselves.  Apart from overlay and the differentiation 
between ordinary and „centred‟ or „great power‟ RSCs, and their roles in interregional 
linkages and external transformations, the phenomenon of „great power penetration‟ is 
again, only gently alluded to, and applied rather intuitively in the empirical section of the 
monograph (pp. 46-47, 49, 53-61). 
To some extent, these omissions are understandable, a result of the lack of space in 
presenting a comprehensive review of global security in the post-9/11 world.  But they 
call out for expansion in two ways.  First, they are central to the interaction between the 
regional, domestic and systemic levels, an interaction that must be properly 
conceptualised if RSCT is to expand its applicability even further. More than ever, 
RSCs are at the nexus of the domestic and the systemic, rather than being, simply, a 
set of self-contained security relationships.  The need for a systematised „toolbox‟ 
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describing these level-to-level interactions has become a necessity within RSCT.  As 
Buzan and Wæver (2003, pp. 16-20) themselves point out, the involvement of great 
powers in RSCs has become more multi-faceted and complex in the post-Cold War 
environment.  Moreover, in today‟s context, the emergence of „weak‟ states has 
implications that go far beyond the regions containing them, helping generate 
securitisations that affect the system as a whole.  Integrating the domestic and 
systemic into a continuous whole centred on the regional level will therefore be one of 
the aims of the theoretical expansion. 
This continuous whole will be structured around the notion of „securitisation‟, by 
expanding the amity/enmity, state incoherence and great power penetration variables 
in terms of the networks/clusters of securitisation by which RSCs have come to be 
defined.   The amity/enmity concept so central to RSCT deserves development beyond 
the hitherto vaguely delineated categories provided by Wendt (1999, pp. 246-312), 
whose rump materialist framework does seem singularly placed to provide such an 
elaboration because of its ontological similarities to RSCT.   How one conceptualises 
the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian structures of anarchy in an ideational world 
defined by securitisations and de-securitisations would be essential in devising a 
readily generaliseable version of this theory.  Considering RSCT‟s hybrid outlook, it is 
also clear that securitisations and security discourse could play a fruitful role in a 
conceptualisation of both state incoherence and great power penetration.  
Characterising and integrating these three variables by providing a discursive micro-
perspective approach in addition to RSCT‟s currently more dominant and more 
material-positivist macro-perspective will be another goal of this theoretical 
development. 
Part of the risk of such an expansion lies in the inherent complexity of RSCT – its 
inherent hybridity, its multiple levels, and the sectors that are part of its Copenhagen 
School heritage, especially within the „revised‟ version; it could be argued that, rather 
than developing concepts in finer detail, intuition and improvisation are often part of the 
large body of thought and practice in IR that does not aspire to scientific-
methodological dogma, providing practitioners with flexibility and contextual 
adaptability.  But then the question arises why such improvised and ad-hoc approaches 
should remain based on implicit assumptions that cannot be formulated in the coherent 
abstract.  Surely, making logical linkages within and between concepts explicit would, if 
successful, add to the value of any theory, while limiting the risk of centrifugal 
tendencies within it.  As in any case, there will be some trade-off between detail and 
clarity; this does not mean, however, that one cannot push towards a Pareto optimum 
involving both. 
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In the end, however, the ultimate test of any resulting theory will lie in its applicability.  
A case study will thus have to demonstrate that the resulting framework can be applied 
to produce empirical knowledge rather than remaining an ivory-tower exercise 
performed for its own sake.  The framework derived from the theoretical expansion will 
have to be put into operation in a region that displays strong interactions between the 
domestic, regional and systemic levels.  The area I have chosen in this case is 
commonly known as the Southern Caucasus (and, less commonly, the 
Transcaucasus), comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, including the still 
overwhelmingly unrecognised republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh2. 
At this point, I shall not address Buzan and Wæver‟s characterisation of this area as a 
regional security sub-complex of the Former Soviet RSC, or their suggestion that it 
might at some point turn into a freestanding mini-complex.   These questions will be 
handled in the empirical chapter providing a macro-perspective view (chapter 6) as I 
attend to one of the concept‟s constitutive variables – its boundaries – and argue, in 
depth, that it has indeed become, or at the very least could be treated, as freestanding.  
My focus, for now, will be on the area‟s suitability for an application of the expanded 
theoretical framework I intend to develop, through an overview of its modern history.  
Does it suggest an ability to generate the questions that, in turn, could provide viable 
hypotheses regarding linkages between amity/enmity, „state weakness‟, and great 
power penetration in an RSCT context? 
Applying the Framework: The Southern Caucasus 
The Southern Caucasus seems a promising site for my empirical section, for a number 
of reasons: first of all, its complex and conflictual nature.  It has seen several violent 
intra-state and inter-state conflagrations since the early 20th century, especially during 
periods without Russian overlay, underscoring the deeply inimical relations within the 
region.  It is has historically functioned as a meeting point of empires, with Russia 
hegemonically dominant for most of the past two centuries, and other great powers 
                                               
2
 Most of the literature approaches the Southern Caucasus from issue- or actor-specific angles, often in 
combination with the Northern Caucasus, Central Asia, the Black Sea or the „Caspian Basin‟, social-
scientific monographs and edited volumes have concentrated on secessionism/nationalism and state 
weakness (Chervonnaia, 1994; Closson, 2007; Coppieters, 1996b; D. Lynch, 2004; Matveeva, 2002), 
bilateral inter-unit relations (Croissant, 1998), the regional role of single great powers (particularly Russia) 
(Baev, 1997; Menon, Fedorov, & Nodia, 1999), or have limited their view to single issue-areas: 
geopolitics/military-strategic matters (Gadzhiev, 2001; Matveeva & Hiscock, 2003), or the one issue that 
elicits real interest in Western policy circles: energy security (Ebel & Menon, 2000; Karagiannis, 2002; Van 
der Leeuw, 1999).  Very few have tried to take a comprehensive and theoretically systematic view of 
security in the Southern Caucasus as the regional interplay of multiple phenomena emanating from both 
material and ideational factors; an in-depth RSCT analysis could therefore be a welcome addition to the 
existing literature. 
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regularly challenging its dominance, as during the 19th-century „Great Game‟ (Hopkirk, 
2001), immediately following WWI (D. Kelly, 2000), and in the post-Soviet period.  
Finally, during the modern-day periods outside of Russian or Soviet imperial control – 
in 1918-1920 and after 1991 – its main constituent states have always been unstable.  
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were riven by violent intra-state conflict in 1918-
1920, much as they are now; it seems, in other words, to be populated by „weak‟ or, as 
I shall call them, „incoherent‟ states.  The region‟s modern history suggests it is rife with 
precisely those questions that my theoretical framework aims to clarify. 
The Southern Caucasus‟ three recognised states emerged in their modern forms 
following the fall of the Czarist Empire, in 1917, after a failed attempt by the three 
largest ethnic groups of the Southern Caucasus (Armenians, Azeris, Georgians) to 
create a unified state, the short-lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic 
(TDFR) (Hovannisian, 1997, pp. 289-299; Swietochowski, 2004, pp. 105-128). Its brief 
and fractious history illustrates the extent to which regional elites had, by that time, 
taken on the specific identities and interests of different „imagined communities‟ (B. 
Anderson, 2006), identities that would only be reinforced in 1918-1921 with the 
emergence of the three „Democratic Republics‟ of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.   
Marked by wars and massacres – an inevitable outcome of dramatically overlapping 
territorial claims and hopelessly mixed populations – this short period of history outside 
of direct Russian imperial rule now occupies pride of place in the nationalist narratives 
of all peoples of the Southern Caucasus as a focus of grievance and identity. 
It is all to easy to claim, as much of Western reporting has done, that  „ancient hatreds‟ 
that had remained bottled up during the decades of Soviet rule effortlessly rose again 
in 1989.  And, to be fair, much of the antagonism within the region is also constructed 
as „ancient‟ by nationalists on all sides in the region.   But if one goes back only slightly 
further in time, towards the middle of the 19th century, one finds a dramatically different 
picture of the area, one that reveals the contingent and far from inevitable nature of 
regional ethnic antagonisms.  Early imperial Russian Transcaucasia was an area of the 
empire where centuries of Byzantine, Persian, Turkish influence, and Russian overlay 
had created what one could conceivably call a unified socio-cultural space, where 
different ethnicities lived side by side in relative peace under a „pax Russica‟ without 
the added territorially exclusive complications of modern nationalism.  At the same 
time, this era of imperial control set the stage for what would happen in the early and 
late 20th centuries: the strife in 1918-1921 (and following 1989) was not based on 
anything „ancient‟; it was the combined, socially constructed product of the processes 
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of modernity and Russian imperialism that had affected the Southern Caucasus during 
the 19th century3. 
Ethnic nationalism only emerged in the second half of the 19th century, when it 
touched first the Armenians and Georgians, and subsequently the Azeris (Goldenberg, 
1996, pp. 23-30).  The Russian imperial authorities had been instrumental in its 
emergence by privileging different ethnic groups at various times during their rule, the 
only constant being their discriminatory attitude towards the their Muslim subjects.  The 
combination of resulting socio-economic patterns, internal and external migrations, and 
modernisation created a potent, volatile situation in which nationalism could readily 
take root.  In Georgia, Marxism mixed with Georgian antagonism against the local 
Armenian bourgeoisie to create a “national liberation movement based on class war”, 
centred on the local Mensheviks (Suny, 1996, p. 140).  The long-simmering 
antagonisms between Armenians and Azeris broke out in the open in 1905 
(Swietochowski, 1996, pp. 214-215), in spite of efforts by communal leaders to contain 
the violence, and, after the fact, encourage reconciliation (Altstadt, 1992, pp. 39-43), 
and set the stage for the brutal ethnic cleansings that would mark the Caucasus 
following the Cold War.  It must be stressed, however, that 1905 was the first instance 
of large-scale ethnic conflict in the region: a distinctly modern date. 
While these hatreds were, perhaps, not ancient, they have nevertheless demonstrated 
a remarkable persistence and resilience over time. The decades of Soviet propaganda 
that followed the Bolshevik takeover of the region – defining the three main ethnicities 
as „brotherly nations‟ and celebrating Southern Caucasian brotherhood of nations 
under Russian-Soviet tutelage – showed itself entirely ineffective.  Quite on the 
contrary: several authors argue that the Soviet „titular nation‟ system, combined with 
rigid, primordialist historiography to reinforce rather than weaken ethnic allegiances 
within the USSR, and create ethnic consciousness where, previously, there was little, 
as, arguably, in Abkhazia and Ossetia (Cornell, 2001; Suny, 2001).  In the Southern 
Caucasus, the situation was complicated by territorial changes and 
upgrades/downgrades in the status of various territories – including Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh – especially during the Stalinist period, which has led 
to not-too-unfounded charges of them having been deliberately designed to foment 
ethnic strife.   
                                               
3
 Well into that century, the absolute majority of Tbilisi‟s population was ethnic Armenian: mostly traders 
and artisans brought there by subsequent Georgian kings aiming to complement their largely agrarian co-
ethnics with an urban population (Suny, 1994, pp. 86-95, 116-117).  The co-habitation of Armenians and 
Azeris (then called „Caucasian Tatars‟) in Baku, Shushi, Yerevan, and throughout the territories that now 
make up Armenia and Azerbaijan, where both groups were substantially intermingled, was relatively 
peaceful until 1905 (Altstadt, 1992, pp. 28-33; Bournoutian, 1996).   
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What is noteworthy about the earlier, very brief period of independence in 1918-1921 is 
the similarity between the regional flashpoints at that time, and the sites of conflict 
seven decades later, in the post-Cold War period: wars and massacres between 
Armenians and Azeris (inside and beyond Nagorno-Karabakh), pro-Bolshevik uprisings 
by the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, a war between Georgia and Armenia over the 
contested provinces of Javakheti and Lori. When Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan 
attained their independence after seventy years of Soviet rule, the patterns of strife 
took on a familiar form, generating both inter- and intra-state conflicts and tensions 
centred around these same territories.  Baku and Yerevan were already involved in a 
de-facto civil war before the formal implosion of the USSR, with Armenian fighters 
confronting Azeri troops in Karabakh from the autumn of 1991, although skirmishing 
and armed unrest had begun long beforehand (De Waal, 2003; Rieff, 1997); 
independence „upgraded‟ the conflict to a full-fledged international conflagration.  
Abkhazia and South Ossetia were at the same time moving beyond Tbilisi‟s control, in 
the run-up to open armed conflict and extensive ethnic cleansing in 1991-93 
(Chervonnaia, 1994; Human Rights Watch, 1992; Potier, 2001).   The end result has 
been a series of „frozen conflicts‟ that have marked the region ever since the „hot‟ 
phase of these conflagrations came to an end, pitting Armenia/Karabakh against 
Azerbaijan and Abkhazia/South Ossetia against Georgia (with the latter becoming 
„unfrozen‟ in 2008).   
The Southern Caucasus has thus been a site for both inter- and intra-state conflict at 
different stages in its modern history outside of imperial domination.  Apart from 
persistently fractious inter-state enmities that provide ample opportunity for the 
exploration of RSCT‟s „amity/enmity‟ variable, its modern nationalisms seem to also 
have produced states that can all be described as weak and unstable.  The intra-state 
troubles of the 1918-1920 and post-1991 period were noted above; today, two of the 
recognised regional states – Azerbaijan, Georgia – have fragmented through the latter 
era‟s separatist conflicts.  All three states have moreover seen their share of political 
instability and strife in the post-Soviet years. None of them has had a peaceful 
transition of power between government and opposition, with both Georgia and 
Azerbaijan going through civil wars during their early post-Soviet history.  In other 
words, the Southern Caucasus appears to also provide ample opportunity to apply the 
rehashed concept of state incoherence this thesis aims to develop. 
Apart from pointing to persistent – if not altogether ancient – forms of enmity and state 
incoherence, modern history also illustrates how great powers have shaped the 
antagonisms within this region, time and again, through either direct domination or 
simple interaction.   As has already been pointed out, the hegemonic role of Russia 
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and the Soviet Union played a crucial role in forming its various contemporary ethno-
nationalisms.  In the absence of Russian hegemony, the different constituent nations 
(and, later, states) of Transcaucasia looked towards outside powers for protection, in 
1918-1921, as in the post-Cold War era.  The Transcaucasian Federative Democratic 
Republic fell prey, among others, to the competing and incompatible great power 
preferences of the Georgians (Germany), Azeris  (the Ottoman Empire), and 
Armenians (the Russians, the Allies, and later, the United States).   From 1918 to 1920, 
the three „Democratic Republics‟ also strove to enhance their relative positions through 
alliances with outside powers, with the British in particular often acting as an arbiter in 
disputes. As today, the interests of these outside powers were primarily focused on the 
oilfields in Baku.  
Following the Cold War, the Southern Caucasus has similarly seen an ever-increasing 
involvement of great powers in its processes since the end of Soviet empire in 1991, 
and commensurately divergent alignments by the three constituent states, in addition to 
the unrecognised statelets.  Moscow has always had a prominent presence (Baev, 
1997), with military bases inherited from the USSR and, as is credibly alleged, 
involvement in the separatist conflicts that marked the region‟s states in their first years 
of independence.  Its economic involvement is considerable as well, in the strategic 
sectors of especially Armenia, and less straightforwardly, Georgia.  With the 2008 war, 
it has to some extent also assured itself a position within the region through its de-facto 
protectorates in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.   
The United States and the EU („Europe‟) have, meanwhile greatly increased their 
regional presence, starting with the „Contract of the Century‟ signed with Azerbaijan in 
1994 (MacFarlane, 1999).  Much of their involvement has centred on energy 
transportation routes for hydrocarbon reserves (like the already functional BTC oil 
pipeline and the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline).  The United States has, however, 
expanded into the military and political sectors by actively pushing for Georgia‟s NATO 
membership, at least during the G.W. Bush presidency (D. Lynch, 2006, pp. 51-54).  
The EU‟s regional involvement has gone from benign neglect of the region‟s states to 
their inclusion within the ENP and Eastern Partnership programme, with the possibility 
of Association Agreements being signed in the near future (European Commission, 
2009d; MacFarlane, 2004).  Turkey and Iran have also played roles shaping the region, 
if only as adjacent regional powers with important historical ties to it.  Again, as regards 
great power penetration, the Southern Caucasus seems fertile and complex ground for 
a practical application of RSCT. 
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Guiding Questions 
Modern history certainly directs attention towards this region as a potentially fruitful site 
for a trial run of an expanded version of RSCT, based around the variables of 
amity/enmity, state incoherence, and great power penetration.  The need for such an 
application is made all the more urgent because of the continued impermeability of the 
region‟s enmities to change: in all its societies, the impact of programmes by well-
meaning peace-promoting NGOs has been minimal.  There are no large-scale self-
sustained movements rejecting conflict-engendering nationalisms, no notable 
indigenous peace groups comparable to Israel‟s „Peace Now‟.  Moreover, on an inter-
governmental level, none of the frozen conflicts have been resolved. This remains a 
highly fractured region, its many impervious, blockaded borders accentuating its 
unresolved – and seemingly irresolvable – antagonisms. 
RSCT – with its multi-level and structural view of security – would suggest the futility of 
trying to untie a Gordian knot by plucking at a few minor strings within it: if expanded 
appropriately, it would allows the complex networks of securitisations and counter-
securitisations that drive regional insecurity to be exposed.  If, as Wæver (2002) 
suggests, these securitisations are „sedimented‟ – that is, of varying „immutability‟ – the 
agency of individuals or smaller „enlightened' groups would bump up against the 
overarching ideational structures created by these securitisations, deep-seated „logics 
of appropriateness‟ that risk marginalising anyone stepping outside of the ideological, 
nationalist mainstream.  Moreover, addressing one level of securitisation – domestic 
(state incoherence), regional (amity/enmity) or systemic (great power penetration) – 
would not be sufficient to break through the complex spider‟s web of securitisations that 
drives regional insecurity.  Finally, the addition of material factors (made possible by 
the hybrid nature of RSCT, its macro-perspective) would add yet another dimension of 
complexity.  Seeing this region as a complex, interdependent, ideational-material 
cluster – as RSCT does – could just help us understand the persistence of its hostile 
relations, and the possibility of them transforming. 
In particular, I shall look into whether a stable security regime can emerge from the 
conflictual situation that now marks the Southern Caucasus RSC.  I shall do this by 
evaluating what I call the „stability‟ of prevailing discourses, and identifying possible 
pathways and obstacles in the way towards a transformation of the fractious Southern 
Caucasus from conflict formation to security regime.  To some extent, this will be a 
highly hypothetical exercise, involving building alternative scenarios and considering 
the likelihoods of their occurring, as described by Buzan and Wæver (Buzan & Wæver, 
2003, pp. 65-70) in their section on „predictive‟ RSCT.  How would the security 
discourses in the region have to change to engender more stability, both within and 
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between the various regional units?  How would a change in the way great powers 
penetrate the region affect the prospects for the emergence of such a stable, less 
conflictual region?  How would changes in the material context affect these prospects? 
These are the types of questions that will conclude my case study. 
Two underlying questions emerge from the line of questioning presented above: one on 
the interplay between the three variables expanded in the theoretical section, and 
another on the consequences of the particular configurations found within an RSC for 
the region‟s transformative potential.  My attention will be focused, firstly, on evaluating 
the past and present interplay between state incoherence, great power penetration and 
amity/enmity within the region, and, secondly, on a scenario-building exercise aimed at 
evaluating the RSC‟s transformative potential, touching on an issue that has always 
been central to the study of international security: the quest for peace, or at the very 
least, stability.  The first line of questioning – interplay – will lead me towards positing 
several hypotheses regarding the links between state incoherence and patterns of 
great power penetration on the one hand, and amity/enmity on the other, within the 
discourses of security that shape the region‟s culture of anarchy: what I shall call the 
„micro-perspective‟ of RSCT.  Looking at the structure of this prevalent discourse, does 
state incoherence engender enmity, as suggested by Miller (2007) from a more 
historical perspective; and if so, how?  Moreover, how does the way the region is 
penetrated by great powers – the structure of great power penetration – affect actors‟ 
discourses of (in)security? Does it skew the regional culture of anarchy towards 
enmity?  Answering these two question from the novel, hybrid, material-ideational point 
of view provided by RSCT will pave the way for my main line of inquiry: exploring the 
region‟s transformative potential. 
The impression is that the peoples of the region are caught in a spider‟s web of self-
sustaining conflict, with their leaders and elites lacking the agency required to tear this 
web to shreds.  What is needed is a holistic understanding of this spider‟s web, 
integrating all its interconnected levels (domestic, regional and systemic), and both its 
ideational and material threads towards answering the crucial question as to the 
possibility of an emergent, conflict-mitigating security regime.  To this end, this 
dissertation will answer queries as to the future persistence of the insecurities that have 
plagued the Southern Caucasus for so long, by looking at conditions within the region 
from the dying years of the Soviet Union to the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, two 
crucial dates in its recent history. 
At this point, some will accuse me of pessimism for referring to the images of a spider‟s 
web or Gordian knot. Others will fault me for optimism for believing in the capacity of an 
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apparently doomed and hopelessly fractious region to change; but for all their 
complexity and the strength of their fibres, spider‟s webs are liable to destruction and 
Gordian knots can be hacked through, if one musters the agency and intelligence to do 
so.  Personally, I shall approach my subject with a degree of detachment and reflexion 
that tries to avoid either extreme.  My goal is not to turn this region into what Adler and 
Barnett (1998b), following Deutsch (1957), call a „security community‟. I have no such 
illusions, and considering conditions in the region today, such a leap of faith would be 
daring indeed.  As the empirical chapters will show, the days when Azeri and Armenian 
elites could jointly call for calm in Baku (as in 1905), or when Georgians, Armenians 
and Azeris could even consider a confederal state (as in 1918) have long been 
displaced in the at times vitriolic nationalist narratives that now mark this region.  So 
have the days of Sayat Nova, the effortlessly secular and cosmopolitan Armenian 
troubadour who in the 18th century sang his songs in Georgian and Azeri alongside his 
native Armenian (Dowsett, 1997). Much less ambitiously, one of my lines of 
questioning will centre on whether the states within the region would be able to 
manage their conflicting security interests through formal mechanisms designed to 
minimise the occurrence of war and armed conflict, giving their populations at least a 
glimmer of hope at a life of „normalcy‟.  That in itself is already a daunting task, in a 
region marked by ongoing strife since before its units even attained formal 
independence.   
The Mechanics of Research 
The methods employed in answering these research questions and hypotheses were 
largely structured around an intertextual analysis of the basic security discourses in 
evidence within the different societies of the region, supplemented by semi-structured 
interviews and ethnographic observation carried out during two separate periods of 
fieldwork, in July-September 2008 and August 2009.  My main aim was to capture the 
region‟s narratives on security, while granting material factors some measure of 
independent causality, conforming to the overall metatheoretical point of view adopted 
in this Wendtian-constructivist expansion of RSCT.   
The material factors were mapped in what I shall call a „macro-perspective‟, largely 
through Western secondary sources, mostly think-tank reports by well-established 
entities like the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, and Transparency 
International.  Considering the „birds-eye‟ nature of this „macro-perspective‟, the level of 
detail afforded by their publications was usually more than sufficient for the purposes of 
my thesis.  The „micro‟ or discursive perspective required a more detailed intertextual 
analysis of the basic security discourses prevalent within the South Caucasus RSC‟s 
three recognised states, and three unrecognised polities; here, a wide variety of 
 32 
sources and a combination of methods provided for both data- and method-
triangulation (Denzin, 2009, pp. 260-313)4.  Documents used in this intertextual 
analysis included both primary and secondary sources, although the stress remained, 
as much as possible, on the former.   
In terms of the research matrix provided by Hansen (2006, pp. 74-82), I aimed to 
capture securitisations, and the multiple, often clashing identities and values driving 
these over a historical time-period going from the decline and fall of the USSR in the 
1980s to the August 2008 Georgia war.   The focus was, firstly, on official discourse, 
and, secondly, on the intra-societal debates that surrounded these official discourses, 
and the historical securitising moves/acts underlying them: with the „stability‟ of 
established official security discourses (i.e. the extent of their contestation) a major 
factor in my research, investigating the existence of alternative narratives and 
understandings of security formed a major part of my analysis, leading to the measured 
inclusion of even marginal political discourses – like those of Ashot Bleyan in Armenia, 
or the Ol! Youth Group in Azerbaijan – for the sake of completeness. 
National Security Concepts acted as a starting point for the analyses of official security 
discourses in the recognised South Caucasus states.  While these could generally be 
seen to be authoritative statements in their own right, their status as a repository of 
successful securitisations was not taken for granted: in all three (Armenian, Azeri and 
Georgian) cases, the evolution of official security discourse was traced back through 
presidential statements and interviews gathered from official presidential websites, 
supplemented by interview transcripts from local and Western news and monitoring 
agencies, as well as policy statements by government entities.   These official 
discourses were then put into the broader context of intra-societal debate in order to 
gauge their „stability‟ or lack of contestation: diverging statements by opposition 
politicians, conflicting opinions and reports in the local media were also part of the 
primary source material on the regional security discourse.  Where possible, these 
local outlets were directly accessed through their internet archives; monitoring by 
                                               
4
 Regional sources were confined to documents and reports in Russian, Armenian and English, in order of 
preference.  This might raise some issues regarding the potential distortive effects of not relying on the 
language of origin in, for instance, Georgia and Azerbaijan, with the ever-present risk of the discourse 
being „adapted‟ to the particular target audience at hand.  Whether your readers or listeners are co-
nationals or Western outsiders will matter, if only because both governments and oppositionists will skew 
their rhetoric to the specific requirements of propaganda and PR.  Two elements are of importance here, 
however, in minimising such distortions.  Firstly, this effect is less pronounced in the case of the Russian 
(as opposed to the English-language) versions of particular articles; in fact, quite often, material that might 
seem offensive to Western ears was simply not translated into English, while it was into Russian (still the 
lingua franca of much of the region‟s elite in the time period under consideration).  Secondly, any such 
distortions should have been minimised by the multi-faceted and cross-cutting nature of my (multiply 
triangulated) analysis, with its combination of primary and secondary sources, supplemented by interviews 
and ethnographic, immersive research and drawn from a wide variety of outlets in a range of different 
languages. 
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Eastview and the BBC (as accessed through Lexis Nexis) also provided a steady 
stream of data, as did reports by Western media focused on the region, like Radio Free 
Europe and Eurasianet. 
In the absence of formal National Security Concepts, and in light of the less accessible 
nature of local source material, the security discourses of the non-recognised entities – 
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia – relied to a greater extent on 
authoritative statements by the local elites, in primary sources where available, and in 
secondary sources where necessary.  Tracing back the underlying securitisations did 
not pose much of a problem as the origins of these conflicts have been well-
documented.  The main securitising moves and acts, contained in resolutions by the 
local supreme soviets, or statements by the various nationalist mass movements and 
personalities were readily available, either directly on the entities‟ internet resources or 
indirectly in secondary sources dealing with the conflicts‟ origins.  The Russian press 
or, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian press also provided a steady 
stream of information regarding these entities‟ elite perceptions.  The most important 
challenges to these dominant discourses could also be detected in secondary material 
reporting intra-elite discord: the conflicts surrounding Samvel Babayan in Karabakh, 
Dmitry Sanakoyev in South Ossetia are a case in point, as is the recent Abkhaz 
unease at Russian economic dominance (see chapters 7 and 8). 
As everywhere in the FSU, the limits to media freedom in the South Caucasus had to 
be taken into account when mapping some of the opposition discourses in the region‟s 
less free states.  While the electronic media (television) are subject to informal state 
control in Yerevan, Baku and Tbilisi, there is some measure of freedom for the printed 
press, and critical articles do appear in opposition and independent newspapers in all 
three recognised South Caucasus states despite of pressure and harassment by their 
governments.   While these independent publications are often in the local language 
(except for Russian-language publications like Golos Armenii in Armenia and Zerkalo in 
Azerbaijan), they are often picked up on and translated by well-respected monitoring 
services like Eastview and the BBC.  Opposition viewpoints are also freely reported on 
by Western media with a regional focus (Radio Free Europe, or the BBC Russian and 
Azeri services), apart from being readily accessible in the regional „blogosphere‟.  One 
Yerevan-based organisation, Caucasus Journalists‟ Network, also provided large 
numbers of raw transcripts of online interviews carried out co-operatively by journalists 
from all three South Caucasus states, with political figures of various political 
backgrounds.  More broadly, prevalent attitudes in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
had been the subject of large-scale opinion surveys (see chapter 6) whose result also 
provided valuable insights into the attitudes prevalent within the different societies, with 
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the important caveats usually accompanying such surveys in more or less authoritarian 
societies. 
Two separate bouts of fieldwork in the region supplemented the formal inter-textual 
research outlined above: one in July-September 2008 (Armenia and Georgia), and the 
other during August 2009 (Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia).  The aim of these visits 
was, firstly, to obtain interviews from various individuals of interest, and, secondly, to 
immerse myself in local socio-cultural conditions to a maximum extent by adding an 
ethnographic element to my research.  Except in Nagorno-Karabakh, I was extensively 
aided in my endeavours by local contacts, who also allowed me to interact to a 
maximum extent possible with ordinary Armenians, Georgians, and Abkhazians.  To 
some extent, the insights gained through such everyday interaction were valuable 
correctives to the information gained through the simple reading of texts: directly 
observing and interacting with anti-government demonstrators in Yerevan, reading the 
mostly English-language placards held by Georgians in protest at the August 2008 war, 
or talking to ordinary Abkhazians about the importance of Apsuara, their „code of 
honour‟, gave me valuable insights into at least a small sample of the day-to-day 
interaction that I would not have received in the comfort of a research library or 
newspaper archive.  It also opened up discourses that did not necessarily feature in the 
mainstream public narratives of these societies: for instance, among religious cult 
members, feminists and ultra-liberal activists on the political fringes of society.   
My formal, semi-structured interviews concentrated mostly on members of the local 
political elites and counter-elites: policymakers, first and foremost, and opposition 
leaders and activists.  Journalists, intellectuals, artists, NGO campaigners and foreign 
diplomats were also included, alongside, in a less formal setting, „ordinary‟ citizens who 
couldn‟t be described as part of a local „elite‟.  Again, these were not central but, rather, 
complementary to my inter-textual approach, aimed mostly triangulating impressions 
inductively arrived at through the latter, asking questions pertaining to the interviewees‟ 
perceptions of regional security, statehood, great power involvement, and prospects for 
change.  The openness and accessibility of my interviewees varied with the extent of 
authoritarianism within a given society: I found respondents in Abkhazia and Georgia 
most ready to speak, while it did take more effort to „open up‟ some of the interviewees 
in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh5.  Such open reluctance was, however, rare: most 
                                               
5
 In one particularly memorable instance, I was refused an interview by a prominent pro-government 
intellectual in Nagorno-Karabakh after revealing my country of citizenship (Belgian) and the topic of 
conversation (regional security), with the friendly advice that only the local foreign ministry would have the 
authority to comment on such sensitive matters.   
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interviewees were frank and openly critical of their governments, even if it required 
more „prodding‟ in some settings than in others. 
One source of regret was my inability to carry out fieldwork in Azerbaijan.  Although this 
did seem remotely possible at the beginning of my project (in 2005-06), as time 
progressed and optimism as to a resolution of the Karabakh conflict regressed, my 
ethnic origins precluded me from visiting Baku, as Azerbaijan routinely denied visas to 
foreign nationals of Armenian descent at the time.  I compensated by, firstly, 
establishing contacts with members of the expatriate Azeri community in London, 
including diplomats and opposition supporters, and by, secondly, delving 
disproportionately into the numerous Azeri sources available from abroad.  Official 
discourses – presidential statements, communiqués and policy papers by various 
ministries – were readily accessible.  Baku is also host to a large number of well-
archived bi- or tri-lingual, or monolingual Russian-language publications which provided 
a wealth of material.  Newspapers like Zerkalo, and news sites like trend.az, day.az 
and apa.az, in addition to the monitoring by Eastview and the BBC provided a wide 
selection of source data.  All in all, the information obtained was sufficient to insert 
insights on Azerbaijan‟s security discourse into this thesis. 
Another unfortunate limitation on this thesis was my inability to explicitly engage with 
the Copenhagen School‟s sectoral view (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 27-29), although the 
political and societal sectors do feature in my treatment of state incoherence in 
particular.  A decision not to present the analysis of the regional security discourse 
sector-by-sector was made about mid-way through the project, as it became apparent 
that the 100,000-word limit would prevent me from doing justice to the possible wealth 
of material that could emerge by looking at interactions between the military, political, 
societal, economic and environmental sectors.  The problem lay partly in my focus on 
both the material and the ideational, and on the nature of my research questions and 
hypotheses, which deals with the general interaction between the three broadly defined 
and expanded variables, from the structural perspective that RSCT provides.  Future 
research could introduce sector-specific approaches to the framework presented 
below, refining it further: in this respect, this framework will remain a work in progress, 
hopefully providing interesting pathways to an ever-increasing understanding of the 
workings of regional security. 
Chapter Outline 
This thesis will take on the following shape.  Following this introduction, chapters 2-5 
will centre on the first aim enumerated above: conceptual expansion.  Chapter 2 will 
focus mainly on the opening out of amity/enmity into a spectrum encompassing six 
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different categories, ranging from revisionist conflict formations to tight security 
communities, defined from a macro- (material/epiphenomenal) and micro- 
(ideational/discursive) perspective.  Within this framework, a distinction will be made 
between the instrumental and argumentative aspects of security discourse, the former 
determining the referent objects that are to be protected, the latter driven by a 
determination to employ the techno-scientific knowledge present within a given society 
towards their protection.  These different aspects of discourse will converge and 
diverge in varying ways to reflect different „cultures of anarchy‟; changes in 
instrumental or argumentative security discourse at the official level will thus lead to 
different regional configurations/networks of securitisations, and, hence, changes in 
regional patterns of amity/enmity.  Such changes in official, state-level security 
discourse are linked to a lack of „discursive stability‟, or the deficient „groundedness‟ of 
official instrumental and argumentative narratives in surrounding material 
circumstances and the underlying society‟s security discourses.   
The second concept, state (in)coherence, will be expanded in chapter 3 by 
distinguishing between three different components and two distinct dimensions: the 
inherent strength/weakness, ostensible stability/instability, and the effective sovereignty 
of states, on the one hand, and their horizontal or vertical (in)coherence on the other.   
Applying a macro- and micro-perspective, the chapter will address the complex 
relationship between the three tiers of state weakness, distinguishing between 
inherently weak, ostensibly unstable and failed states, and making an additional 
division between collapsed and fragmented variants of state failure based on the 
horizontal/vertical distinction.   
The third expanded concept, great power penetration, will be discussed in chapter 4 
and will again include both macro- and micro-, material and discursive elements.  
Objective, subjective and intersubjective elements within the concept will be 
differentiated through the physical presence and interests of the penetrating powers, in 
addition to the „discursive dependence‟ of local security dynamics on great power 
involvement.  Taken together, these material and ideational factors will allow me to 
classify region-specific patterns of great power penetration into a range of categories 
ranging from unipolar, through multipolar/competitive to multipolar/cooperative 
(bounded by the related notions of hegemony and disengagement) in preparation for 
an empirical analysis of the interaction between such patterns and the amity/enmity 
within a given region.   
The goal of chapter 5 will be two-fold: firstly, the elaboration of the hypotheses that will 
guide the empirical application of the previously expanded concepts, and, secondly, the 
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development of a methodology suited to the thesis‟ aims. As indicated above, these 
hypotheses will relate to the links between state (in)coherence, great power penetration 
and amity/enmity, as well as the possibility of the RSC „transforming internally‟ into a 
security regime.  More practical, methodological sections will relate to the mechanics of 
the empirical employment of amity/enmity, state (in)coherence and great power 
penetration in subsequent chapters. 
These empirical chapters (6, 7, 8 and 9) will place regional phenomena within the 
previously elaborated concepts.  Chapter 6 will provide a comprehensive macro-
perspective view of the „security constellation‟ surrounding the Southern Caucasus 
through the constitutive variables of the RSC proper (units/polarity/boundaries/amity-
enmity) and two additional expanded factors (state coherence, great power 
penetration).  Chapter 7 will describe how security discourses imbued with divergent 
nationalist narratives on their argumentative side, and marked by the acceptance of 
war as an suitable tool of policy on their instrumental side fashion the South Caucasus 
RSC into a „revisionist conflict formation‟.  Chapter 8 will dissect the material and 
ideational aspects of „state incoherence‟ by looking at the inability of the region‟s 
„horizontally fragmented‟ states (Georgia, Azerbaijan) to shape the „collective strategies 
of survival‟ that would be required for re-integration, because of fundamentally 
diverging identities and narratives of history.  The states‟ „vertical incoherence‟  – their 
lack of legitimacy and limited ability to compensate for that lack through projections of 
state power into society – will also be looked at.  Chapter 9 will characterise the nature 
of great power involvement in the region by considering the subjective interests 
shaping their material entanglements, and the applying the typology previously 
expounded in chapter 4 to the resulting patterns of great power penetration; in 
conclusion, the „discursive dependence‟ of the states‟ security discourses on these 
patterns will be considered. 
Chapter 10 will finally „pull everything together‟ and answer the main research 
questions by detailing how the expanded concepts of amity/enmity, state (in)coherence 
and great power penetration feed into each other from the micro- as well as macro-
perspectives.  The hypotheses will seen to have been largely confirmed: in other 
words, state incoherence indeed drives this region towards greater enmity, while 
generally competitive, multipolar patterns of great power penetration distort the 
calculations and discourses of regional states to maintain the current conflict formation.  
Nevertheless, elements within the counter-narratives of the different regional sub-state 
societies will be deemed to reveal a potential for change and the „destabilisation‟ of 
dominant discourses of security.  The thesis will conclude with scenarios for the future, 
specifically elaborating on the chances for the emergence of a security regime in the 
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Southern Caucasus and offering a critical-prescriptive assessment of policy 
implications for both regional and extra-regional actors concerned with improved 
regional stability. 
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CHAPTER 2: AMITY AND ENMITY IN ITS REGIONAL 
CONTEXT 
This chapter will attempt to further develop one of the central concepts in RSCT: the 
amity/enmity variable co-defining the character of RSCs alongside their boundaries, 
polarity and anarchy.  Buzan and Waever (2003, pp. 45-51) describe patterns of 
amity/enmity as “taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of 
security interdependence”.  They furthermore roughly outline a typology of such 
patterns – conflict formation, security regime, and security community – and suggest a 
possible Wendtian approach to this issue (Buzan, 1991, p. 218; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 
pp. 50-55; Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 12; Wæver, 1989).  Apart from this vague sketch, the 
concept has as yet not been given the development warranted by its central 
importance in the overall theory; and this conceptual expansion and refinement is one 
of the primary tasks of this part of my inquiry.   
Accordingly, in the first part of this chapter, I shall argue in favour of using Wendt‟s „soft 
constructivist‟ theoretical framework as the broader theoretical underpinning of the 
concept‟s expansion within RSCT‟s specifically hybrid context.  A second part will 
consequently expand on the nature of corporate state agency within RSCT by linking 
securitisation with state behaviour.  A third section will elaborate a typology of 
amity/enmity in terms of this theoretical background, as a six-category spectrum of 
amity/enmity ranging from „revisionist conflict formations‟ to „thick security regimes‟.  
The fourth and final part will then look at permissive factors behind changes in these 
patterns: what allows for the „internal transformation‟ of RSCs? In concrete terms: 
which factors – or, „facilitating conditions‟ (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 31-33) – allow for 
alterations in patterns of amity/enmity from one category to the other (or, alternatively, 
shifts on the amity/enmity continuum)?  
A Meta-theoretical Excursion 
As pointed out in the introductory chapter, Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan, 
1991, pp. 186-229; 1993a; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 10-20; Lake 
& Morgan, 1998) is one of the „middle roads‟ to have emerged in recent years in 
response to the centrifugal forces that have plagued IR and Security Studies since the 
onset of the Third Great Debate within the discipline.  Standing at the nexus of 
structural neo-realism and constructivism, it has come to display hybrid characteristics 
that stem from its complex intellectual pedigree, particularly in the „revised‟ version 
developed by Buzan and Wæver (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 1-
20).  Its ontology is inherently crossbred: its central concept‟s essential structure is both 
materially and ideationally delimited.  Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) are defined 
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by anarchy and polarity (largely materially conceptualised facts), but both their 
boundaries and patterns of amity or enmity are socially constituted by inherently 
discursive securitisations.    
RSCT‟s bias is certainly structural: most of the aforementioned concepts imply a 
measure of constancy and immutability.  But securitisations, as Austinian speech acts 
that generate a given society‟s intersubjective definitions of (in)security, also introduce 
an element of process and, consequently, an underexplored potential to conceptualise 
change.  The uneasy combination of the material and the ideational, structure and 
process within its ontology is mirrored in the cohabitation of „erklären‟ and „verstehen‟ 
within the theory‟s epistemological outlook (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 83-87).  This 
hybridity, raises the question of how to balance its various, diversely grounded 
theoretical elements (material and ideational, explanation and understanding, causal 
and constitutive, structure and process) when deepening and widening its central 
concepts.  And this applies just as strongly to any expansion of the amity/enmity 
variable; how can one develop it in a way that keeps intact the inherent hybridity of the 
theory, so as to link it with its material elements, provide it with structure without 
disregarding process, tie it to explanatory as well as interpretive theory?   
In the „revised‟ version of RSCT, amity/enmity is clearly situated on the 
ideational/interpretive side of RSCT: „security interdependence‟ is seen as being co-
constituted by securitisation, and the variable is thus part of RSCT‟s constructivist 
heritage (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 70-76).  This suggests a constructivist approach 
would be most adequate as the theoretical scaffold around which to build an expansion 
of the concept.  The question is, however, exactly which form of constructivism?  As 
has been pointed out by many, there are a great variety of constructivisms within the 
intellectual landscape of contemporary IR; and the distinction goes beyond the simple 
dichotomy between the „soft‟ and „hard‟ variants. In fact, constructivisms exist on a wide 
spectrum between the extremes of positivism and post-structuralism, separated from 
the former by a belief in an intersubjectively constructed social reality, and from the 
latter by a continuing adherence to some measure of objective knowledge.  Within that 
spectrum, varieties abound:  Zehfuss (2002, pp. 1-32), for instance, distinguishes three 
variants: Wendtian, Kratochwilian and Onufian.  Adler (1997), on the other hand, has 
made a more complex distinction between the approach‟s „modernist‟, „modernist 
linguistic‟, „critical‟ and „radical‟ forms.  The different varieties diverge on a number of 
aspects, inter alia: the extent to which they essentialise and objectify social kinds; the 
extent to which they are structure- or process-oriented; their digressing willingness to 
endow the material world with independent causal qualities; their anti-foundationalism 
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or scientific realism; the absence or presence of an emancipatory agenda; their degree 
of state-centredness.  
The problem of where to place the Copenhagen School in this spectrum is 
compounded by the ambiguities within the concept of securitisation. In its foundational 
text – Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan, et al., 1998) – (in)security is 
seen as heavily discursive, and „revised‟ RSCT seems to be introduced more as a 
possible add-on to this process-oriented approach than an indivisible part.  But – to 
considerable criticism from the „harder‟ constructivist range of the spectrum – Buzan 
and Wæver do refer to the „sedimentation‟ of discourses into fairly static identities 
(Buzan & Wæver, 1997, p. 244); and their view of society similarly does lean towards 
the structural and moderately static (Wæver, et al., 1993, p. 39).  Moreover, integrated 
into RSCT, securitisation becomes part of a more unambiguously structural whole.  
RSCT‟s ontological scope goes beyond the strictly discursive; and both the material 
and the ideational are part and parcel of its reality.  In fact, Securitisation Theory has 
generally been criticised for exactly the „faults‟ found in „soft‟ versions of 
constructivisms by those operating from a more post-structuralist or critical vein: for 
reifying and objectifying fluid social realities, a lack of critical engagement, state-and 
Western-centredness, scientific realism, scientific-philosophical incoherence (Hansen, 
2000; McSweeney, 1996, 1998; Wilkinson, 2007)6. These criticisms sound familiar, in 
that they resemble those levelled against one of the grand theorists of constructivism, 
Alexander Wendt (Guzzini & Leander, 2006; Kratochwil, 2000; S. Smith, 2000; 
Suganami, 2002), precariously suggesting a possible compatibility between his „rump 
materialism‟ and RSCT.   
Perhaps the clearest, most explicit and most important compatibility between Wendt‟s 
and Buzan and Wæver‟s ontologies lies in their conceptualisation of security: in the 
way it is clearly demarcated from universalist and largely constant assumptions that 
govern the rationalist theorisations of the concept, and at the same time differentiated 
from the entirely fluid and contingent notions of „hard‟ constructivists and post-
structuralists.  Virtually all theories of IR agree on the centrality of survival as the 
primary interest of all states, although they differ sharply on the exact implications 
                                               
6
 Taking this „soft constructivist‟ position will no doubt make this thesis vulnerable to precisely these 
critiques.  While some measure of objectification is to be expected, the framework will illustrate the 
diversity of opinion present within these societies by not taking existing securitisations for granted, instead 
extensively problematising them by also accounting for their „discursive stability‟, i.e. the extent to which 
they are (or are not) contested within the societies by alternative discourses.  Looking at the inner workings 
of societies will also address the ever-present risk of state-centrism: again, the securitisations driving 
regional actors are not taken at face value, always seen as contingent on continuous processes of social 
construction and contestation.  These processes will be laid out in later chapters through, for instance, the 
post-Cold War conflicts between ethnic and civic conceptualisations of nationhood in Armenia and 
Georgia.  See also chapters 1, 3 and 5. 
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thereof.  Rationalists of different colours varyingly assume states will adopt security-, 
power- or utility-maximising behaviour in safeguarding this primary objective: the 
security-as-survival of the state.  „Hard‟ constructivists don‟t assume anything, except 
to view „security‟ as contextual, indeterminate and inherently reflexive, unable to 
escape its „essentially contested‟ nature.   
On the one hand, Wendt (1999, pp. 224-245) separates himself from orthodox 
rationalists by pointing out that security is „multiply realisable‟: except in particularly 
acute, life-threatening situations – his proverbial „hotel fire‟ (Ibid., p. 122 & 157) – 
„security‟ can be interpreted in multiple ways.  States must thus give meaning to 
„security‟ in their day-to-day interaction, and actively interpret this very vague concept 
in terms of more concrete interests and policy goals, without which the concept would 
remain an empty shell.  Rather than seeing the notion as an undifferentiated, material 
given which can or cannot be modified under the influence of causal factors, security 
thus becomes a largely socio-cultural construct around a small, material core: the 
imperative of physical survival.  And this is no different in the case of RSCT‟s materially 
embedded securitisations, which are inevitably culturally specific and subjectivist, in 
contrast to more rationalist notions of security. 
On the other hand, both RSCT and Wendt‟s rump materialism are separated from 
„harder‟ versions of constructivism by this existence of the material alongside the 
ideational, the hybridity that offers so much potential and flexibility but adds to the 
theories‟ complexity.  In both approaches, discourse – or, if you will, the ideational 
realm – does not exist in a material void (Wendt, 1999, pp. 110-113): hence, the 
above-mentioned accusations of excessive structuralism and state-centredness 
levelled at Wendt and Buzan/Wæver.   This explicit presence of the material also 
means that notions of rationality and rational choice – problematised in the „harder‟ 
parts of the constructivist tradition – retain their relevance.  For Wendt (1999, pp. 114-
138), rationality may be culturally embedded, but it is still rationality, giving scholars 
insights to the pressures that push actors towards reacting to material realities in 
predictable ways within a relatively fixed context.   
RSCT is more implicit in that regard, but it is clear that the material variables and the 
theory‟s neo-realist pedigree imply some measure of rationalism there as well.  In the 
scenario-building, „predictive‟ version of RSCT, states react to their environment 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 45-46, 67-70), be it to exogenous shocks or endogenous 
regional factors like, for instance, the polarity of a given RSC, or its geography, or the 
material possibilities of technology.  In both RSCT and Wendtian constructivism, 
interests and security are constructed around culturally specific ends and values, while 
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instrumental action is still influenced by a material reality, upholding the potential 
relevance of adequately contextualised structural-rationalist models of behaviour.  As 
will be apparent below, the insights of various rationalist theories of IR and International 
Security – offensive and defensive varieties of realism, regime theory – will retain some 
validity in the differing cultures of anarchy that constitute the amity/enmity variable, 
providing a predictive element of state behaviour within that particular context7. 
Finally, both Wendt and Buzan/Wæver see combined objectivist and subjectivist 
epistemologies and methodological pluralism as a fitting complement to their hybrid 
ontologies.  While RSCT clearly takes a less rigid approach than Wendt in that regard – 
the latter arguably advocates a more strictly delineated „social-science‟ angle in 
International Relations research – the framework is sufficiently adaptive to 
accommodate varying combinations of positivism and interpretivism.  This is all the 
more necessary because of the potentially rich insights that could be provided by not 
disregarding either the objective/material or the subjective/ideational in RSCT.  In the 
following theoretical expansion and case-study, this combined objectivist-subjectivist 
epistemology will thus be translated into a dualist methodology, with a macro-
perspective grasping the objectively observable characteristics (behaviour and brute 
material givens) of security interaction from the top down, and a micro-perspective 
looking at the subjective security discourse, the networks of securitisation underlying 
these objectively gathered „facts‟.  
All of the above can be illustrated by a brief look at the one structure so central to both 
approaches: the state.  For Wendt, states encompass a material base with super-
imposed identities and notions of (in)security that are in large part culturally and 
socially constituted (Wendt, 1999, pp. 193-245).  In RSCT‟s most recent versions, the 
notion of the state seems underdeveloped beyond the differentiation between pre-
modern, modern and post-modern (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 20-26); but an earlier 
conceptualisation of the state by Buzan clearly includes both ideational and material 
elements, and a measure of corporate agency.  While it has remained in the 
                                               
7
 The Liberals‟ bottom-up approach, for instance, sees unit-level characteristics – reflective of internally 
generated beliefs and interests and mostly explained through the democratic or non-democratic character 
of domestic regimes – as a causal factor of cooperation or conflict (Doyle, 1986; Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998; Gaubatz, 1996; Moravcsik, 1997).  On the other hand, those working from a systemic-structuralist 
perspective have constructed top-down models that seek to explain emphases on relative or absolute 
gains in terms of the structure of anarchy itself (Waltz, 1979) system-level, externally generated variables  
(Grieco, 1988a, 1988b) or iterated, multi-player game-theoretical configurations (Snidal, 1991): relations 
are competitive or cooperative because of particular configurations of the system, given functionally 
identical units displaying a similar preference for either absolute or relative gains (Axelrod, 1984; Grieco, 
1988a, 1988b; Keohane, 1982; Oye, 1985; Snidal, 1985a, 1985b, 1991).  RSCT‟s multi-perspectival 
aspect makes the integration of these theories‟ insights into RSCT a possibility – by looking at ways 
particular configurations of material reality „push‟ state action into certain, „rationally mandated‟ directions – 
within the culturally determined teleological context provided by securitisation theory. 
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background, this version of statehood is clearly compatible with both Wendt‟s and 
contemporary RSCT approaches.  The next section will concentrate on reintegrating 
this material-ideational form of corporate statehood into modern-day, „revised‟ RSCT by 
linking it to the latter‟s central notion of „securitisation‟ through a double move: firstly, by 
distinguishing argumentative and instrumental aspects within the processes of 
securitisation and security discourse more generally, and, secondly, by linking these 
two aspects to a tri-partite (material/institutional/ideational) view of the state.  In so 
doing, it will also turn the supra-state and sub-state levels into a unified field, integrated 
by discourses of security that cut across and interact, opening up state discourses to 
contestation and destabilisation from both above and below. 
Securitisation and the State in an RSCT Context 
In People, States and Fear, Buzan (1991, pp. 57-111) sees the state as being 
composed of three fundamental building blocs: its physical base (territory and 
population), its institutions (administrative-bureaucratic apparatus and laws), and its 
ideas (a state‟s ideology, and the underlying society‟s socio-cultural values); this tri-
partite definition of the state is, clearly, part material, part ideational.  On the material 
side, one has the physical base or pure matter, on the ideational side, (almost) pure 
ideas.  The institutions of a state form an intermediate category between these two  
where, in effect, ideology and matter meet to create the legal and organisational 
expression of statehood, formed on the state‟s physical base according to the ideas of 
statehood prevalent within a given society.  Within the context of security, these three 
components are the main referent objects of state action: protecting the survival of its 
physical base, the stability of its institutions and the continuity of its values form a 
three-pronged set of priorities for any state.  How does securitisation – a society‟s 
discursive definition of an issue as an existential threat requiring emergency measures 
and justifying actions outside the bounds of political procedure (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 
24) – relate to this setup, and how can the state be conceptualised as it is within RSCT 
– a „unit‟ – when so much of regional securitisation takes place at the domestic, sub-
state level?   
Securitisation is about the identification of issues as existential threats requiring 
emergency measures.  The identification of „existential threats‟ is, on the one hand, 
predicated on collective assumptions and beliefs as to what exactly is worthy of being 
protected from harm, the choice by a given society of its „referent objects‟ for security 
(Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 36-40).  On the other hand, the protection of these values and 
identities is dependent on techno-scientific knowledge, or assumptions on the workings 
of the outside world that underlie a „logic of threats and vulnerabilities‟ (Buzan, et al., 
1998, pp. 57-61, 79-84, 103-109, 124-126, 150-154).  Securitisation in the broad sense 
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thus includes two intertwined but distinctive discursive processes that logically8 
precede and follow the identification proper of a threat.  I shall call these discursive 
processes instrumental and argumentative.  The argumentative element concerns the 
construction of the values and the interpretation of identities that are to be protected.  
Instrumental discourse, on the other hand, is determined by the techno-scientific 
knowledge within a given society: its assumptions on the workings of the outside world 
that play a central role both in the identification of (potential) threats, or the choice of 
extraordinary means to remedy these threats9.   
The argumentative constituent of securitisation emerges from the requirement that 
referent objects be defined and interpreted before they can be designated as being 
under existential threat.  It is called argumentative precisely because it encompasses 
arguments about the ultimate goals of state action, the highest-order referent objects 
that are constitutive of national identity and its associated ideological values; it is 
therefore intricately bound with a state‟s self-view, and thus, the third, ideational part of 
the tri-partite physical base-institutions-ideology complex, connected to how society 
views its state as it is and as it ought to be. Instrumental discursive processes, on the 
other hand, deal with the means of achieving security for the state, and consequently 
involve the application of a society‟s techno-scientific knowledge and physical base to 
the protection of the identities and values generated above.   States and their 
underlying societies will have to answer two central questions based on their 
assumptions on the workings of the outside world.  Firstly, they will have to identify 
threats to the values pre-determined in the argumentative discursive process.  Whether 
or not something is seen as a threat depends, after all, not only on the values one 
holds dear, but also on the knowledge one has regarding what, in the outside world, 
might threaten them.  Secondly, they will have to determine the exact manner in which 
to employ the assets contained within their physical base, potentially resulting 
dramatically different culturally determined strategies towards identical ends (Desch, 
1998; Johnston, 1995).   
                                               
8
 Note that this does not imply the chronological precedence of the argumentative identification of values 
as referent objects.  As Huysmans (1998, p. 494) and Wilkinson (2007, p. 11) have argued, values and 
identities are often constituted during the securitizing act/move proper.  Nevertheless, from a logical 
perspective, a successful securitisation can, as a rule, not take place without the referent object being 
identified as the premise, the starting point of the speech act calling for „extraordinary measures‟.  One 
takes measures in order to safeguard an object of value; an object does not become of value only because 
one has taken certain measures to preserve it. 
9
 To some extent, this notion of „argumentative‟ and „instrumental‟ discourse ties in with Wæver‟s (2002) 
three-layered view of „sedimentation‟ of discourse.  In the deep, first layer, one finds relatively immutable 
and constant discourses on identity.  The slightly more variable middle layer concerns itself with the 
formulation of interests based on the identities formulated in the first.  The relatively changeable top layer 
deals with the formulation of policy. The immutable, bottom „identities‟ layer clearly correlates with the 
argumentative aspects of security discourse discussed here, while the top, policy-layer corresponds to its 
instrumental facets, with the middle layer of interests representing an intermediate category between these 
two poles. 
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It must be stressed these two types of discourse are ideal-types, seldom, if ever, 
occurring in pure form.  In a way, they could be seen as an interlocked continuum, with 
argumentative discourses largely ideational and value-based, and the instrumental 
extreme plugged into material reality to a greater degree.  Those of a post-structuralist 
slant may consequently argue that it is impossible to disentangle the instrumental and 
argumentative, that identities and values stand in an inseparable, mutually constitutive 
relationship with techno-scientific, „Zwecksrationalität‟/logic-of-consequences 
knowledge (March & Olsen, 1989).  Just as argumentative discourses shaping state 
identity cannot contain the purely ideational, instrumental discourses cannot be devoid 
of elements of state identity and its specific value-set. On the argumentative side, if the 
state is or ought to be anything, it should, first and foremost, survive physically.  The 
survival of the physical base and its institutions is a prime ideational value in and of 
itself, and its practical material exigencies (one has to feed a population and defend a 
territory) can consequently form part and parcel of this value-set contained in the 
ideational part of the tri-partite state10.  On the instrumental pole, unless a society‟s 
moral outlook is entirely consequentialist (the ends justifying the means), most 
extraordinary measures required by securitisations would involve a significant element 
of moral reflection, and this is where values and identity also come into play.   
Particularly in the middle of this continuum – in between the argumentative and 
instrumental – one finds definitions of vital interest that can seem both referent objects 
in and of themselves, but are just as well instrumental in their subordination to higher-
level values and identities11. 
                                               
10
 While the state as an objective referent object is indeed composed of these three distinct material and 
ideational elements, rationalists often see only the material requirements of state survival as ultimately 
underlying state action.  However, here, the identity of the state is, ultimately, a complex of values and 
interpretations, and outside of particularly acute situations (wars), immutable, purely material 
considerations (feeding a population, defending a territory) will form an important but certainly not 
exclusive part of a state‟s value-set.  The state‟s „material rump‟ and its requirements will be enveloped by 
„national values‟ and subject to interpretation as to what exactly it is that must survive, and what survival 
entails.  The state is, after all, a social construct, not an independently existing individual with a well-
defined physical boundary, and self-definition will naturally play a greater role in defining its survival.  This 
ties in with Wendt‟s idea of identity comprising a rump material component, overlain with an idea of „self‟ 
constructed through social interaction (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224-245). More specifically, Wendt distinguishes 
4 types of identity: personal/corporate, type, role and collective.  Personal or corporate identities consist of 
the “self-organising, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities” (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224-225).  
Type identities refer to social categories or labels “applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) 
some characteristic or characteristics” (Ibid., p. 225).  In contrast, role identities are not based on 
characteristics intrinsic to the individual or collective concerned, but “exist solely in relations to Others” (as 
in the case of master and slave, teacher and pupil) (Ibid., p. 227).  Finally, collective identities take the 
relationship between Self and Other “…to its logical conclusion, identification…in which the Self-Other 
distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether….with the causal power to induce 
actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be altruistic” (Ibid., p. 229).  The rump 
material core is situated in the first of these types. 
11
 One example is the relationship between the state and the military: is the military a means towards 
security, or is it a value in and of itself?  As Huntington (Huntington, 2000, pp. 80-97) has pointed out, the 
answer depends on the ideological outlook of a given society. 
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All of the above raises the question of where exactly to put the distinction between 
argumentative and instrumental. Is it sufficient it to state that argumentative discourse 
refers to the highest-order referent objects, those that are directly constitutive of 
collective state- and nation-hood, mostly values in and of themselves?  Even the most 
argumentative, value-directed discourses can be seen as instrumentally serving the 
extreme goal of state survival, and the situation becomes particularly blurry in the case 
of the „vital interests‟ mentioned in the previous paragraphs.  To some degree, then, 
the distinction between argumentative and instrumental becomes a matter of 
interpretation and contextualisation.  When referring to the argumentative aspects of 
the security discourse, this text will imply a discursive reality that is situated relative to 
its instrumental counterpart, most closely and explicitly generating notions of state- and 
nationhood through values and identities that, to their greatest extent, define rather 
than serve the goal of survival.   
Finally, within any given society, countless contradictory securitisations and security 
discourses will inevitably present a confusing picture to anyone attempting to engage in 
shameless state-centrism by conceptualising the state as a coherent corporate actor.  
Within the framework presented here, the solution lies in acknowledging these 
contradictions through the notion of discursive stability (encapsulating the security 
discourses variegated and often contested nature, and outlined below), combined with 
a focus on the highest institutional discourses of the state.  Within Buzan‟s tri-partite 
structure of the state (matter/institutions/ideas), institutions do indeed play a central 
role: they are, in effect, where a society combines matter with ideas to produce the 
institutional expression of statehood.  From an IR standpoint, they are also the primary 
locus of state agency: a state acts within international society primarily through its 
institutions – its government, its armed forces, its diplomatic corps, its bureaucratic 
machinery.  The discourse prevalent within a state‟s institutions thus becomes of 
primary importance when assessing the self-definition and practical policymaking of a 
given state: it is indicative of what „a state‟ as a collective entity „thinks‟, how it justifies 
its existence, and its actions (Wendt, 1999, p. 222). These above-mentioned processes 
of securitisation existing within society are filtered and crystallise into official discourse, 
in both their argumentative and instrumental aspects.  Thus conceptualised, and 
properly contrasted with any alternative discourses that might exist within society, 
security discourses at the official, institutional level can thus be taken to reflect that 
corporate agency within the theoretical expansion that I will outline below. 
Conceptualising a Spectrum of Amity and Enmity 
Buzan and Waever explicitly (and fleetingly) mention the possibility of conceptualising 
amity and enmity in terms similar to Wendt‟s „cultures of anarchy‟, more specifically 
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mentioning the categories of „conflict formations‟, „security regimes‟ and „security 
communities‟, roughly (but as we shall see below not entirely) commensurate with 
Wendt‟s Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian anarchies governed by relationships of 
„enmity‟, „rivalry‟ and „friendship‟ (Buzan, 1991; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 50-55). In 
effect, basing myself on the hybrid nature of RSCT and its similarities and parallels to 
Wendtian constructivism, I shall now elaborate criteria that would allow us to place 
RSCs into one of the ideal-type categories suggested by Buzan and Wæver.  The one 
and only modification to their suggested typology will be the inclusion of two sub-
divisions within each category, to add additional nuance.   Thus, conflict formations will 
be sub-divided into „revisionist‟ and „status-quo‟, security regimes into „thin‟ and „thick‟, 
and security regimes – following Adler and Barnett (1998a) – into „loosely coupled‟ and 
„tightly coupled‟ sub-types. 
In keeping with the preceding meta-theoretical discussion, these criteria will have a 
dualist character, combining both objective and subjective characteristics in their 
definition of amity/enmity within a given RSC.  On the one hand, different types of amity 
and enmity will be differentiated through overt, objectively discernible state behaviour: 
do states in a region display co-operative or competitive behaviour in their security 
interactions?  Typically, do they form a balance of power system or a collective security 
system?  On the other hand, this question will be approached from a subjectivist, 
discursive point of view: what are states‟ predispositions vis-a-vis their regional 
counterparts, as seen in their institutional discourses on security, their securitisations?  
Do they perceive each other in amicable or inimical terms? The former, objective 
macro-perspective view would relate to the general structure of interaction within the 
RSC: the complex of overt, objectively observable state behaviour, norms, institutions.  
The latter subjective micro-perspective aspect would refer to the unit-level discourse 
informing and interpreting these objective elements, more specifically the nature of 
unit-level securitisation.   
The macro-perspective is clear enough: it consists in analysing the epiphenomenal 
aspects of unit-to-unit, interregional and systemic interaction within and around a given 
RSC.  The presence or absence of armed conflict, the relevance or irrelevance of 
conflict-minimising normative legal instruments and institutions can give an indication 
as to where to situate the region in this spectrum.  These epiphenomenal elements are, 
in themselves, far from sufficient, however.  The micro-perspective analysis provides 
the crucial „Verstehen‟ element in my approach by dissecting the security discourse 
behind the security interaction.  This combination of a macro- with a discursive micro- 
approach is, ultimately, what allows one to detect factors like the difference between 
status-quo and revisionist units, the internalisation of norms, and, the presence or 
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absence of collective identities within an RSC.  Crucially, it adds to the understanding 
of a region in ways that purely behavioural or game-theoretical approaches would 
leave out, quite apart from creating a better fit with the holistic approach chosen in this 
instance.  
The discursive, micro-perspective approach will be crucial in complementing the 
insights of the objective criteria employed from the macro-perspective, revealing the 
narratives underlying hostile or friendly regional security interaction and anarchical 
culture through what I shall call their discursive convergence or divergence.  
Argumentative discourses may thus reflect identities and values that are mutually 
compatible or incompatible.  Whether or not states end up as „enemies‟ or „friends‟ may 
depend, for example on the way they define their territory or the ideologies they define 
themselves by: states with conflicting territorial claims, for instance, will often have 
inimical relationships that are clearly reflected in their argumentative discourses 
(Forsberg, 1996).  Instrumental discourses, on the other hand, can lead to conflicting 
security-enhancing strategies or identifications of threat that – even if identities are not 
inimical per se – result in an adversarial relationship: for example, when states are 
forced to compete for limited resources – e.g. water (Postel & Wolf, 2001) – or when 
regional security dilemmas are exacerbated through the blurring of the distinction 
between offence and defence (Jervis, 1978, pp. 186-206). 
The result will be a unified spectrum of amity and enmity12 whose categories typically 
overlap in practice, even if, in the discussion below, they are presented as 
disconnected, qualitatively separate ideal-types.  On different points of this spectrum, 
macro (interactional) and micro (discursive) patterns will have varying degrees of 
compatibility.  On the one hand, the superficial macro-interaction between states will be 
inimical or amicable based on objective criteria.  On the other hand, their deeper 
mutual discourses will reflect amity or enmity, partly through patterns of mutual 
securitisation/desecuritisation13, through the convergence or divergence of states‟ 
argumentative values and identities (their logics of appropriateness), or through the 
convergence or divergence of instrumental, rational security-enhancing action by states 
                                               
12 
Grieco (1988a) provides an interesting positivist approach to the question of amity and enmity through 
his U=V-k(W-V) formula, where U stands for the utility an actor gains from cooperation, V for its absolute 
gains, W for its relative gains, and k for its sensitivity to relative (as opposed to absolute) gains: in other 
words, its level of distrust.  In a security community, trust will be complete, k will be close to 0 and actors 
will be sensitive mainly to absolute gains from co-operation (U=V).  Conversely in a conflictual situation, k 
will approximate 1, distrust will predominate, and parties will solely be sensitive to relative gains (U=W).   
The problem of how to quantify the ideational „k‟-variable in a socially constructed environment does seem 
an intractable one, however. 
13
 „Patterns‟ or „networks‟ of securitization will henceforth refer to these major interlinked processes of 
securitization and/or de-securitisation (both institutionalized and ad-hoc) that, constituting the theory‟s 
amity/enmity variable, form part of the very definition of a Regional Security Complex (Buzan & Wæver, 
2003, p. 44; Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 28-31).   
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(their logics of consequences).  Accordingly, in the discussion that follows, each of the 
different categories will be specified according to both macro-perspective, objective 
criteria and micro-perspective, discursive criteria, the latter differentiated along 
argumentative and instrumental lines. 
Revisionist and Status-Quo Conflict Formations 
In conflict formations (Senghaas, 1973; Väyrinen, 1984), the regional culture of 
anarchy will be power-based: the dominant determinant of state security will be 
relationships of power.  From an objective, macro-perspective, security interaction 
between states will be regulated by a bare minimum of norms that are not aimed at 
systematically excluding risks of armed conflict.  The basic tenets of realism – first and 
foremost, balancing behaviour and political interaction as a zero-sum game – will be 
valid throughout the region, and, manifest themselves through readily observable state 
behaviour, for instance, arms races and ad hoc alliances.  Within this category, a 
distinction can be made between „revisionist‟ and „status-quo‟ conflict formations, 
based mainly on the predominance of revisionist or status-quo states within it, and the 
dynamics within these two sub-types will also differ slightly.  
These differences will to some extent mirror the distinctions between power-
maximising, offensive realism and security-maximising, defensive realism.  In 
revisionist conflict formations, most states will want to challenge the status quo 
according to their own views, resulting in highly fluid RSCs lacking mutual recognition 
among constituent units.  In status-quo conflict formations, relations between states will 
still be marked by fundamental distrust and competitive behaviour (e.g. over scarce 
goods).  These different logics of anarchy will sometimes produce similar conduct.  On 
the one hand, a region composed of status-quo units in a relationship of fundamental 
distrust could still see security dilemmas „accidentally‟ escalating interaction into arms 
races and armed conflict without any of the units actually desiring such an outcome 
(Jervis, 1976, pp. 62-76).  On the other hand, a region composed of revisionist states 
could end up in an uneasy balance of power, with none of the units prepared to actually 
realise their challenge to the status-quo.   
However, this potentially confusing similarity would not rid the status-quo/revisionist 
conflict formation distinction of its validity, and its relevance.  Firstly, because the 
distinction can still be found, more or less clearly, at the discursive level: whether or not 
states are revisionist can clearly be read from their security discourse (Cortell, 2000).  
Secondly, because most RSCs – being composed of both status-quo and revisionist 
units – will be situated in the grey area between revisionism and status-quo, only 
tending towards one of these two ideal-types.  Finally, because whether or not states 
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accept each others‟ legitimacy and right to exist can be crucial in assessing the 
potential of RSC transformations from conflict formation to security regime. 
Turning to this category‟s subjective, micro-level characteristics, both types of conflict 
formation will be marked by the presence of war as an acceptable tool of security and 
foreign policy within the instrumental security discourse of regional units.  The 
reasoning for this adherence to armed conflict as an instrument of policy will vary in the 
two sub-categories: in revisionist conflict formations, divergent argumentative 
discourses will, in effect, be reflective of the mismatched identities that, in turn, lie at 
the root of unbridled enmity.  States with overlapping territorial identities and 
contradictory ideological values, for instance, will usually clearly identify these overlaps 
and contradictions as the reason for their revisionism and resulting inimical 
relationships (Forsberg, 1996). In status-quo conflictual regional political cultures, the 
grounds for enmity and conflict will have to be sought in rather less value-laden techno-
scientific assumptions of instrumental security discourse, resulting in mutually 
incompatible security-enhancing strategies, even if the states‟ identities or fundamental 
values are not contradictory in themselves (as in the above-mentioned examples, in 
competition over scarce resources or enmity emanating from security dilemmas). 
Thin and Thick Security Regimes 
In security regimes (Jervis, 1982), states will have developed, to paraphrase Krasner 
(1983, p. 2), “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge” regarding security interaction, 
and it is the existence of these norms mitigating the logic of power that differentiates 
this category from conflictual, balance of power RSCs.  Security interaction will be 
governed by mutually agreed, permanent co-operative rules and norms that stipulate 
codes of conduct for participants aimed at minimising the risk of armed conflict.  
Depending on the nature and prevalence of these rules, I shall distinguish between 
„thin‟ and „thick‟ security regimes14.  In „thin‟ security regimes, norms and rules 
governing security interaction will be entirely technical in nature, and concerned mostly 
with the military issue-area. Thick regimes, by contrast, will imply active cooperation on 
the part of the participants towards commonly defined goals.  The areas of cooperation 
will be multiple in nature, and also exist in non-traditional areas of security 
(transnational crime, environment), usually supported by a permanent regional 
organisation.  
                                               
14 
For a more complex typology addressing the varying scope and intensity of regimes, see Donnelly 
(1986). 
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From an objective point of view, thin regimes will thus consist mostly of „ad-hoc‟ 
agreements within a given issue-area (for instance, arms-control, confidence-building, 
hotlines), regulated through periodic intergovernmental summits and meetings.  Rather 
than mutual co-operation, they will include mechanisms for mutual verification, either 
by the parties themselves, or by an outside party, indicating a lack of mutual trust.  In 
most cases they will not be accompanied with large-scale, permanent regional 
organisations. Within the regional security discourse, such „thin‟ regimes will not imply 
any kind of desecuritisation, rather, they will lead to forms of „regulated (in)security‟ 
between the parties.  The instrumental nature of these thin security regimes will be 
apparent by a „logic of consequences‟ within this discourse; rather than common, 
internalised value-systems – which are typical of thick security regimes – the 
participants will see these regimes as conducive to the security of their own, specific 
referent objects. 
Thick regimes, by contrast, will include wide-ranging formal agreements covering a 
range of security issue-areas (comprehensive peace treaties for instance), often 
resulting in the setting up of permanent regional organisations.  Most importantly, these 
arrangements will not be purely instrumental in nature: participating states will spend 
considerable effort at maintaining them as values in and of themselves, having 
internalised their norms to some degree15. This internalisation will also be visible within 
regional discourses of security: these thick security regimes‟ effectiveness will rely to 
some extent on a „logic of appropriateness‟ and an implicit trust between the parties, 
leading to the at least partial desecuritisation of some previously contentious issues.  
The argumentative part of the regional web of securitisations and counter-securitisation 
will thus include certain commonly held values associated with these regimes. 
Loose and Tight Security Communities 
The absence or presence of collective identities is what distinguishes „thick‟ security 
regimes from the final category in the spectrum, the „security community‟.  This final 
                                               
15
 One of the most common problems of regime theory is the precise conceptualisation of the term „regime‟ 
(Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997, pp. 8-22; Keohane, 1993; Kratochwil, 1993).  One first question 
is whether it refers to formal agreements between states (e.g. treaties), or „norms‟ and „institutions‟ in the 
broader, constructivist sense? A second point that requires clarification is the choice between seeing 
regimes as mainly constituted by these norms in themselves or in terms of compliant behaviour.  In fact, I 
shall give a combined answer to both these questions, in suggesting that the concept of „regime‟ be limited 
to norms contained in explicit, formal agreements between the units within a given RSC, insofar as they 
are also complied with by the parties.  These formal agreements do not have to be region-wide: they can 
take the form of bilateral agreements between individual units that ultimately form a „web‟ constituting a 
region-wide security regime.  These norms can moreover be generated by formal instruments operating at 
a higher level: if the states within a region are all signatories of a higher-level agreement regulating 
security interaction and they start obeying these norms, a regional security regime will come into 
existence.  The a priori requirement of compliance also explains my terminology.  I do not refer to „strong‟ 
or „weak‟ regimes: compliance is already presumed.  The „thinness‟ or „thickness‟ of a security regime here 
refers to the extent, in scope an in depth, of the norms within the regime: the number of issue-areas it 
tackles and the degree to which its norms are internalised within the state actors‟ value-systems. 
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category in the range of regional anarchies has been extensively described by Adler 
and Barnett (1998b), whose expansive description can be followed here.  It is also the 
category where subjective factors become extremely important in themselves.  The 
concept of a „pluralistic security community‟ was introduced by Karl Deutsch et alia 
(1957) to describe regions consisting of several states where increasing 
interdependencies had come to create, dependable expectations of peaceful change 
among actors.  In terms of RSCT, these RSCs can be said to have been completely (or 
at the very least largely) desecuritised internally.  Armed conflict between the regional 
units is seen as so unlikely that security is in effect defined collectively: while states 
maintain a distinct independence, their identities are so interlinked that the processes 
of securitisation become, in effect, synchronised and bundled, accordingly resulting in 
collective security policies towards commonly perceived threats. 
Adler and Barnett (1998a, pp. 55-57) make a distinction between „loosely‟ and „tightly 
coupled‟ security communities based on several factors, with loosely coupled security 
communities described as displaying “a high degree of trust, a shared identity and 
future, low or no probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters, and a 
differentiation of those within from those outside the security community”.  Tightly 
coupled security communities, by contrast, have thoroughly internalised mechanisms of 
mutual aid, which become an inherent part of the national identity.  Both can be 
differentiated using specific criteria: multilateralism, unfortified borders, changes in 
military planning, common definition of threats and discourses and languages of the 
community in the case of loosely coupled ones, and, additionally, co-operative and 
collective security, military integration, policy coordination against internal threats, free 
movements of populations, internationalisation of authority and a multiperspectival 
polity for the tightly coupled ones. 
The epiphenomenal nature of many of the above characteristics of loose and tight 
security communities must be stressed here: what actually constitutes such „Kantian‟ 
cultures of anarchy is the existence of a collective identity, a collective definition of „self‟ 
that is clearly visible in the regional security discourse.  Crucially, the existence of such 
a collective identity does not imply the disappearance of national, unit-level identities  
(Adler & Barnett, 1998a, pp. 29-36).  Individual states continue to exist (this is why 
Deutsch referred to pluralistic security communities in the first place), but with identities 
that are inextricably combined, amalgamated with a supra-national sense of „we-ness‟, 
and national interests that are defined in terms of the higher-level collective interests.  
At the „tightly coupled‟ end of security communities, units can transfer considerable 
aspects of sovereignty to supra-national institutions, and RSCs will only continue to 
exist as long as this transfer of sovereignty is not complete.  But, at least in theory, it 
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follows that security communities can lead to the end of anarchy within a given region, 
in effect terminating the existence of the RSC as a separate regional structure, and 
transforming it into a unit in and of itself (Buzan, 1991, pp. 218-219; Buzan & Wæver, 
2003, pp. 66-67). 
The Amity/Enmity Variable as a Spectrum 
From the above, it is clear that the method for characterising the structures of enmity 
and amity within a given RSC will be multi-faceted, relying on objective indicators on 
the one hand, and the subjective, ideational discourse of unit-level actors on the other.  
And amity and enmity will thus not simply be characterised as the aggregate of bilateral 
inter-state relations within a given RSC; rather, it will be evaluated as an integrated 
whole, a holistic, Wendtian „culture of anarchy‟.  Rather than a seamless continuum, 
the result is a succession of overlapping categories that form a spectrum of amity and 
enmity bounded by chaos (in the absence of even the minimal norms sustaining a 
revisionist balance of power culture of anarchy) and hierarchy (in the absence of 
anarchy).  This spectrum can be summarised in the following figure: 
 
Figure 1: The Amity/Enmity Spectrum 
 
It is important to note the graduated and relatively indefinite nature of the above-
mentioned categories.  There is considerable overlap between the border areas of 
conflict formations, regimes and security communities: thin regimes are often difficult to 
distinguish from status-quo conflictual sub-systems, thick regimes often resemble loose 
security communities.  While clear borders can be defined on paper, and in theory, 
applying them will to some extent be a matter of interpretation and debate.  In my view, 
there is no foolproof natural-scientific way to quantitatively and positively measure the 
compliance of units with the norms of an incipient, thin security regime, or the reality of 
an embryonic collective identity.  The above-mentioned categories are therefore ideal-
types against which to assess and estimate, not measure.  It is therefore of the utmost 
importance to keep in mind the qualitative nature of my endeavour, and its inherent 
„fuzziness‟.  This intrinsic overlap between the categories is further complicated by the 
multiple realisability of these ideal-type regional cultures of anarchy.  Each of these 
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(Conflict-Minimising 
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Security Communities
(Collective Identities)
Revisionist Status-Quo Thin Thick Loose Tight
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categories can manifest itself in a wide variety of forms, with regional specificities 
surrounding their core characteristics: there are no prototypical conflict formations, 
security regimes or security communities.  The minimal requirements of each category 
will usually be translated into practice in regionally specific ways.  
I have expanded the amity/enmity variable in terms of a „spectrum‟ of different, regional 
„cultures of anarchy‟.  These „cultures of anarchy‟ can be analysed from two 
perspectives: the macro – in terms of overt patterns of behaviour – and the micro – in 
terms of discourse, including security discourse.  On different points of this spectrum, 
these macro (interactional) and micro (discursive) patterns will have varying degrees of 
compatibility.  On the one hand, the superficial macro-interaction between states will be 
inimical or amicable.  On the other hand, their deeper mutual discourses will reflect 
amity or enmity, partly through patterns of mutual securitisation/desecuritisation.  
These patterns of securitisation/desecuritisation will depend, in large part, on the 
convergence or divergence of both types of discourse outlined above.  The logical 
conclusion is that changes in security discourse would enable RSCs to transform in 
terms of amity/enmity, in other words, to move from one category within this spectrum 
to another.  The question thus becomes how these discourses could change; and it is 
to this question that I now turn in this chapter‟s final section. 
Change and the Amity/Enmity Spectrum 
As laid out earlier, this thesis will also address the possible transformation of conflictual 
patterns of amity/enmity towards security regimes.  This requires conceptualising the 
internal transformation of RSCs from one culture of anarchy to another; at first sight, 
however, the predominantly static nature of RSCT would seemingly pose a problem in 
that regard.  For while its structure is indeed to some degree constituted by process16 
(especially in the case of the boundaries of RSCs), and the theory allows for internal 
and external transformations of RSCs (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 53), it does not 
address the mechanisms behind such transformations.  It is, admittedly, not my 
intention here to turn RSCT from a static into a dynamic theory; rather, my focus will be 
on the presence or possible emergence of permissive and efficient factors that would 
allow for such transformations.  In short, my goal will be to formulate a method of 
identifying the obstacles to and potentialities for the emergence of alternative cultures 
                                               
16
 The balance between structure and process is one of the most contentious debates within IR, and, 
especially, its Constructivist tradition.  „Wendtian‟ constructivism,(Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999) 
allows for a greater role for structure in comparison to its „harder‟ counterparts elaborated by, among 
others, Onuf (1994), Kratochwil (2000) and Ruggie (1993).  It moreover allows for the independent role of 
a material „rump‟, unlike those versions of constructivism tending to a more post-structuralist, purely 
interpretive-discursive outlook.  My choice is for the former version precisely because it to some extent 
mirrors the hybrid material/ideational ontology of RSCT. 
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of anarchy from a given structural (material and ideational) situation: which factors in a 
given RSC stand in the way of or allow for its transformation into a regime or a security 
community, its figurative evolution from point A to point B on the spectrum?  How that 
transformation would occur is in itself not my object of study; rather, I shall be 
concentrating on what could increase the probability of the RSC transforming.   
A wide range of rationalist IR theories can explain the emergence of regimes (and 
security communities), and thus, the transition from one type of regional anarchy to 
another (Hasenclever, et al., 1997).  Power-based theories concentrate on the role 
played by hegemons and powerful states as self-interested facilitators and creators of 
regimes whose norms can, over time, can become self-sustaining (Gilpin, 1982; 
Kindleberger, 1974; Mearsheimer, 1994).  Interest-based theories see transitions from 
one type of anarchic culture to another as emanating from the rational utility-
maximisation by relevant actors (Keohane, 1982, 1984).  Knowledge-based rationalist 
theories concentrate on learning (simple and complex) to explain ways in which actors 
adapt their instrumental action, or even the interests to be pursued themselves in 
reaction to new technical or social information (Haas, 1980, 1989; Kydd, 2000; J. S. 
Nye, Jr., 1987).  All three types of theory often work on the basis of rational-actor 
models (although the latter, knowledge-based theories sometimes do turn „interest‟ 
from an independent into a dependent variable, and often do come close to 
constructivism in their implications).   
One way of conceptualising change in RSCs could thus be to simply adapt all or some 
of these theories to the RSCT framework, empirically draw out relevant variables, and 
come to a conclusion as to the feasibility of internal, cultural RSC transformation.  And 
if my goal was to simply explain instead of to understand, this would be more than 
sufficient.  But it isn‟t: I want to „verstehen‟, as well as „erklären‟.  Because I view 
regional cultures of anarchy as „ideas almost all the way down‟ – in a Wendtian sense – 
I should be able to take a closer look at the constitution of the ideas themselves 
informing these cultures of anarchy, rather than the behaviour caused by these ideas 
that the purely rationalist theories capture.  These rationalist theories will to some 
extent be able to explain and evaluate these ideas, but they will not give us any 
indication as to their nature.  And it is their nature that is central to my discussion. 
A previous section elaborated on the link between security discourse and the state as a 
corporate actor, within the Wendtian grand-theoretical context I had adopted earlier.  In 
it, a state‟s official, institutional discourses on security – in both their argumentative and 
instrumental aspects – could be seen as the crystallisation, the end result of intra-
societal debates occurring at the sub-unit level, at least in non-totalitarian states.  But 
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processes of securitisation – securitising moves, securitising acts – take place 
constantly within more-or-less open societies; many of the debates touching on 
existential issues remain ongoing, even if state institutions themselves have adopted a 
position and issues have become fully securitised.  In most societies, established 
securitisations and discourses on security are regularly challenged, both in their 
argumentative and instrumental aspects, and it is the presence of such challenges that 
offers the key to identifying possibilities for change.  Within the material-ideational 
environment offered by RSCT, the question comes to centre on whether and how 
alternative approaches could cause changes akin to a Kuhnian „paradigm shift‟ (Kuhn, 
1996), albeit in the secular area of security discourse rather than scientific theory, 
sometimes aided by changing material circumstances that undercut the coherence of 
dominant discursive paradigms. 
In the case of argumentative aspects of security discourse, intra-society debates will 
often touch on questions of identity, the interpretation of the precise meaning of 
statehood, and thus, the values and interests that must ultimately be defended as 
referent objects of security (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 58-62).  
These debates can sometimes „dethrone‟ or modify the dominant discourse, and it thus 
becomes important to assess how contested or not this value/identity discourse really 
is (Wendt, 1999, p. 188).  Is there an agreement on what exactly is to be secured when 
one refers to „the state‟, or are there significant challenges, alternative values informed 
by differing interpretations of identity?  Such challenges can find their origin on both the 
domestic and international levels.  In the former case, internal social, political, and 
cultural changes can conspire to produce divergent views of statehood.  In the latter 
case, discursive encounters with significant others can either reinforce or weaken 
existing identities, which, after all, are not simply self-contained, but also encompass 
views of a state‟s role in the wider world (Wendt, 1994; 1999, pp. 326-336).   
Challenges originating in both the domestic and international levels will be reflected 
within intra-society ideological debates.  And the intensity and nature of such debates 
will give us an indication on whether identities and values can survive as they stand, or 
whether they could be replaced by versions more amenable to a different regional 
„culture of anarchy‟, through the internalisation of new norms or the merging of 
identities, for example. 
In case of instrumental discourse, intra-society debates can question the definition of 
threats as threats and the strategies used to attain security.  There may be no 
agreement as to the existentially threatening nature of a perceived menace, and 
security discourse in broader society may identify more than one way of remedying a 
given threat.  Such debates are much more common, and they are often amplified by 
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either modifications in material circumstances or changes in the technical knowledge 
informing such instrumental action (Goldman, 2001).  Material circumstances can 
change on the domestic or international levels: the resources contained in the state‟s 
physical base may alter, as can the regional or higher-level balances of power, 
affecting the power of the state relative to other regional units and influencing the 
coherence and consistency of certain policy options over others.  On the other hand, 
technological knowledge may be modified domestically, or propagate downwards from 
the international level: for instance, through the proliferation of new military doctrines, 
or the insights of global epistemic communities.  In both cases, prevailing instrumental 
discourses may shift under the weight of contestation, adjusting the balance between 
cooperative and competitive behaviour in terms of their usefulness towards fixed goals 
(rather than their appropriateness in terms of shifted values), and in the end affecting 
the patterns of amity and enmity.  Assessing the stability of security discourses will 
consequently also necessitate identifying the material and ideational factors that might 
at some point cause shifts in their instrumental logic, in addition to their argumentative 
aspect. 
A state‟s dominant security discourse, as expounded by its institutions, is thus liable to 
destabilisation because of the debates that usually mark societies that allow for at least 
some measure of contestation.  As is clear from the previous paragraphs, the 
discursive stability of both argumentative and instrumental discourses is influenced by 
both ideational and material factors at both the sub- and supra-state levels.  A narrative 
must be firmly rooted in both domestic and international/regional value-systems to 
successfully ward of challenges to its dominance of a state‟s institutions.  It must also 
remain consistent with the external, domestic and international material realities to 
which it refers and by which it is sustained.  Shifts in either societal values and material 
circumstances can lead to changes in the viability of a given discourse,and, insofar as 
security discourses and patterns of amity and enmity are co-constitutive, the resulting 
discursive changes will have an effect on these patterns of amity and enmity.   
Perhaps the best parallel to this notion of „discursive stability‟ would be Kuhn‟s 
scientific-philosophical concept of a „paradigm shift‟.  Although applicable to scientific 
theory, it could be argued that the fundamental truths held by societies in general – 
including those governing their perceptions of security, and attendant pathways 
towards it – are liable to transformation by alternative takes on reality that displace 
established ideologies undercut by growing inconsistency and incoherence.  For lack of 
time and space, this particular thesis will not go into these actual processes of 
transformation, but the issue would no doubt be interesting material for further 
exploration.  The empirical portions of this text  – particularly the final chapter – will 
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concentrate on identifying either the alternative discourses or the material changes that 
might, at some point, permit such changes to occur, potentially rendering existing 
security discourses obsolete. 
Conclusion 
This chapter‟s main objective was the expansion of the concept of amity and enmity, 
central to RSCT and to the hypotheses being scrutinised in this thesis.  This expansion 
started off with a short meta-theoretical excursion, an evaluation of the different grand 
theoretical frameworks that might be applied to the flexible conceptual framework of 
RSCT. In the end, the choice was in favour of a (broadly defined) Wendtian-
constructivist approach, positing an ideational reality constructed around a materialist 
rump, and thus approximating the ontology implicit in RSCT.   Within the processes of 
securitisation that stand at its centre, an additional differentiation was made between 
argumentative and instrumental discourses, the former linked to the identities and 
values that constitute the ends of state action, the latter bound to instrumental action 
geared towards securing these goals.  Accordingly, the amity/enmity variable was 
expanded into a spectrum made up of „cultures of anarchy‟ – conflict formations, 
security regimes, security communities – that differ not only in their epiphenomenally 
conflictual or cooperative natures, but also in terms of their units‟ underlying discursive 
beliefs, norms and identities.  Transformations in these cultures of anarchy were 
elaborated in terms of the stability or instability of underlying official, institutional 
security discourses, and their „groundedness‟ within their respective sub-state societies 
and the surrounding material environment, in both their argumentative and instrumental 
aspects. 
The multi-level nature of RSCT will pose the impetus for my two subsequent chapters, 
consecutively dealing with the domestic and systemic levels of security interaction.  As 
will be shown, a thorough consideration of the former is quite necessary in assessing 
the possibilities of regime emergence in regions with particularly weak and fragile 
states, apart from being called for from a purely deductive-theoretical point of view.  
The final theoretical chapter, on the systemic level, will subsequently place the effects 
of great power involvement on RSCs within the overall theoretical framework chosen 
here.  First, however, the discussion turns to the domestic, sub-state level, and, more 
specifically, on how to conceive of what is currently (and somewhat confusingly) known 
as „state weakness‟ in an RSCT context.  
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CHAPTER 3: STATE INCOHERENCE AS WEAKNESS, 
INSTABILITY AND FAILURE 
In the previous chapter, the notion of „discursive stability‟ introduced the sub-state level 
into the discussion of amity and enmity in a Wendtian RSCT context, something made 
possible by the complex, multi-level nature of the theory.  RSCT certainly remains 
state-centred, but the theory does allow for more flexibility in including sub-state 
processes and non-state actors in its analyses of international security than its „black-
box‟ rationalist predecessor, structural neo-realism.  While this may lead to less elegant 
and streamlined theorising, it broadens the theory‟s scope by including factors that are 
crucial in understanding and explaining international phenomena outside the purview of 
IR‟s dominant paradigm.  And one of the obvious advantages of opening that black box 
of statehood is the possibility of factoring in what is commonly called „state weakness‟ 
and „state failure‟ into integrated accounts of international and regional systems.  This 
crucial element was, for much of the history of IR, simply obscured from view as a 
subject of „political science‟, an omission that came to haunt the discipline when it 
became one of the defining features of regional (and, in the post-911 world, even 
systemic) instability in the post-Cold War World17. 
One obvious but very important distinction should be made from the outset, between 
weakness and powerlessness, weak states and weak powers, cohesion and capability 
(Buzan, 1991, pp. 112-114).  In the broader literature, the weakness of states generally 
doesn‟t refer to an absence of power in the neo-realist sense, in other words, to low 
aggregate military or economic capabilities; rather, it usually points to the cohesiveness 
of states, to their effective empirical statehood.  To clearly distinguish between these 
two quite different understandings and do away with a confusing situation that regularly 
re-emerges throughout IR literature on the subject, I shall use the terms „state 
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 Different theories of International Relations conceptualised the state in varying ways well before that; 
Realist, Liberal and Marxian IR scholars all employed their particular view of „stateness‟, but the coherent 
nature of the state was in most cases assumed in their theorisations of the international (Hobson, 2000).  
Debates on the character of the international system‟s primary constituent emerged relatively late in IR‟s 
conceptual development, and were, mostly, held on the fringes of the discipline.  There was Skocpol and 
others‟ (1985) attempt to „bring the state back in „, during the 1980s, when the relative autonomy of the 
state both from its domestic society and international structures was stressed.  Within historical sociology, 
much work was done in terms of the genesis of modern statehood as a phenomenon in international 
affairs.  Scholars like Michael Mann (1984) and Charles Tilly (1975, 1985, 1990) attempted to 
reconceptualise the state and its underlying society as inseparable state-society complexes or, essentially, 
war-waging entities.  Wallerstein‟s World Systems Theory and the Dependencistas saw the state‟s role as 
shaped by its position in a global capitalist economy (Wallerstein, 1984, pp. 27-96).  But for most IR 
scholars, the state remained a subject for political science, not international relations; no wonder then, that 
most debates on the phenomenon took place (and are still taking place) at the intersect between history, 
sociology and IR. Much of the work on statehood within the discipline was theoretical and historical, aimed 
mostly at the de-reification of the established, fossilised assumptions of the state within existing IR theories 
rather than the development of practically applicable notions of state incoherence. 
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incoherence‟ or „coherence‟ in reference to the latter understanding (lack of cohesion) 
and „powerlessness‟ to encompass deficient material capabilities throughout this 
chapter and thesis.    
Much of the literature on state incoherence characterises the phenomenon in 
functionalist or institutionalist terms, with the state‟s primary purpose defined in terms 
of „governance‟, as the provision of various public goods (Fukuyama, 2004a; Krasner, 
1988, 2004; Rotberg, 2002b, 2003, 2004), the most important of which is security, 
along with public services like health, education, communications and transportation 
infrastructure, or even political freedom and socio-economic security.  State 
incoherence occurs when the provision of these public goods becomes markedly 
deficient because of inefficiencies inherent to the state as a bureaucratic construct.  
Others, including Jackson (1982, 1990) describe the state in Weberian terms: as an 
organisational structure with the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given 
territory and population.  State incoherence can be seen in that context as the fraying 
of this monopoly.  Still others writing within this neo-Weberian tradition see state 
weakness mostly in terms of deficient state legitimacy, defining state strength as the 
“...capacity of the state to command loyalty – the right to rule – to extract the resources 
necessary to rule and to provide services, to maintain that essential element of 
sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force...” (Holsti, 1996, p. 82).  In a 
variation on that theme, Migdal (1988, pp. 32-33) defines state coherence in terms of 
social control, with legitimacy as the strongest form thereof.  None of the definitions on 
offer readily fit into the RSCT context; finding one that does will, consequently, be the 
aim of this chapter‟s first half. 
RSCT needs a well-integrated and expanded concept of state incoherence.  From an 
inductive standpoint, much of regional insecurity in today‟s world emerges from „weak‟, 
„failed‟ and „collapsed‟ states (Milliken & Krause, 2002): different gradations of the 
same phenomenon.  Such incoherent states result in what Holsti (1996, pp. 123-149) 
calls “wars of the third kind” -civil wars- that affect regional security either through 
overspill or through the intervention of neighbouring states.  From a more systemic 
viewpoint, so-called „weak‟ and „failed‟ states provide fertile staging grounds for 
transnational terrorist groups (Rotberg, 2002a); the increasing frequency of state 
collapse has also been tied to the general decline of the state with the rise of 
globalisation (Clapham, 2002; Yannis, 1999, pp. 820-821). Remaining blind to these 
issues by not accounting for state incoherence would be a major omission, and a 
theory aimed at providing a universally applicable, reasonably broad conceptual 
framework for regional international politics it would thus have to take this occurrence 
into account.   
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But on a purely deductive-theoretical level as well, RSCT is in need of a reasonably 
worked-out concept of state (in)coherence.  Firstly, RSCs depend to a large degree on 
inter-state security interaction, which, in turn, presupposes a reasonable degree of both 
state cohesion and state power within the region, or, at the very least, the presence of 
state-like units, recognised or otherwise.  It is difficult to imagine a functioning RSC 
composed solely of juridical states, with legally recognised governments whose writ 
does not extend beyond their respective capitals, outside of which chaos rules.  
Second (and, importantly, to a certain extent qualifying the previous point), the 
fragmentation of incoherent states into secessionist, recognised or unrecognised state-
like units could lead to a de-facto internal transformation of RSCs through the addition 
of units and a potential change in polarity (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 66-67).  Finally, 
beyond the most extreme revisionist conflict formations, the amity/enmity spectrum 
elaborated in the previous chapter assumes the presence of reasonably cohesive and 
stable states (or state-like units), the lack of which would preclude the emergence of 
regional anarchic cultures.  „Reasonable expectations‟ of norms-ruled behaviour or 
peaceful change could not emerge in an environment marked by unstable units and 
resultant potential power-vacuums.   
This chapter will then expand this general, over-arching notion of state incoherence as 
follows.   In a first move, the provision of security through a monopoly of legitimate 
force will be identified as the essentially defining feature of the state in International 
Relations.  State incoherence will subsequently be disaggregated into three distinct 
tiers based on the three components of the Weberian definition of the state: ideational 
legitimacy, material force, and institutional monopoly.  The first tier of inherent 
weakness will be defined in terms of the legitimacy of a state‟s given constitutional 
framework as a collective strategy of survival.   The second tier of ostensible stability 
will be delineated in terms of the ability of the state to compensate for deficiencies 
within its constitutional framework‟s legitimacy through the application of state force.  
The third tier of effective sovereignty will be made contingent upon its capacity to 
maintain its institutional monopoly of legitimate force through a „force-legitimacy 
equilibrium‟: its ability to address the security concerns of its underlying society without 
itself being securitised as a threat.  Based on the above framework, as well as Holsti‟s 
differentiation between horizontal and vertical incoherence, a final typological 
distinction will emerge between inherently weak, ostensibly unstable and 
collapsed/fragmented states, before being placed in the overall „Wendtian‟ framework 
of RSCT outlined in the previous chapter. 
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Conceptualising State Incoherence in an RSCT Context 
How would one best integrate state weakness in a Wendtian-constructivist version of 
RSCT, based on notions of embedded rationality and rump materialism?  The three-tier 
view of state structure presented in the previous chapter provides a useful starting 
point.  The state is composed of material, institutional and ideational elements, with 
institutions as the primary source of agency, at the crossroads between ideas and 
matter, society and the state itself.  This material/institutional/ideational structure 
stands in a complex relationship of exchange with society.  On the one hand, as 
implied above in the mainstream literature, its purpose is the provision of public goods 
– above all, security – to groups within its underlying society.  On the other hand, this 
underlying society – part of the state‟s physical base – is instrumentalised to a certain 
degree (through, among others, the extraction of resources) in order to provide this 
security.  The provision of public goods is, thus, not a one-way street: resources are 
extracted from society by the state in return for its services.   
For the purposes of this discussion, aimed at conceptualising state weakness in RSCT 
terms, I shall put forward two initial, preparatory arguments.  Firstly, that state 
incoherence can in fact be described in terms of only the provision of security through a 
monopoly of legitimate force, which, in the context of RSCT, and in a wider context as 
well, is the only public good provided by the state directly relevant to its cohesion and 
continued existence as a state, and hence, wider, region-level security.  The provision 
of other public goods is either not essential to statehood per se, or ancillary to the 
central aim of providing security.  An important consequence is that state incoherence 
could be conceptualised in terms of securitisation, of unstable and incompatible, 
dissensual security discourses within state and society, which leads me to my second 
point.  A state performs its essential purpose of providing security through institutions 
that hold a monopoly of legitimate force over a given territory and population.  This 
latter characteristic – the monopoly of legitimate violence – is what makes a state a 
state and differentiates it from other arrangements that social groups may use to 
enhance their survival.  The strength/weakness, (in)stability, collapse or fragmentation 
of states will depend on a complex relationship between that monopoly, these 
components of legitimacy and force, and the ability of the state to provide security, a 
relationship visible in the patterns of securitisation that pervade underlying society.  
According to the authors writing from a functionalist perspective (Fukuyama, 2004b; 
Rotberg, 2004), the state exists to provide a variety of public goods to its citizenry.  All 
agree on the centrality of security, both from external and internal threats.  Most add 
the provision of socio-economic goods: transportation, communications, education, 
healthcare, et cetera.  Some extend the state‟s function to the provision of political 
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freedoms as well.  However, the fundamental purpose of sovereign statehood can be 
seen as residing only in the provision of security at an individual or sub-state group 
level through a monopoly of legitimate violence.  In theory at least, states could exist as 
states without providing socio-economic goods or without being remotely democratic: it 
is, admittedly, to stretch the imagination, but in the ideal-type, libertarian night-
watchman state, a situation could be envisaged where many of the above-mentioned 
functions are carried out entirely by the private sector18.  The thoroughly Westphalian 
states of early modern Europe in fact did not provide many of the socio-economic 
functions attributed to contemporary statehood (Birnbaum, 1981; Van Creveld, 1999); 
their involvement in society was truly minimal by today‟s standards, and freedom and 
democracy were certainly not seen as their „raison d‟être‟.  In Fukuyama‟s (2004a, pp. 
22-26) terms, their „scope‟ was extremely limited.  This did not diminish their status as 
states.   
Sovereign states are ultimately endowed with a monopoly of legitimate force precisely 
in order to provide security for groups within their underlying societies; at core, they can 
still be seen as contemporary expressions of Hobbes‟ Leviathan and Locke‟s social 
contract, remedies against the insecurities of anarchy.  The fact that they have taken 
on a multitude of functions that apparently go beyond this fundamental purpose is 
based on a shift in the interpretation of what security exactly entails.  Whereas 
prototypical 18th and 19th century states were concerned almost exclusively with the 
provision of military and political security – often to a narrowly defined elite – this 
concept has now been expanded to include the economic, environmental and societal 
issue-areas (Thomas & Meyer, 1984, pp. 467-469).  „Security‟ is not constructed as 
simply entailing merely security of life and limb for the limited number of people who 
matter („society‟ in the restrictive, 18th-century sense of the word), it encompasses all 
individual citizens of the state, and implies much more than mere physical survival.  
And while it may involve the provision of a raft of public goods, it is clear that many, if 
not most of these goods are in fact directly linked to the primary purpose of providing 
security at a collective and individual level. 
To a certain extent, this echoes the Wendtian notion of state survival encompassing 
more than the mere existential continuity of institutions, territory and population; as the 
state is composed of both matter and ideas, defining its „survival‟ goes beyond the 
purely material (Wendt, 1999, pp. 233-238).  In almost analogous fashion, the 
socialised individual defines his „survival‟ in terms that go beyond the merely physical 
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 Nozick‟s “Anarchy, State and Utopia” (1974) was one notable attempt to construct just such a minimal, 
night-watchman state. 
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(Wendt, 1999, pp. 130-138).  Man cannot be content with simple survival in a physical 
sense, but also craves, indeed necessitates, social and cultural continuity, the stable 
existence of the reference-points that give meaning to the world around him: he defines 
his personal well-being in terms of socially constructed expectations that form part and 
parcel of the sense of self that is to be safeguarded from harm.  Security, for the 
individual like the state, consists of a physical rump surrounded by socially constructed 
outer cultural and civilisational layers.  Thus, when one says that the state must 
safeguard the security of its citizens or subjects, this goes beyond their mere corporeal 
integrity – the latter is merely the hard core of a complex concept – whose complexity 
and „layeredness‟ increases in tandem with society‟s as the latter modernises and 
raises individuals‟ expectations to ever-higher levels in a world of increasing 
„disembeddedness‟ and „time-space distantiation‟ (Giddens, 1990).  The provision by 
the state of a greater number of public goods to societies therefore to some extent 
masks its continued focus on an albeit much-expanded notion of security, which makes 
securitisation particularly relevant in discussions of state weakness, a point that will be 
amplified below19. 
If security is taken to be a complex, socially and intersubjectively defined concept, and 
this fundamental exchange between the state and its underlying society – resources for 
security, broadly defined – is seen as the core, irreducible purpose of statehood, how 
can one conceptualise state survival or failure?  The obvious functionalist or 
institutionalist reply would place it in the states‟ inability, or ineffectiveness, in 
performing their central task: providing security20.  That is, however, a very superficial 
answer.  States are but one in a plethora of alternative institutions capable of providing 
security to groups: empires, tribes, clans, feudal relationships.  The objective here is to 
describe the incoherence and failure of states as states, to describe state failure and 
incoherence, not the general inability of societies to maintain their security through 
social „institutions‟, broadly defined.  The one substantial characteristic that makes 
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 This relates to the Copenhagen School‟s sectored view of securitisation (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 27-31).  
Indeed, from historical political sociology, it would appear securitisations in the military and political sectors 
were the driving force behind the complex relationships of exchange that created the modern state.  While 
every society will include a differing set of expectations as to the role (and legitimacy) of state action in 
each of the Copenhagen School‟s sectors, it does appear the military and political are of particular 
importance, directly linked as they are to the survival of the core physical, institutional and ideological 
aspects of statehood (Buzan, 1991, pp. 116-134).  The linkages between the state and the societal, 
environmental and economic sectors, on the other hand, are more indirect and also quite recent, resulting 
from the expansion of state functions already mentioned above.  The provision of security by the modern 
state in the societal sector, and the complexities attendant thereto, are of particular importance in view of 
the role of modern state nationalism in incorporating the state within the identities of its citizenry; 
securitisations occurring in this sector will therefore be of particular importance in states where competing, 
alternative identities – ethnic, religious – are securitized by the state as political threats, and state ideology 
is securitized as a societal threat by sub-state groups.  
20
 Lake (1996, p. 2) even uses the metaphor of the state as a security-producing firm, while Tilly‟s 
conception of state formation is largely based on its role in war-making, with the latter at one point 
comparing the state to a protection racket (Tilly, 1985, 1990). 
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states states and differentiates them from other security-enhancing institutional 
arrangements must thus be brought into play: Weber‟s (1984, p. 37) „monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force‟. 
The answer to the question as to why states fail is contained in this very term: the 
continuity of states is determined by three distinct variables contained within this 
concept, monopoly, legitimacy and force.  Each of these elements relates, to some 
extent, to one of the three components of „statehood‟ posited by Buzan.  Force can be 
tied relatively easily to the state‟s physical base, while legitimacy is related to its 
ideational-ideological foundation.  The sovereign monopoly, meanwhile, is a key 
qualitative attribute of the state‟s institutional-administrative features.  Viewed from this 
angle, Buzan‟s approach seems to tightly link into Weber‟s definition of statehood, for 
while many authors tend to prioritise one of the elements by emphasising state 
capacity, institutional effectiveness or legitimacy, this particular approach most clearly 
acknowledges the complexities underlying Weber‟s definition. 
Three questions must be asked when approaching the overall coherence of states: do 
they retain a monopoly of legitimate force by exercising effective sovereignty over their 
territories and populations?  Are they capable of efficiently applying force to their 
respective societies?  And, finally, in how far is this force accepted as legitimate by 
these underlying societies?  The overall cohesiveness of states depends on, and can 
be conceptualised according to the complex relationship between these three elements 
of legitimacy, force and monopoly.  Furthermore, the deficiencies and imbalances 
within and between these elements will be clearly visible within the patterns of 
securitisation that pervade a state‟s underlying society.  In societies where the state 
does not carry out its core function – providing security – efficiently, securitisations will 
inform protective measures that circumvent the state; conversely, where a state lacks 
legitimacy, it will be securitised as a threat as its attempts at imposing or enforcing its 
authority collide with the disobedient mistrust of ordinary citizens. 
A Three-Tiered View of State (In)Coherence: Legitimacy, Force and 
Sovereignty 
Legitimacy and Inherent Strength/Weakness 
The first of these three elements, legitimacy, is best comprehended by seeing the state 
as, in Migdal‟s (1988, p. 27) terms, a collective „strategy of survival‟, amalgamated and 
coordinated from the various strategies of survival of sub-state groups and actors.  As 
such, it is directly related to the ideational portion of Buzan‟s tri-partite state.  In an 
ideal-type coherent state, collective political identities and values are shared by 
constituent elements, and an overarching, sovereign authority is provided with the 
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resources required to protect these collectivities from external (and internal) threat.  
States act as a consensual framework – a social contract, a grand bargain – by 
bundling these strategies of survival of groups and individuals in sub-state society.  The 
result is an arrangement whereby the state is endowed with a monopoly of legitimate 
violence and provided with commensurate resources, in return for security for a 
collective identity and value-set21. 
But what exactly are these collective identities and values, and how are they going to 
be secured?  As argued in the previous chapter, the exact mechanisms and methods 
employed by the state, and the nature of the collective values and identities it pursues 
is, more often than not, the subject of vigorous debates in many societies.  To 
paraphrase Migdal, the various „strategies of survival‟ within society will not necessarily 
be harmonious and compatible: some values of groups and individuals will necessarily 
clash.  The important question, in terms of state cohesion, is how such clashes are 
resolved: through the state, or outside the state?  This makes the patterns of 
securitisation that pervade society so important when it comes to state (in)coherence, 
and legitimacy in particular.  Do sub-state groups see the state as the principal method 
for resolving their securitisations, and in how far do these sub-state groups identify with 
the collective identities and values espoused by the state, internalising these value-sets 
and identities as their own referent objects of securitisation?   
A state‟s legitimacy – here referring to the extent to which the state‟s collective 
strategies of survival and their underlying values and identities are accepted as 
authoritative and are integrated into the security discourses and practices of society – 
lies at the core of state strength and survival, of state coherence.  Returning to the 
notion of „civilised‟ man seeing his security socially constructed around a physical core, 
this basically refers to the extent to which the state has become part of that social 
envelope as a value in and of itself.  In cases where it has done so successfully, 
groups and individuals will automatically rely on the collective strategies of survival 
offered by the state, and the state will be what I call „inherently strong‟.   
This internalisation of the state, and its collective values and identities as the legitimate 
source of security will, however, seldom be perfect; in any society, alternative 
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 The above does not imply all groups and individuals will be treated equally by all states, in other words, 
that the state will evenly provide security to all its citizens, without distinction.  Contemporary liberal-
democratic states – the normative benchmark in the current international system – strive to do that in the 
political (although not the socio-economic) sense.  Other forms of statehood may primarily provide security 
to a more or less small, dominant elite, yet still retain their legitimacy based on notions of divine right, or 
ideological necessity; or they may, on the contrary, insist on providing socio-economic rather than legal-
political equality.  The crux of the matter is, however, whether the arrangement – egalitarian or not – is 
accepted as legitimate by most groups in society, whether the state‟s collective values and identities are 
internalised as a quasi-natural fact of life.     
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strategies of survival will continue to exist alongside those provided by the state.  It is 
important here to remember that the state is but one among a range of such strategies 
that may or may not be adopted by groups or individuals, some of whom will continue 
to reject the state in favour of such alternative strategies.  Inherent strength will not 
preclude the possibility of certain criminal and subversive groups placing themselves 
outside the „grand bargain‟ of state and society: all states, however egalitarian and 
inclusive, securitise sections of their sub-state society that do not perceive them as 
legitimate and do not accept their authority at face value.  But the passive acceptance 
of the state by the great majority of society will ensure the state‟s continuity in the face 
of its challengers, at least as long as the state can muster the force required to control 
the latter, as shall be argued below. 
In inherently weak incoherent states, clashing alternative strategies continue to exist in 
broader sections of society because of two specific deficiencies in this internalisation of 
the state‟s ideological base.  First, the consensual, collective „strategy of survival‟ 
incorporated into the state may be generally ill-defined and badly internalised: societies 
as a whole, for a variety of reasons, could fail to achieve and maintain the collective 
values and identities necessary to produce and sustain sovereign statehood.  In terms 
of the tri-partite state, the ideational portion of statehood, the collective „idea of the 
state‟ could lack in definition and clarity, or be poorly integrated into the discourse and 
practices of the state‟s citizenry.  In the worst cases, the absence of a collective idea of 
the state‟s purpose and function, values and identity, the state will in effect become a 
hollow shell, subject to the arbitrary, narrow interests of whoever controls its 
institutions, leading to a general distrust of the state by society, its reliance on 
alternative strategies of survival, in turn resulting in lawlessness and corruption22.   
Secondly, the collective state identities and values could indeed be clearly defined and 
well internalised by specific parts of society, but could, simultaneously, be rejected by 
significant, territorially and ethno-religiously distinctive groups harbouring equally well-
defined, but divergent identities and value-sets.  In this case, there will be a clear 
distinction between in-groups, which have internalised the values and identities 
associated with state-centred strategies of survival, and out-groups, which haven‟t: the 
latter will securitise the state as a threat, continuing to advocate aberrant strategies of 
survival that often lead to secessionist tendencies, sometimes intensified by an intra-
state security dilemma (Buzan, 1993b).   
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 For a detailed study of the link between legitimacy and corruption, see Anderson and Tverdova (2003). 
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This ties in with Holsti‟s (1996, pp. 91-97) distinction between the „vertical‟ and 
„horizontal‟ legitimacy of states.  „Vertical legitimacy‟ applies to the degree in which a 
state is seen as legitimate by its underlying society as a whole; a deficit in this 
particular type of legitimacy will lead to endemic corruption, political disorder and 
criminality, and a disregard for state authority as sub-state groups and individuals try to 
ensure their security despite the state.  Here, state legitimacy can be said to be lacking 
in depth: collective values and identities are badly defined, and weakly internalised in 
society as a whole, and the state‟s ideology and institutions are ill-defined and 
contested in a territorially non-descript manner.  „Horizontal‟ legitimacy, on the other 
hand, refers to the extent to which the state is evenly accepted as legitimate across 
different sections of society; states lacking in such legitimacy will have underlying 
societies that are fractured along ethno-religious, sectarian lines.  State legitimacy, in 
other words, is lacking in breadth: collective values and identities are defined only in 
terms of one particular (often ethno-religious) section of society, their internalisation is 
unevenly spread.  This vertical/horizontal distinction is, it must be remarked, one of 
ideal-types: most state-society complexes will incorporate divisions of both types, in 
varying proportions.  Distinguishing between the two is nevertheless important as they 
underlie a crucial distinction between two types of state failure, collapse and 
fragmentation, introduced below23. 
Force and Ostensible (In)Stability 
But is state incoherence solely about legitimacy?  Most of the existing literature doesn‟t 
make a distinction between instability and weakness: these two terms are seemingly 
interchangeable.  Yet, a quick glance at contemporary international society reveals a 
qualitative difference in the type of incoherence one observes in various states: 
Lebanon (Rotberg, 2002a, p. 134) and North Korea (Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 
2005, p. 136) have all at some point been described as „weak‟, yet the internal 
dynamics of these two states differ widely.  With Lebanon apparently in a constant 
state of organised chaos, and North Korea remaining one of the most tightly controlled 
societies in history, nevertheless teetering on the brink of collapse for much of the post-
Cold War period, would describing both states as „weak‟ adequately capture the 
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 Vertical and horizontal weakness would also result in diverging interactions between the Copenhagen 
School‟s various sectors of security.  In the case of vertical weakness, one would expect a complex 
interplay between the state‟s ideological-institutional makeup (the political sector‟s main referent object) 
and a variety of other sectors in which the contemporary state is assumed, but fails to provide security 
(military, economic, societal, environmental): whether the state, in its current institutional form and with its 
current ideological outlook, is an adequate „collective strategy of survival‟ in all these sectors comes under 
question, resulting in generalised, territorially non-distinct challenges to the state.  By contrast, in cases of 
horizontal weakness, securitisations would centred more strongly on the political and societal sectors.  The 
state‟s ideological and institutional makeup would be seen as a societal threat to the values and identities 
of out-groups, whose identities and values are, in turn, seen as incompatible with the state‟s, either 
because the state is subservient to identities of a dominant ethnos (as in the case of pure nation-states), or 
because they do not fit into state as a political project (as in the case of homogenising, centralised states). 
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essentially differing nature of their internal incoherence?  Differentiating between 
inherent weakness and ostensible instability – as I do here – might introduce some 
clarity to the situation.  Because, whereas the inherent weakness of states is linked to 
their legitimacy within sub-state society, the question of whether such lapses actually 
destabilise the state and lead to ostensible instability is directly related to the second 
element of „stateness‟: force. 
Both vertical and horizontal legitimacy gaps (Eizenstat, et al., 2005, p. 136; J. M. 
Weinstein, Porter, & Eizenstat, 2004) – deficiencies in the ideational fabric of legitimacy 
undergirding the state – must, in the end, be filled through the exercise of material 
power, or the application of force, broadly defined:  the more inherently weak the 
incoherent state, the more hard power the state will have to employ in order to 
compensate for its deficient legitimacy, suppress these divergent strategies and ensure 
its ostensible stability.  Because legitimacy is based on internalised norms and values, 
it is, to some extent, a self-regulating mechanism not requiring direct intervention from 
the state; the exercise of force to compensate for deficiencies in legitimacy exerts the 
state to a far greater degree, as a conscious effort requiring resources and organisation 
(Gallarotti, 1989).  This makes inherently weak states much more dependent on their 
physical and techno-scientific resource base for their stability, because they must 
compensate for their weakness through a costly combination of coercion and 
cooptation.  One example here are rentier states, of highly deficient legitimacy, whose 
regimes nevertheless often manage to maintain their relative stability thanks to, among 
others, their oil wealth – as argued in a quantitative study by Smith (2004).  This 
distinction between inherent weakness and ostensible stability is of special importance 
in unmasking the well-documented instances where an authoritarian state masks its 
subservience to the security of a small elite or specific ethnic group through the 
application of such hard power into society, an issue not foreign to the Former Soviet 
Union. 
An ostensibly unstable state will, firstly, be confronted with strategies of survival that 
include an element of political violence, and, secondly, be unable to offset and 
suppress these strategies through the application of force on its part.  It will not be able 
to exercise effective and constant political control over its whole territory and 
population, and this ineffectiveness will risk pushing it into a powerful downward spiral 
towards failure, collapse or fragmentation, instances where the state not only loses 
substantial control, but that core attribute of statehood, its monopoly of legitimate force.   
Two issues are of importance here: firstly, as in the case of inherent strength or 
weakness, this ostensible stability of the state is never perfect: just as a state‟s 
legitimacy cannot be all-encompassing, its ability to make up for these ideational 
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lacunae by suppressing every single criminal and dissident group will be limited: some 
level of violence will exist in every sub-state society.  The difference between stability 
and instability lies in the nature of the violence: does it have a political aspect, 
specifically aiming to modify the existing state order, as opposed to limiting itself to 
financial gain as in the case of criminality?  Secondly, this violence must be of a nature 
as to negatively affect the very core of state survival – the monopoly itself of legitimate 
force or its „effective and exclusive sovereignty‟ – albeit in a partial and transitory 
manner.  In other words, it must be concentrated around alternative foci of legitimate 
violence that present themselves as alternatives to the state or advocate alternative 
forms of statehood, use political violence to assert themselves as such, yet do not 
succeed in irrevocably and permanently limiting the state‟s sovereignty over its territory 
and population.  
The very same vertical/horizontal distinction introduced above matters in ostensibly 
unstable states, producing different dynamics according to the fissures and deficiencies 
that affect the legitimacy of the state.  A horizontally weak state will most likely also 
destabilise horizontally: what would simply be secessionist tendencies in an inherently 
weak state would turn into ongoing armed separatist movements that actively contest 
the state‟s constitutional status-quo and try (but fail) to establish permanent control 
over a given territory and population.  Accordingly, ostensible instability in vertically 
weak states would also express itself vertically, with corruption and lawlessness 
becoming blatantly visible as the state is unable to repress alternative strategies of 
survival: open politically (rather than ethnically) inspired armed rebellions, and 
widespread terrorist activity are indicative of this kind of instability.  Again, as the 
vertical/horizontal differentiation is an ideal-type, instability in many, if not most states 
will display different combinations of both variants, with one or the other providing the 
dominant dynamic of instability.   
The distinction between inherent strength/weakness and ostensible (in)stability is 
nevertheless crucial in approaching overall state incoherence efficiently in a regional 
context.  The inherent weakness of states – linked directly to their deficient legitimacies 
– allows one to identify states whose stability is dependent on the exercise, by the state 
and its elites, of considerable repressive force, the thin veneer that often covers over 
the fissures of illegitimacy and inherent state weakness, and that can disappear as 
soon as material circumstances change.  The then resulting ostensible instability often 
degenerates into permanent state failure, with its profound regional security 
implications; keeping a tab on such potentialities – Iraq 2003 springs to mind – would 
consequently prove useful in any regional analysis.   
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Effective Sovereignty and State Failure 
The difference between mere instability and wholesale failure is ultimately determined 
by the third element of „stateness‟, based on an ability to maintain a monopoly of 
legitimate force over the longer term.  The discussion now turns to this, the most 
crucial, and most complex of the three elements.  At the core of state survival lies 
effective sovereignty: the extent to which the state can cling on to its monopoly of 
legitimate force over its territory and population.  While defects in the two other 
elements do not necessarily lead to state failure, inherent weakness and ostensible 
instability can, over the longer term, involve vicious downward cycles that ultimately 
lead to the loss, by the state, of its ability to maintain its exclusive legitimate authority, 
standing at the very core of its survival.  It is important here to understand the way 
legitimacy and force interact in producing these vicious cycles leading to state failure.  
State survival, ostensible stability and inherent strength (or their opposites) form one 
integrated whole, and their respective constituent elements – sovereignty/monopoly, 
force, legitimacy – are inextricably interlinked, and mutually constitutive.   
 
Figure 2: The Three Tiers of State (In)Coherence
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 At the base of state coherence stand the two tiers of legitimacy and force, with legitimacy determining 
the weakness or strength of a state, and force complementing it to form ostensible stability, supporting the 
third tier („monopoly‟).  If this base shrinks (i.e. if the state becomes less legitimate, or weaker, without an 
expansion in the application of force to compensate), the state becomes ostensibly unstable.  At some 
point, the state could become so unstable as to affect the monopoly of legitimate force standing atop this 
shrinking base, toppling it, and making the state failed. 
 73 
The link between legitimacy and force is, as was implied above, one of 
complementarity, with force having to compensate for a state‟s inherent weakness in 
order to ensure its stability.  There are, however, additional, linkages between 
legitimacy and force on the one hand, and monopoly on the other: over the longer term, 
a state‟s monopoly of legitimate force requires a careful balancing of its legitimacy and 
the application of force to its society.  An inability to achieve such a balance not only 
leads to instability, but also to a possible vicious cycle resulting to the loss of effective 
sovereignty – or state failure.  Long-term instability negatively affects the legitimacy of 
the state as the preferred „strategy of survival‟ for sub-state groups and individuals: if a 
state is unable to guarantee the security of large swathes of its population because it is 
unable to muster the force necessary to maintain stability, these groups and individuals 
are increasingly bound to consider alternative ways of enhancing their security 
(Dupont, Grabosky, & Shearing, 2003; Musah, 1999).  More and more force will 
subsequently be needed to compensate for this decline in legitimacy, exacerbating the 
situation if such force cannot or will not be mustered by the state.  The vicious nature of 
this downward spiral is clear: unless the failing state can restore stability by restoring its 
legitimacy (through, for instance, a renegotiation of its grand bargain) or by mustering 
the force required to reassert its authority (perhaps through outside help), the result 
can be a slide into fully-fledged state failure as the gap between legitimacy and 
inadequate repressive violence inexorably grows wider, ultimately eliminating the 
state‟s monopoly of legitimate force.  
Neither of the options that offer a way out of this downward spiral, driven by instability, 
towards state failure – a renegotiated grand bargain or increased application of force 
by the state – are straightforward.  In vertically weak states, the absence of an 
adequately defined and internalised idea of the state within society would pose a catch-
22 problem for anyone attempting to re-establish legitimacy: the renegotiated state-
society bargain that would create new, consensual collective values and identities itself 
requires some level of political culture, of commonality of values and identities, that are 
often themselves absent.  In horizontally weak states, a renegotiated bargain would 
depend on the extent to which the well-defined, clashing values and identities that are 
behind the fissures in sub-state society could be reconciled within a reconstructed 
notion of unified statehood, and that is in itself far from uncomplicated.   On the other 
hand, what Holsti has called the „state-legitimacy dilemma‟ (Holsti, 1996, pp. 91-122) 
often makes an increase in the level of force applied to society for the sake of 
enhanced stability detrimental to legitimacy: weak and unstable states that try to 
augment their control over society by applying forceful, authoritarian methods often end 
up losing their legitimacy in the process by alienating large sections of society.  In the 
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end, with their legitimacy reduced, they often find control more elusive than initially was 
the case, quite apart from eventually risking a fall into the vicious cycle of reduced 
legitimacy and inadequate force described above. 
The third element at the core of state survival, effective sovereignty, thus requires a 
careful, long-term balance between state legitimacy and force: the level of force 
applicable by a state to its society is, over the longer term, bounded by a minimum 
required to assert authority and maintain security, as well as a maximum level 
acceptable to society.  Maintaining this force-legitimacy equilibrium helps avoid the 
vicious circle of instability, decreased legitimacy, and ultimate state failure described 
above.  This equilibrium can be disturbed by exogenous factors affecting both sides of 
the force-legitimacy equation.  A state can lose its ability to exercise effective control 
because of extraneous economic failures.  It can lose its legitimacy because of social 
or cultural changes.  There is also a definite role for human agency in provoking 
failures in this equilibrium: for instance, overly authoritarian or incompetent leaders, or 
fractious competing elites.  Many states have been unable to ever achieve this balance 
between legitimacy and force for lack of an adequate economic and/or ideological base 
from the very onset of independence, leading either to in-born ostensible instability, or 
to an increasingly illegitimate state order whose stability is reliant on increasing 
repression, exposing the state to the ever-present danger of downward vicious cycles. 
The end point of these vicious cycles is often complete state failure, deemed to occur 
when the state definitively loses its sovereign monopoly of legitimate force – its 
effective sovereignty – to sub-state groups.  It is important here to make clear 
distinctions, firstly between ostensible instability and state failure, and secondly 
between two variants of state failure based respectively on the vertical/horizontal 
distinction discussed above, state collapse and state fragmentation.  In both ostensibly 
unstable and failed states, the monopoly of legitimate force is affected to some extent; 
the main difference is, however, the inability of the failed state to reassert its control 
and restore that monopoly through the mobilisation of power.   
In ostensibly unstable states, the alternative foci of legitimacy that exist in every state 
(even the strongest states contain organised criminal groups or political extremists at 
the margins of their societies) will violently challenge that monopoly without, however, 
succeeding in permanently removing significant portions of its territory and population 
from state control.  Their challenges to the state will be fluid and transitory, and the 
state, while not in total control, will remain the dominant actor over its territory and 
population, able to muster the force to confront and suppress these partial and 
impermanent challenges.  In failed states, by contrast, sub-state groups will have 
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succeeded in establishing themselves over the longer term in significant areas and 
over larger groups in society, with the state unable to muster the force required to 
regain control and re-establish its exclusive monopoly over prolonged periods of time.   
The state will in effect have lost out to other strategies of survival incorporating an 
element of violence.  
Within failed states, the differentiation between vertical and horizontal incoherence 
results in a corresponding distinction between state collapse and state fragmentation, 
previously suggested in a different theoretical context by Vinci (2008).  The main 
difference will consist in the nature of the sub-state groups that manage to break the 
state‟s exclusive hold on power, more specifically, whether or not they aspire to 
separate statehood.  In fragmented states, sovereignty will have fragmented as well.  
The juridical state will have split into several fragments that, in themselves, display all 
the features of empirical statehood: a stable territory, more or less effective control 
through state-like institutions, a unifying ideology.  In collapsed states, by contrast, 
state sovereignty will have wilted into irrelevance, in favour of sub-state actors 
(factions, warlords) that do not in themselves lay claim to separate statehood, against 
whom the state remains powerless.  While these actors might in themselves not 
exercise a monopoly of legitimate force over a stable territory or population, 
collectively, they deny the state from exercising its own positive sovereignty over its 
territory and population, which is consequently left in a Hobbesian state of chaos.  
Again, fragmented and collapsed states are ideal-types: many states display 
characteristics of both.  Often, states that originally collapse vertically end up partially 
fragmented as well, as sub-state groups organised in ad-hoc state-like units organise 
themselves to at least partly fill the void left by the collapsed state25.   
In a regional context, the immediate consequences of these two different forms of state 
failure – collapse and fragmentation – differ considerably.  Collapse, as the term itself 
implies, is far more indeterminate than fragmentation, which, in contrast to the former 
variant, can still leave clear foci of legitimacy and empirical sovereignty in place.  In the 
context of RSCT, fragmentation can be said to result directly in the de-facto internal 
transformation of an RSC through the addition of state-like units.  Collapse poses a 
different problem altogether: one of a political vacuum within the RSC, in effect an 
internal transformation of the RSC in the opposite direction, through disappearance of 
a unit and the opening of a regional political no-mans land.  Both variants similarly 
                                               
25 
The unrecognised states of Somaliland and Puntland, in collapsed Somalia, are a good example (Shinn, 
2002). 
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introduce an unwelcome source of instability and uncertainty within any given complex 
because of the risks of regional (and sometimes even global) overspill. 
Above all, however, the failure of states creates a tension between the resultant 
absence/fragmentation of empirical sovereignty, and the relatively immutable, juridical 
understanding of sovereignty under International Law.  The concept of state survival 
provided above has mainly embraced a Weberian, empirical understanding of 
statehood, one based on positive rather than negative sovereignty (Jackson, 1990, pp. 
26-31).  Yet, both sovereignty and statehood can be conceptualised in the legal rather 
than empirical, terms of the 1933 Montevideo convention, which refers, more 
specifically, to the capacity of states to enter into relations with other states (Art. 1): in 
other words, to their necessary recognition as states by their peers.  These two 
notional sides of statehood operate on different, separate spheres of reality – one 
empirical, the other legal – but nevertheless interact to produce concrete 
consequences for anyone studying a given region.   
Firstly, the juridical aspect of statehood works in favour of state survival and the status-
quo by setting a clear limit to the legal recognition of state failure.  In the case of 
fragmented states, resultant unrecognised state-like units do not enjoy the full legal 
protection accorded to their juridical counterparts by international society (Jackson, 
1982).  Unrecognised, devoid of international legal legitimacy, they cannot become the 
subjects of permanent international regimes, or acquire the reasonable expectations of 
peaceful change that are the security community‟s defining feature  (Nathan, 2004).  In 
the case of collapse, the legal continuity of the juridical state in effect masks its factual 
disappearance as an autonomous actor within the RSC; the question of whether or 
how to fill the void thus created more often than not leads to the involvement of 
„interested parties‟ in a part of the region that in effect falls outside the normal 
parameters of the international system of sovereign states. 
Consequently, one is faced with an awkward choice between empirical and juridical 
statehood when approaching RSCs with failed (fragmented and collapsed) states.  A 
first question concerns the state-like units that emerge from state fragmentation: does 
one treat unrecognised statelets as „units‟, or see them as sub-state actors?  My – 
albeit qualified – choice is in favour of the former: RSCT is, after all, a theory of IR, not 
International Law, and it is the empirical rather than legal status of states that should 
matter in assessing whether they count as units.  That having been said, however, an 
element of caution must be retained when approaching these state-like units, by 
acknowledging the power of legal norms in favour of the status-quo, and the 
complicating aspect of their unrecognised status in the emergence of stable, long-term, 
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non-conflictual cultures of anarchy: durable regional security regimes and communities 
will require a solution to the problem posed by fragmented states.    
A second issue concerns the treatment of collapsed states: does it make sense to treat 
them as actors/units, or must their territory be seen as falling outside the „normal‟ 
parameters of RSCT?  Again, I will favour the second, empirical view: in the absence of 
empirical statehood, the territory and population of a collapsed state shall be deemed 
more a passive object rather than an autonomous subject of the international system.   
The chaotic nature of state collapse militates against the inclusion of its internal turmoil 
in structural theories like RSCT.  However, firstly, to the extent that sub-state actors in 
these collapsed states assume state-like properties (in the event of combined collapse 
and fragmentation, as described above), they can themselves be treated as state-like 
units in their own right.  Secondly, this does not mean that groups not displaying 
empirical characteristics of statehood will be ignored: such sub-state groups (including 
those in weak or unstable states) are the object of micro-perspective analysis through 
their participation in the region‟s securitisations, even if they cannot be seen as „unit-
level actors‟ in the RSCT sense of the word.  Thirdly, neither does this imply the 
minimisation of the effects of state collapse on the other units within the given RSC, 
and beyond; in fact, their reactions (among others in terms of patterns of securitisation) 
could prove vital in understanding the broader implications of state failure.   
State Incoherence, Securitisation and RSCT 
How can one fit this three-tiered conceptualisation of state incoherence into the 
Wendtian framework of RSCT sketched out in the previous chapter?  The three tiers of 
state survival – inherent strength, ostensible stability, effective sovereignty – contain 
both material and ideational aspects, which an analysis of state coherence would thus 
have to include.  This invites a combination of the macro- and micro-perspectives 
introduced in the previous chapter when operationalising this approach in terms of the 
overall theoretical framework employed here.  To recap, the former concerns itself with 
the objective, epiphenomenal aspects of security interaction, the latter with the security 
discourse underlying these epiphenomena. Deficiencies at the core of this structure of 
„stateness‟, effective sovereignty, are most obviously present in the security interaction 
both within the state concerned and in the wider region, and thus lend themselves 
readily to the macro-perspective: the symptoms of outright state failure (collapse or 
fragmentation) are easily discernable in a sub-state and wider regional context.  The 
same goes for the features of ostensible instability.  Identifying the lapses in the state‟s 
legitimacy that underlie these failures and instabilities, or differentiating between 
inherently weak or inherently strong (but stable) states would, however, require a 
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discursive, micro-approach that identifies diverging values/identities and strategies of 
survival/definitions of threat. 
Any analysis would thus have to combine a macro and micro-perspective to be entirely 
effective.  The macro-perspective would examine the integrity of the state‟s existential 
core, its effective sovereignty, in effect preliminarily characterising the state as failed 
(collapsed and/or fragmented), unstable or stable; in addition, it would look at the more 
obvious indications of inherent weakness: corruption, a repressive or rentier state.  The 
micro-perspective would shift one‟s attention to the outer ideational layer of legitimacy 
by evaluating the inherent strength or weakness of the state through existing patterns 
of securitisation; its goal would consist in identifying the deficiencies and fissures within 
the ideational structures that either help explain existing failures and instabilities, or 
could – in ostensibly stable but inherently weak states – form the basis of future 
destabilisation.  Combined, the insights of these objective and interpretive approaches 
would allow for an assessment of the ability or inability of the state to maintain its force-
legitimacy equilibrium by effectively filling the legitimacy gaps identified. 
A macro-perspective could objectively assess the effective sovereignty of a given state:  
does the state have an effective monopoly of legitimate force over its territory and 
population, and to what extent is this monopoly compromised?  The presence of 
unrecognised state-like units on the territory of a state, the inability of a state to 
exercise such exclusive control are all symptoms of state fragmentation and collapse 
that are obvious from this objective viewpoint.  So are the symptoms of ostensible 
instability: if there still is a monopoly of legitimate force, it will be occasionally and 
partially corroded through violent political unrest of various kinds, or armed 
secessionist movements.  The macro-perspective can thus set the scene for a 
subsequent micro-analysis by characterising the state as collapsed, fragmented, 
ostensibly unstable or stable.  Apart from this, it can identify the extent to which states 
are engaged in repression or cooptation, and the pervasiveness of corruption: all 
possible indicators of inherent weakness, regardless of the state‟s ostensible stability. 
The exact pathways for a discursive micro-perspective analysis depend on the 
characterisation of the state as failed, unstable or stable from an objective, macro-
viewpoint.  If the state has been classified as ostensibly stable, an additional 
differentiation can be made between inherent weakness or strength: the examination of 
the state‟s legitimacy will concentrate on vertical and horizontal fissures that could lead 
to collapse, fragmentation or instability in the future.  If, on the other hand, the state has 
been classified as failed or ostensibly unstable, the guiding question will be which 
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lacunae in the state‟s legitimacy have contributed to state failure or instability; the 
state‟s inherent weakness can be safely assumed. 
This approach would rely on the patterns of securitisation observed within and around 
the examined state.  Within the framework of state (in)coherence outlined above, there 
is a clear relationship between these patterns and state weakness (or lack of 
legitimacy).  One has to remember that the provision of security is the state‟s ultimate 
raison d‟être and source of legitimacy: the state is, in effect, an overarching, collective 
strategy of survival aimed at protecting collective values and identities.  The conformity 
of sub-state securitisations with this collective strategy can be analysed from the points 
of view of argumentative and instrumental discourse introduced in the previous 
chapter: values and identities that diverge from the collective, state-centred benchmark 
will be visible within the argumentative portion of intra-state securitisations.  On the 
other hand, perceptions of threat and strategies of survival that do not conform to the 
perceptions and methods implicit in the state‟s collective strategy for survival could be 
found in the instrumental aspects of the security discourse.   
Analysing diverging patterns of securitisation from these argumentative and 
instrumental perspectives will make it possible to distinguish between the vertical and 
horizontal weakness of states through what could be termed mutual auto-securitisation, 
which occurs when the state is securitised as a threat (rather than valued as a 
guarantor of security) by significant sections of society, which are, in turn, securitised 
as threats by the state.   In horizontally weak states, such mutual auto-securitisation 
will involve territorially and culturally specific out-groups that reject the state‟s collective 
identities/values in their argumentative security discourse, identify the state as a threat 
to their aberrant values and thus advocate deviant strategies of survival in their 
instrumental discourse.  The centrifugal dynamics thus created will usually favour the 
emergence of aspirant-states or secessionist movements: unless these de-legitimising 
tendencies are suppressed and marginalised through force or cooptation, they risk 
degenerating into instability and fragmentation.   
In vertically weak states, the deficient internalisation of values and identities throughout 
society and the consequent presence of aberrant strategies of survival will be visible 
from the micro-perspective in the low level of public trust in state institutions, seen as 
threats to the values prevalent within society rather than means towards greater 
security.   Even in the most stable inherently weak states, the continued presence of 
non-state institutions as providers of security (the family, the clan, the tribe, informal 
networks) in a society‟s everyday security discourse could be seen as indicating state 
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weakness, especially if they circumvent and contradict state-sanctioned procedures 
and strategies.  
Once the extent to which state legitimacy has been compromised in society is known 
through the micro-perspective, the insights of the macro- and micro-approaches can be 
combined to answer questions as to the past, present or future ability of the state to 
compensate for these legitimacy gaps through the exercise of force (through either 
cooptation or repression).  In the case of inherently weak states, forward-looking 
scenarios could be developed wherein the fissures observed can no longer be 
remedied by the state, leading to ostensible instability, or, in extreme cases, possible 
downward spirals towards state failure.  In ostensibly unstable states, the inquiry could 
focus on the present inability of the state to compensate for deficient legitimacies, and 
the possible future emergence of vicious cycles leading from instability to failure.  In 
failed states, the inquiry could take on an explanatory form, looking back at the reasons 
for state failure.  Of course, in all three cases, the situation will also have to be 
analysed from a more positive, constructive point of view: could circumstances improve 
rather than deteriorate?  In short, the micro- and macro-perspectives can be combined 
to analyse the past, present or future interplay of legitimacy, force and monopoly, and 
their relationship with state coherence.  As conceptualised into the three-tiered schema 
above, the coherence of states is dependent on an often precarious institutionalised 
equilibrium between ideational and material factors, and any adequate approach would 
thus have to blend in both these perspectives. 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at developing the notion of state incoherence within the previously 
introduced, over-arching Wendtian framework of RSCT.   After reducing the central 
function of the state to the provision of security, and linking Weber‟s definition of 
statehood to Buzan‟s tri-partite view, it disaggregated the phenomenon into a state‟s 
inherent weakness, ostensible instability and effective sovereignty, all three related, 
respectively to the ideational, material and institutional aspects of the state.  Inherent 
strength/weakness was said to depend on a state‟s legitimacy (or lack thereof) within 
society; ostensible (in)stability on that state‟s ability to compensate for legitimacy gaps 
by projecting force into that society; and, finally, effective sovereignty on its resulting 
capacity to maintain an effectual monopoly of such legitimate force.  A further 
distinction was introduced between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of state 
incoherence, resulting in a complex typology including: horizontally and vertically 
inherently weak/strong states, horizontally and vertically ostensible stable/unstable 
states and failed – collapsed or fragmented – states.  The chapter subsequently delved 
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into ways of applying the previously elaborated objective macro-perspectives and 
discursive micro-perspectives of RSCT to this set-up.  
Throughout the framework outlined above, the multi-level nature of RSCT will have to 
be kept in mind; after all, the framework of this analysis – RSCT – is a multi-level 
theory, and any examination of intra-unit occurrences would thus have to take into 
account their broader, regional and systemic interactions.  In evaluating the effects of 
the above-mentioned phenomena on the surrounding RSC and higher-level, great 
power interaction, as well as, conversely, the effect of regional and systemic security 
dynamics on state weakness, instability or failure will have to be included.  From a 
macro perspective, one has the ostensible effects of failure and instability in terms of 
regional (and sometimes even systemic) overspill, or the demonstrable involvement of 
external forces in the internal affairs of failed, unstable or weak states.  From a micro-
perspective, on the other hand, the failure or instability of states may be securitised as 
a regional or systemic threat, or legitimacy gaps can be manipulated by external 
powers to their strategic advantage: patterns of securitisation that cross state 
boundaries will fall well within the purview of this inquiry.  The many possible 
theoretical-empirical viewpoints made possible by RSCT – macro/micro, 
ideational/material, domestic/regional/systemic – will have to be used to the full in order 
to provide a detailed understanding of one of the most important phenomena in the 
post-Cold War world.  Accordingly, the next chapter will move from the sub-state to the 
systemic level of RSCT by grappling with the issue of great power penetration (GPP) 
into RSCs. 
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CHAPTER 4: GREAT POWERS AND THEIR REGIONAL 
ENTANGLEMENTS 
The previous chapter, focusing on state incoherence, already dealt with one non-
regional level of RSCT.    While this opening of the black box of domestic politics may 
seem outside the purview of IR and International Security Studies to those adhering to 
more orthodox and parsimonious views of the discipline, within the context of inherently 
multi-level RSCT it was both a possibility and a necessity: the presence of domestically 
stable, recognised units is one of the prerequisites for the emergence of security 
regimes and communities, and thus directly impinges upon the patterns of amity and 
enmity observed on the regional, inter-state level. This chapter switches attention to the 
more conventional systemic level of RSCT, and its interaction with variables at the 
regional level: more specifically, the effect of great power penetration (GPP) on the 
security dynamic of RSCs. 
The chapter‟s central question revolves around the involvement (or more pejoratively, 
interference) of great powers in regional affairs, and its effect on the security 
interactions and discourses within an RSC.  For while at the lower, domestic level, 
constancy may prove crucial to the formation of distinctly regional, and relatively stable 
security relationships, at the higher, systemic level as well, the configurations of great 
power interaction, and their penetration into the regional level make an essential 
contribution to these security dynamics.  The following sections will expand on the 
interaction of the systemic and the regional within RSCT in the following way.  First, a 
definition of great power status compatible with the overall Wendtian framework will be 
devised.   The subsequent section will build a material, subjective and intersubjective 
view of regional great power involvement.  The aggregation of these individual 
involvements in the final section will lead a 1+3+1 typology of GPP, based on their 
varying polarity and amity/enmity: unipolar, cooperative-multipolar and competitive-
multipolar, bounded by hegemony and disengagement on either side. 
Defining Great Powers 
Before trying to conceptualise GPP in terms of this inquiry‟s overarching framework, 
however, a clear, theoretically compatible definition of „great power status‟ would have 
to be elaborated.  If the systemic level is primarily about the interaction between great 
powers, and penetration is about systemic-regional interaction, how are the units 
operating at the higher level defined and differentiated from lower-level regional powers 
and other states/units?  What is a great power?  The term itself is one of those 
fundamentally contested concepts that litter the social sciences – and, accordingly, 
definitions of great power status abound – with most of these definitions corresponding 
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to appropriately materialist or ideational conceptions of „power‟ that exist within the 
discipline26.   
Waltz (1979, pp. 129-131) refers to seven material elements that determine „capability‟, 
and distinguishes great and „secondary‟ powers through their relative ranking within a 
hierarchy of material power. Mearsheimer (2001, p. 5) – basing himself on a similarly 
orthodox materialist view of power – defines great powers in terms of their dominant 
economic-military capabilities: more specifically, as commanding the military assets 
needed to “put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most 
powerful state in the world”, including a nuclear deterrent.  Others, including Bull (1977, 
pp. 200-229) introduce elements of subjectivity and intersubjectivity into this exclusively 
material view of great power status, by adding factors such as a perceived „social 
status‟ and the social recognition of concomitant rights and duties to military power.   
Keohane (1969, p. 296) sees a great power as a state “whose leaders consider that it 
can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international system”.  
Clark (1989, p. 2) points to their „managerial‟ role in the “decision making of the society 
of states”, while Simpson (2004) emphasises their role in the generation and 
maintenance of norms of international law.  Martin Wight (1995, p. 50) distinguishes 
great powers through their “general interests”, as opposed to the “limited interests” of 
other states.  Hopf (1998, pp. 172-173), on the other hand, emphasises the socially 
constructed nature of great power status. 
Within the context of RSCT, Buzan and Wæver (Buzan, 2004; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 
pp. 30-37) make a distinction between superpowers, great powers and regional 
powers, implicitly combining material and ideational elements.  In their view, 
superpowers are characterised materially by “broad spectrum capabilities exercised 
throughout the system” (2003, p. 34), referring to „objective‟ material military and 
economic factors.  Moreover, superpowers both see themselves and are seen by 
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 As suggested by the concept itself, „great power status‟ is primarily about power, and how one defines a 
„great power‟ is closely linked to how one defines „power‟ and „polarity‟ in general.  Conceptions of power in 
IR vary from neo-realism‟s extreme materialism to post-structuralism‟s extreme ideational position.  
Structural neo-realists like Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer, (2001) conceive of power in almost entirely 
material terms, as military and/or economic „capabilities‟.  At the other extreme are, among others, „hard‟ 
constructivists like Ashley (1984), who see power intersubjectively and largely unintentionally constituted 
through perception and discourse.  Between these two positions lie a number of intermediate, hybrid 
material/ideational views of power.  While they do strongly tend towards materialism, classical realists – 
Morgenthau (1985), among others –  speak of „perceptions of the balance of power‟ as a factor to be 
reckoned with, while within the English School, Hedley Bull (1977) differentiates „subjective‟ and „objective‟ 
balances of power.  From a more liberal standpoint, Joseph Nye (1990) developed the ideational notion of 
„soft power‟ acting alongside the more traditional forms of „hard power‟.  The approach taken by Wendt 
(1999) lies within the middle ground between materialist and ideationalist notions of power: he sees the 
distribution of power as implying a core material element, and, additionally, as closely correlated with the 
distribution of interests within the system.  Without delving further into the debates surrounding power in IR 
(which would necessitate a thesis in and of themselves), my conception of „great power status‟ will 
implicitly utilise this Wendtian conception of „power‟. 
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others as such; they also act as ”fountainheads of universal values” (2003, p. 35) that 
underpin international society, clearly adding subjective and intersubjective elements to 
the definition.  Great powers, while not enjoying quite the same broad-spectrum, 
system-wide capabilities as superpowers, are seen as still capable of projecting power 
outside their respective RSCs, a capability recognised by themselves, and by third 
states in their calculations of system-level polarity.  Regional powers, in contrast, are 
merely able to influence (albeit decisively) the internal polarity of „their‟ RSC. 
The approach taken in this thesis will be based on these latter definitions, explicitly 
combining objective material criteria on the one hand, and the ideational subjective and 
intersubjective (self)-understandings of the states involved on the other hand.  Great 
powers will be defined as states whose ability and willingness to project their power 
beyond the boundaries of their respective RSCs is recognised by states and actors 
throughout the international system.  In other words, in order to be great powers, states 
must conform to three different sets of criteria: objective, subjective and intersubjective. 
- Objectively, they must possess the ability to independently and effectively project 
power beyond their RSC, in a number of sectors, particularly the military, political 
and/or economic. 
- Subjectively, they must be willing to use this ability in pursuit of extra-regional interest 
as part of a great power identity27. 
- Intersubjectively, states outside their RSC – and, especially, fellow great powers – 
must recognise this ability and willingness, and base their strategic calculations on this 
recognition. 
Any claim to great power status would thus not stand on its own: it would both have to 
be grounded in the objective capabilities of the state concerned and its subjective self-
perception, and be accepted as valid by the international community of states and a 
„peer group‟ of fellow great powers, implicitly if not explicitly.  Superpowers would be a 
special case within the wider category of „great powers‟,with a recognised ability and 
willingness to project power independently, effectively and permanently, throughout the 
international system rather than simply beyond their RSC. 
Great powers‟ objective ability to independently and effectively project their power 
beyond their RSC in the first place refers to an ability – grounded in raw military and 
economic capabilities – to achieve „results‟ and affect the behaviour of other states 
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 Russia‟s adherence to derzhavnost‟ – great power status – as part of its national identity is one such 
example, discussed in chapter 8. 
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over the longer term, and in a systematic fashion.  Subjectively and intersubjectively, 
great power status denotes a particular social interpretation of „power‟, placing a 
particular state in the higher reaches of the hierarchy of international society.   Great 
power status results from a subtle interplay between capability, self-perception and the 
perceptions of „significant others‟, of „society‟ at large (Levy, 1982, p. 282).  This is no 
different from what occurs domestically, within states: in this context, the idea of „great 
powers‟ should be seen as the international equivalent of intra-state elites,based on a 
similar interpretation of „power‟ in the context of – an albeit anarchical – hierarchy.  This 
elite status also implies – again, similarly to the intra-state context – a leading role in 
the creation and maintenance of the norms of international society, one that flows 
logically from, among others, the interactions of the law-making mechanisms of the 
international legal order with perceived preponderance in international affairs 
(Simpson, 2004; Suzuki, 2008)28. 
The next natural question would concern the actual application of this definition to the 
current international system: which states or units qualify?  Considering the wide range 
of definitions existing in IR, it is not surprising that the precise enumeration of „great 
powers‟ will differ from author to author (Kennedy, 1988; Krauthammer, 1990; Layne, 
1993; Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 360-384; Waltz, 1993), with significant disagreements 
over states that lie on the regional/great power border.  Even the 
objective/subjective/intersubjective definition offered above can lead to differing 
interpretations.  Buzan and Wæver (2003, pp. 37-39), using their particular approach, 
talk of a 1+4 system, with the United States seen as the only superpower, and 
„Europe‟, Russia, China and Japan acting as great powers; these classifications could 
certainly be contested, even within the same theoretical framework.   
One possible solution that could diminish differences in interpretation lies in 
operationalising the concept from a specifically regional perspective by applying this 
definition of great power status only to units that are active, security-wise, within a 
particular security constellation.  A comprehensive, system-wide identification of all 
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The relative importance of material, subjective and intersubjective factors in determining great power 
status inevitably varies, and, as a result, states‟ identities lag behind their capacities and vice-versa, with 
important implications for their systemic and regional behaviour in times of transition and change.  A great 
power or superpower that perceives itself and is perceived by others as such may lose its material capacity 
to uphold its status before it itself realises this to have occurred: such was the case with the United 
Kingdom following World War Two (arguably up to the rude awakening of 1956) (Boyce, 1999, pp. 163-
178), and, it could be argued, of Russia following the end of the Cold War.  Conversely, a state with the 
requisite material capabilities for great power status may fail to define itself as one over a considerable 
period of time: the United States during the interbellum may serve as one such example (Ruggie, 1997).  
If, in the future, the United States withdraws from the international community, the subjective may in fact 
again precede the material and intersubjective.  Closely monitoring the interplay of these three 
components of great-power status is thus not only necessary from a purely deductive-theoretical point of 
view; it is empirically valuable in accounting for change and the possibilities/consequences thereof. 
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great powers becomes unnecessary: only great powers that impinge on the security 
dynamics of the region that is targeted for study would need to be identified as such.  
From this viewpoint, the search for great powers would concentrate on those units that 
penetrate a given RSC, and conform to the definition mooted above, implying a 
generally perceived ability and willingness to independently project power at the 
systemic level.    
How does one conceptualise systemic-regional projections of power, based on the 
three-tiered definition of great power status provided above?  If systemic-regional 
projections of power are conceived of as the region-level application of power by a 
state of a certain capability, with particular self-perceptions and a high, intersubjectively 
constructed social status, ‟projections‟ will inevitably involve objective, subjective and 
intersubjective elements.  How does material capability interact with the material 
aspects of a given RSC?  What role does subjective perception play in the 
operationalisation of these material capabilities?  And, finally, how do great powers, 
their regional entanglements and international society shape each other at the regional 
and systemic levels?  The conceptualisation of regional projections of power presented 
below will necessarily include three tiers that to some extent echo this theme of 
objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity.  Firstly, a single great power‟s regional 
entanglements have a distinct objective component in the power‟s material presence in 
the security dynamics of the RSC.  Secondly, subjective motives behind regional 
projections of power stem from the place of the RSC within the great power‟s overall 
matrix of subjective perceptions.  Thirdly, projections of power will have to be placed 
within the general context of a region as part of „international society‟, by referring to 
the ways in which such projections are perceived and assimilated into the region‟s 
security dynamic.   
Over time, such projections of power add up to great power penetration, defined here 
as the longer-term projection of power by a great power into a RSC, justified through 
long-standing patterns of securitisation between the power and the region, substantially 
affecting the enduring structures of a region‟s internal security dynamic.  This implies 
rather more than just episodic involvement, entailing a measure of constancy and 
durability.  In simple terms, a great power is deemed to penetrate a region when it is 
physically present there over a longer period (militarily, politically, economically…), 
when it rationalises its presence in terms of its long-term security, and when it 
substantially affects the security behaviour/discourse of regional units.  Penetration by 
great powers that are „indigenous‟ to a centred or „great power‟ RSC will logically have 
an element of automaticity about it; they will be deemed to be both members and 
penetrators of „their‟ respective regions.  One obvious question that follows is as to the 
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exact meaning of „permanence‟ in the case of extra-regional penetrating powers: how 
long-standing and durable must these projections of power be?  The answer lies in the 
intersubjective aspects of great power penetration: simply put, regional great power 
involvement must be of such a nature as to shape long-standing patterns of 
securitisation within the region, beyond the concrete instances of involvement 
themselves.  Episodic involvement like, for instance, military evacuation missions, 
cannot count in themselves unless they affect strategic calculations and discourse of 
regional actors long after they have ceased.  
The link between this objective/subjective/intersubjective approach and the macro- and 
micro-approaches discussed in previous chapters is clear: analysing the objective 
aspect of GPP would involve investigating the superficial, macro signs of power 
projection – formal alliances or the application of force into the RSC, the presence of 
military bases, and trade, aid and investment flows with its constituent units – 
specifically in light of potentially distortive effects on the indigenous polarity of the RSC.  
An interpretive micro-approach could subsequently elucidate both the subjective and 
intersubjective aspects of such projections by firstly tracing back the patterns of 
securitisation that link the said region to a great power through its definition of interest 
or perhaps even identity, focusing on both the instrumental and argumentative aspects 
of security discourse within the great power concerned.  Secondly – also on the micro-
level – one would have to look at the intersubjective effects of great power penetration 
on the security discourses of the regional units themselves.  Such individual great 
power penetrations could then be aggregated into distinct categories, developed within 
the context of region-system interaction and RSCT.  The subsequent two sections will 
follow this approach, the first tackling individual great power penetrations, in their 
macro/objective and micro/subjective and intersubjective aspects, the second 
aggregating these into „patterns of penetration‟, categorised according to the variables 
of polarity and amity/enmity. 
The Objective, Subjective and Intersubjective Aspects of Individual Great 
Power Penetrations 
Firstly, at the most general level, the objective aspects of individual GPP refer to the 
superficial, macro-perspective elements of one single great power‟s interactions with a 
given region, based mostly on observable and material state behaviour, specifically the 
allocation of resources by each power to interaction with the RSC in the form of a 
military intervention or presence, financial or humanitarian aid, alliance commitments, 
trade and investment flows and the like.  These material commitments form a 
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preliminary „map‟ of the projection of power into a given region29.  What are the flows of 
aid from the great power to the region‟s units?  Does the power have a military 
presence – permanent or temporary – in the region, and if so, where, and in what 
capacity?  Does it have formal alliances, or does it serve as a guarantor or 
peacekeeper in the context of a security regime, or does it entertain considerable 
commercial interests?  On their own, however, these macro-perspective „objective‟ 
elements of penetration can only provide a partial picture of the phenomenon.  As 
explained above, the projection of power has both subjective and intersubjective 
aspects, which brings us to the central role of discourse in understanding the 
phenomenon. 
The second, subjective tier of regional power projection concerns the great power‟s 
perception of the RSC, as detected in its discursive rationales for regional involvement.  
The central question revolves around the ways in which the region is represented in the 
power‟s security discourse, and the distinction made in chapter 2 between 
argumentative and instrumental aspects of securitisation is, once again, important 
here.  On the argumentative side, a region can play a role in defining a great power‟s 
identity, its value-set, its sense of self.  On the instrumental side, a region may offer an 
opportunistic means of upholding a great power‟s values and safeguarding crucial 
referent objects of security (Ayoob, 1999, pp. 251-253).  The central question in both 
cases concerns the relationship between the region and the great power‟s values and 
referent objects: where exactly do these linkages lead?  At one extreme, a region may 
become so closely interwoven with a power‟s identity that it in effect becomes 
inseparable from its sense of self and its perception of security, becoming a referent 
object in itself.  At the other extreme, regional involvement may simply be a means to 
safeguarding values and referent objects that are entirely extraneous to and 
disconnected from the region itself.  In between, there can be a number of other 
intermediate possibilities and pathways through which a great power can connect a 
region to its sense of security (Desch, 1993; Miller, 1998). 
Four of these pathways will be distinguished here by differentiating between shared 
identity, material interest, systemic strategies and universalised values as drivers of 
GPP; each of these drivers plays a role in the power‟s discourse by justifying regional 
involvement in terms of different arguments that indicate an increasingly detached 
relationship between the RSC and the great power.  The first driver, shared identity, 
                                               
29
 The objective criteria for GPP concentrate only on these three sectors (military, political, economic), 
because they refer to the active formulation and application of policies by the power within the region.  This 
does not preclude the relevance of other sectors (environmental, societal) in the subjective and 
intersubjective aspects of great power involvement.   
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refers to the above-mentioned extreme where a great power‟s sense of self 
interweaves with a region to such an extent that it has become an inseparable referent 
object of security for the power in question, part of its very identity: region and power 
are in effect almost indissoluble, and intervention becomes reified in discourse.  In 
justifications referring to material interest, independently existing, innate features of a 
region are defined as essential to the power‟s security: interventions here are not 
based on an expanded, imperial sense of identity, but an instrumental evaluation of the 
region as an indispensable tool for national security.  Considerations of systemic 
strategies, on the other hand, cause the logic of the power‟s security discourse to 
wander towards the systemic level: intervention occurs not because of intrinsic, 
„objectivised‟ material regional interests, but because higher-level security dilemmas 
push powers towards engagement.  Finally, involvement rationalised through 
universalised values will be either humanitarian or universally ideological in nature.  In 
each of these cases, the discursive linkages between the power and the region 
become more indirect and tenuous, and regional penetration therefore more unstable 
and ephemeral. 
In arguments based on shared identity, regional great power involvement is steered by 
the perception of the region (or parts thereof) as an inseparable referent object, almost 
an extension of the great power‟s sense of self.  GPP often becomes so matter-of-fact, 
so reified, that the region, in whole or in part, almost turns into an extension of the great 
power‟s territorial identity, a „natural‟ sphere of influence, where involvement is seen 
not only as essential to security, but also self-evident, part of the norms that govern 
interaction in the RSC, a value in and of itself for the great power in question.  Often, 
such intervention will be based on cultural or ideological affinities and shared values 
and norms.  One good example can be found in the Cold War: American involvement 
in Western Europe through NATO was often justified as being in defence of the „Free 
World‟, and has been described as being based on shared identities and values 
(Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002).  Meanwhile, the Soviet Union dominated and 
subsidised its Eastern European neighbours in the name of „socialist internationalism‟ 
(Jamgotch, 1975, pp. 407-412), sometimes arguably at great cost (Marrese & Vañous, 
1988).  In both cases there were identities and values creating bonds between regions 
and powers that went beyond mere material interest.  Another example could be found 
in the way in which the European colonial states continued their involvement in far-
flung regions regardless of whether they had become a liability, in the name of 
upholding an imperial identity, as in the historical case of Britain and the Indian 
subcontinent, or Portugal and its colonies (Mahajan, 2001, pp. 199-204). 
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In justifications based on material interest, independently existing „objective‟ features of 
the relevant region are either instrumentalised as essential to the power‟s higher-value 
referent objects of security, or securitised as threats to these referent objects.  Two 
elements are important here: firstly, the fact that these features are instrumentalised or 
securitised means that these characteristics, rather than being referent objects in their 
own right, have a significance that is always relative to other referent objects; rather 
than having an intrinsic value as part of the power‟s identity or innate value-set, their 
importance lies in their usefulness for or threat to the great power‟s higher-level 
security objectives.   This distinction is important in distinguishing this type of discourse 
from the previously discussed identity-based variant.  A second defining characteristic 
of such discourse is that regional interest be based on material features whose 
relevance is independent from interactions at the systemic level; in other words, 
features that would be either useful or threatening to the great power regardless of the 
behaviour of its peers30.  
The justification of regional involvement through the security imperatives emanating 
from the systemic level, on the other hand, brings us to the third element in the 
discourse underlying system-region projections of power: systemic strategies.  Here, 
the value of a region lies not in its identification with the great power, or in its innate 
and materially threatening or useful nature, but in its significance to interaction at the 
systemic level (Taliaferro, 2004).  The great power may not perceive any „objective‟ 
interests within a region, yet, higher-level strategic considerations may force it to be 
involved; a systemic security dilemma may drive great powers towards regional 
entanglements in the periphery, by default, lest the others „get there first‟.  Again, the 
superpower rivalry during the Cold War provides many examples of regional 
involvements by the United States and the USSR in the absence of „objective‟ 
interests, simply predicated on the possibility of exerting “indirect influence” (Scott, 
1982, pp. 177-197) on the adversary. The crucial element here is the absence of 
„objective‟, material interests: that the region concerned be neither intrinsically 
threatening nor useful for the power in question save for its role in the broader context 
of systemic great power competition.  As a result, regional commitments are not 
                                               
30
 This discourse underlies regional great power behaviour that is predicated on clearly defined geopolitical 
objectives centred on the region in question.  In cases where features are instrumentalised this may, for 
example, refer to „resource wars‟ aimed at ensuring the supply of strategic commodities (Broad, 1980; 
Klare, 2001), or interventions in favour of economic interests (Frieden, 1989).  In cases where such 
characteristics are securitised, this could include interventions designed to prevent the proliferation of 
WMD, or involvements aimed at suppressing terrorist activity directed at the great power. In all these 
cases, regional involvement would usually be subject to a favourable cost/benefit analysis mainly taking 
account of variables within the region proper.  To some extent, it also underlies grand strategies based on 
„selective engagement‟ (Art, 1998; Posen & Ross, 1996, pp. 17-24), whereby great powers only involve 
themselves in regions where „vital interests‟ are at stake (although the next factor may also be at play 
there). 
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justified through a cost-benefit calculus based on the region proper; in fact, the costs of 
such involvement may very well exceed the benefits if one evaluates them separately 
from the overall systemic context.  The rationale only becomes apparent when 
systemic factors, such as the overall balance of power and concomitant issues of 
credibility and prestige are taken into consideration. 
Finally, some justifications of regional intervention centre around universalised31 
values, to some extent bringing the classification full circle as the argument returns, 
once again, to ideas and shared identities, albeit of a cosmopolitan/solidarist rather 
than communitarian/pluralist kind (Wheeler, 2002).  While such global values imply a 
form of identification (with mankind as a whole), they are quite distant from the great 
power‟s particularist domestic values and identities that formed the first motivating 
element explored here in great power interventions.  There thus is a great difference 
between regional involvement based on shared values/identities and interventions 
based on global values/identities, like, for instance, the „responsibility to protect‟ (ICISS, 
2001); the first refer to confluences of a particular set of specifically communitarian 
values, whereas the latter refer to universalist values and identities, deemed common 
to humanity as a whole.  Securitisation in the latter case is quite distant and abstract: at 
stake are not identities and values that are specific to the great power, but the common 
identities and values of humanity, a general concern with the welfare and survival of 
the species.  Needless to say, such discourse is the main driver behind humanitarian 
interventions based not on existential fear but on altruism, and as such is the weakest 
and, as some would argue, least straightforwardly credible (Chandler, 2004) of all four 
discourses in driving regional great power intervention, at least in contemporary 
international society. 
Great power discourse on regional intervention includes elements of all four above-
mentioned ideal-types, and clearly differentiating between them will add considerable 
value to any analysis.  The different motivations/calculations behind regional great 
power involvement are important in determining the extent to which the power will go in 
order to maintain its presence there.  Two discursive elements are important here.  
Firstly, clearly distinguishing between the argumentative and instrumental aspects of 
securitisation gives the researcher an edge in understanding the phenomenon by 
separating values and means in the drivers of intervention – shared identities, material 
interests, systemic strategies and universal values – and judging the extent to which 
involvement is a strategic aim in itself or a mere opportunistic tactic in the overall 
                                               
31
 Note the deliberate use of „universalised‟ instead of „universal‟ here, aimed at avoiding western-centrism 
and cultural absolutism: while the values referred to are claimed to be universal by the given great power, 
their actual universal nature remains open to question. 
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interaction between great powers, or something in between.    Each of these discursive 
ideal-types implies different configurations of ends and means, different pathways 
linking the region to the great power as either a value or a means in terms of security.  
Secondly, and more importantly, the concept of discursive stability introduced in 
chapter 2 could again serve to denote the permanence of a great power‟s presence in 
a region; the extent to which discourse of regional intervention is well-rooted, both 
materially and ideationally, indicates the lengths to which a power is prepared or able 
to go in order to prolong its involvement.  To what extent such involvement is 
contested, or under danger from changing material circumstances, are central 
questions to ask when looking at the subjective perceptions of regions by the great 
power. 
Moreover, this subjective aspect of great power involvement relates directly to the 
notion of socially constructed „interest‟ alongside material „capabilities‟ as mutually 
constitutive parts of a hybrid, Wendtian conceptualisation of „power‟ (Wendt, 1999, pp. 
96-109), if one sees the relationship between the distribution of capabilities and 
interests throughout the system in regional terms.  If, as Wendt (1999, p. 109) says, 
“the distribution of interests must have an independent role in constituting the meaning 
of anarchy and the distribution of power”, great powers‟ regional interests – as outlined 
above in terms of „subjective‟ discourse – could be argued to determine the allocation 
of resources to particular regional involvements. In fact, this conforms to what one sees 
in terms of actual state behaviour: the „distribution of capabilities‟ through the system 
will to some extent be regionally defined, and powers will be more willing to apply their 
capabilities in some regions than in others.  In other words, as a result, the distribution 
of these capabilities will be directly related to the distribution of interest within the 
regionally differentiated system.   
The final, intersubjective tier of penetration refers to the effects of an individual great 
power‟s regional involvement on the security dynamics of a region.  The presence of a 
great power in regional patterns of securitisation – or the „discursive dependence‟ of an 
RSC – is the last, and crucial, intersubjective building block in regional projections of 
power; without it, neither the material nor subjective tiers of penetration would be 
relevant.  A region can only be deemed penetrated by a great power if its component 
units actually react to this penetration.  Seen in such discursive terms, the question 
thus becomes how a given power is integrated into the region‟s security discourse: how 
and how intensely region-level units react to and perceive its power, and its interests 
within regional „discourses of penetration‟.  This „discursive dependence/independence‟ 
can be seen as encompassing the following elements, among others: firstly, the 
prominence (or absence) of the great power in the region‟s security discourse.  
 93 
Secondly, the alignments of regional actors with or against the penetrating power: in 
terms of securitisation, whether the great power is securitised as a threat or whether it 
is seen as a potential means towards greater security.  And, thirdly, perceptions by 
regional states of the penetrating power‟s capabilities relative to its counterparts, and of 
its effects on regional polarity.   
Through its effect on the instrumental and argumentative security discourses of 
regional actors, great power penetration directly or indirectly influences these units‟ 
security-enhancing strategies (R. E. Kelly, 2007) and collective values/identities.  On 
the one hand, regional actors react directly to regional GPP, by either securitising 
regional involvement by the great power as a threat (in their instrumental security 
discourses), by aligning themselves (bandwagoning) with the great power as a 
security-enhancing strategy (again, in their instrumental security discourses) or, more 
rarely, by identifying with the great power through shared identities and values (in their 
argumentative security discourses).  On the other hand, GPPs can also have an 
important indirect effect on regional patterns of securitisation by influencing the 
strategic calculations and broadening or narrowing the range of options available to the 
units in their relations to their regional counterparts.  Through the resulting effects on 
the convergence or divergence of regional security discourses, great power penetration 
thus has a considerable effect on regional patterns of amity and enmity, a link that will 
be of great importance in the later chapters connecting these two concepts. 
These objective, subjective and intersubjective aspects of great power involvement 
cannot be seen as separate from their effects on the wider systemic security dynamic.  
Ultimately, they must be placed within the network of perceptions and counter-
perceptions, action and counteraction that constitute „international politics‟ in general.  
The material actions and subjective perceptions of other intervening great powers, of 
the regional units themselves, and of „significant others‟ are, in the end, collectively 
instrumental in shaping the material and subjective/intersubjective aspects of a 
particular intervention; objective reality, subjective self-perception and intersubjective 
interaction thus stand in a relationship of constant mutual constitution.  Placing 
separate, objective-subjective-intersubjective regional penetrations within the wider 
security dynamic thus becomes the final part of the puzzle of great power involvement.  
At this point, our discussion somewhat returns to RSCT – whose structural variables 
provide a means of capturing the complexities of an intersubjective universe of security 
– concentrating on building a typology of aggregate „patterns of great power 
penetration‟. 
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Categorising Aggregate Patterns of Great Power Penetration 
In the end, the individual projections of power into a region described in the previous 
section can be aggregated into what I shall call a „regional pattern of penetration‟, the 
systemic-regional portion of the security constellation surrounding a given RSC.  Their 
structure and characterisation depends largely on the interaction between the different 
powers penetrating the region, including those powers that may be indigenous to the 
latter.  Such a regional „pattern of GPP‟ serves as an intermediate category between 
the region and the system; with its own polarity and patterns of amity/enmity, and a 
membership that combines both extra-regional and „indigenous‟ powers, it captures the 
how system-level polarities and patterns of amity and enmity are „focused‟ in regionally 
specific ways through the interaction of the capabilities and interests of powers. 
As was implied above, the projection of power by great powers is determined by both 
their capabilities and their interests, with the latter determining the distribution of 
projections of power throughout the system.  As a consequence, it would be wrong to 
directly link the systemic and the regional: the former must be mediated, focused 
through a region-specific lens, constituted by interests, in order to become relevant in a 
particular RSC.  Rather than conceptualising the systemic level and linking it directly 
with the regional, one would have to construct it from the unique perspective of the 
RSC that is the object of study (Miller, 1995).  Empirically, this is supported by the 
significant „disconnects‟ one often encounters between regional penetrations and the 
systemic distributions of power and patterns of amity/enmity.  Powers do not penetrate 
the various regions within the system equally; their presence is more pronounced in 
some RSCs than others, and their patterns of amity/enmity will sometimes (but more 
rarely) be at variance with specific configurations of cooperation or competition, from 
region to region.  Some participants at the systemic level might be indifferent to a 
particular region and thus be irrelevant, as great powers, to the polarity of systemic-
regional penetration there.  Differences in interest may amplify the capabilities of some 
great powers in certain regions, and temper them in others.  Alternatively, great powers 
with an overall cooperative relationship may be more competitive at a specific regional 
level.  Thus, what is relevant to the regional level is not the overall structure of the 
systemic level, but how this structure is ultimately transferred onto the regional level 
through interventions by great powers as the polarity and amity/enmity of region-
specific patterns of GPP. 
As far as system-level penetration goes, Russia and Japan – if one takes them as 
system-level great powers – are hardly relevant to the security dynamics of African 
RSCs.  China is, as it has clearly decided to project its power into the region (mostly 
through no-strings-attached aid) in pursuit of raw materials (Alden, 2005).  An analysis 
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of system-region interaction could thus reasonably omit Japan and Russia.  The above 
also explains to a great extent why great powers sometimes accept defeat in far-flung 
regions in spite of their overwhelming system-level superiority.  The enormous military 
prowess of the United States was ultimately inconsequential in Vietnam (Betts, 1980) 
precisely because a lack of interest limited its willingness to use its capabilities to the 
full; the extreme military unipolarity of today‟s international system would arguably be 
far more relevant in case of interventions in regions of high interest, like Europe or East 
Asia.  Similarly, there have been (admittedly rare) historical cases of cooperation or 
competition between great powers that diverged from the overall systemic pattern of 
amity or enmity.  This could be argued to be the case between the US, the UK and 
France in contemporary Africa  (regionally competitive, systemically cooperative) 
(Alden, 2000), or, conversely, between the otherwise fractious Western great powers in 
East Asia – especially China – during and after the Boxer rebellion (Otte, 2007). 
Thus, each region will have a unique group of great powers interacting within its pattern 
of GPP.  Apart from those powers penetrating the region from above and outside, they 
will also include indigenous great powers32, which both penetrate and are part of the 
region.   
These aggregate patterns of GPP will be classified along two dimensions:   
Firstly, their „polarity‟: the sum of great powers penetrating the region as described in 
the previous section, and the distribution of power between them.  As stated above, 
such penetrations would necessitate three distinct components: a physical presence on 
the macro-level, subjective great power „discourses of penetration‟, and at least some 
„discursive dependence‟ of the RSC on the penetrating great power.   
And, secondly, their „amity/enmity‟, based, from a macro-perspective, on their overt 
cooperative or competitive behaviour, and, from a micro-perspective, on the 
convergence or divergence of their subjective „discourses of penetration‟, or, in other 
words, the compatibility/incompatibility of subjective motivations for regional 
involvement.  This runs entirely in parallel with the idea of discursive 
convergence/divergence underlying amity/enmity within the region proper, as described 
in chapter 2. 
                                               
32 
One could argue that indigenous regional powers would have to be included as well, insofar as they are 
able to challenge penetrating great powers.  If power is taken to be constituted by capability and interest, 
their power could become comparable, from a region-specific perspective, to that of their great power 
counterparts.   
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Keeping this in mind, it now becomes possible to establish a typology of GPP based on 
these two, material and ideational variables of polarity and discursive 
convergence/divergence.  To this effect, the concepts of polarity and amity/enmity will 
be operationalised somewhat less complicatedly than in the case of RSCs. Where 
polarity is concerned, a simple distinction shall be made between unipolar and 
multipolar33.  As regards amity/enmity, there will be a straightforward differentiation 
between competition and cooperation, rather than the necessarily more complicated 
conflict formation/security regime/security community differentiation in chapter 2.  The 
result will be the 1+3+1 typology of GPP seen in table 1: unipolarity (where 
amity/enmity is irrelevant as a variable), cooperative multipolarity and competitive 
multipolarity at the centre, bounded on either side by two related concepts – hegemony 
and disengagement – that fall outside the definition of penetration proper, the former 
because it implies the effective overlay of regional security dynamics (and 
consequently, the absence of a functioning RSC), the latter because it refers to an 
absence of GPP.  I shall now discuss these different categories one by one, applying 
the objective/subjective/intersubjective framework as necessary34. 
Table 1: 1+3+1 Typology of Regional Great Power Penetration 
   Great Power Penetration  
Disengagement  Competitive-
Multipolar 
Cooperative-
Multipolar 
Unipolar  Hegemony 
0  
Great Powers 
 n Competing 
Great Powers 
n Cooperating 
Great Powers 
1  
Great 
Power 
 1  
Great Power 
Perfect Anarchy / 
Discursive 
Independence 
 Partial Discursive Dependence  No Anarchy / 
Discursive 
Dependence 
 
Hegemony in effect means the overlay of regional security dynamics by a single great 
power, and its complete military, economic and/or political domination of the RSC.  
From the objective, macro-perspective, hegemony thus entails an overriding presence 
by one great power within the RSC: the existence of a formal alliance with most units of 
the RSC, the stationing of troops throughout the RSC, its economic/commercial 
predominance within the region, leading to a significant impairment of regional anarchic 
conditions.  From the micro-perspective, the crucial factor is the absence of 
autonomous patterns of securitisation.  The security of regional units is entirely, 
                                               
33
 An additional, structurally significant differentiation is possible between multi-polar and bi-polar: there is, 
indeed, an important difference between the dynamics of 2-player and n-player games from a purely 
rationalist point of view, and this is bound to reflect upon the security dynamics of a given region.  I have 
steered clear of an explicit differentiation in this text, mostly for purposes of simplicity and clarity (to avoid 
an exceedingly complex 1+5+1 typology), preferring to treat bi-polarity as a special form of multi-polarity. 
34 
The scheme presented here is, in effect, based on the adaptation of a mainly materialist/macro-
perspective framework suggested by Benjamin Miller (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2007; Miller & Kagan, 1997; 
Miller & Resnick, 2003). 
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willingly or unwillingly, attuned, subordinated to the interests of the hegemon, 
instrumentally and often argumentatively as well. In other words, subordinated states 
take care to adjust their security-seeking discourse and behaviour to the hegemon‟s, 
and often end up pursuing similar values or even sharing an identity with their 
hegemonic overlord; the Gramscian (Cox, 1983) slant in this ideational part of the 
concept is evident.  Failure to do so usually results in „corrective‟ punitive measures by 
the latter. 
Disengagement implies the exact opposite: the irrelevance of any great power to a 
region‟s security dynamic.  The question is how to establish whether a great power is 
relevant to the region‟s security; after all, in today‟s globalised world, great powers (and 
lesser states, for that matter) do tend to have a presence of sort in regions around the 
world, without necessarily being relevant to regional patterns of securitisation.  The 
three-tiered conceptualisation of individual GPPs can serve as a guide.  Objectively, a 
disengaged great power‟s relations with the region in question will be minimal, and 
generally imply that the power in question is unwilling to bear significant material costs 
in order to (directly or indirectly) maintain a regional presence, either through the 
support of proxies or through a substantial presence of its own.  Subjectively, the great 
power must perceive the region to be of no or only marginal interest to the 
maintenance of its security: in other words, the region must not feature in its network of 
securitisations.  Intersubjectively, the region‟s security dynamic must not be affected by 
the great power‟s above-mentioned minimal, objective presence. Neither the great 
powers‟ peers, nor the RSC units must include whatever limited presence the great 
power may have within the region in the instrumental and argumentative aspects of 
their mutual securitisations.  This does not mean that the units don‟t take account of the 
presence of these great powers on the systemic level; it does mean, however, that the 
activities of great powers within the RSC remain too insignificant to affect relationships 
of security between the RSC units.  Disengagement thus amounts to the material 
absence, subjective indifference and intersubjective irrelevance of great powers vis-à-
vis a given RSC. 
The unipolar/multipolar, competitive/cooperative forms of GPP are situated between 
these two extremes of hegemony and complete disengagement.  It is important here to 
make a clear distinction between hegemony on the one hand, and the unipolar 
penetration of an RSC on the other.  The latter simply refers to the penetration of an 
RSC by one single power, with other units retaining their ability to pursue autonomous 
foreign and security policies.  While the region‟s security dynamic is affected, in whole, 
by one single external, or internal „centring‟ power, regional units preserve some 
independence in determining their external relations according to autonomous patterns 
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of securitisation.  In case of hegemony, however, the RSC in effect ceases to function 
because of the severe impairment of regional anarchy:  endogenous patterns of amity 
and enmity and polarity are overridden by a common submission to the hegemon by all 
or part of the units, giving it the role of final arbiter in intra-regional disputes.  Units still 
formally survive as sovereign entities, but over the longer term, their foreign and 
security policies are determined (willingly or otherwise) by the dominant great power‟s 
interests; deviations from this norm are usually localised and by and large temporary35. 
While the difference between unipolarity and multipolarity is fairly straightforward, and 
based on the number of powers (indigenous or external) penetrating the region, the 
variable of amity/enmity, as defined through cooperation and competition deserves 
some wider discussion.  On a macro-level, the co-operative involvement of several 
great powers within a region can become apparent through their presence in joint 
peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, the presence of formal or informal decision-
making and coordination mechanisms regarding the region.   The co-ordinated and 
compatible nature of the powers‟ micro-level discourse is crucial in determining the 
stability and longevity of these co-operative arrangements; whether they co-operate on 
opportunistic strategic considerations that happen to coincide, common material 
interests or genuinely shared values makes a difference in terms of discursive stability, 
and, hence, the continuity of co-operative behaviour.  A competitive relationship 
between different great powers involved in a region, on the other hand, manifests itself 
on the macro-level through the existence of opposing alliances (of varying formality) 
between units within the RSC and their respective great power sponsors, or frequent, 
intra-regional proxy wars, as well as divergent coercive and incentivising policies aimed 
at either forcing or persuading units at bandwagoning with one or the other power, or 
combinations of powers.    From a micro-perspective, such competition will be the 
result of conflicting and incompatible subjective discourses of interest by the great 
powers, and the exact nature of these incompatibilities, and their interaction with the 
regional security dynamic will be crucial in determining the effect of GPP on regional 
security. 
The importance of these patterns of GPP lies in their varying influence on the security 
dynamics of penetrated regions; in effect, different types of penetration impose different 
structural constraints on the discourse and behaviour of units (Miller, 2000, 2007; Miller 
                                               
35 
The USSR‟s role in Eastern Europe – if one takes it as a region separate from Western Europe – during 
the Cold War could certainly be described as falling under hegemony, thus defined.  The security interests 
of the socialist bloc were very much subordinated to those of the USSR, certainly during the earlier years 
(Rubin, 1982).  Decision-making was very much centralised in Moscow; the Brezhnev doctrine later saw to 
it that it deviations from the norms concocted in the Kremlin were punished (Jones, 1977).   
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& Resnick, 2003).  As argued in previous chapters, the rump materialist and structural 
theoretical approach applied here not only opens discourse to the explicitly 
acknowledged influence of the physical, material world; it more generally allows for the 
limiting influence of structures (both ideational and material) on the agency of individual 
actors.  Patterns of penetration are such constraining structures, bending discourse 
towards certain outcomes without, however, any kind of determinism or automatism.  
As such, they influence the four constitutive variables of RSCs – boundaries, anarchy, 
polarity and amity/enmity – by creating inter-regional interaction centred on penetrating 
powers, by distorting the polarity of a given RSC, by mitigating its anarchy and by 
exacerbating or dampening existing patterns of amity and enmity. 
Patterns of penetration can also be linked to what Buzan and Wæver have called the 
„external transformation‟ of RSCs, either through their combination into 
„supercomplexes‟ – groups of RSCs whose still-distinct security dynamics display a 
high measure of interdependence through their joint penetration by one or several 
great powers – or through their outright merger or division (Buzan, 1991, p. 219; Buzan 
& Wæver, 2003, pp. 53-61).  Two or more otherwise disparate regions might „transform 
externally‟ into a supercomplex through their common penetration by one single, or 
several, interacting great powers, as in the case of the Northeast Asian and Southeast 
Asian RSCs and China (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 155-156).  Conversely, a RSC 
where penetration is geographically disparate – with different great powers penetrating 
or even overlaying different sub-complexes – might fall apart, as arguably happened in 
Europe after the Cold War (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 346-351).   
In addition, the indigenous polarity of a given region may become practically irrelevant 
if it is heavily penetrated by extra-regional powers; the balance of power in a given 
region may be determined not so much by internal factors – the capabilities of units 
themselves – as by alignments and alliances with sponsoring powers.  The intensity of 
penetration, its polarity and its unipolar/cooperative or competitive nature would be 
crucial in determining by how much such intra-regional factors would lose their 
relevance, with increased penetrative multipolarity and competitiveness adding to the 
complexity of analysis. 
GPP also qualifies the anarchic nature of a given RSC, with the hegemonic, unipolar, 
multipolar-cooperative, multipolar-competitive and disengaged categories very much 
acting as a continuum allowing increasing anarchy within a given RSC36.  Thus, 
                                               
36 
Several authors working within the English School also broached the subject of international systems 
with varying levels of anarchy, albeit outside an explicitly regionalist framework.  Wight (1977, pp. 21-29) 
thus distinguished between sovereign state-systems and suzerain, hierarchical systems.  Watson (2007, 
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unipolar or co-operative multipolar involvements will limit the margins of manoeuvre of 
regional units in counteracting the objectives of those powers; the systemic level will 
dampen the autonomous and anarchic regional security dynamic to a considerable 
degree as the powers are able to impose themselves more efficiently onto the region, 
and interactions at the systemic-regional level will thus be of disproportionate 
importance in understanding region-level security.  The contrary is true for competitive 
multipolar penetrations: here, regional units will often see their options multiply through 
the possible bandwagoning with different powers vying for influence.  Anarchic 
conditions will unmitigatedly prevail.  As I shall hypothesise in the following chapter, 
such patterns of penetration have a significant influence on the amity/enmity variable 
through their effects on the presence and/or structure of regional anarchy.  GPP is thus 
one of the structures pressuring discourse and behaviour in certain directions through 
its effects on the security dynamic of a given region; and the effects of such varying 
patterns of penetration on patterns of amity and enmity the Southern Caucasus will 
figure among the subjects of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has formulated the third, and final, conceptual building block to this 
expanded, „Wendtian‟ version of RSCT, by developing the notion of great power 
penetration alongside the already refined concepts of amity/enmity and state 
(in)coherence.  After defining great power status, it turned its attention to individual 
great power involvements and their material-objective, subjective and intersubjective 
manifestations.  The objective aspects referred to a great power‟s physical presence in 
and interaction with the given RSC; the subjective tier developed the region‟s role 
within the great power‟s subjective security discourse through four ideal-types: shared 
identity, material interest, systemic strategies and universalised values; 
intersubjectively, GPP was also expounded in terms of the discursive (in)dependence 
of regional units vis-à-vis the great power.  The result was a 1+3+1 typology based on 
the polarity and amity/enmity of aggregated great power involvements with a given 
RSC: unipolar, cooperative-multipolar and competitive-multipolar patterns of GPP, all 
bounded by hegemony on one side and disengagement on the other. 
But as explained before, this thesis will not be a solely theoretical exercise; it will aim to 
demonstrate that such a hybrid, multi-dimensional framework could be used for the 
                                                                                                                                         
pp. 19-22) similarly elaborated a more detailed spectrum of anarchy and hierarchy (independence, 
hegemony, dominion, empire).  Although they run parallel to the framework presented here, a crucial 
difference is their sole concern with the undifferentiated quantitative level of anarchy versus hierarchy, as 
opposed to the qualitative and multi-dimensional pattern of great power involvement as differentiated 
according to polarity and amity/enmity, which is the object of discussion here.  The above-mentioned 
variance in the level of anarchy emerges from my primary concern with these patterns. 
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generation and ordering of practically useful and understandable empirical knowledge 
that also adequately captures the inherently complex interactions that lie at the heart of 
regional security.  Subsequent chapters will endeavour to prove just that, by utilising 
the concepts to a number of mutually complementary ends, including the testing of 
several hypotheses, and the concurrent mapping of the Southern Caucasus‟ security 
dynamic.  In preparation, the next chapter will act as a methodological „hinge‟ between 
the thesis‟ theoretical and empirical parts, by outlining a practical application of what 
hitherto has been a rather abstract conceptual exercise. 
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CHAPTER 5: PUTTING THE FRAMEWORK INTO 
PRACTICE 
Ultimately, the appeal of any given theoretical framework lies in its applicability to the 
real world, and its ability to provide added analytical value; the central aim of this 
methodological chapter will therefore consist of outlining a systematic practical 
operationalisation of concepts previously elaborated in the abstract. The first, 
introductory chapter already identified the case study that will serve as a testing ground 
for this expanded conceptual framework of RSCT: the Southern Caucasus.  As 
promised in that chapter, I shall specify a number of hypotheses on the linkages 
between state incoherence, great power penetration and amity/enmity, and a number 
of research questions regarding their effects on the possible transformation/evolution of 
patterns of amity/enmity.  Subsequently, using the case study and the research 
questions and hypotheses as a mental „anchor‟, I shall proceed to elaborate a 
methodology geared towards falsifying/confirming these hypotheses, using the as-yet 
abstract concepts introduced in previous chapters.  In the case of amity/enmity, state 
incoherence and great power penetration, I shall set out approaches to the macro- and 
micro-perspectives alluded to in previous chapters, by specifying clear, systematic 
criteria from the macro-perspective for the different categories introduced, and by 
elaborating on the micro-perspective study of discourse in each case through concepts 
like „discursive convergence/divergence‟ and „(in)dependence‟.  This chapter‟s final part 
will particularly dwell on the identification of potential change in the regional security 
dynamic through the „stability‟ of instrumental and argumentative official discourses.   
As laid out in the first chapter, the latter half of this thesis will concentrate on assessing 
the amity/enmity, state incoherence,and great power penetration variables within a 
small, but disproportionately complex area of the Former Soviet Union – the Southern 
Caucasus – using the previously expanded theoretical framework. The ultimate aim will 
be to weigh the possibilities for the emergence of a security regime within the region by 
employing the previously expanded RSCT framework with its hybrid, material-
ideational view.  I shall assess the possibilities of the emergence of a security regime in 
the region by evaluating the „stability‟ of prevailing discourses.  The methodology 
employed – involving the mapping of the convergence, independence and stability of 
security discourse in the region – should also provide a detailed view of the 
opportunities and pitfalls, discursive pathways, bottlenecks and obstacles that stand in 
the way of a transformation of the fractious South Caucasus from conflict formation to 
security regime.   
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This line of questioning opens up a range of issues, and within the previously 
expanded framework of RSCT, it in particular points to the possible effects of state 
incoherence and great power penetration on amity/enmity.  How do these two variables 
affect amity/enmity in terms of providing opportunities and pitfalls, bottlenecks and 
obstacles for or against the emergence of a security regime?  Previous work by Miller37 
(2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2007; 2003) has implied that horizontal state incoherence 
and competitive patterns of GPP skew the culture of anarchy within an RSC towards 
greater enmity, and complicate transitions from revisionist conflict formations to 
security regimes by acting as structural impediments.  More empirically, commentators 
within and outside the region have often referred to the new „great game‟ between the 
powers as an impediment to peace, and have pointed to the presence of ethnic 
minorities as a source for international conflict (Cheterian, 2008, pp. 373-379; Cornell, 
2001; De Waal, 2010).  Would an analysis of material conditions and security discourse 
in the South Caucasus similarly confirm these negative links made either from a 
different theoretical perspective, or more empirical standpoints?  Looking at the way 
the incoherence of their counterparts and the presence of the great powers affects the 
security policies of the region‟s units thus becomes a pertinent preparatory line of 
inquiry to the final scenario-building exercise. 
Whether and how, state incoherence  affects enmity in the Southern Caucasus RSC, 
and whether and how GPP affects these patterns of amity/enmity become this thesis‟ 
two main foci of inquiry, to be analysed from a combined macro- and micro-
perspective.  The two corresponding hypotheses are, firstly, that state incoherence has 
negatively affected amity and enmity in the Southern Caucasus since independence, 
and, secondly, that the competitive nature of great power penetration has played an 
essential role in maintaining the revisionist conflict formation there.  By the end of this 
endeavour, both hypotheses should have been examined from this hybrid, material-
ideational point of view, allowing me to more effectively gauge the potential for an 
emergent security regime in the RSC, But what exactly does a methodology combining 
macro- and micro-perspectives. and ideational and material factors entail?  And how 
                                               
37
 Employing a largely materialist outlook and a historical methodology, Miller describes state incoherence 
and territorial revisionism (he refers to the phenomena jointly as state-nation imbalance) as the main 
independent variable affecting the war-proneness of regions, which he visualises in terms of a spectrum 
ranging from „hot war‟, through „cold war‟, „cold peace‟, and „normal peace‟ to „warm peace‟ (2007, pp. 41-
81).   Apart from the state-nation imbalance, Miller also sees patterns of GPP as co-determinants of 
regional „war-proneness‟; in the case of both variables, he clearly retains a macro-view and avoids looking 
at discourse.  His basic claim is that these patterns mainly facilitate the emergence of „cold war‟ and „cold 
peace‟, with co-operative patterns of penetration favouring the latter outcome.  Transitions to „hot wars‟ 
and „warm peace‟, on the other hand, are mainly determined by the interests and calculations of the 
regional actors themselves (as the costs and risks involved in both are disproportionately more significant) 
(2007, pp. 13-20).  
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does one operationalise the three variables in terms of discursive convergence, 
independence and stability? 
Amity/Enmity, and the Convergence/Divergence of Inter-State Discourse 
In chapter two, I already conceptualised amity/enmity in terms of a spectrum, based on 
both macro- and micro-criteria.  I also briefly introduced the notion of „discursive 
convergence‟ to describe the ways in which micro-perspective security discourse 
comes together or diverges within a given RSC.  Placing a given region within this 
spectrum will thus entail applying criteria from both the macro- and micro-perspectives.  
From the macro-perspective, a RSC will display a number of objective, readily 
observable characteristics where amity and enmity are concerned.  The most obvious 
is the presence or absence of conflicts, their regularity, and the extent to which they are 
resolved. These structural macro-characteristics will be reflected at the level of 
discourse; zones of conflict, regimes and zones of peace observed from the macro-
viewpoint will be „grounded‟ in processes of securitisation and desecuritisation 
observed in a given region.   
Security discourse will converge to differing degrees, and display varying 
characteristics, in different cultures of anarchy, in both its instrumental and 
argumentative aspects.  Conflict formations could be based on deep-rooted 
argumentative mutual securitisations of values and identities; on the other hand, they 
could be the result of conflicting instrumental strategies aimed at securing identities 
and values that are not a priori conflictual.  Security regimes could be seen entirely 
instrumentally, as utility-maximising means, or they could become values in and of 
themselves.  Security communities might be based on merged collective values and 
identities of differing intensity.  From the point of view of methodology the question 
arises: how exactly does one place a region in this spectrum?  To properly characterise 
a given region, one would need two sets of criteria: epiphenomenal, macro-perspective 
ones, acting as a first indication of a region‟s nature, and micro-viewpoint counterparts 
that require a thorough analysis of the discourse in a region.  Let us now turn to these 
formal macro-characteristics of amity/enmity, before moving on to the micro-
perspective. 
Conflict formations are thus characterised – from a macro-perspective – by military 
competition (detectable through arms races, aggressive military postures and/or the 
presence/regularity of armed conflict) and a lack of formal security regimes aimed at 
resolving such military competition.  „Armed conflict‟, in this sense, will be defined as 
any unresolved military confrontation involving at least one state-like unit, having 
caused 1000 or more battle-related combatant or civilian deaths, loosely following the 
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criteria specified for „war‟ in the PRIO and Uppsala University DPCR datasets (Strand, 
Wilhelmsen, & Gledits, 2003, pp. 3-4).   “Two or more parties perceiving themselves to 
be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a 
rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to 
the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties” 
(Gray, 1971, p. 40) will be seen as being involved in an arms race.  The lack of an 
effective security regime will be interpreted as the absence of effective binding 
agreements under international law specifically aimed at mitigating military competition, 
either by solving the underlying issues behind direct military conflict, or by providing for 
arms control mechanisms.  Ad-hoc cease-fire agreements and third-party monitoring 
regimes will not count as such: the defining criterion will be the emergence of a political 
agreement addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, not suspending the military 
confrontation itself.  The difference between revisionist and status-quo conflict 
formations will mainly lie in the lack of formal legal recognition that underlies conflict in 
the former, as in the case of Israel and some Arab states and Iran, Taiwan and the 
PRC, and, indeed, the de-facto statelets in the Southern Caucasus. 
Moving on, the next category of „security regimes‟ is characterised by the presence of 
formal conflict-minimising norms, or, in other words, the binding security accords 
whose absence was typical of conflict formations.  From a macro-perspective, conflicts 
within thin security regimes have been resolved through ad-hoc agreements that still 
imply a degree of distrust, and thus often require either mutual verification mechanisms 
or third-party security guarantees), and include a weak degree of institutionalisation.  
Thick security regimes, by contrast, will be based on agreements that are strongly 
institutionalised, and imply a high degree of trust between the parties38.  The „density‟ of 
such agreements will also matter: in „thick‟ security regimes, units will have developed 
mechanisms for cooperation and coordination at different levels and in different sectors 
of security.  The differing underlying dynamics of these two types of security regime are 
somewhat similar, respectively, to those of common or cooperative security 
arrangements (in the case of thin security regimes), and comprehensive security 
frameworks (in the case of thick security regimes), with the latter implying a greater 
degree of institutionalisation and a broader range of (non-traditional) issue-areas 
(Dewitt, 1994; Emmers, 2003, pp. 4-5).  
                                               
38
 For an appropriate conceptualisation of „trust‟ in International Relations, see Hoffman (2002); he defines 
trust in terms of the degree of discretion granted to actors, and the limited nature of oversight as visible in 
both practice and formal normative frameworks.  Intergovernmental security institutions providing for 
limited exchanges of sensitive information and intelligence, for instance, imply a high degree of trust, thus 
defined. 
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Table 2: Categories of Amity/Enmity and their macro- and micro-perspective criteria 
 Macro-Perspective 
Characteristics 
Instrumental 
convergence/divergence 
(means and threats) 
Argumentative 
convergence/divergence 
(identities and values) 
Revisionist 
Conflict 
formation 
Military Competition 
/ Lack of mutual 
recognition / Lack of 
formal security 
regimes 
War as means / 
hypersecuritisations
39
 
Incompatible Identities and 
values 
Status-Quo 
Conflict 
Formation 
Military Competition 
/ Mutual Recognition 
/ Lack of formal 
security regimes 
War as means / 
securitisations based on 
security dilemmas, 
conflicting „national interests‟ 
Distinct but compatible 
identities and values 
Thin Security 
Regime 
Conflicts resolved 
through ad-hoc 
security regimes 
often based on 
verification / 3d-party 
guarantees 
Security cooperation as 
means / securitisations 
based on security dilemmas 
Distinct but compatible 
identities and values 
Thick 
Security 
Regime 
Conflicts minimised 
through 
Institutionalised 
mechanisms based 
on trust 
Partial desecuritisation / 
Regime as value 
Security 
cooperation/institutions as 
part of collective values / 
distinct identities 
Loose 
Security 
Community 
Absence of conflict / 
integrated security 
institutions 
Exclusion of war as means / 
de- or meta-securitisation 
Security 
cooperation/institutions as 
part of collective values / 
Emergence of collective 
identities 
Tight 
Security 
Community 
Absence of conflict / 
supranational 
security institutions 
Exclusion of war as means / 
de- or meta-securitisation 
Security 
cooperation/institutions 
based on collective identities 
Higher up the ladder of amity, in loose – or, in Adler and Barnett‟s (1998b, pp. 55-57) 
terms, „loosely coupled‟ – security communities, conflicts will be „unthinkable‟ partly 
because the structure of international law providing for permanent security institutions 
will to some extent have been integrated rather than simply providing for co-ordination 
or co-operation.  Joint military planning (as, for instance, in the case of NORAD), the 
absence of fortified borders and multilateralism will be the most visible macro-level 
symptoms of wide-scale desecuritisation at the micro-level40.  In tight security 
                                               
39
 Hypersecuritisation denotes “a tendency both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive counter-
measures” (Buzan, 2004, p. 172); this usually occurs in an acute way, over several sectors, to the 
detriment of other referent objects that might actually be threatened by the counter-measures themselves.  
Ultra-nationalist conspiracy theories may be a good indication of such hyper-securitisation. 
40
 De-securitisation is, in effect, the reverse of „securitisation‟: a referent object is deemed to be no longer 
under existential threat, and any extra-ordinary measures taken to safeguard it are rolled back.  Its urgency 
diminished, the issue (re-)enters the political realm and becomes an object of everyday, routine politics.  
Within the context of the South Caucasus‟ regional conflicts, this would refer to more than the simple 
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communities, finally, units will have ceded part of their traditional sovereign powers to 
supra-national frameworks for dealing with collectively defined security concerns; while 
states will remain in existence, aspects of their core security-providing functions will 
have been taken over by these institutions which will have become political actors in 
their own right.  Such regions would be one step away from an internal transformation 
into a single political entity. 
By itself, this macro-perspective characterisation tells only part of the story of 
amity/enmity.  Especially within the categories related to higher levels of amity, the 
formal security agreements and mechanisms by which these are defined are based on 
the convergence of discourse around collective values and identities that can only be 
micro-analysed discursively.  Collective identities are essential to pluralist security 
communities, and part of the „thickness‟ of „thicker‟ security regimes lies in the fact that 
their security mechanisms have become values in and of themselves.  The lack of 
recognition and persistence of conflict in revisionist conflict formations is based on the 
incompatible identities and values of the units involved.   Accordingly, the macro-
criteria enumerated above will have to be complemented by a set of micro-counterparts 
– discursive „markers‟ – referring to particular patterns of securitisation; RSCs will also 
have to be placed within the spectrum through the peculiarities of their security 
discourse linked to readily observable phenomena from a macro-perspective.   
This link starts at the level of official discourse, which will, more often than not, reflect 
objectively observable security conditions.  Logically enough, if the region is a 
revisionist conflict formation, governmental discourse at the unit level will see armed 
conflict as a constant possibility, and treat „war‟ as a legitimate means of policy, as well 
as intensely securitising other units within the region as acute existential threats.  On 
the argumentative side of discourse, the unwillingness to recognise „the other‟ will be 
based on identities and values that are mutually exclusive: for instance, conflicting 
long-term territorial claims (with territory as an essential part of state identity) or 
opposing political ideologies (Diehl, 1999; Walt, 1996, pp. 33-45).  The discourse 
typical of status-quo conflict formations will differ specifically on this argumentative 
                                                                                                                                         
normalisation of relations between recognised states and their secessionist entities following the 
implementation of formal agreements: such agreements (especially when accompanied through 
international guarantees) would still be aimed at managing a security issue rather than turning it into 
something everyday political, they would form the basis of security regimes.  Full de-securitisation might 
over the longer term produce the situation of „a-security‟ typical of security communities as the identities 
and values of the belligerents themselves become more compatible, resulting in a trust and self-
identification that would make such formal agreements self-sustaining, or even superfluous.  Roe (2004) 
has pointed out that full de-securitisation and the dissolution it entails of the Schmittian friend-enemy 
distinction (Huysmans, 1998) is particularly difficult to achieve in the societal sector, as this would entail 
the denial of identity of the minority in question.  He argues that a „management‟ of these minority issues 
within the security realm would be more feasible than their complete removal towards the political.  
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side.  The mutual recognition of units will be based on compatible identities and values, 
with conflict mostly founded on divergences on the instrumental side:  conflicting 
definitions of threat – often based on a security dilemma (Jervis, 1976) – and clashing 
interests rather than identities, with war still seen as a distinct possibility. 
How the normative mechanisms provided for in security regimes are incorporated into 
patterns of securitisation is also essential in distinguishing between thin and thick 
versions of the category.  Official discourse will deal with such mechanisms either 
instrumentally – as, purely, a technical means of securing stability and avoiding conflict 
– or, in the case of thick regimes, values in and of themselves.  Crucially, in contrast to 
thin regimes, the high degree of inherent trust and comprehensive nature of „thick‟ 
security regimes will imply a partial degree of mutual desecuritisation.  One step further 
along the amity/enmity continuum, in pluralist security communities, desecuritisation 
becomes near-complete, with units excluding the possibility of war among themselves, 
no longer seeing each other as potential threats, and defining and addressing threats 
collectively41. The tight security community represents the „high point‟ on this spectrum, 
with units conceding increasing portions of their sovereignty to supra-national 
institutions legitimised through collective identities that are readily detectable in the 
argumentative portion of security discourse. Beyond this lies the end of anarchy. 
As argued in previous chapters, however, an exclusively regional view of amity/enmity 
would tell us only part of a complicated story.  The friendliness or hostility of intra-
regional relations cannot be decoupled from either the domestic or global levels of 
security interaction.  Unit-level patterns of securitisation are after all the result of sub-
unit processes; securitising moves, their acceptance or rejection by the audience, the 
contestation of prevailing security discourse et cetera (Buzan, et al., 1998).  But more 
specifically, in incoherent states, failure to adhere to collective strategies of survival (on 
the instrumental side) or to generate (relatively) stable collective values and identities 
(on the argumentative side) leads to state weakness and instability.  As argued below, 
in certain cases the lack of identifiably constant collective identities or strategies can 
spill over onto the regional level, particularly when some of the alternative identities 
challenging those of the state overlap with others in the wider region, or when 
separatist intra-state strategies are instrumentally abused by outside states.  Moreover, 
the penetration of great powers into the region inevitably influences the nature of amity 
and enmity as well: the instrumental and argumentative aspects of security discourse 
are dependent or independent from such penetration in varying degrees.  Several 
methodological questions spring from this interconnected theoretical framework.  
                                               
41
 A situation referred to by Wæver as “asecurity” (Wæver, 1998). 
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Firstly: how does one approach the question of state weakness (lack of legitimacy, 
vertical and horizontal) and its linkages with the regional level?  In other words, how 
does one identify „alternative identities‟ and „strategies of survival‟, and their „overspill‟ 
onto the regional level?  And, secondly, how does one evaluate the dependence or 
independence of regional security discourse from penetrating great powers?   
State Weakness, Legitimacy, and the Convergence/Divergence of Intra-
State Discourse 
Chapter 3 made a number of clear theoretical-conceptual distinctions regarding 
different elements of state (in)coherence.  Most generally, there was the differentiation 
between the phenomenon‟s two dimensions, vertical and horizontal (Holsti, 1996, pp. 
91-97).   Also, three tiers of state incoherence were identified: inherent weakness, 
ostensible instability, and state failure (collapse or fragmentation).   The inherent 
strength and weakness of states was linked to their legitimacy as strategies of survival, 
a quite ideational element implying a necessary micro-analysis of societal discourse.   
Ostensible stability/instability, on the other hand, was made dependent on the ability or 
inability of the state to exercise material power over a given society in order to 
suppress any imperfections in its legitimacy, something more easily discernable from a 
macro-perspective.  Finally, state failure was linked to the inability of the state to 
maintain an institutional monopoly its effective sovereignty in the face of challenges to 
its power and authority.   These three tiers and two dimensions also allowed for a 
typological differentiation between inherently weak, ostensibly unstable and 
fragmented/collapsed states. 
Table 3: Macro-characteristics of inherently weak, ostensibly stable and failed states 
 Horizontal Vertical 
Inherently Weak (but Ostensibly 
Stable) States 
Secessionist tendencies 
suppressed through state 
repression 
Generalised political dissent 
suppressed through state 
repression, Corruption 
Ostensibly Unstable States 
(Inherently Weak by default) 
Presence of armed/violent 
secessionist movements 
Political instability, extra-
constitutional transitions of 
power 
Failed States (Inherently Weak by 
default) 
“Fragmented” state: division of 
state into territorially distinct and 
stable secessionist units with 
empirical statehood 
“Collapsed” state: complete 
absence of empirical statehood 
 
As in the case of amity/enmity, the assessment of a state‟s strength/stability will have 
to be approached from both macro- and micro- perspectives.  The method employed in 
this case will oscillate between these two viewpoints: firstly, a number of objective 
criteria will distinguish between (horizontally/vertically) failed, unstable/stable, 
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weak/strong states.  Secondly, a deep analysis of the discourse will help to discern the 
underlying patterns in the legitimacy of the state, and thus, provide a clear 
understanding of the element at the core of state coherence.  Only a combination of 
these two perspectives will present a full picture state coherence, one that can be 
subsequently linked to amity and enmity at the regional level. 
Looking at the issue from a macro-perspective, the differences between the collapse, 
fragmentation and continued survival of a given state are relatively discernable.  A 
vertically failed, collapsed state is characterised by the absence of an effective 
government, with authority diluted among numerous political factions battling over 
control of one state, without, however, themselves laying claim to separate statehood.   
A horizontally failed fragmented state has divided into a number of entities that display 
most, if not all qualities of empirical statehood (Jackson, 1982), recognised or not.  
Ostensibly unstable states are likewise easily identifiable from a macro-perspective. 
The presence or absence of armed secessionist movements is the main, and quite 
obvious criterion pointing to horizontal instability. Vertically, a society‟s adherence to 
the constitutional legal-political framework is empirically assessable over time; whether 
or not internal political processes remain peaceful, and whether or not transitions of 
power occur according to the constitutional order provided for by the state is historically 
more or less evident.  In the case of longer-term unstable states, the inherent 
weakness of a state can moreover be safely assumed.   
The distinction between inherent strength and weakness is trickier to discern from the 
macro-perspective in the case of ostensibly stable states, and would necessarily have 
to be complemented by micro-perspective discursive analysis to be entirely effective.  It 
is nevertheless preliminarily possible by looking at the level of political repression 
applied by a given state onto its society, and the corruption that indicates a lack of 
internalisation of a state‟s institutional norms.  Simply put: an ostensibly stable state 
with a relatively high degree of authoritarianism will likely be inherently weak, and one 
where minimal repression is required for the effective functioning of state institutions, 
inherently strong; similarly in the case of relatively elevated levels of corruption (Buzan, 
1991, pp. 57-111).  The indices of political and press freedom provided by Freedom 
House (2007) can point to such repression, and, hence, to the inherent weakness of 
states deemed „partly free‟ or „not free‟ under its classification system, even in the 
absence of overt instability.  Quantitative measures like Transparency International‟s 
Corruption Perception Index (Lambsdorff, 2007; Sampford, Shacklock, Connors, & 
Galtung, 2006) can also give an indication as to the level of corruption in a given 
society, suggesting the existence of the „legitimacy gaps‟ that constitute inherent 
weakness. 
 111 
But as mentioned above, accurately assessing and understanding a state‟s inherent 
strength or weakness inevitably involves a foray into the micro-perspective.  Here, the 
starting point is Migdal‟s (1988, pp. 27-29) view of the state as a „collective strategy of 
survival‟, introduced in Chapter 3.  Seen this way, a state‟s legitimacy (the factor 
underlying inherent weakness or strength) can be assessed from the discursive micro-
viewpoint, in both the argumentative and instrumental aspects of a society‟s security 
discourse.  Argumentatively, state weakness manifests itself through a deficient 
internalisation of the collective values and identities propagated by the state, in either a 
generalised manner (in the case of vertical weakness), or in an ethno-territorially 
distinct way (in the case of horizontal weakness).   
In the former, vertical case, ethnically and territorially diffuse alternative values and 
allegiances – „primordial sentiments‟, in Geertz‟ (1963) words – continue to exist within 
society to the detriment of the effective functioning of the state.  In the latter, horizontal 
case, these alternative values, identities and allegiances have a distinct, ethnic and 
territorial focus, leading to the threat of separatism.  Within the instrumental portion of 
the sub-state security discourse (dealing with the identification of threats and choice of 
means), the failure to internalise the state as a „collective strategy of survival‟ is 
apparent in a tendency to recognise the state as a threat to security rather than a 
means towards it (again, maintaining the distinction between horizontal and vertical 
weakness through the element of ethno-territoriality), as happens so often in cases of 
societal securitisation, when clearly discernible, territorially distinct out-groups view the 
state as a societal threat to their identities, while they are viewed, in turn, as political 
threats to the territorial integrity of the state. 
From a practical point of view, assessing a state‟s vertical strength is indeed more 
problematic: it is relatively easier to analyse ethno-territorially distinct competing 
identity discourses rather than the deficient „internalisation‟ of one state identity or 
ideology in society at large.  The latter will often be cloaked by the ostentatious state-
centred discourse of elites and counter-elites, who will often describe their actions as in 
defence of the collective values, identities and strategies of survival espoused by the 
state.  This presents considerable difficulties from a purely discursive point of view, as 
those in control often use the rhetoric of statehood, issue pompous declarations in 
support of the state while instrumentalising that very state for their narrow interests and 
carefully covering up the corruption that is inherent to vertical state weakness.  
The key to solving this problem lies in the consideration of the praxis of securitisation 
along with the security discourses in wider society.  First, the macro-perspective will 
already have answered the question as to the ostensible instability or failure of a given 
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state; in the case of unstable states, their political volatility will in itself be a clear 
indication of inherent weakness, more obviously so in the case of failed states.  
Second, even if political instability has been averted through repressive or cooptative 
state force – as in the case of rentier states – that repressive and cooptative force, as 
observed from the macro-perspective, may in itself be seen as an indication of inherent 
weakness, as argued above.  A vertically ostensibly stable and inherently strong state 
will not have to rely on a large inward-looking security apparatus or widespread patron-
client networks to remain stable.  Third, discourse remains relevant: even the 
mendacious rhetoric of elites has its value as an indication of the identities and values 
that a given society strives for.  And, unless a society is totalitarian, the deficient 
legitimacy of a state and the consequent presence of aberrant strategies of survival will 
be visible from the micro-perspective in the low level of public trust in state institutions, 
often described by ordinary citizens as threats to the values prevalent within society 
rather than means towards greater security; the continued presence of non-state 
institutions as providers of security (the family, the clan, the tribe, informal networks) in 
a society‟s everyday security discourse will point to aberrant „strategies of survival‟. 
The main focus of this thesis will be horizontal weakness, because horizontal 
legitimacy ties mostly into the divergence and convergence of the security discourses 
of distinct sub-state groups with those of the state, rather niftily relating to the 
juxtaposition of divergent/convergent security discourses seen at the regional level in 
the case of amity/enmity.  My micro-analysis of horizontal state weakness will, 
basically, seek out such ethnically/territorially specific discourses of security within 
states, assessing the extent to which their inherent collective identities are compatible 
with the state‟s (argumentative), as well as the extent to which they designate the state 
as a threat rather than a provider of security (instrumental).  In fragmented or 
ostensibly unstable states, the aim will be to evaluate the impact of the alternative 
discourses of separatist state-like units or secessionist sub-state ethnic groups on 
regional amity/enmity. And even in ostensibly stable but inherently weak states, 
suppressed societal securitisations of ethnic minorities could point to the emergence of 
future conflict, and a possible deterioration in the regional level of amity/enmity.  But 
how exactly are these alternative, ethnically distinct discourses of security linked in with 
this variable?  
At the beginning of this chapter, I hypothesised that state incoherence would have a 
significant effect on the level of hostility within a region.  I shall now refine this 
statement into two working hypotheses that might explain this outcome.  Firstly (and 
most obviously), the level of enmity within the region might be affected directly, with the 
central state trying to reassert its authority and effective sovereignty by suppressing or 
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aiming to suppress the alternative identities of unrecognised statelets (in fragmented 
states) and secessionist movements (in unstable states).   If one takes the de-facto 
statelets as regional units (as I decided to do in chapter three), the absolutely 
incompatible nature of their identities with those of the central state‟s skews 
amity/enmity in a region towards the revisionist conflict formation part of the spectrum.  
Secondly, amity/enmity might be impacted upon indirectly, because of the overlap of 
such secessionist identities with those of or within (recognised) neighbouring units, or 
the instrumental exploitation of such separatisms by these very neighbours.  This could 
even happen in the face of ostensible stability – that is, in the absence of overt 
separatist moves by a minority – if that minority‟s subservience to the central state is 
based on active and successful repression by the latter. 
State incoherence in the Southern Caucasus (Coppieters, 2001; Malek, 2006; 
Matveeva, 2002) will thus be analysed according to the above framework: first a 
macro-perspective view of the effective sovereignty, ostensible stability and inherent 
strength or weakness of the three states, and, subsequently, a micro-analysis of 
domestic security discourse, with the specific aim of assessing the horizontal fractures 
within underlying societies and their links to amity/enmity, in particular within the 
political and societal sectors.  The changing narratives and definitions of statehood 
prevalent within the different states will be considered in detail, as well as the basic 
discourses within secessionist units, while the security discourses of ethnic minorities 
that the macro-perspective might have identified as candidates for future unrest (the 
Armenians, Azeris and Ajars in Georgia, the Lezghin and Talysh in Azerbaijan) will be 
touched upon.  Of crucial interest will be the ways in which these competing alternative 
identities behind state weakness feed into regional patterns of amity and enmity, as 
hypothesised above.  In fragmented states like Georgia and Azerbaijan, secessionist 
identities could do so by underpinning unrecognised state-like units that push the RSC 
towards increased enmity, because of the de-facto revisionism implied by the central 
government‟s imperative aim of rolling back the factually existing status quo. Enmity 
between established states could also increase through the repression (real or 
perceived) of alternative collective identities associated with identities of neighbouring 
recognised units, leading them to turn revisionist, as in the case of Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1990-1992.  
Great Power Penetration and the Dependence/Independence of Regional 
Security Discourse 
The final element of this thesis is great power penetration; again, the methodology 
employed here will switch between assessing its macro-elements and performing a 
deep analysis of security discourses connected to the phenomenon.  Based on the 
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combination of these macro- and micro-perspectives, I will classify patterns of GPP into 
the different categories laid out theoretically in the previous chapter: hegemony, 
unipolar penetration, cooperative multipolar penetration, competitive multipolar 
penetration and disengagement.  To recap, hegemony will entail the near complete 
dominance of the security dynamic by one single great power: regional patterns of 
securitisation (at the official level at least) will be determined by its interests and 
regional units will be left with little autonomy in setting the security agenda.  On the 
other end of the spectrum (disengagement), the region will be free from great power 
interventions; security discourse of units will barely mention great powers within a 
regional context (although systemic references will naturally always be possible).  In 
regions that are subject to cooperative multipolar GPP, the security dynamic will be 
influenced (but not determined) by several great powers acting more or less in unison.  
Finally, competitive multipolar penetration will, self-evidently, involve a number of great 
powers pursuing incompatible objectives, as apparent in their macro-perspective 
behaviour and official security discourses.  Any approach would thus have to assess 
GPP along three lines of inquiry.  Firstly, it would have to account for the number of 
great powers penetrating the region.  Secondly, if there are several, it would have to 
assess the nature of the relationship between these great powers (cooperative or 
competitive), and, thirdly, it would have to weigh up the impact of their involvement on 
the regional security dynamic. As in the case of the other variables discussed in this 
chapter, this would have to be done through a macro- and micro-perspective.   
From a macro-perspective, I loosely follow Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997, p. 755) by 
assessing the presence of great powers penetrating a region through three types of 
regional involvement: 1) political/economic (trade and investments, non-military aid), 2) 
semi-military (military aid, arms supplies, advisors, covert operations), 3) direct military 
(presence of troops, alliance commitments).  Both the magnitude of this material 
involvement, and its particular nature could give an early, macro-perspective indication 
of the cooperative or competitive nature of regional great power penetration, or the 
effects it might have on the security dynamic of regional actors.  A micro-viewpoint will 
then look at two different kinds of discourse:  firstly, it will gauge the discursive 
convergence/divergence of the penetrating great powers in order to more deeply 
assess their competitive or cooperative relationship.  Secondly, it will look at the 
discursive dependence or independence of the intra-regional official security 
discourses from external, system level influence: in other words, how the presence of 
great power affects the regional units‟ security discourse in both its instrumental and 
argumentative aspects.  It is precisely this link into security discourse that provides the 
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bridge between patterns of GPP and regional patterns of amity and enmity, one of the 
objects of my inquiry. 
The simplest category of penetration – disengagement – entails the absence of great 
powers, materially from the region proper, and ideationally from the official security 
discourse of the units.  In other words, the regional presence or activities of great 
powers are sufficiently small so as not to become an element in the patterns of 
securitisation of regional units, and the region‟s security is entirely discursively 
independent.  Conversely, hegemony implies an end to anarchy in the RSC: material 
involvement is so extensive that regional security discourse has become entirely 
dependent on the great power.  Regional units in effect lose the autonomous ability to 
generate policy in a situation of „overlay‟ and subordinate their preferences to those of 
the sole penetrating power.  In the case of disengagement, penetration is irrelevant; in 
case of hegemony the RSC effectively ceases to exist because of the de-facto (though 
not de-jure) suspension of anarchy.  This leaves the more conventional forms of GPP, 
lying somewhere between complete dependence and independence, as more 
interesting bases of analysis. 
In case the RSC is penetrated (but not dominated as in the case of hegemony) by one 
single great power – in other words, when there is a degree of discursive dependence 
in light of the presence of this sole power – the pattern of GPP can be deemed to be 
unipolar without further ado.  In the case of multipolar penetration, or the material and 
discursive presence of several great powers, a distinction will have to be made 
between cooperative and competitive variants: the notion of discursive convergence – 
mentioned above in the context of regional amity/enmity – can also be applied to 
making this distinction.  Apart from the appearances gathered from the macro-
perspective, such an analysis of „discourses of regional penetration‟ of great powers, 
and their compatibility/incompatibility can reveal the underlying motivations of these 
powers vis-a-vis the region.  In this particular case, the study of the official discourses 
of great powers will be guided by the different types of interest elaborated in the 
previous chapter: shared identity, material interest, systemic strategies and 
universalised values.  Each of these motivations will normally be reflected in either the 
instrumental or argumentative aspects of these powers‟ official security discourse; 
taken together, these „narratives of GPP‟ explaining and justifying regional involvement 
can illustrate the superficially co-operative or competitive behaviours observed from the 
macro-perspective, confirming the characterisation of a regional pattern of GPP as 
„cooperative‟ or „competitive‟. 
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Subsequently, an assessment must be made of the impact of these patterns of GPP on 
the patterns of amity/enmity within the region.  Situated between the extremes of 
hegemony (complete dependence) and disengagement (complete independence), the 
security dynamic of most regions is at least partially dependent on outside influence.  
The next stage of the analysis dealing with regional patterns of GPP will thus consist of 
mapping this influence by looking at the role played by great powers in shaping the 
security discourses of regional units.  Three interrelated factors will be considered: 
firstly, the prominence of great powers in the discourse, secondly, the alignments of 
regional units with or against the penetrating powers, and, thirdly, the effects of these 
penetrations and alignments on the units‟ intra-regional security calculations, either 
through their instrumental discourse, by affecting their perceptions of threats and 
choice of means, or through argumentative discourse, by influencing the values and 
identities of these units.   
The goal of this discursive analysis will not only be establishing the role of individual 
great powers in the regional security dynamic; my aim will also be to reveal the 
intersubjective impact of particular patterns of GPP on the discourse of these regional 
units, taking the argument back to my hypothesis on the links between such patterns 
and the amity/enmity variable.  Consequently, in a final phase of the analysis, I shall 
have to take a step back and look at GPP and its discursive effects in a holistic, all-
encompassing manner, specifically querying the direction into which a particular 
intersubjective set-up has pushed the region, by either limiting or expanding the options 
open to its regional units.     
I specifically posited that within the Caucasus competitive penetration has contributed 
to maintaining the region as a conflict formation, diminishing the chances for the 
emergence of a security regime.  I shall now further hypothesise that the particular link 
between great power penetration and this outcome mainly lies in the effect of the 
former on instrumental rather than argumentative aspects of security discourse, 
especially in the short- and medium-term: while great power penetration affects the 
instrumental calculations of the regional units and actors, it has relatively little effect on 
their identities and values.  Any effect of any changes in the patterns of GPP on an 
emergent security regime would thus be limited, with positive changes to these 
instrumental calculations encumbered by the mainly regional dynamics underlying 
definitions of identities and value-sets.  The micro-analysis of discourse will 
concentrate on identifying these effects of great power penetration on the security 
discourse of regional units, in both its instrumental and argumentative aspects.  
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On the face of it, the Southern Caucasus is quite heavily penetrated as an RSC (Baev, 
1997; Cornell, 1999; Menon, et al., 1999; Perovic, 2005).  It was, of course, part of the 
Soviet Union, and Russia quickly reasserted its authority over the area in the 
immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, undermining the openly hostile regimes of 
Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and Elchibey in Azerbaijan, supporting (according to many 
non-Russian observers) secessionist movements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Ajaria, and aiding Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.  The 
situation has, however, become more fluid and complex over the past decade-and-a-
half; other great and regional powers (the United States, the European Union, Turkey, 
Iran) have become engaged in the region, mostly through their involvement in the 
transportation- and energy corridors linking the Caspian basin to the West (Baran, 
2002; Karagiannis, 2002).  In trying to assess the changing nature of regional GPP, 
and its effects on patterns of amity/enmity, I shall concentrate mostly on this changing 
relationship between the „traditional‟ hegemon, and these newly engaged powers, and 
the regional units, which is commonly held to be competitive despite outwards 
appearances in mediation mechanisms like the OSCE Minsk group, centred on the 
Karabakh conflict.  The presence of these diverse powers does seem to strongly affect 
the official and societal discourse of most of the regional units; interestingly, perhaps 
not only in terms of strategic calculation (instrumental discourse) but also in terms of 
norms and values (argumentative discourse), especially in the EU‟s case.   
Change and the Stability of Discourse 
This brings me to the question of how to assess change within the framework outlined 
above.  As was earlier mentioned, this thesis‟ central questions concern the security 
situation in the Southern Caucasus from the period immediately following the fall of the 
USSR to 2008, and as shall be shown in the empirical chapters, this was a period of 
(varyingly successful) consolidation for the regional units, and of transition from 
hegemony to more complex forms of GPP.  Whether these two elements feed into the 
patterns of amity and enmity in the region in the manner previously hypothesised will 
be one of the main areas of attention in the subsequent empirical chapters.  More 
generally, however, this thesis is about the possible future transition of the Southern 
Caucasus from conflict formation to security regime in light of existing patterns of 
penetration and state incoherence.  This implies that, apart from being able to identify 
the connections between the different variables, my methodology should also be able 
to account for potential change.  On the theoretical level, this was done through what 
was termed the stability or instability of the security discourse in previous chapters.  But 
how does one assess discursive stability in practice? 
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The idea behind discursive stability/instability is simple.  Security discourses and 
securitisations are always the result of an intra-societal debate; issues are put forward 
as existential, in securitising moves, by securitising actors.  Whether or not the move 
succeeds and becomes a securitising act depends on the ability of these actors to 
convince a relevant audience in the face of veto actors opposing those moves (Buzan, 
et al., 1998).  The discursive micro-perspective elements of this framework are thus the 
result of a complex give-and-take, constant debate and contestation, and it is precisely 
through contestations, and the introduction of alternative frameworks of securitisation 
that change occurs (Wendt, 1999, p. 188).  In this particular framework, security 
discourse does not stand alone; it is loosely „wrapped‟ around a material rump that 
informs it and plays a role in actively shaping and changing it.  Neither is it entirely 
homogenous: security discourse has argumentative and instrumental aspects.  The 
former refers to a society‟s choice of values and identities as referent objects based on 
its normative assumptions, the latter to that society‟s identification of threats and choice 
of remedial means on its techno-scientific knowledge of the material world.  As such, 
security discourse can become destabilised through a change in either one of three 
constituents – shifting material conditions, evolving techno-scientific knowledge, and 
successfully contested normative assumptions – leading to the unravelling of existing 
securitisations and the emergence of alternative ones. 
These three components are influenced by a multiplicity of factors, (not least of which 
are state incoherence and great power penetration).  Assessing the prospects for 
change would start at the level of official discourse, as expressed by policymakers in 
statements or official documents.  At the very top of such discourse are the 
securitisations included in the national security strategies of states, blueprints of the 
most fundamental security concerns of a given polity.  Logically enough, these 
documents include frequent references to surrounding regional units and more or less 
accurately reflect regional patterns of amity and enmity.  They also include 
argumentative aspects in the form of fundamental referent objects – values, and more 
implicitly, identities – and instrumental aspects in terms of identified threats and 
remedial strategies.  They are no less determined by the material conditions that inform 
the unit‟s security discourse.  Official security discourses, and their patterns of 
securitisation are grounded in the complex interaction of material conditions, techno-
scientific knowledge and normative assumptions both shaping and shaped by 
underlying societies, including, most directly, the state institutions that actively generate 
policy.   
How does one then practically assess the effect of these three building blocks on the 
stability of such official discourses of securitisation?  Let us start with the normative 
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assumptions that inform them.  These elements underlying the argumentative aspect of 
security discourse are both product and result of societal discussion on values and 
identities, the most fundamental referent objects.  The extent of contestation 
surrounding these values and identities as included within official security discourse will 
be the major determinant of the „discursive stability‟ of its argumentative aspects, 
challenged through the presence of alternative values and identities and diverging 
discourses of securitisation, often carried by opposition groups, generating discussion 
in the media and potentially „dethroning‟ existing official discourse.  Returning to the 
categories of amity and enmity, it becomes clear that the emergence of such 
alternative argumentative discourses can affect changes in discursive convergence on 
the regional level.   
To illustrate with an example in the South Caucasus: Armenia‟s current identity is 
based on an ethnic form of nationalism, based on „pan-Armenianism‟, stressing the 
need for Armenia to secure not just the security of its own population, but also the 
continued survival, as an independent state, of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh and 
world-wide recognition of the 1915 Genocide.  As explained in the following chapter, 
there exists a different narrative of identity (carried mostly by the more liberal followers 
of the state‟s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan) stressing a civic form of nationalism 
(„Armenians as citizens of the Republic of Armenia‟) and reducing the prominence of 
the aforementioned elements of ethnic nationalism in the general hierarchy of referent 
objects, and thus, the potential „compatibility‟ of Armenian security discourse with that 
of surrounding states.   
The instrumental aspects of securitisation refer to the identification of threats and the 
choice of means based on a society‟s techno-scientific knowledge of the material 
world, in the broadest sense of the word: that is, the socially constructed assumptions 
held by society on the workings of its physical environment.  Based on these 
assumptions, policymakers are able to identify threats and securitise them 
successfully, as well as choosing the particular means to address these threats.  As I 
argued in chapter 2, the identification of threats in international relations is not as 
materially pre-determined and constant as one would expect from a pure rational-
choice perspective; it is in large part a matter of subjective perception and 
intersubjectivity, and this, in turn, is largely a function of the prevailing domestic and 
regional cultures.  The same goes for the choice of means towards greater security: 
whether one chooses co-operation or military competition both determines and is 
determined by perceptions of the surrounding security environment.  However, 
perceptions within societies can diverge: what some see as a threat may well be seen 
as harmless by others, what others see as an efficient means towards security, may 
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come to be seen as counterproductive by some.  Again, in the same way, counter-
elites, divergent bureaucratic factions, and epistemic communities underlying the top of 
the decision-making pyramid may come to challenge securitisations in terms of their 
choices regarding threats and means as expressed in the national security strategies of 
the polities concerned. 
The link to change in the amity/enmity spectrum is clear here as well: the identification 
of neighbouring units as threats (rather than potential partners for cooperation) 
underlies many of the more hostile „cultures of anarchy‟.  And the choice of war as a 
realistic option in one‟s relationship with these neighbours is also tightly linked with the 
level of distrust and conflict within a given region.  The potential for change is precisely 
predicated on societal challenges to these inimical instrumental discourses carried by 
policymakers.  In the Caucasus, for instance, one could pose the question in how far 
the Georgian government‟s stated commitment to a peaceful solution of the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the re-integration of these territories through the 
granting of the „highest level of autonomy‟ was rooted in wider Georgian societal 
discourse during the years preceding the 2008 war: was this strategy, aimed at 
securing the referent object of Georgian statehood widely accepted, and therefore well-
grounded and stable?  It is, among others, through an analysis of societal discourses 
and narratives that one can find out.   
The contested perceptions and assumptions of instrumental discourse, however, are 
only part of the picture of its stability; staying true to the Wendtian, rump materialist 
approach chosen in this theoretical framework, material conditions must be seen as 
having some causal value of their own (Wendt, 1999, pp. 130-138).  Physical reality 
after all feeds into instrumental discourse and shapes it; instrumental discourse can 
change both because techno-scientific knowledge changes, through these processes 
of contestation, or because existing discourses are changed by shifting material 
conditions.  The difference between these two variants is simple.  In the first case, 
dominant, official discourses of threats and means are challenged from below and 
overthrown, as argued in the previous paragraphs.  In the second case, these 
dominant discourses are affected by changes in their material environment: instead of 
societal contestation, they are modified by an obligation to acknowledge and react to 
changing physical realities.   
A first, basic example could serve as an illustration.  If two states quarrel over an 
economically essential natural resource, two things can happen in relation to material 
conditions and techno-scientific knowledge.  First, techno-scientific knowledge within 
these states can change internally: in other words, alternative technologies may 
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emerge within their societies that make the natural resource useless, changing the 
perceptions of both states, and their instrumental discourses.  Second, material 
conditions can change: the natural resource may run out completely, making it logically 
irrelevant in the belligerents‟ eyes, almost mechanically modifying instrumental 
discourse.  The second variant is not a matter of assumption or contestation, but one of 
a simple, logical reaction of existing discourse to material reality, giving material 
conditions an independent explanatory value.  My analysis will thus also try to identify 
such changes in the purely material regional context that might affect the stability of 
existing instrumental discourses in the Southern Caucasus. 
Discursive stability can both be enhanced and diminished through changes in the 
state‟s material environment, as they strengthen or invalidate assumptions held within 
these states; identifying such potential transformations would help one assess the 
stability of discourse to a greater degree.  For instance, entirely hypothetically, if 
Azerbaijan‟s recent belligerent rhetoric (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 15) is 
based on projections of oil-fuelled economic growth, what could happen if the oil runs 
out, or if the „resource-curse‟ invalidates these predictions?  How would this feed into 
the existing discourse?  If Armenia‟s uncompromising security discourse is partly 
predicated on ten years of uninterrupted economic growth despite economic 
blockades, what could a sudden economic crisis do to the stability of this discourse?  
Such a disinterested, critical look at the constancy of the material conditions that inform 
instrumental security discourse would certainly give valuable additional information as 
to its potential transformation.  This makes an interpretive element directed at 
extracting the socially constructed views of „objective reality‟ within a given 
intersubjective situation especially important, as argued by Pouliot (2007) in his attempt 
to marry the material and the ideational into a „sobjectivist‟ constructivist methodology.  
Interpretively understanding the place of material factors within these regional security 
discourses makes it possible to engage in scenario-building exercises aimed at 
exploring the potential effects of material changes on these discourses, and, hence, on 
regional cultures of anarchy, especially if these cultures are adequately historicised 
rather than reified as immutable givens.   
Of course, „discursive stability‟ cannot be seen separately from its intersubjective 
context.  Inter-state interaction shapes intra-societal security discourse as much as it is 
shaped by it: neither techno-scientific knowledge, nor normative assumptions are 
„closed boxes‟, free from external influences.  And it is through, for instance, the effects 
of state incoherence and patterns of GPP on this discursive stability of that one can 
construct potentialities in the amity/enmity of a region, asking oneself how changes in 
regional states‟ social environment would affect the chances of a region „migrating‟ 
 122 
from one category of amity/enmity to another through their effects on units‟ security 
discourse.  In this way, discursive stability will become a recurring theme throughout 
the empirical chapters of the thesis.  At different stages, questions will be asked as to 
the stability of the set-ups described, with the aim, at the very end, of assessing the 
potential for the emergence of a security regime, and constructing plausible scenarios 
for the Southern Caucasus future development.  In so doing, the three central aims of 
this endeavour, set out in chapter 1, will have been accomplished: (1) an expansion of 
several concepts RSCT, (2) a critical examination of several hypotheses through the 
said expanded theoretical framework, and (3) the construction of a comprehensive map 
of security in the Southern Caucasus, focusing in particular on the potential 
transformation of the region into a security regime. 
Conclusion 
In the subsequent, empirical chapters, the above framework will be applied to link the 
three central concepts of this thesis: amity/enmity, state weakness, and great power 
penetration.  The next chapter will present a comprehensive macro-view of the RSC, 
tackling, in turn, the four constitutive elements of the region (units, polarity, boundaries 
and amity/enmity), in addition to the two expanded variables of state incoherence and 
GPP.  The three subsequent chapters will engage with the three expanded concepts by 
dealing with their informing micro-level discourses, both instrumental and 
argumentative.  In combination with the macro-perspective, these three chapters will 
also try to place the RSC and its security constellation as accurately as possible within 
the numerous categories elaborated previously.  These „discursive‟ sections will have 
to identify intertextual, official and alternative „basic discourses‟ (Hansen, 2006) on both 
the argumentative and instrumental sides of the equation from the specific point of view 
of this thesis‟ theoretical framework. At this point, it would perhaps be useful to 
prophylactically remark on the subjective nature of the discourses that will be laid out 
imminently: the – at times extreme – opinions and inconsistent historiographies they 
contain will be entirely those of the regional actors, unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
And their reproduction will obviously in no way entail the endorsement of one historical 
view over another. 
The assumption is that the societies in the region are indeed sufficiently open to 
provide the data necessary for such an enterprise; and indeed, while all Southern 
Caucasian states do have (at times serious) problems in terms of democracy and 
transparency, suitably vigorous debates take place within the written press on most 
issues of importance (Freedom House, 2008d).  With several months of culturally 
immersive fieldwork in the region – in 2008 and 2009 – providing an anthropological 
context, the study of official discourse in the chapters that follow will be anchored in the 
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recently elaborated National Security Strategies of the Southern Caucasian states 
(Republic of Armenia, 2007b; Republic of Azerbaijan, 2007; Republic of Georgia, 
2005), supplemented by official documents, semi-structured interviews with relevant 
policymakers, and media reports.  Alternative societal narratives will be analysed, 
again, through media discourse, and semi-structured interviews with members of 
opposition and civil society groups concerning the period in question (1988-2008), with 
the particular aim of gauging the effects of these alternative societal discourses on 
„discursive stability‟ (alongside material, macro-perspective factors).     
Once a clear „web‟ of security interaction in the Southern Caucasus is arrived at, 
discussion will move towards explicitly evaluating the hypotheses on the relationship 
between these three concepts, in the final, tenth chapter.  As outlined above, the first 
proposition would assert that horizontal state incoherence has driven the Southern 
Caucasian RSC towards greater enmity since independence.  I further hypothesised 
that this was due, from a micro-perspective, to both direct and indirect discursive 
mechanisms: directly, the region is driven towards the highly inimical „revisionist conflict 
formation‟ category through the existence of de-facto states of dubious legitimacy.  
Indirectly, enmity in the region is increased through the identification of regional units 
with secessionist minorities in neighbouring states, or through their instrumentalisation 
of such minorities for higher-level strategic aims.   
The second proposition ties amity/enmity to patterns of great power penetration.  In this 
case, the corresponding working hypothesis will be that the competitive nature of GPP 
has played an essential role in maintaining the region as a revisionist conflict formation 
through its effects on instrumental security discourses.  Changing patterns of 
penetration would thus have a limited effect on any moves towards the more amicable 
parts of the amity/enmity spectrum because of their circumscribed influence on the 
argumentative portions of the security discourse.  After offering its conclusions 
regarding the validity or falsity of these hypotheses, the thesis will close with an 
evaluation of the possible emergence of a regional security regime and scenarios for 
the future – based on „discursive stability‟ – in this highly problematic region.   
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CHAPTER 6:  A MACRO-VIEW OF THE SOUTHERN 
CAUCASUS 
The previous chapter set out the basic methodological approach to be employed in my 
case study: the Southern Caucasus.  As argued in the introductory chapter, the choice 
of this region is not accidental: despite its relative smallness (both in terms of surface 
area and population), it is a region of surprising complexity, a complexity that would 
allow me to test the applicability of this expanded version of RSCT to its limits.  In 
terms of the principal aim of my study – establishing the link between state 
incoherence, great power penetration and amity/enmity – the area between the Black 
and Caspian seas is nothing less than a treasure-trove.  As the next chapters will 
show, relations between and within its recognised states, marked by a complex web of 
compatible and incompatible interests and identities, are far from straightforward.  
Since 1991, the region has increasingly been a bone of contention between a number 
of great powers (Russia, the United States and „Europe‟), culminating in the Russo-
Georgian war of 2008.  In terms of state incoherence, the picture is further complicated 
through the presence of endemic political instability and corruption, as well as the 
existence of three secessionist entities that are strongly enmeshed in the great power 
politics of the region. 
As stated in the preceding methodology chapter, the approach employed here will 
encompass two distinct perspectives: one macro, concentrating on the „superficial‟, 
readily observable and mostly material characteristics of the region, and one micro, 
concentrating on ideational patterns of securitisation and counter-securitisation.  This 
chapter deals with the former.  In approaching this macro-view, I shall proceed as 
follows: an introductory section will give a general overview of the region in terms of the 
four „traditional‟ constituent variables of RSCT: units, polarity, boundaries and, finally, 
amity/enmity.  While the first three will largely be dealt with in a cursory manner, the 
macro-aspects of the expanded notion of amity/enmity expounded in chapter 2 will be 
applied in a longer, separate section.  The next two sections will similarly deal with the 
expanded variables of state incoherence and great power penetration, in preparation 
for the complex task of establishing networks of securitisation for the three expanded 
variables in the subsequent chapters. 
Units 
The Southern Caucasus contains three recognised states: Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia.  All three came into existence in 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union.  Of 
the three, Georgia has the longest historical track record as an independent state, with 
the last Georgian kingdom, Imeretia, losing its statehood after having been subjugated 
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by the Russian empire, in 1804 (Suny, 1994, pp. 63-64).  By contrast, the last 
independent Armenian state on the territory of today‟s Republic of Armenia 
disappeared almost one millennium ago; after centuries of subsequent Georgian, 
Turkish and Persian rule, the area around Yerevan was incorporated into the Russian 
empire in 1828, through the Russo-Persian treaty of Turkmenchai (Hovannisian, 1997).  
And while Turkic-Muslim khanates and sultanates had existed on Azerbaijan‟s territory 
for centuries, the very concept of a unified Azeri nation-state only came into being at 
the beginning of the 20th century, when the southern Caucasian „Tatars‟ (as its Turkic 
inhabitants were called at the time) started developing a national identity 
(Swietochowski, 2004).  While all three states did enjoy a brief period of independence 
after the Russian revolution, by 1923, they had swiftly been incorporated into the Soviet 
Union.  After being forcefully united within the so-called Transcaucasian Soviet 
Socialist Federative Republic, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan became Union 
Republics in their own right in 1936, maintaining that status until the end of the Soviet 
empire turned all constituent republics into independent states under international law. 
This historical picture is complicated by the existence of three (overwhelmingly) 
unrecognised statelets in the region: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.  
All three used to be either autonomous republics or autonomous oblasts (regions), 
subordinated to union republics in Soviet times (Potier, 2001, pp. 1-20).  Abkhazia did 
have an intermittent history of (semi-)independent statehood, often as a vassal or ally 
of larger neighbouring Georgian kingdoms, before its gradual incorporation into the 
Russian empire in the 19th century (Zverev, 1996, pp. 37-39).  It enjoyed limited 
autonomy within the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1922), and was a full union 
republic of the USSR (associated with the Georgian SSR) up to 1931, after which it 
was attached to the Georgia as an autonomous republic.  Neither South Ossetia nor 
Nagorno-Karabakh had had a long-standing history of sovereign statehood, although 
the latter did enjoy wide-ranging autonomy as a collection of Armenian-ruled fiefdoms 
within larger Muslim polities before the 19th century (Murinson, 2004, pp. 13-14).   Both 
were largely Soviet creations: Nagorno-Karabakh was assigned to Baku in 1921, and 
granted the status of an autonomous oblast in 1923 after having been a bone of 
contention between the independent Azeri and Armenian Democratic Republics in the 
brief preceding period of independence.  The Soviet authorities granted a similar status 
within the Georgian SSR to South Ossetia, in 1922, after pro-Bolshevik insurrections 
during the previous years of Georgian independence. 
The path taken by these three entities towards de-facto statehood differed 
considerably.  In the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the movements towards 
independent statehood started around 1990, largely in reaction to Georgian moves 
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towards independence from the USSR (Nodia, 1996, pp. 81-85; Zverev, 1996, pp. 37-
47).  There had been tension in the past between the Abkhaz and the Georgians, 
springing from the fact that the Abkhaz constituted only about 17% of the nominal 
population of „their‟ autonomous republic (Hewitt, 1999, p. 463), where they enjoyed 
cultural and political predominance as the „titular nation‟.  Relations between the 
Ossetians and the Georgians, however, had been relatively harmonious up to 1990: in 
fact, intermarriage rates between the two ethnic groups had been quite high in Soviet 
times, and, according to the 1989 census, more ethnic Ossetians lived in Georgia 
proper than in the autonomous oblast of South Ossetia (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2008, p. 
487).  Nevertheless, both territories decidedly moved towards secession from Georgia 
once it became clear the Soviet Union would not survive.  By contrast, Nagorno-
Karabakh‟s challenge to the authorities in Baku began in earnest several years before 
the final collapse of the Soviet Union, with the local Armenian majority demanding the 
region‟s transfer from Azerbaijan to Armenia as early as in 1987 (Zverev, 1996, pp. 17-
29).  By 1991, both union republics were entangled in a civil war over the region, and 
the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh only came into being when it became clear that 
outright annexation by Armenia would not be acceptable to the wider international 
community.  Today, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoy official international 
recognition by Russia and a handful of other states, Nagorno-Karabakh is not even 
recognised by its „protector‟, Armenia.   
The question emerges whether to treat these entities as fully-fledged regional units, or 
analytically subordinate them to either their de-jure metropolitan states, or their 
protectors, Russia in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Armenia in the case of 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  This problem is inextricably tied to their ability to develop policies 
independently from their factual sponsors, Armenia and Russia.  In fact, the 
composition of their leadership and their policies over the past two decades would 
indicate these entities‟ near-complete dependence on their respective supporters in 
Yerevan and Moscow.  In the case of South Ossetia, and to a lesser extent in 
Abkhazia, there are close links between both entities‟ leaderships and the Russian 
state bureaucracy (Nichol, 2008, p. 1), amplified by the distribution of Russian 
citizenship to the majority of their populations during the past decade (Cornell & Starr, 
2006, pp. 55-56).  Their factual behaviour has been one of near-complete obedience to 
the aims of the Russian Federation in the Southern Caucasus, with their very survival 
as de-facto „states‟ depending on economic, political and military support from Moscow, 
especially following their formal recognition by the latter, in September 2008.  The 
same goes for the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)”: although the region‟s 
leadership does at times verbally assert its independence, in terms of actual policy its 
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relationship to Yerevan has been one of subordination.  It has never been included in 
peace negotiations as a fully-fledged party, and, ironically, its „obedience‟ has been 
facilitated by the concentration of power in Armenia proper in the hands of the 
Karabakhi elite, following the 1998 constitutional coup and the 1999 parliament 
massacre42 (Panossian, 2002).   
It would, therefore, seem analytically feasible not to treat the de-facto statelets of the 
Southern Caucasus as units in their own right.  They appear incapable of formulating 
policies that diverge, in essence, from those of their political masters, and thus would 
appear to have much difficulty in independently projecting significant power without 
prior approval from Moscow or Yerevan.  That is, however, tempered by one important 
consideration: while these entities cannot for the most part develop policies – 
particularly security policies - on their own, they are involved in the networks of 
securitisation that define the Southern Caucasus.  As we shall see below and in later 
chapters, both Georgia and Azerbaijan are fragmented states; and it is the mutual 
securitisations between them and their secessionist entities that throw light on that 
situation.  Therefore, while I shall certainly take full account of the fact that these 
entities are more accurately described as „protectorates‟ than fully-fledged states, I will 
continue treating them as separate units in terms of the securitisations that underlie 
their status as parts of „fragmented‟ states (see chapter 3, and below). 
Polarity 
Turning to the region‟s polarity, between the three recognised states, the picture is one 
of increased imbalance, both in economic and military terms.  Economically, in terms of 
absolute figures, Azerbaijan has undoubtedly become the regional frontrunner, almost 
entirely due to its enormous oil and gas reserves43.  With a GDP of 31.2 Billion USD in 
2007 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, p. 5), it easily overshadows both of its 
neighbours.  Moreover, its oil-fuelled growth rates have been nothing less than 
spectacular in recent years: 22% on average from 2003 to 2007.  That has left its 
principal political rival, Armenia, far behind: whereas Yerevan could hope for some 
semblance of parity - at least in terms of GDP per capita – in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, today, it has certainly lost considerable relative economic clout.  The only 
consolation for policy-makers in Armenia could be the distorted and oil-dependent 
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 Tellingly, both Armenian presidents since 1998 have been natives of Nagorno-Karabakh.  Robert 
Kocharyan, president from 1998 to 2008, was a former president of the de-facto statelet, while the current 
president, Serj Sargsyan, is a former defence minister. 
43
 Azerbaijan‟s oil and gas reserves are estimated by the United States Energy Information Administration 
(2008) at respectively 7 billion barrels and 30 trillion cubic feet. 
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nature of Azerbaijan‟s economy, that is, if Armenia‟s economy hadn‟t been as isolated 
and vulnerable as it is today. 
 
Figure 3: Real GDP (USD Billions), 2000 & 2005-2007 (The World Bank Group, 2008) 
 
In the case of Azerbaijan, the economy is still almost entirely centred on oil, which 
makes up an extraordinarily high proportion of national income (70% in 2006) and 
exports (84% in 2006) (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007), consequently exposing 
Baku to the vagaries of the international oil market, although steps are being taken to 
reduce this one-sided dependence.  The creation of an oil fund looking to manage 
Azerbaijan‟s new-found wealth on a long-term basis (SOFAZ) has only partially allayed 
fears about the emergence of an inefficient „rentier state‟, as is so often the case in 
societies that suffer from the „resource curse‟ (O'Lear, 2007).  Another issue is the 
dependence of the oil sector on pipelines through Russia and, more precariously, 
Georgia, for export.  Since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the strategic advantage of 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline transporting Azeri oil outside of Russian territory has 
diminished considerably (The Economist, 2008a).   
Armenia, on the other hand, is almost entirely devoid of natural resources, save for 
limited gold, copper and molybdenum deposits in the North and South of the country 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a; Levine & Wallace, 2007).  Worse still, most of its 
international borders have been closed to trade for the better part of the past two 
decades: Azerbaijan‟s since before the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey‟s since April 
1993.  Apart from being circumvented by almost all major regional infrastructure 
projects, the country is dependent on costly Georgian transportation routes for 70% of 
its external trade (with Iran and air routes accounting for the remaining 30%), a 
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situation which hampers the development of export-based industries and artificially 
inflates import prices (Freinkman, Polyakov, & Revenco, 2004; Polyakov, 2001). In 
spite of the fact that Armenia generally has scored highly in surveys of economic 
freedom (Holmes, Feulner, & O'Grady, 2008, pp. 85-86), its economy is dominated by 
government-connected cartels that further increase the inefficiencies and deformations 
in the economy.  The fact that Yerevan could boast growth rates in the double digits for 
every year since 2000 was in no small part due to the dramatic growth in remittances 
sent home by the quite numerous Armenian diaspora, amounting to an estimated 1.3 
billion dollars in 2007 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008d, p. 28)44. 
For many years, Georgia‟s economy was the regional laggard in terms of GDP per 
capita.  Since the Rose Revolution, it has been able to register a significant rise in 
economic growth, among others thanks to extensive Western economic assistance 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008c).  The country‟s main strength (or, alternatively, its 
geo-strategic curse) is its position between Europe and the oil and gas reserves of the 
Caspian basin:  thanks to its friendly relations with both its Southern Caucasian 
neighbours, it has been able to transform itself into a strategically indispensible 
transportation hub for both Azerbaijan and Armenia.  As was stated above, the latter 
especially depends on Georgia for access to the outside world.  It is, moreover, the 
chosen route for the already operational Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Baku-Supsa and 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, in addition to being the corridor of choice for the 
proposed Nabucco gas pipeline and the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad, both linking the 
Caspian basin directly to Europe (Baran, 2007, pp. 138-139; Ismayilov, 2007). 
Nevertheless, Tbilisi‟s conflicts with Moscow have inflicted serious damage on some 
(largely export-oriented and agricultural) sectors of the economy: trade links with 
Moscow have been virtually non-existent since 2006, when the Kremlin banned the 
importation of Georgian produce, expelled Georgian citizens and closed the border with 
its southern neighbour (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008e, p. 8)45.  And, of course, the 
continuing conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – culminating in the 2008 Russo-
Georgian war – have been a constant brake on development and a drain on the state‟s 
resources, although a substantial (4.5 Billion USD) aid package promised by Western 
donors in October 2008 should mitigate the most immediate consequences of the 
conflict in the years to come (European Commission, 2008). 
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 The above figure is based on the amount of cash transfers registered by the Central Bank of Armenia; 
but as pointed out by Banaian and Roberts (2004), according to whom remittances may account for up to 
30% of Armenia‟s GDP, unofficial estimates can exceed official ones considerably.  For a statistical survey 
on the importance of remittances to Armenian society, see Gevorkyan (2007). 
45
 At the time of writing (September 2010) the trade embargo was still in force, while the Upper Lars border 
crossing between Russia and Georgia had reopened on 1 March 2010.  Flights between Moscow and 
Tbilisi (suspended in 2006) resumed later that year (Patsuria, 2010; RIA Novosti, 2010). 
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Figure 4: Gross National Income Per Capita (ppp, USD) (The World Bank Group, 2008) 
 
In terms of military capabilities, there has been a noticeable regional power shift, at 
least in terms of defence expenditure and military hardware, in favour of Azerbaijan.  
Whereas in the mid-late 1990s, immediately following their victories in the Karabakh 
conflict, the Armenian armed forces could be acknowledged as the best-equipped and -
organised in the Southern Caucasus (thanks largely to Russian assistance), recent 
years have seen a dramatic increase in the defence expenditures of both Baku and 
Tbilisi (IISS, 2008, pp. 165-168, 176-177; SIPRI, 2008, pp. 185-190).  In Georgia, the 
budget increased quite dramatically following the Rose Revolution, from 51.7 million 
USD in 1998 to 592 million USD in 2007, that is, from 1.1% to 5.2% of GDP; the bulk of 
these increases had gone to preparing the armed forces for entry into NATO through 
the implementation of a thorough Strategic Defence Review, heavily based on IPAP 
standards of interoperability.  Troop levels stood at 36,000 just before the 2008 conflict 
erupted, but while the level and quality of armaments had improved, and military 
„software‟ had been brought closer to NATO standards through American advice, 
training and direct aid (Tselyuko, 2008), the conflict revealed serious deficiencies in 
Georgia‟s armed forces (Giragosian, 2008).  During the August war, these deficiencies 
exacerbated the significant losses inflicted on Georgia‟s military capability by Russia‟s 
armed forces, which, despite their own technical and operational inefficiencies, 
succeeded in dismantling the Georgian military-industrial complex through 
overwhelming force (Barabanov, 2008a; Barabanov, Lavrov, & Tselyuko, 2009; Lavrov, 
2009; McDermott, 2009). 
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Figure 5: Military Expenditure in the Southern Caucasus 1998-2008 (Million USD) 
(Source: SIPRI) 
 
Azerbaijan‟s growth as a regional military power has been very impressive, although, 
according to a recent International Crisis Group report (2008b), serious problems 
remain.  Azerbaijan‟s army is a far cry from what existed in June-October 1993, when 
Armenian forces were able to overrun several Azeri districts without much resistance, 
Baku called in the aid of Mujahideen mercenaries from Chechnya and Afghanistan, and 
warlords were instrumental in changing regimes in the capital (De Waal, 2003, pp. 181, 
211-216, 236).  Baku has implemented NATO norms, participating in a variety of 
programmes with various acronyms (PfP, IPAP, PARP, PAP-T) and receiving bilateral 
assistance from the US, UK and, especially, Turkey, even if it has avoided specifying 
NATO membership as an explicit policy objective.    Moreover, the recent spectacular 
growth in oil revenues has allowed the Aliyev regime to increase defence expenditures 
to 2 Billion dollars in 2008 – equal to the whole state budget of arch-foe Armenia – 
allowing Azerbaijan to upgrade its military capabilities both quantitatively and 
qualitatively in quite dramatic ways.  However, as pointed out by the International Crisis 
Group (2008b, pp. 12-15), the Azeri power ministries‟ lack of transparency and 
accountability may seriously hamper any gains through inefficiency and 
mismanagement, besides the fact that money never equates to combat capability so 
simply. 
Relatively speaking, Armenia had become the regional slacker in military terms by 
August of 2008, before the destruction of much of Georgia‟s military capability: its 
military budget was only a fraction of both its neighbours‟, both in absolute terms and 
as a proportion of GDP.  Nevertheless, from a regional perspective, its armed forces 
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retain several advantages, admittedly depending on the continued regional presence 
and goodwill of the Russian Federation, whose strategic partnership is explicitly 
stressed in Yerevan‟s National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine (Republic of 
Armenia, 2007a, 2007b).   Armenia‟s „external‟46 borders are still guarded by Russian 
troops, and, save for the strategically important radar station at Gabala, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia is the only (recognised) state in the region hosting Russian military bases, 
more specifically, the 102nd base at Gyumri.  Armenia has an explicit mutual defence 
agreement with Russia, and continues to receive Russian arms supplies at preferential 
terms (H. Melkumian & Zakarian, 2003; Tamrazian, 1997).  Finally, as a member of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Yerevan cooperates with other former Soviet 
Republics in a number of military issues (Malysheva, 2001), representing the centre of 
the organisation‟s so-called Caucasus axis of military operations and the focal point of 
its regional air defence component.  Nevertheless, there is little doubt the country has 
increasing difficulty in keeping up with its main strategic adversary in terms of raw 
manpower and level of armaments (Barabanov, 2008b).   
Boundaries 
Where are the boundaries of the Southern Caucasus RSC?  Is it, in fact, an RSC, or, 
as argued by Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 419), a sub-complex within the wider FSU 
RSC? The security linkages between the three Southern Caucasian states are far 
denser than those with the Central Asian and other surrounding states, partly because 
of their geographic proximity and the relatively well-delimited nature of the Southern 
Caucasian land mass, bordered to the West and the East by respectively the Black and 
Caspian seas, as well as the formidable, relatively impenetrable Caucasus mountains 
to the north.  Although a fully grounded reply to the question of „boundaries‟ would 
require a diversion into a micro-analysis of security discourse, even from the macro-
viewpoint of material reality and ostensible state behaviour, there are strong indications 
that these three units can be analysed meaningfully as a separate whole.   
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by transportation links that create a 
significant interdependence between them: Baku‟s oil industry is largely dependent on 
technical supplies transported through Georgia for its expansion, while Armenia‟s 
economy relies on Georgia as an import/export corridor to the outside world.  In 
themselves, these economic links open up quite a few security concerns in all three 
capitals of the Southern Caucasus.  In terms of macro-perspective military interaction, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in open conflict since independence.  There 
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 I.e. with states outside the FSU – Turkey and Iran. 
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are significant Armenian and Azeri minorities in Georgia, creating potential problems 
between all three states.  And, most importantly, as will become clear in the following 
chapters, these states define their security first and foremost in terms of each other.  
Describing the region as a separate RSC or RSSC – as I shall do in this case study – 
would therefore be far from unjustified. 
Nevertheless, seeing the region as a separate entity is not as straightforwardly 
accepted as one might think.  Many – if not most – authors treat the Armenia-
Azerbaijan-Georgia triad as part of the wider Former Soviet Union, often linking it 
closely to Central Asia.  A minority see the three countries as part of the „Black Sea 
Region‟ (Pavliuk & Klympush-Tsintsadze, 2004; Sezer, 1997, Herd, 2000 #333), or, 
more questionably, the „Caspian Basin‟ (Alam, 2002) or „West Asia‟ (Peimani, 1999).  
But as Buzan (2003) and Lake and Morgan (1998) point out, expanding the geographic 
scope of „regionness‟ often goes at the expense of analytical depth, and, especially in 
the case of the quite expansive „West Asian‟ and „Black Sea‟ cases, apart from a few 
specific issue areas (terrorism, the environment, trade), it is quite unclear what 
including the Balkans or countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan would contribute to 
the analysis that will be carried out in the following chapters.   
The security linkages between the Caucasus and the outlying areas of West Asia, the 
Caspian Basin or the Black Sea simply do not reach the scope and critical mass 
required to justify their meaningful inclusion in a comprehensive analysis of security in 
the Southern Caucasus (except perhaps if limited to the narrow but admittedly 
important issue-area of energy).  There is, however, a stronger case for viewing the 
Southern Caucasus as part of the Former Soviet Union, or linking it to Central Asia.  
Many of the security dynamics one observes between Armenia, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan are tied to wider interactions in these areas.  GUAM and the CSTO include 
members throughout the FSU.  The Southern Caucasus is strategically located 
between the vast Central Asian energy reserves and an energy-hungry Europe 
increasingly concerned at its dependency on Russia.  As former Soviet republics, all 
three states are faced with similar problems of transition to their counterparts in other 
parts of the demised superpower.  And, crucially, states in both the Caucasus and 
Central Asia define their security largely in relation to their northern „big brother‟, the 
Russian Federation.   
In many issue-areas, mostly centred on the workings of the CIS and the CSTO, Russia 
acts as a crucial pivot point between the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.  More 
importantly, there is considerable overspill on quite fundamental security issues 
between Russia‟s Northern Caucasus region and the three states to the south: 
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examples include the links between Abkhazia and related Northern Caucasian ethnic 
groups (Hewitt, 1999), especially apparent during the Abkhaz-Georgian war of 1992-
1994, the close relations between South and North Ossetia, the activities of Chechen 
militias in Georgia‟s Pankisi gorge in the early 2000s (German, 2004), ties between 
North Caucasian and Azeri Salafist radicals (Valiyev, 2005), and the occasional 
restlessness of Azerbaijan‟s Lezgin, Avar, and Tsakhur minorities, ethnic groups with a 
presence in Russian Dagestan (Melikishvili, 2008; RFE-RL, 2008).    
It is quite clear Russia cannot be treated as an „ordinary‟ penetrating great power 
because of its geographic proximity and its intense, direct involvement in the region, 
predicated in no small part on the linkages between the north and the south of the 
great mountain chain.  Provided this is always kept in mind, whether to define the 
Southern Caucasus in one way or the other – as a complex or sub-complex – is a 
minor question of terminology and analytical choice.  In this case, I shall follow 
Coppieters (1996a), Rondeli (1998 ) and Derghoukassian (2006) in analysing it as a 
RSC:.  It can indeed easily be deemed to represent a sufficiently self-contained “set of 
units whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation, or both are so 
interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved 
apart from one another” as defined by Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 44).  However, 
rather than seeing the Southern Caucasus RSC as unipolar and centred on Russia, I 
shall treat it as internally tri-polar and self-contained, while at the same time 
acknowledging Russia‟s strong regional presence as an external actor and great 
power, that is as a state whose behaviour is not simply predicated on its interactions 
with other regional units, but also, or even more so, on its interactions with what it 
rightly or wrongly sees as its systemic peers.  
Amity and Enmity: A Macro-View 
Turning to the fourth traditional variable of RSCT, amity/enmity, previous chapters 
provide a detailed roadmap for its operationalisation.  The central question here is 
where to situate Southern Caucasia within the typologies first suggested in chapter 2 
and methodologically elaborated in chapter 5.  To recap, these ideal-types were linked 
to a number of macro- and micro- characteristics, included in table 2 (p. 106).  So how 
can one characterise this region in terms of amity/enmity‟s macro-perspective aspects, 
thus defined?  As foreshadowed by the gloomy modern historical overview of chapter 
1, from a macro-viewpoint at least, it would make sense to classify the Southern 
Caucasus as a revisionist conflict formation.  In terms of military competition, there is a 
raft of unresolved (frozen) armed conflicts throughout the region, all of which erupted in 
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the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR47.  The situation in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, which violently broke away from Georgia in a series of 
conflagrations between 1991 and 1994, „thawed‟ towards open warfare as recently as 
in August 2008, resulting in their becoming de-facto protectorates of Russia.  Armenia 
and Azerbaijan fought one of the bloodiest conflicts in the Former Soviet Union in 
1991-1994, causing over 20,000 deaths on both sides and well over a million refugees 
and IDPs (De Waal, 2003, p. 285).  While peace talks have been ongoing under the 
auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, a final settlement seems particularly elusive, and, 
as is clear from the preceding discussion on polarity, all sides in the region are 
apparently locked in a particularly intense and costly arms race.   
Crucially, the conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are not ordinary conflicts over 
competing interests; they are the result of the mutual non-recognition of several 
regional units – an essential characteristic of a revisionist conflict formation – grounded 
in fundamentally incompatible interpretations of history.  Georgia (along with almost all 
states except Russia) naturally doesn‟t recognise either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, 
while these Russian protectorates do not in any way accept the legitimacy of Georgia‟s 
claims over their territory.  Armenia‟s government does not recognise the inclusion of 
Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan; in fact, since 1991, it has carefully avoided any 
legal act that could be interpreted as even an implicit recognition of its Eastern 
neighbour‟s territorial integrity (Potier, 2001, p. 84).  As shall be seen in later, 
discursive chapters, the mutual non-recognition of units is well-grounded in nationalist 
ideas that pervade all societies in the region, and that, in different ways, imply the 
illegitimacy of „significant others‟, sometimes in quite extreme ways. 
Until the beginning of the 20th century, populations in the Southern Caucasus were 
quite intermingled; the region can certainly be compared to the Balkans in that respect.  
Today‟s borders were demarcated in the 1920s, and solutions were often imposed by 
the authorities in Moscow, who routinely ignored ethnic composition or demography as 
a decisive factor in their „adjudications‟ in an effort to facilitate control over the region‟s 
nationalities (S. T. Hunter, 2006, p. 112).  Thus, the disputed territories of Nakhichevan 
and Nagorno-Karabakh – the latter populated by an Armenian majority of 94.4% 
according to the 1926 Soviet census (Yamskov, 1991, p. 344) – were awarded to 
Azerbaijan in 1921, while the area of Zangezur was assigned to Armenia, under 
circumstances that remain contested by both parties (Potier, 2001, pp. 2-5).  All these 
territories had been the site of fierce fighting, ethnic cleansing and massacres in the 
short period of independence immediately following WWI, and neither Armenians nor 
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Azeris were to accept these decisions as final.  Similar problems had existed in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia during the brief period of Georgian independence; Soviet 
nationalities‟ policy served to further construct primordialist and highly territorialised 
national identities for these „titular‟ ethnic groups, laying the groundwork for today‟s 
disputes (Cornell, 2002a; Suny, 2001). 
On the Armenian side, there was continued bitterness over the inclusion of Nagorno-
Karabakh in Azerbaijan, long before the Azeri-Armenian conflict became 
internationalised in the 1990s. Disputes over Nagorno-Karabakh (and Nakhichevan) 
emerged within the Soviet Union as early as in the 1960s, when the Karabakh 
Armenians protested Azeri rule through a petition to Nikita Khrushchev, and the 
communist leadership of the Armenian S.S.R. was extensively purged for having 
allowed nationalist demonstrations in the streets of Yerevan (Croissant, 1998, p. 20; 
Dekmejian, 1968, pp. 512-520; Potier, 2001, pp. 5-6).  The conflict finally (re-)erupted 
in earnest in 1988, when the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh, supported by 
massive demonstrations of their ethnic kin in Armenia, made use of Gorbachev‟s policy 
of Glasnost to demand the attachment of the autonomous oblast to Armenia.  After 
anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan and the expulsion of the Azeri minority from the 
Republic of Armenia, the situation soon spun out of Moscow‟s control, and when 
„overlay‟ was removed and both republics gained independence, in 1991, what had 
been a low-level internal conflict became an intense and particularly cruel, zero-sum 
international war between two parties with radically differing interpretations of history 
(De Waal, 2003; Rieff, 1997). 
The situation was somewhat different in Georgia, whose territorial integrity is 
recognised by both its de jure Southern Caucasian neighbours.  Although the country 
has a minor border issue with Azerbaijan, centred on the cave monastery of David 
Gareji (Abbasov & Akhvlediani, 2007), it does seem to be well on its way towards 
resolution, and is largely overshadowed by the two countries‟ broader strategic 
relationship.  Relations with Armenia are less straightforward, but only slightly so.  In 
1919, independent Georgia had fought a short border war with Armenia over the 
disputed provinces of Lori and Javakheti (Hovannisian, 2005, pp. 104-105).  The 
Soviets drew the current border between the two republics in 1921, awarding Lori to 
Armenia and Javakheti (still 90% Armenian-populated) to Georgia, a situation that is 
accepted by both sides today on an intergovernmental level.  Mindful of their 
dependence on Georgia as a transit route, successive governments in Yerevan have 
worked to lessen the frequent tensions between Tbilisi and its Armenian minority, 
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despite irredentist claims by nationalist groups in Armenia (Wheatley, 2004, pp. 30-31).  
Notwithstanding the region‟s economic and cultural isolation48 within Georgia, demands 
for autonomy and federalism by some groups within Javakheti do not enjoy official 
support across the border (Minasian, 2006). 
While Georgia has – relatively speaking at least – good relations with both its 
recognised Southern Caucasian neighbours, it is nevertheless entangled in highly 
conflictual relations with the two breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
This ties into Georgia‟s predicament as a fragmented state, and the close 
entanglement of Russia in its interactions with these separatist entities and de facto 
Russian protectorates, which will be discussed in greater detail below, in the sections 
dealing with state incoherence and GPP.  For now, relating to the present subject of 
amity/enmity, suffice it to say that the fundamental relationship between these entities 
and their de-jure metropolitan state is one of non-recognition, de-legitimisation, and 
open conflict, complementing the macro-perspective characterisation of the Southern 
Caucasus as a revisionist conflict formation.   
Despite limited and as yet largely unrealised plans for security co-operation between 
Georgia and Azerbaijan (within the context of GUAM49) (Allison, 2004), and various 
vague and as yet improbable proposals by Western scholars and regional leaders for a 
Caucasian stability pact (Celac, Emerson, & Tocci, 2000; Emerson & Tocci, 2001; The 
Economist, 2008b), the dominant relationships within the region remain fundamentally 
distrustful and lack any formal security regime.  Macro-level interactions are 
characterised by intense military competition – at times culminating in open conflict – 
and by the lack of mutual recognition between several of its constituent elements.  This 
characterisation of the Southern Caucasus as a revisionist conflict formation will be 
reinforced at the micro-level through the complex web of mutual securitisations that 
pervade the Southern Caucasus.  Before moving on, however, two more factors would 
have to be dealt with from a macro-perspective: state incoherence and great power 
penetration.  It is to the former of these two that I now turn. 
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 Javakheti remains one of Georgia‟s poorest and most isolated regions (Wheatley, 2004).  Until its 
closure in 2007, a Russian military base was the area‟s largest employer; locals moreover preferred using 
the Armenian or Russian currencies over the Georgian Lari.  Javakheti‟s Armenians are also 
overwhelmingly Russian speakers, adding to suspicions of pro-Russian sympathies, and isolating them 
further from Georgian mainstream society.  Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, there have been attempts to 
address these issues, with limited success.   
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 A regional grouping of four former Soviet states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, set up in 
1997 in an as yet unsuccessful attempt to balance the Russian Federation (Allison, 2004, pp. 475-477). 
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State Incoherence in the Southern Caucasus 
Chapter 5 set out a number of macro-perspective characteristics for each of the 
different types of state incoherence elaborated previously.  To recap, the typology 
elaborated in chapter three included a horizontal and vertical dimension, referring to 
types of incoherence associated with secessionism and generalised instability, 
respectively.  In addition, distinctions were made between inherent weakness, 
ostensible instability and failure – collapse and fragmentation – (see table 3, p. 109), 
each with corresponding macro- and micro-characteristics.  From the macro-
perspective employed here, all states in the Southern Caucasus do have readily 
visible, serious internal deficiencies.  Obviously, with de-facto states existing on their 
de-jure territories, Georgia and Azerbaijan are both fragmented, while Armenia, lacking 
any minorities, is horizontally strong.  According to the indicators of vertical weakness 
and instability suggested in chapter 5, all three regional units are inherently weak and 
display occasional signs of ostensible instability.  All three states are rated either partly 
free or not free by Freedom House, and score badly on Transparency International‟s 
Corruption Perception Index (both macro-level indicators of illegitimacy and hence, 
inherent weakness); and a history of political unrest exposes all regional units‟ 
ostensible instability, or their inability to maintain themselves as their societies‟ 
preferred „strategy of survival‟ among large parts of their populations. 
In terms of political freedoms and civil liberties, Freedom House (2008c) awarded 
Georgia the highest regional score, 450, which was a slight deterioration from previous 
years, mostly due to the heavy-handed repression of anti-government demonstrations 
in November 2007 by the Sahakashvili government.  While Freedom House does 
describe Georgia as an „electoral democracy‟, that evaluation was only partially 
confirmed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2008: serious challenges were 
identified by the OSCE-CoE observer mission, which simultaneously judged both 
elections to have in essence conformed to Georgia‟s international commitments 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2008a, 2008b).  Other organisations point to continuing limits on the 
freedom of electronic media, as critical television stations and reporters have been 
systematically taken over by pro-government interests in recent years (Committee to 
Protect Journalists, 2007).  But while the country‟s divided opposition – now including 
important elements of the forces behind the „Rose Revolution‟ of 2003 – continues 
accusing the government of authoritarian tendencies, it is nevertheless safe to say that 
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 Freedom House grades states‟ political rights and civil liberties according to an inverted scale from 1 to 
7, with 1 denoting perfect freedom/protection of rights, and 7 a complete absence of freedom/protection of 
rights.  For a complete methodology, see Freedom House (2007). 
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„rump Georgia‟51 remains the relatively least autocratic state in the region.  At 67th place 
in Transparency International‟s 2008 corruption perceptions index (Lambsdorff, 2008), 
it also remains the Southern Caucasus‟ least corrupt country, in no small measure 
thanks to extensive reforms following the 2003 Rose Revolution.  Vertically at least, it 
seems to be the inherently strongest in its region, in contrast to its extreme horizontal 
fragmentation into de-facto states and its potential problems with other minorities, 
notably the Armenians of Javakheti, discussed previously in the context of Armenian-
Georgian relations. 
Armenia, like Georgia, was ranked „partly free‟ in the 2008 Freedom House report 
(2008a); it scored slightly lower than Georgia in terms of both civil liberties (4) and 
political rights (5); this may, however, present an exceedingly positive picture in light of 
recent developments.  Tellingly, the FH report explicitly states that Armenia is not an 
electoral democracy, every election since independence having been marred by 
irregularities and fraud.  The report furthermore refers to rampant nepotism, restrictions 
on press freedoms (especially in the case of electronic media), limited academic 
freedom, arrests and harassment of opposition members.  Events surrounding the 
presidential elections in 2008, when at least 11 citizens were killed during 
demonstrations against presidential elections judged flawed by international observers 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2008c), have further pushed Armenia in an authoritarian direction 
(International Crisis Group, 2008a).  Dozens of opposition supporters remain in jail, and 
the failure of Armenian authorities to free what are described as „political prisoners‟ has 
opened the possibility of the country losing its voting rights within the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE, 2008). At 109th place in Transparency 
International‟s index, Armenia scores considerably lower than its northern neighbour 
Georgia in terms of corruption. Within the preceding typology, it can be said these 
macro-perspective criteria suggest an Armenian polity suffering from considerable 
vertical inherent weaknesses; conversely, in the absence of any sizeable, territorially 
distinct ethno-religious group, Armenia remains horizontally inherently strong. 
Azerbaijan is the only recognised country to have been judged „not free‟ in the 2008 
Freedom House report, achieving scores of 6 and 5 on, respectively, its respect for 
political rights and its protection of civil liberties (Freedom House, 2008b).  The report 
states that “elections since the early 1990s have been considered neither free nor fair 
by international observers.” It points to extensive corruption, limits on press freedom 
(again, particularly in the case of electronic media), the jailing of opposition journalists, 
and some restrictions on academic freedom as problems weighing on the country‟s 
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 I.e. Georgia, minus the two secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 140 
claimed liberal-democratic credentials.  Despite a boycott by the fragmented opposition 
and continuing serious deficiencies in the electoral process, international observers did 
judge the October 2008 elections to be an improvement over previous ones 
(International Election Observation Mission, 2008).  And, for the moment at least, it 
does seem as if the Aliyev regime has been able to maintain the country‟s stability 
through a combination of repression and cooptation, although it remains to be seen 
whether its oil wealth will be able to maintain the country‟s stability over the longer 
term.  ICG in particular has pointed to the potentially destabilising effects of an 
inevitable drop in oil revenues on Azerbaijan and the whole region (International Crisis 
Group, 2007).  Apart from that, the final macro-indicator of inherent weakness, 
corruption, puts Azerbaijan, at 158th place in Transparency International‟s 2008 
Corruption Perceptions Index table, easily outscoring both Georgia and archrival 
Armenia in that dubious category. 
In terms of ostensible instability, all units in the Southern Caucasus are prone to 
political unrest; and, apart from the scarcity of free and fair elections, none of the 
regional units have experienced constitutional transitions of power to successors that 
were not pre-approved by the incumbent.  In Azerbaijan, there were two transitions of 
power between 1991 and 1993, both of them extra-constitutional government 
overthrows.  In the first, the Azeri popular front removed Azerbaijan‟s last Soviet-era 
leader, Ayaz Mutalibov, after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian forces in 
1992.  His fervently anti-Russian successor, Abufaz Elchibey, was ousted in a bizarre 
coup by an Azeri businessman-turned-warlord following defeats at the front in 1993.  
Heidar Aliyev, general secretary of the Azeri Communist party from 1969 to 1982, and 
a former politburo member came to power as a result.  Despite another attempted coup 
in 1995, and some violent opposition demonstrations, the Aliyev dynasty (Heidar was 
succeeded by his son, Ilham, in 2003) has been able to maintain stability within 
Azerbaijan ever since, through a combination of co-optation and repression (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2008b, pp. 5-6; Nichol). 
With a recent history littered with political violence, Armenia remains an ostensibly 
unstable state.  Armenia‟s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was forced out of office 
through a bloodless constitutional coup in 1998, after having clung on to power by 
sending tanks onto the streets of Yerevan following forged elections in 1996 (Astourian, 
2000).  On 27 October 1999, little more than a year later, gunmen perpetrated a 
massacre in the Armenian parliament, killing six parliament members along with the 
speaker, Karen Demirchyan, and the prime minister, Vazgen Sargsyan, leading to a 
six-month power-struggle between two factions within the group that had come to 
power in 1998 (Bravo, 2006, pp. 503-506).  The current president, Serj Sargsyan, was 
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the approved successor of his predecessor (and the winner of that power struggle), 
Robert Kocharyan, who had to proclaim a state of emergency following bloody clashes 
between demonstrators and security personnel in March 2008 (International Crisis 
Group, 2008a).  While Armenia is horizontally strong and stable – thanks to its ethnic 
homogeneity – it continues to be vertically weak and unstable, with its authorities 
regularly losing control over a society suffering from an absence of the rule of law in 
both the political and economic spheres. 
Georgia‟s recent history similarly doesn‟t bode well for its continuing stability.  Its first 
president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was ousted in an armed revolt (Way & Levitsky, 2006, 
pp. 397-400), and subsequently died in an apparent suicide.  His successor, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, survived several assassination attempts – alleged to have been 
masterminded by Russia (Geyer, 2000, p. 61) – only to be overthrown in the Rose 
Revolution of 2003.  While Saakashvili did command considerable popularity in 
subsequent years, his democratic credentials were shaken in November 2007, when 
opposition demonstrations were violently suppressed by his security forces.  To its 
credit, the Georgian government did regain some legitimacy by organising generally 
free and fair elections in 2008; but an apparent determination in Moscow to realise 
regime change in the country continues to put Georgia at risk of destabilisation in the 
future (International Crisis Group, 2008d).  Crucially, the country has not yet had a 
constitutional transfer of power from incumbent to opposition, the ultimate test of long-
term vertical stability; and, in its absence, for all its purported democratic credentials, 
any stability it may exhibit would have to be taken with a grain of salt.  What‟s more, 
minorities within rump Georgia (the aforementioned Javakheti Armenians) might 
present a challenge to its horizontal stability in the future.  
The three unrecognised entities in the Southern Caucasus will be dealt with cursorily in 
this section, partly because of the lack of data, partly because the extensive 
involvement of external actors (Russia, Armenia) makes it difficult to gauge their self-
supporting strength and stability.  The main conclusion one could make from political 
developments in 1993-2008 is on the relative vertical strength of both Abkhazia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, both of whom seem to have more-or-less independently 
functioning and reasonably (by Caucasian standards) stable political systems, as 
opposed to the fractious and highly dependent South Ossetia (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 
2008).  South Ossetia seems to be the vertically weakest entity in this sense, having 
suffered from a serious split in its political elite with the defection of Dimitri Sanakoyev 
to the Georgian side in 2006, detailed in chapter 8: neither Nagorno-Karabakh nor 
Abkhazia ever saw the emergence of a similar political force seriously advocating 
reunification with the metropolitan state.  
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The other two de-facto states display characteristics of state weakness that are not 
unlike those seen in the region‟s „legally established‟ units, especially during elections 
(Caspersen, 2008).  Abkhazia in particular seems to have a vibrant political culture that 
does at times display both independence from Russian control, and the periodic 
instability associated with elections throughout the region, as indicated by the turmoil 
surrounding the 2004 presidential ballot.  The outcome of the October 2004 polls in 
favour of Sergei Bagapsh, the candidate not initially favoured by either Moscow or the 
incumbent, was overturned and not recognised by either Russia or the pro-government 
candidate.  After forceful Russian „mediation‟, Bagapsh was eventually allowed to take 
power after a re-run – on a joint ticket with his opponent – early the following year 
(Fuller, 2004; Peuch, 2004b, 2005).  Following the 1999 parliamentary murders in 
Armenia and the subsequent tensions within Armenia‟s elites, Nagorno-Karabakh‟s 
political stability did suffer from infighting that pitted factions led by Robert Kocharyan 
and Serj Sargsyan against those of one-time local strongman and former defence 
minister, Samvel Babayan.  But the issue was resolved by the comprehensive removal 
from power and imprisonment of the latter, and the de-facto republic has remained 
stable ever since, holding relatively peaceful elections that regularly draw the 
condemnation of both Baku and the outside world (ANN-Groong, 2004). 
Great Power Penetration 
Georgia‟s and South Ossetia‟s predicaments take the discussion to a macro-
perspective analysis of the final factor in the Southern Caucasian security puzzle, great 
power penetration.  Chapter 5 set out its macro-characteristics:  the presence of great 
powers penetrating a region can be assessed through three types of regional 
involvement: 1) political/economic (trade and investments, non-military aid), 2) semi-
military (military aid, arms supplies, advisors, covert operations), 3) direct military 
(presence of troops, alliance commitments).  Both the magnitude of this material 
involvement, and its particular nature give an early, macro-level indication of the 
cooperative or competitive nature and the polarity of regional great power penetration, 
or the effects it might have on the security dynamic of regional actors, to be 
complemented at the micro-level by the discourse of both regional actors and 
penetrating powers. 
Of course, as the region‟s old imperial master, Russia penetrates the region almost by 
inertia: it inherited several military bases from Soviet times, in all three former Soviet 
republics, although its direct military presence had been shrinking before the 2008 
Russo-Georgian conflict (Lachowski, 2007, pp. 43-68).  In rump Georgia, its last 
military base, at Akhalkalaki, in the Armenian-populated Javakheti region, was closed 
in 2007 (Socor, 2007).  In Azerbaijan, Russia‟s  „Military Space Forces‟ maintain a 
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strategically important radar station at Gabala (Aliev, 2004; Podvig, 2002), close to 
Baku, whose lease is due to run out in 2012, and which was the subject of a possible 
deal regarding strategic missile defence between Washington and Moscow.  Russia‟s 
military position seems safe and relatively uncontested in Armenia, where its border 
troops guard the border with Turkey, and ground and air forces maintain bases in 
Gyumri and at Erebuni, near Yerevan.  Moreover, after the withdrawal of Georgia and 
Azerbaijan in 1999, Armenia remains the only regional member of the Russian-
dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) (A. Weinstein, 2007). 
Russia‟s role in the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia must 
also be mentioned here.  From 1994 to August 2008, about two thousand Russian 
servicemen were stationed in Abkhazia, and around one thousand in South Ossetia, 
their official, nominally neutral (MacFarlane, 1997) status as „peacekeepers‟ always put 
into question by subsequent Georgian administrations (Nichol, 2008, pp. 11-14).  The 
2008 five-day war has considerably increased the level of Russia‟s military presence in 
both entities, apart from reinforcing Russia‟s commitment to the breakaway regions 
through their official recognition on 26 August 2008, and cooperation and defence 
agreements signed the following month (Reuters, 2008; RIA Novosti, 2008b).  Most 
non-Russian observers, including the ICG (2008d, p. 2) consider Russia not to have 
abided by the agreements brokered by the French EU presidency at the end of the 
conflict.  As a result, what was previously a „peacekeeping‟ presence seems to have 
been upgraded by Moscow to a full-fledged military commitment to recognised 
independent statelets: Russian troop levels have increased to 3,800 in Abkhazia and a 
similar number in South Ossetia, and Sukhumi has already declared its readiness to 
host a permanent naval base to the Russia‟s Black Sea fleet on its territory, at the 
former Soviet submarine base at Ochamchira (Allison, 2008, p. 1163; UPI, 2008).   
Even if Russia‟s position in its traditional naval base at Sevastopol now seems secure, 
this could at some point offer an – albeit imperfect – alternative or supplement (apart 
from the purely geopolitical element of adding several hundred kilometres to the Black 
Sea coastline under de-facto Russian control).  
Russia‟s economic presence in the Southern Caucasus remains considerable as well.  
It is Armenia‟s main trading partner and source for foreign direct investment, with 
Russian companies controlling strategically important sectors of the economy: with the 
exception of one mobile operator, Russian firms own all of Armenia‟s 
telecommunications network, virtually the whole energy sector (including the nuclear 
power plant at Medzamor), its rail network, and the local remnants of the Soviet-era 
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defence industries, most of these acquired during the presidency of Robert Kocharyan 
(1998-2008) in exchange for debt relief or  subsidised energy supplies52.  Armenia‟s 
economic dependence on Russia as its main trading partner is amplified by the 
remittances sent home from an important diaspora spread throughout the territory of its 
former imperial master, where a large part of the estimated 1.5 million economic 
migrants fleeing Armenia in the decade immediately following independence ended up.   
Tbilisi‟s economic relations with Russia have been strained since the Rose Revolution, 
and Georgia has suffered particularly since 2006 from a trade and transportation 
embargo by what used to be the largest export market for its products.   An attempt by 
Gazprom in 2006 to increase prices for the provision of natural gas accelerated 
Georgia‟s decision to purchase supplies from Azerbaijan even before the 2008 war, 
lessening its energy dependence on its northern neighbour (Nichol, 2007, p. 21).  
Despite the fraught relationship, Russian-based firms have continued to be active in 
the country, controlling its electricity network, a major bank, mines, and a mobile 
telecoms operator (Indans, 2007, pp. 136-137; The Financial, 2008), although this has 
not translated into any kind of leverage over the current government in bilateral political 
relations.  Simultaneously, despite frequent protestations by Tbilisi, Russian 
corporations and private individuals have been operating for years in both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially in the tourism and telecoms sectors (Civil Georgia, 
2007). 
In that strategic sense, Azerbaijan is perhaps least economically penetrated by Russia 
of all three Southern Caucasian states.  Although Russian companies were involved in 
the „contract of the century‟, regulating the exploitation of Azerbaijan‟s substantial 
Caspian oil reserves through AIOC53, they have largely withdrawn their interest, leaving 
the oil sector – accounting for 90% of the country‟s FDI – to mostly Western operators 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b, pp. 38-39; Muradov, 2003).  Azerbaijan is largely 
self-sufficient where energy is concerned, and, in the absence of substantial FDI 
outside the oil sector, its remaining strategic sectors are either domestically owned, or 
penetrated by a diffuse mix of foreign companies.  However, Russia‟s influence over 
the Azeri economy is to some extent maintained by its continuing direct control of 
important export routes (like the Baku-Novorossiisk oil pipeline) and, much more 
indirectly, its (now clearly demonstrated) ability and willingness to project power into 
Georgia, potentially threatening the crucial BTC pipeline, as well as Azerbaijan‟s main 
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overland transportation routes to the ports of Poti and Batumi.  In recent years, the 
growing realisation of this fact in Baku may have contributed to a further deepening of 
the rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Russia, after the signing of a Declaration 
of Friendship and Strategic Partnership in July 2008 (Khachatrian, 2008b). 
Russia‟s exclusive presence in the Southern Caucasus has been declining since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, at least in Azerbaijan and Georgia.  While Armenia adopted a 
pro-Russian line from the very beginning, in the early days of independence at least, 
governments in power in both these states had an unmitigated pro-Western slant 
(Alieva, 2000, pp. 17-26); the nationalist regimes of both Zviad Gamsakhurdia and 
Abulfaz Elchibey openly challenged Moscow‟s predominance of the region in 1991-
1993.  These brash, direct challenges remained short-lived: both Gamsakhurdia and 
Elchibey had been removed from power by 1993.  In both cases, these anti-Soviet 
political leaders were replaced by high-ranking members of the former Communist 
bureaucracy, Shevardnadze in Georgia‟s case, Heidar Aliev in Azerbaijan‟s.  While 
both states became more cautious in their challenges of their former imperial master, 
they did more subtly continue a rapprochement with the West, allowing both the United 
States and the European Union to establish a more or less firm foothold in the region 
(Alieva, 2000, pp. 17-25).  Georgia remained the most pro-Western state in the RSC, 
and this was dramatically amplified by the coming to power in 2003 of an unabashedly 
pro-Western administration in Tbilisi, openly advocating NATO and EU membership 
and challenging Russian regional hegemony.   
The first significant Western presence in the Southern Caucasus was economic, 
however, and centred on Baku.  With the signing of the multi-billion „contract of the 
century‟, large oil multinationals, including BP and Exxon-Mobil, reinforced Western 
interest in Azerbaijan and the Caspian in general as a new, 21st-century source of oil 
and gas.  Azerbaijan also quickly developed close economic ties to NATO member 
Turkey, with the clear approval of subsequent American administrations (Croissant, 
1997, p. 354).  The building of the BTC-pipeline and its putting into operation in 2005 
reinforced its role as a major alternative source of energy to petro-power Russia and 
the ever-unstable Middle East, as well as increasing Western involvement in the 
region.  The State Department‟s part in pushing this intensely political project – funded 
by the US Exim Bank, along with the EBRD, the IFC and a private consortium led by 
BP – was notable (EBRD, 2003; Hill, 2004).  The pipeline was, for a long time, the 
largest Western venture in Georgia, which has benefited in recent years from increased 
attention from international investors outside the oil sector as well.  Armenia, blockaded 
and circumvented by almost all major regional transportation projects, has not been 
able to benefit to the same extent from Western FDI.   
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Since independence, Western states – especially the United States – have also been 
able to penetrate the Southern Caucasus militarily (Nichol, 2007).  US military aid to 
Azerbaijan was seriously constrained until 2002 because of legislative limitations, 
which, as a result of Armenian lobbying in Washington, prohibited any military aid to 
the country by the US government (Cornell, 2005, pp. 111-115), to the annoyance of 
subsequent US administrations.  After its lifting, such security-related aid rose to a 
modest 26.71 million in 2007 (Nichol, 2007, p. 33), concentrating mostly on counter-
terrorism training and energy security.  Meanwhile, Armenia – a firm ally of Russia‟s 
with nevertheless good relations with the West – has also received modest amounts of 
military aid in the form of training and know-how from the United States government 
(11.89 Million USD in 2007)54.  Both Armenia and Azerbaijan participate actively in 
NATO‟s PfP and iPAP programmes, and both countries have, like Georgia, contributed 
modestly to NATO- or US-led missions abroad, including Iraq (Armenia), Afghanistan 
(Azerbaijan), and Kosovo (Armenia); but while Armenia has expressly excluded the 
possibility of it ever joining NATO, Azerbaijan‟s attitude towards alliance membership 
has been only slightly more ambivalent. 
U.S. and NATO military involvement in Georgia, however, has been quite open and on 
a larger scale; a commitment to eventual NATO alliance and E.U. membership is 
among the central planks of the country‟s security and foreign policies, as clearly stated 
in its National Security Concept (Republic of Georgia, 2005), and Tbilisi is by far the 
largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the region, a cumulative 379 Million USD 
between 1992 and 2005.  Although Georgia started its move towards the Atlantic 
alliance in the Shevardnadze era, its pro-Western orientation turned into something 
more than a „tilt‟ following the 2003 Rose revolution.  American advisors had already 
arrived in the country in 2002, ostensibly to help Georgian troops clear Chechen 
fighters from the remote Pankisi gorge, in the Caucasus, following threats of cross-
border intervention by the Russians.  That same year, the United States initiated 
GTEP, a „train and equip‟ programme aimed at improving standards in the Georgian 
military, while a security treaty was signed between the two countries in 2003, 
reportedly much to Russia‟s ire (Blagov, 2003).   
After the coming to power of Mikheil Saakashvili, Tbilisi‟s NATO membership became 
one of the Bush administration‟s most important regional priorities.  GTEP was followed 
by a similar American programme (SSOP) in 2004, with the intention of encouraging 
Georgia to upgrade its armed forces to NATO standards within a minimal amount of 
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 Between 1992 and 2008, the United States also provided 4.761 Billion USD in (non-military) foreign aid 
to all three South Caucasus states: 1.821 Billion USD to Armenia, 832 Million USD to Azerbaijan and 
2.108 Billion USD to Georgia (Nichol, 2011, p. 46). 
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time, even though this did not prevent the humiliating defeat at the hands of the 
overwhelmingly more numerous forces of the Russian 58th army in August 2008 
(Barabanov, 2008a).  NATO accession had already been delayed by the NATO 
council‟s refusal to grant it a Membership Action Plan (MAP) during the Bucharest 
summit, in April 2008, and the perceived imprudence by Tbilisi‟s leadership during the 
Summer war of that year further increased the resistance to near-term membership 
among some of the states in Donald Rumsfeld‟s „Old Europe‟ (Allison, 2008, p. 1165)55.  
Georgia‟s commitment to NATO membership nevertheless remained a matter of 
consensus within society during the period under review, as shall be seen in 
subsequent chapters. 
As is often the case, regional involvement by the European Union56 rests mostly on 
financial assistance and the subtle attraction of „soft power‟.  Although actual EU 
membership is still a very distant prospect, all recognised regional units have on 
various occasions revealed an interest in joining the European bloc as fully-fledged 
members.  All three de-jure states were recipients of aid in the context of the TACIS, 
TRACECA, INOGATE and a host of other EU-sponsored programmes during the 
previous fifteen years, together receiving a more than 1.200 Billion EUR in aid between 
1991 and 2006; in 2004, they were included in the EU ENP (European Neighbourhood 
Policy), an integrated, long-term approach to building security and sustainable 
development in regions adjoining the organisation (European Commission, 2007b, 
2007c, 2007d; Trenin, 2005).  The EU was active in the past financing rehabilitation 
projects in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflict zones, and European Union 
observers have also been acting as observers in the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-
Georgian conflict (European Union, s.d.).  Collectively, the EU is actually the largest 
trade partner for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with turnover in 2007 amounting to 
1.575 Billion, 993 million and 8.3 billion EUR respectively (European Union, 2008a).  In 
the absence of „hard‟, military power, however, it remains to be seen to what extent this 
largely civilian involvement has an effect on the security behaviour of the regional 
actors; precisely because of the ideational nature of „soft power‟ and the conditionalities 
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 Whether or not the recently signed US-Georgian Strategic Charter (United States Department of State, 
2009) is anything more than declarative remains to be seen . 
56
 Involvement by individual member states is negligible.  In Shevardnadze‟s time, Germany and Georgia 
did have a particularly close relationship, with Berlin aiding the former Soviet Republic both through its 
influence on EU institutions and through direct aid.  France and Armenia seem to have a cordial 
relationship, mostly based on the presence of a sizeable French-Armenian diaspora, although this does 
not translate into tangible French penetration in the region.  Britain‟s presence in Azerbaijan, mostly 
through BP‟s investments in the energy sector, is also notable, as is Italy‟s through ENI.  Individually, 
however, these involvements are not sufficient to substantially and permanently affect the strategic 
calculations and security behaviours of the three Transcaucasian states (see following sections). 
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associated with EU aid, the true significance of regional penetration by the EU will be 
captured through the subsequent micro-, discursive perspective. 
Two other external actors are worth mentioning in the Southern Caucasus, although, 
not being great powers, their interactions occur on an exclusively interregional level 
rather than having an additional systemic aspect: Turkey, and Iran.  During the first 
years following the fall of the Soviet Union, there were high expectations (and 
concerns) regarding their roles in the newly independent, mostly Muslim and Turkic-
speaking states of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, most of which have not 
been realised.  The main Western fear was that these countries would come under the 
influence of Iranian-style political Islam; this discounted the fact that, except for Shiite 
Azerbaijan, most of the newly independent states were traditionally Sunni, and that the 
populations of these states had been thoroughly secularised in Soviet times.  In the 
Southern Caucasus, as in the rest of the FSU, direct Iranian political influence has 
remained quite muted, and much of Islamist radicalism in the region has a Sunni-
Salafist rather than Shiite character.  Security interaction between Tehran and the 
region remains mainly limited to issues concerning the Caspian sea, counter-
proliferation, the potentially nefarious influence of Azerbaijan on Iran‟s Azeri-populated 
north, and Iran‟s role as an alternative energy and transportation corridor for Armenia.  
In general, Tehran takes a pragmatic and low-profile approach in its policies towards 
the region, one based more on national interest than ideological imperative (S. Hunter, 
2003, pp. 142-143; Oliker, 2003, pp. 208-213; Tarock, 1997b; Vartanian, 2004). 
Turkey was, for a while, seen as an appropriate model for the former Soviet states, and 
during the early 1990s, focused much of its attention on the FSU (De Pauw, 1996); it 
soon became clear the expectations of a Turkish-dominated region stretching from the 
Mediterranean to the Altai Mountains would not materialise (S. A. Jones, 2000, pp. 63-
65).  Most of the Central Asian states remained firmly in the grip of their Soviet-era 
leaders, most of whom ultimately – after some vacillation – have chosen 
accommodation with Moscow.  Ankara‟s influence in today‟s Southern Caucasus lies 
mostly in its position on the current and potential energy and transportation routes out 
of the region, and its role as a major trade and investment partner for both Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, with whom relations remain particularly close.  Moreover, its historic enmity 
with Armenia has combined with its ethnic kinship with Azerbaijan to keep Yerevan 
firmly in Moscow‟s orbit.  The August 2008 events have prompted Turkey to increase 
its diplomatic activity in the region, redoubling efforts at normalising relations with 
Armenia, and putting much emphasis on a so far vaguely-defined „Caucasus Stability 
and Co-Operation Platform‟, but overall, its independent influence has so far still been 
limited compared to the penetrating great powers‟.   
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From a macro-perspective, the Southern Caucasus remains strongly penetrated by 
Russia, and although its regional hegemony appears to have diminished in recent 
years, as events in Georgia have shown, it is still very able to decisively influence 
events in the region.  Relations between Russia and the United States are undoubtedly 
competitive, with – as shall be seen in the relevant discursive chapter – Moscow taking 
an increasingly hard-line stance on NATO expansion into a region it still sees as part of 
its Southern „soft underbelly‟, its rightful sphere of influence.  In addition, while EU 
involvement is largely commercial or ideational in nature and lacks a „hard power‟ 
military aspect, Moscow still views Brussels‟ activities in the region with a certain 
degree of suspicion.  Russia‟s distrust of the West is amplified further by American-led 
efforts to construct energy routes from the Caspian basin circumventing its territory.  
The one issue where these great powers do co-operate – Nagorno-Karabakh – 
remains an exception to the otherwise competitive rule.   
Conclusion 
According to the macro-perspective provided in this chapter, the Southern Caucasus 
remains a RSC defined by weak and unstable states, penetrated by competing great 
powers and plagued by revisionist-conflictual patterns of amity and enmity.  In terms of 
their horizontal coherence, both Georgia and Azerbaijan can be described as 
„fragmented‟ in light of the existence of “territorially distinct and stable secessionist 
units with empirical statehood” within their recognised borders (see table 3, p. 109).  
Several extra-constitutional transfers of power and recurring political instability also 
suggest these states are moreover ostensibly unstable from a vertical point of view.  
Furthermore, Russia, the United States and the European Union all penetrate this 
RSC, alongside regional players Turkey and Iran, making for a competitive-multipolar 
pattern of great power penetration (see table 1, p. 96).  Finally, the RSC can also be 
described as a „revisionist conflict formation‟, in light of intense military competition 
(including armed conflict), combined with the absence of the mutual recognition of 
several units and a formal security regime (see table 2, p. 106). While this is already 
clearly visible from the macro-perspective laid out above, the intricate interactions 
between these phenomena truly come to the fore from the micro, discursive viewpoint, 
the main focus of the next three chapters.  How do state incoherence, GPP and 
revisionist-conflictual relations appear in the regional security discourse, the patterns of 
securitisation that pervade this RSC?  It is to these questions that we now turn, before 
providing an answer to this thesis‟ main research questions by focusing our attention 
on the relationship between these phenomena. 
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 CHAPTER 7: DISCOURSES OF CONFLICT IN THE 
SOUTHERN CAUCASUS 
Introduction 
In chapter 2, the amity/enmity variable of RSCT was elaborated at a micro, discursive 
level in terms of regional networks of securitisation, differentiated as to their 
argumentative (values-centred) and instrumental (means/threats-centred) aspects.  
The result was a spectrum of amity/enmity, ranging from the revisionist conflict 
formation at the conflictual extreme, to the tight security regime at the amicable end.   
Above, I already touched upon the fundamentally inimical, conflictual relations that 
appear in the Southern Caucasus from a macro-viewpoint; these are also reflected at 
the deeper, discursive level, where the argumentative and instrumental patterns of 
securitisation reveal a region that is still very much in the revisionist conflict formation 
part of the spectrum.  This is an RSC where all three recognised units define 
themselves – their values and identities – in fundamentally conflicting terms, as 
apparent in their official security discourses. The presence of units that are 
overwhelmingly unrecognised under international law exacerbates this situation by 
adding a legal-normative element to the conflictual nature of these identities.  This is 
also a region where all units see the use of force as a legitimate means towards solving 
their clashing self-views, apparent not only in the frequency of armed conflict and a 
regional arms-race at the macro level, but within the units‟ national security strategies – 
supplemented by official pronouncements of their respective leaderships – from the 
micro-, discursive perspective.  More depressingly perhaps for those of a more 
peaceful disposition is the relative stability of these conflictual discourses of security: 
values and identities rooted in aggressive and essentialist nationalism are seen as 
relatively legitimate, while the military is still seen as the most effective way to maintain 
security by both governments and oppositions, especially in Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
The national security strategies of the three Southern Caucasian states (see appendix) 
were adopted in 2006-2008, and all deal comprehensively with a wide range of issue-
areas, from the military to the environmental.  In effect, they can be seen as 
„crystallisations‟ onto the state level of the numerous securitisations and securitising 
acts that have pervaded their respective state institutions and societies since 
independence.  Throughout, they contain numerous explicit and implicit definitions of 
identity and values – argumentative aspects of securitisation – that often lie at the core 
of fundamentally compatible and incompatible regional relationships.  These 
fundamental normative assumptions are generally grounded in a wider discursive 
context; all three states have formulated their security concepts in a way that is largely 
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reflective and constitutive of the historically generated and unique fears and concerns 
that permeate their societies.   
Armenia and Azerbaijan‟s argumentative construction of identity/values clash directly, 
and quite dramatically, through the uncompromising centrality of Nagorno-Karabakh in 
their conceptions of national security; the conflict over this territory is but a small part of 
fundamentally incompatible definitions of statehood, history and territoriality prevalent 
within both societies.  Georgia‟s National Security Concept, meanwhile, is predicated in 
no small part on the securitisation of its northern neighbour, the Russian Federation, as 
a particularly acute existential threat to the central value of unified and independent 
statehood.  While Tbilisi does not directly securitise its Southern Caucasian neighbours 
– indeed, its relations with Azerbaijan are almost unequivocally friendly – the relative 
fragility of its relationship with Armenia and the existence of unrecognised statelets that 
constantly and intensely question its territorial identity still warrant describing the region 
as „revisionist-conflictual‟. 
The security concepts also expound the core principles of the security policies that 
make up the instrumental facet of securitisation, referring to methods for achieving 
security, for addressing these fears and existential concerns; all of them give 
considerable importance to the state‟s military development, which, in conjunction with 
policy statements and actual implementation, leave open the constant possibility of 
armed conflict.  These discourses also relate to fundamentally different foreign policies 
and great-power alignments that create additional tensions between the three units, 
with Georgia and, to a far lesser extent, Azerbaijan tending towards the West, and 
Armenia firmly remaining within the Russian orbit, earning the latter latent distrust in 
Tbilisi and open contempt in Baku.   In the next few sections, I shall analyse each of 
these units‟ security concepts as to their effects on the patterns of amity/enmity within 
the Southern Caucasus RSC proper, and as to their groundedness in the wider security 
discourses within their state institutions and societies, in both their argumentative and 
instrumental aspects, before moving on to their implications for state (in)coherence and 
regional great power involvement in subsequent chapters. 
Armenia’s Insecurities: Karabakh and the Ghosts of 1915 
Armenia‟s formulation of its security concept (Republic of Armenia, 2007b) (see also 
appendix p. 253) starts with a standard enumeration of values:  independence, 
protection of state and population, peace/international cooperation, preservation of 
national identity and economic prosperity, each further amplified in the document 
through the specification of a range of fundamental interests.  The document is candid 
in its subsequent characterisation of the Republic‟s security relations with various 
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neighbours.  Both Azerbaijan and Turkey are included in its subsequent itemisation of 
direct threats to fundamental values and interests.  More specifically, “Azerbaijan‟s 
aggressive policy of military posturing” is seen as “threatening the Republic of Armenia 
and the Republic of Mountainous Karabakh” [emphasis added].  “Turkey, a strategic 
partner of Azerbaijan, may also pose an additional threat”, the concept continues, 
adding that the trade and transport blockade imposed by both countries is equivalent to 
the use of force.  Armenia‟s isolation from regional projects (pipelines, transportation 
links) is likewise posed as a threat attributable to Azerbaijan.   
In terms of policies, the document is equally unambiguous: under a separate sub-
heading, it states that “the just and peaceful resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict is a key issue for the national security strategy of the Republic of Armenia, 
which is the guarantor of the safety and security of the population of the Republic of 
Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh)”.  The concept nevertheless advocates a normalisation of 
relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, arguing against Baku‟s policy of regional 
exclusion that “bilateral and regional cooperation could build confidence.”  Meanwhile, 
the establishment of diplomatic relations, the recognition of the 1915 genocide and the 
lifting of the blockade are identified as key policy goals in bilateral relations with Turkey.  
Georgia – with whom relations are relatively friendly – is seen mostly in terms of its 
importance as a stable transportation corridor, although the troubled Armenian-
inhabited region of Javakheti is referred to as necessitating co-operation between the 
two states. 
The explicit and largely unqualified identification of Azerbaijan and Turkey as threats, 
and Nagorno Karabakh‟s population as a referent object of security in addition to 
Armenia‟s, are what stand out in this document.  Armenia‟s concern at the survival of 
an entity that de jure falls outside the bounds of its political responsibility lies at the 
core of its fundamentally revisionist and dysfunctional relationship with Azerbaijan, and, 
by extension, Turkey.  Since before the inception of independence, the one constant in 
Armenian security discourse – both official and societal – has been the inclusion of 
Karabakh‟s security into the remit of the Armenian state57.  And – save for a brief 
vaccilation in the final months of Levon Ter-Petrosyan‟s presidency, discussed below – 
security for Karabakh‟s population and its Armenian identity has, in general, meant a 
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 Armenia‟s parliament has never rescinded a law passed by its Soviet-era predecessor, the Supreme 
Soviet of the Armenian SSR, in effect annexing the territory, in December 1989 (Croissant, 1998, p. 146); 
in fact, that law is expressly mentioned in the Republic‟s 1991 declaration of independence (Republic of 
Armenia, 1990).  Armenia‟s independence movement emerged from the so-called „Karabakh Committee‟, 
set up in 1988 precisely to achieve the reunification of the then autonomous region to the Armenian SSR.  
The successor to that committee, the Armenian Pan-National Movement, came to power after 
parliamentary elections in 1990 on a platform that was centred on the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh to 
Armenia.  The Karabakh issue and Armenia‟s independence movement were thus inextricably intertwined. 
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commitment to the territory‟s right to self-determination, including independence. This 
line has been consistently repeated by Armenian officialdom in various fora when 
addressing the subject, at least since the coming to power of Robert Kocharian in 1998 
(see Noyan Tapan, 2001; Oskanian, 1998, 2005; Public Television of Armenia, 2004; 
Regnum, 2008), and is moreover clearly visible in the foreign ministry‟s legal 
arguments regarding Nagorno-Karabakh‟s status under international law (see ACNIS, 
1997; Avakian, 2005). 
This adherence to Karabakh‟s security and independence has to be seen in the wider 
context of the foundational discourse that still influences many of the pronouncements 
of high-ranking policymakers and ideologues in the Republic, one that is both reflective 
and constitutive of a deeply felt sense of deprivation stemming from events in the early 
20th Century.  In this discourse, Armenian statehood is seen as the realisation of a 
long-standing aspiration of the Armenian ethnos, one that must prevent a repeat of the 
1915 Genocide, and the loss of the “Western Armenian” homelands that ensued, an 
aspiration included in the Republic‟s declaration of independence (1990).  Tellingly, 
Armenia‟s National Security Strategy lists the preservation of (an ethnically defined) 
Armenian national identity, “within Armenia and throughout its diaspora”, as one of the 
Republic‟s fundamental values, also warning against the dangers of an “inadequate 
intellectual and national education”, more specifically resulting in a “an insufficient 
awareness of national ideals, respect towards the state and its institutions, and 
individual morality, including healthy living, the traditional role of the family, and the 
misinterpretation of the national identity.”58  Karabakh, with its Armenian population, is 
seen as part and parcel of this broader referent object of Armenian identity.   
This official view of Karabakh, and „Armenian identity‟ in general as fundamental values 
to be secured by the Armenian state is deeply grounded in broader societal discourse.  
Armenian historiography unswervingly refers to the disputed territory as a heartland of 
Armenian culture, often citing its central role in the Christianisation of Armenia and the 
development of the written Armenian language in the 4th and 5th centuries; the tenuous 
Armenian identity of this heartland under Azeri domination is then often juxtaposed with 
the disappearance of Armenians from their historic homelands in Eastern Anatolia at 
                                               
58
 Although political parties in the Soviet Union are generally (and rightly) seen as ideologically vacuous, 
the dominant member of the current coalition, the Republican Party of Armenia, describes its fundamental 
values as „Tseghakron‟ (Lalayan, 2002a, 2002b; Republican Party of Armenia, 2009): literally, „race-
worship‟, a fundamentally racist ideology developed in the 1930s by Garegin Njdeh, an erstwhile guerrilla 
commander and Nazi collaborator.  The RPA‟s former junior coalition partner, the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation – also known as the Dashnak party – meanwhile still officially includes the realisation of a „free, 
united and independent Armenia‟ – usually interpreted as including territories in Georgia and Turkey, in 
addition to Nagorno-Karabakh – among its official goals (ARFD, 2009), although this now seems to be 
more of a declaration of intent rather than a matter of practical policy, in Georgia‟s case at least 
(Stepanyan, 2009).   
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the hands of the Ottoman Turks, and from Nakhichevan and the areas around 
Nagorno-Karabakh at the hands of the (Turkic) Azeris, in what is seen as the 
culmination of one millennium of Turkic encroachment (G. A. Galoian & Khudaverdian, 
1988; Kotanjian, 1997; Manassian, 1997; S. A. Melkumian, 1990).  This narrative of 
dispossession is present throughout Armenian society, and the grievances stemming 
from it are usually subsumed under the term “Hay Dat” (the „Armenian Cause‟), or, 
alternatively, “azgayin qaghaparakhosutyun” („national ideology‟).  Much of Armenian 
everyday discourse fails to distinguish between Azeris and Turks (both colloquially 
referred to as “Turqer” in Armenian), and, as in the Balkans, this ethnonym does carry 
with it a strong stereotypical connotation of innate barbarism and cruelty59, recently 
amplified by the 1988 Sumgait pogroms and the subsequent ethnic cleansing of 
Armenians from Azerbaijan, and their attempted removal from Karabakh proper in 
1990-1992 (BBC Monitoring, 2005a; Hakopyan, 1997).  Added to this is a latent fear 
that „the Turks‟ still harbour the goal of eliminating Armenia as an obstacle to pan-
Turanist goals as long as it does not acknowledge and atone for the 1915 Genocide, 
and of Karabakh as a „bastion‟ against such designs.  In such an atmosphere of 
hypersecuritisation, any suggested concessions, including on the return of territories 
occupied by Armenia but falling outside of Karabakh proper, are heavily criticised by 
large sections of the Armenian public and intellectual elite (Ayvazian, 2007; Marina 
Grigoryan, 2009; Mikaelyan, 2006; Panorama.am, 2008; Sarkisyan, 2009). 
This territorial-ethnic view of Armenian identity is, to a more limited extent, replicated in 
societal attitudes towards Georgia.  Within Armenian society at large, feelings towards 
Georgia are ambiguous, partly because of its recent alignment with Turkey and close 
cooperation with Azerbaijan, partly because of some relatively limited historical 
antagonisms between the two sides, based, again, on diverging territorial identities.  
Many ordinary (and not-so-ordinary) Armenians see Javakhq/Javakheti as a part of 
historical Armenia; perceived neglect or oppression of the Armenian identity in this 
Armenian-populated region (see chapter 8), and long-running disputes over Armenian 
cultural monuments throughout Georgia aggravate the situation by amplifying the 
existential fears among some regarding Armenian identity in the neighbouring state 
(Martirosyan, 2008, Stepanyan, 2009 #589; Novosti-Armenia, 2008).  Nevertheless, as 
is clear from the National Security Concept, these existential fears have not found their 
way into state policy, undoubtedly because of Armenia‟s dependence on Georgia as its 
only viable outlet to the outside world, leading to frequent criticism of Armenian state 
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 For examples of such discourse, see Ararat Center (2009) and opinion surveys by ACNIS (2006b, pp. 
616, 623).  For a mainstream Armenian view of the Karabakh issue, see De Facto (2009). For a detailed 
survey on Armenian public and expert attitudes on the Karabakh issue, see ACNIS (2006d). 
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policy in the media. Subsequent governments have consistently described Georgia as 
a friendly country, although this was sorely tested by events in August 2008, when 
Yerevan had to navigate between its strategic relationship with Russia in the military 
issue-area and its dependence on Georgia in the economic sphere (see also below).  
Against this backdrop, Karabakh‟s centrality in Armenia‟s National Security Strategy 
becomes more understandable, firmly founded, as it is, in broader security discourses 
pervading society. Much of Armenian state and societal discourse defines the republic 
in ethnic rather than civic terms:  Armenia is the state of the transnational Armenian 
ethnos, and, the territorial identity of that ethnos clearly supersedes the boundaries of 
the recognised state.  In both official and broader public discourse, the idea that the 
Republic of Armenia must include Armenians outside its borders as referent objects of 
security is widespread indeed.  This is further complicated by a widely held 
incongruence between the territories of today‟s Armenia, and the historical homelands 
„lost‟ in 1915-1923: this narrative of territorial loss increases the perception of threat to 
the Armenian identity among ordinary Armenians.  Independent statehood, whether in 
Armenia or in Karabakh, is seen as the only proven method for securing Armenian 
identity and, at the very least, the remnants of this historical homeland in view of the 
„ethnic incompatibility‟ – to paraphrase former president Robert Kocharyan – of 
Armenians and Azeri Turks (as quoted in Teryan, 2003).  As Kocharyan‟s predecessor, 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, found out to the cost of his presidency, it makes it very difficult 
for anyone to present an alternative view that at least partially de-securitises Azerbaijan 
and Turkey, limits the republic‟s referent objects to its territory and population, and 
weakens its “pan-Armenian” commitment. 
There is, indeed, an alternative discourse to the narrative expounded above, one that 
defines the state‟s referent object of security rather differently.  As was already briefly 
mentioned above, public state discourse on Karabakh only became ambiguous for a 
brief period during Levon Ter-Petroyan‟s ill-fated second term as president.  In fact, 
there had already been a noticeable evolution in the discourse of the ANM and its 
leader, Ter-Petrosyan, between 1989 and 1997: Armenia‟s first president gradually 
became more cautious as internationally sponsored peace negotiations around the 
enclave progressed after the 1994 cease-fire60, increasingly laying bare previously 
existing fissures within the Armenian government (2003).  These tensions finally 
erupted into the open when in November 1997, he published a crucial article entitled 
                                               
60
 In hindsight, Ter-Petrosyan‟s differing attitudes towards Karabakh can be readily detected when 
comparing his speeches – especially in the later years – with those of his successors, Kocharyan and 
Sargsyan (see Armenian Radio, 1994; Armenpress, 1998; Arminfo, 2002; Public Television of Armenia, 
2005, 2006, 2008; Ter-Petrosyan, 1994). 
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“War or Peace? A Time for Seriousness”, followed by a press conference, where he 
openly questioned the possibility of Armenia ever achieving recognition of Karabakh‟s 
independence without risking renewed war and international isolation (SNARK New 
Agency, 1997; Ter-Petrosyan, 1997).  The result was an outcry in the Armenian press, 
the mobilisation of the remnants of the country‟s intelligentsia, accusations of defeatism 
(Noyan Tapan, 1998), and, finally, the palace coup of February 1998.  Since that date, 
Armenian official (and mainstream opposition) discourse has never deviated from the 
prime necessity of having Karabakh‟s independence recognised; only a number of 
fringe liberal parties, personalities and media outlets dare advocate any alternatives 
(for examples see Bleyan, 2006; Ghazinyan, 2007). 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan‟s conciliatory attitude regarding Nagorno-Karabakh was partly 
based on instrumental calculations: accommodation was seen as the best way of 
ensuring Armenia‟s survival in the longer term.  According to Ter-Petrosyan and his 
most influential foreign-policy advisor, Jirair Libaridian (1999, 2004), the difficult nature 
of Armenia‟s region necessitated a pragmatic attitude excluding the Armenian Cause – 
demands for recognition and restitution for the 1915 Genocide – from official state 
policy.  Much of the liberals‟ argument for concessions on the Karabakh issue also 
emanated from an understanding that Armenia, as a small state, would have to make 
the most of its policy options by adopting a maximally pragmatic attitude.  Security for 
Armenia would have to be achieved through normal relations with its neighbours rather 
than the realisation of the „Armenian Cause‟.  The republic‟s first foreign minister, Raffi 
Hovanissian, was thus promptly dismissed after raising the genocide issue in Istanbul 
in 1992; plans were even made in the early years of independence of developing the 
Turkish port of Trabzon as the main western outlet for Armenian trade, although the 
escalation of the Karabakh conflict in 92-93 and the ensuing blockade by Turkey put an 
end to these designs (Libaridian, 2004, p. 277). 
But, quite apart from instrumental calculations, these conciliatory discourses towards 
two Turkic neighbours were also based on a fundamentally different world-view, one 
that diverged dramatically in terms of its values and identities from the ethnic Armenian 
nationalism that permeates official and societal discourse today, thus defining the 
security remit of the Republic of Armenia in radically different terms (Libaridian, 1999, 
pp. 69-96).   Along with a small number of politicians at the core of the then-ruling 
ANM, Ter-Petrosyan saw the project around the Armenian state primarily in civic rather 
than ethnic terms; Armenia‟s statehood did not stand at the service of a pan-ethnic 
ideal, but at the service of its – and only its – citizens.  The Levon Ter-Petrosyan 
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administration thus took a cool and ambiguous approach to the Armenian diaspora, 
even going so far as to securitise it at times61. Much of the focus during the Ter-
Petrosyan presidency, in 1991-97, was on creating a “petakan qaghabarakhosutyun” – 
state ideology – as opposed to the “azgayin qaghabarakhosutyun” (ethno-national 
ideology) that had dominated much of Armenian political thought, discourse and culture 
till then62: the Republic of Armenia existed, first and foremost, to safeguard its citizens.  
Statehood, not nationhood was the primary ideal to be secured.  In combination with 
the above-mentioned instrumental considerations, this led to fundamentally differing 
attitudes towards territoriality, Karabakh, and relations with Armenia‟s two Turkic 
neighbours.   
On an official level, such discourse has by now been largely overshadowed by an 
ethnic, pan-Armenian view of the state, and, within the Armenian political landscape, it 
remains rather marginalised.  Although Ter-Petrosyan has recently returned to the 
political scene as the leader of the country‟s main opposition coalition (including ultra-
nationalist elements), he is very careful to show himself committed to the recognition of 
Karabakh‟s right to self-determination, and does regularly criticise the government from 
a nationalist angle, particularly where Turkish-Armenian relations are concerned (Ter-
Petrosyan, 2009a, 2009b).  There are, however, still clear indications of Ter-Petrosyan 
fundamentally liberal views on Armenia‟s security, and fundamental purpose: frequent 
admonitions that the current government is moving the country towards war, his 
suspension of opposition activities during the Turkish president‟s visit to Armenia in the 
summer of 2008, and his continued commitment to normalising relations with all of the 
country‟s neighbours.  Most tellingly, Ter-Petrosyan (2007a) has tried to securitise 
Armenia‟s current regime as one of foreign occupation, clearly going against the 
fundamental tenets of pan-Armenian „national ideology‟ by, in effect, implying the 
„foreignness‟ of Karabakhi Armenians. Any major shift in Armenia‟s security 
perceptions would require a departure from some of its fundamental assumptions, and 
it is so far unclear to what extent Ter-Petrosyan will be able to „destabilise‟ this 
dominant discourse in the future. 
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 Thus, the Armenian government at the time refused to grant diaspora Armenians citizenship, and 
passed a law prohibiting Armenian citizens from holding dual nationality, arguing that this would pose a 
security threat that could possibly be manipulated by third powers (A. V. Gevorkyan & AIPRG, 2006).  The 
Dashnaks – mostly funded by the diaspora – were promptly banned and expelled as threats to national 
security in 1995 (the ban was lifted in 1998) (Ter-Petrosyan, 1995). 
62
 Ter-Petrosyan thus explicitly rejected the very notion of a „national ideology‟ in one particularly 
controversial interview (see Astourian, 2000, p. 34). 
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Azerbaijan’s Oil, and the Call of Karabakh 
Azerbaijan‟s National Security Concept (Republic of Azerbaijan, 2007) (see also 
appendix, p. 271), adopted in 2007, starts with a general outline of a general context 
marked by both challenges and opportunities.  The by far most important challenges, 
according to the document, are the refugee flows, “crimes against humanity”, 
“genocide”, and “illegal activities by criminal groups in the occupied territories, including 
international terrorist groups”, brought about by “Armenian aggression”.  Among the 
contextual opportunities enumerated are “transportation corridors for Azerbaijan‟s 
natural resources”; Georgia‟s role as a link between Baku and Turkey is mentioned, 
and the western neighbour is described as a “strategic partner” with whom cooperation 
will continue to develop “in the framework of common interests of both countries, 
implementation of the regional energy and transportation projects and other areas of 
mutual interest.”   
While Georgia is mentioned only twice – as a strategically important transportation 
corridor and a fellow member of GUAM – Yerevan is expressly securitised as a threat 
throughout the document in a broad range of issue-areas: Azerbaijan‟s environment 
(through pollution of the river Arax and the Metsamor nuclear power plant), as a 
hindrance to Azerbaijan‟s democratisation, as an impediment to border security and a 
source of transnational crime (through Nagorno-Karabakh), and an obstacle to regional 
economic cooperation, which, in the absence of an agreement on the enclave remains 
“unacceptable” to Baku.  Foremost among the state‟s interests are its independence 
and territorial integrity, to which Armenia is identified as the principal threat, even 
beyond an eventual resolution of the Karabakh issue: 
“Regardless of the outcome of the conflict resolution process, persistence 
of the ideology of mono-ethnic statehood, ethnic cleansing practices and 
territorial expansionism of the Armenian state policy will inevitably continue 
to affect negative relations between the two states also in the future” 
Against this, the concept advocates a foreign policy aimed at restoring the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan using “all means laid down in international law”.  It declares 
Azerbaijan “committed to a peaceful settlement” of the Karabakh dispute, on the 
following basis: 
 Withdrawal of Armenian troops 
 Restoration of sovereign rights 
 Return of forcibly displaced Azeris 
 High degree of self-rule for Karabakh 
 Restoration of communication 
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Overall, the impression is that Armenia is hyper-securitised by Azerbaijan in its security 
concept, in an arguably more explicit and overarching way than Turkey and Azerbaijan 
are in Armenia‟s considering its ubiquitous presence within the document as a threat to 
a wide range of referent objects.   In addition to this difference in degree – most 
probably due to Azerbaijan‟s position as the defeated party in the current status-quo – 
Armenia and Azerbaijan‟s world views seem to clash dramatically, and in terms of both 
fundamental values and identity on the one hand, and interests and policy on the other.  
From the point of view of argumentative securitisation, apart from the obvious, 
historically conditioned divergence in territoriality around Karabakh, Armenia‟s mono-
ethnic nature is contrasted with an idealised view of Azerbaijan as an age-old “example 
of peaceful coexistence”.  Added to this incompatibility in identities is a stress on a 
clash in interests and policies: in all the issue-areas above, Armenia‟s policies are seen 
as impeding the development of Azerbaijan‟s.   As shall be seen below, Baku has 
increasingly come to see military action in Karabakh as a viable and justified option: in 
the wider official discourse, war is now presented as a legitimate policy tool in the face 
of Armenian “aggression”.  Azerbaijan‟s oil wealth should therefore be put at the 
service of its military, in order to – one way or the other – turn the country into the 
Southern Caucasus‟ dominant power and pressure its enemy into concessions. 
Azerbaijan‟s state discourse on security has been fairly constant since the coming to 
power of the current president‟s predecessor – and father – Heidar Aliyev, in 1993.  On 
its argumentative side – defining the state‟s values – Karabakh, and Azerbaijan‟s 
territorial integrity have always been clearly discernable, over-arching referent objects 
of security, whose perceived violation by Yerevan has now come to dominate almost all 
issue-areas.  Since the 1994 cease-fire, and following successive Azerbaijani defeats 
on the battlefield, this requirement has received added urgency because of 
considerable refugee and IDP flows within Azerbaijan, with six districts outside of 
Nagorno-Karabakh proper under Armenian occupation.  The Azeri state has been 
unvarying in its assurances to these IDPs of their return to these territories; it has, also, 
been quite consistent in its single-minded insistence on the principle of territorial 
integrity, and the need for re-integrating Karabakh into Azerbaijan.  For successive 
Azeri governments, the Karabakh issue has, moreover, been seen as mostly territorial: 
both internationally and domestically, this conflict is usually presented as an old-
fashioned land-grab by Armenia rather than as a minority issue.  Moreover, post-
independence government discourse almost invariably blames the Armenian diaspora 
and “double-faced” and “traitor” foreign politicians (I. Aliyev, 2006b) for the West‟s 
perceived indifference at the plight of the Azeris over the years. 
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Nevertheless, there has been a distinct evolution in Azeri official discourse over the 
past decade-and-a-half.  While neither Heidar nor Ilham Aliyev ever departed from the 
stated objective of securing the restoration of Azeri control over its lost territories 
(including Nagorno-Karabakh), the senior Aliyev put much more emphasis on a 
peaceful resolution on the conflict than is the case today, perhaps reflecting a greater 
concern, at that time, for the rebuilding of the basic foundations of the Azeri state – 
economic, bureaucratic, military – after the turmoil of 1991-1993.  While Armenians and 
Armenia were certainly securitised, the intensity of their securitisation at the very top of 
the government was, in public at least, far less intense than in recent years.  Aliyev, the 
elder statesman, preferred to couch his arguments on Karabakh in terms of inter-state 
(rather than inter-ethnic) politics, framing his language in the terminology of 
international norms: Armenia had been condemned by the United Nations Security 
Council, it had committed aggression and ethnic cleansing, and Azerbaijan was entitled 
to restore its territorial integrity and the rights of its displaced citizens under 
international law.   
This has somewhat changed since the coming of power of Ilham Aliyev, in 2003.  In 
contrast to his father, the younger Aliyev does not shy away from supplementing the 
securitisation of the Republic of Armenia as an „aggressor state‟, with an image of the 
Armenians as a fundamentally alien and hostile ethnic group by frequent references to 
orthodox Azeri historiography.  His publicly and frequently professed belief that 
Armenians are new arrivals who mostly appeared in Karabakh following the treaty of 
Turkmenchai in 1828 is one that is broadly held and propagated in Azerbaijan.   
Contrary to his more pragmatic-sounding predecessor, the younger Aliyev often refers 
to the contentious territorial history between Azeris and Republic of Armenia proper, at 
one time even implying that an indefinite postponing of a solution to the Karabakh 
problem might entail the resuscitation of Azeri territorial claims on Armenian territory at 
some time in the future (see I. Aliyev, 2006e) (see also 2006a; I. Aliyev, 2006c, 2006g). 
Allusions to a possible military solution had never disappeared entirely from the 
instrumental portion of official Azeri security discourse after the 1994 cease-fire.  But 
during the latter years of the first Aliyev presidency, and certainly with the coming to 
power of Azerbaijan‟s current president, they have certainly intensified in both 
frequency and quality.  Ilham makes the link between Azerbaijan‟s oil wealth, its 
exponentially increasing military budget and a possible military solution to the conflict 
much more often than his father63, regularly reminding his interlocutors of the limits of 
                                               
63
 The elder Aliyev‟s speeches can readily be compared to his successor‟s discourse, indicating gradually 
more sceptical attitude to the peace process led by the Minsk Group, and a greater readiness to engage in 
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the Azeri people‟s patience, or of Azerbaijan‟s intention to use „all means‟ to achieve 
Karabakh‟s reintegration.  The image of Azerbaijan as a rising regional power with a 
truly independent foreign policy is then contrasted with the dependence of Armenia on 
Russia, and its much smaller military expenditure, to support the idea that time is on 
Azerbaijan‟s side.  This could, of course, be dismissed as simple domestic 
propaganda, or as bluster designed to maximise positions in the long-running Minsk 
Group negotiations.  Considering the centrality of Karabakh in Azeri official and societal 
discourse, however, there is a clear, inherent danger in this divergence of perception in 
both capitals: after having staked so much on the issue, Baku could at some point feel 
able and willing, perhaps even obliged to make good on its frequent, public, and clear-
cut commitment to restore the country‟s territorial integrity.  
The younger Aliyev‟s discourse is indeed much more grounded in the broader narrative 
on Nagorno-Karabakh and relations with Armenia.  On an immediate, policy level, there 
seems to be a well-established consolidation within society around the so-called 
„Charter of Four‟, a 2001 document described as “establish[ing] a sort of „maximum 
tolerance level‟ of compromise for Azerbaijan, and [firing] a warning shot across the 
bows of the ruling elite that passing this level would elicit wide and consolidated social 
protest” (Musabekov, 2005). The charter, written by four former officials close to the 
Aliyev regime, described a phased solution to the Karabakh conflict, with the ultimate 
aim of bringing the territory under renewed Azeri control, either through peaceful 
means, or, if necessary, through renewed military action (BBC Monitoring, 2001a).  It 
enjoyed the support of a wide range of both pro- and anti-government organisations, 
and seems to be reflected quite closely in current government discourse and policy, 
defining Karabakh as a fundamental value, and the use of force as an acceptable 
means of securing it.  The numerous nefarious consequences that could result, in 
particular international condemnation, the interruption of energy transit routes, and 
renewed military defeat, are usually omitted from the discourse. 
On a more profound level, the observed hyper-securitisation of Armenia is amplified by 
an official historiography – widely replicated in societal discourse – centring on 
perceived Armenian encroachment and intrigue on age-old Azeri land from ancient 
times.  This narrative became established in Azerbaijan during the Soviet period, when 
Azeri historians like Ziya Bunyatov, a former chairman of the Academy of Sciences, 
                                                                                                                                         
sabre-rattling. The elder Aliyev stressed development, stability and a negotiated solution (H. Aliyev, 1998b, 
2000, 2001); gradually, however, his rhetoric on the use of force became more ambiguous, with an AFP 
report in October 2001 already claiming Aliyev senior had threatened war explicitly thrice during that year 
(AFP, 2001).  Today, under Ilham Aliyev‟s presidency, the state‟s military build-up is often directly linked to 
an armed solution to the conflict (see 2003, 2004b, 2004c; I. Aliyev, 2005c, 2007b, 2009).   
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engaged in endless polemics with their Armenian counterparts, mostly centred on the 
role of the Caucasian Albanians in the region.  Orthodox Soviet Azeri historiography 
presents the Azeris as the direct descendants of, among others, this ancient – now 
almost entirely extinct – Caucasian ethno-linguistic group.  One of the most important 
controversies thus surrounds the identity of the Karabakh Armenians, often presented 
either as immigrants, or as forcibly Armenianised Albanians, and, therefore, in the 
essentialised historiography of the Caucasus, Azeris; but the line of argument goes 
further, presenting today‟s Republic of Armenia as historically Albanian territory, and 
pointing to its Muslim majority in the early 19th century as evidence in support of rightful 
Azeri claims to the territory64.  According to official historiography, that majority was 
subsequently diluted through large-scale Armenian immigration from the Ottoman and 
Persian Empires encouraged by the imperial Russian authorities in a deliberate policy 
of colonisation, leading to an artificial Armenian presence on Azeri soil (Alijarly, 1996; 
Bunyatov, 1987, 1990; Day.az, 2006; De Waal, 2003; F. Mamedova, s.d.; Tabrizli, 
1989). 
This narrative of encroachment is complemented by a history of massacre and 
„genocide‟ at various points during the 20th century, and the creation of an illegitimate, 
artificial Armenian state, with Russian help, on the territory of the former „Erivan 
khanate‟, ceded to Armenia in 1918. Historically, the 1918 Baku Commune and the 
surrounding ethnic violence during the „March Days‟, as well as the Dashnaks‟ 
massacre of Armenia‟s Azeri population in 1918-1920 are perceived as an essential 
part of this historical Armenian enmity towards Azerbaijan, rather than as a Bolshevik 
attempt to take power in post-revolutionary Azerbaijan.  The expulsion of Azeris from 
the Armenian SSR in 1946-47 and 1988-89, from Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991-92 and 
the surrounding regions in 1992-94 is simply seen as the continuation of earlier, 
centuries-old Armenian encroachment and victimisation aimed at creating a „Greater 
Armenia‟.  The Khojali tragedy in particular – during which hundreds of Azeri civilians 
were killed during an advance by ethnic Armenian troops – functions as a rallying cry 
during commemorations of these various events, which take place yearly on the 31st of 
March, the „Day of Azerbaijani Genocide‟, Baku‟s answer to the 24th of April 
commemoration of the 1915 Genocide in Armenia65 (H. Aliyev, 1998a; I. Aliyev, 2008; 
Hasanli, 2009; Hasanov, 2008; K. Mamedova, 2004; Suleymanov, 2006). 
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 For a most comprehensive review of clashing Armenian and Azeri historical narratives, see Shnirelman 
(2001, pp. 17-197) 
65
  The image of the „barbarian Turk‟ evident in Armenia is mirrored in Azerbaijan through innumerable 
overtly racist statements and publications expounding on the supposedly devious and terroristic character 
of Armenians.  The Ministry of National Security thus lists a number of such publications on its website 
(Republic of Azerbaijan, 2008b), including a particularly notorious racist diatribe by one V.L. Velichko, 
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Karabakh is central in this narrative of dispossession, and, more generally, in Azeri 
historical definitions of territoriality, and, hence, identity:  it is described as an age-old 
cradle of Azeri culture: several important Azeri poets were born in the region‟s pre-
Soviet capital, Shushi/Shusha, and the Karabakh Khanate is seen as one of the most 
important Muslim predecessor states of modern Azerbaijan.  The Karabakh issue is 
thus presented as but one new episode in a long history of Armenian oppression, 
intrigue and “terrorism”, deftly covered up by what is sometimes referred to in Azeri as 
“dünya ermənilər” and in Russian as the “mirovoe armyanstvo”, best translated as 
„world Armenianry‟ (Gasanov, 2007; Kocharli, 2004).  The creation of a second 
Armenian state on Azeri soil by what are seen as recent immigrants is then presented 
as a step too far.  Both the Azeri president and the Azeri media routinely compare the 
Armenian community in the region to other diasporan Armenian communities in France 
and Russia: immigrants, new arrivals, and therefore unable to claim legitimate 
statehood on ancient Azeri land (I. Aliyev, 2004a, 2004c, 2005a). 
As argued by the ICG (2007) and others, the threat of war over Nagorno-Karabakh 
should be taken seriously indeed.  Regardless of their conformity with actual historical 
fact, official and societal Armenian and Azeri narratives on the region mirror each other 
almost perfectly: both describe the other as „intrusive‟, almost eternally encroaching on 
what are seen as historically Armenian or Azeri lands.  Both present the other‟s identity 
as a fundamental, existential threat to themselves: in terms of one millennium of Turkic 
oppression on the Armenian side, and almost two centuries (more if one counts 
discourse on the perceived plight of the Caucasian Albanians) of Armenian aggression 
on the Azeri side, resulting in large swathes of actually and potentially disputed 
territory.  Both include narratives of massacres and genocide that block out the others‟ 
suffering and necessarily define security in zero-sum terms.  And, at an official and 
societal level, decision-makers on both sides see the use of force – including ethnic 
cleansing66 – as an entirely legitimate means of solving their problems.  As I shall 
argue in a subsequent chapter, it is this full-frontal clash of identities, coupled with a 
                                                                                                                                         
originally published in 1904 (Velichko, 1990, p. 2).  Armenian attempts at gaining recognition for the 1915 
Genocide are thus also summarily dismissed as part of intrigues aimed at material and territorial gain 
(Gasanov, 2007).  This discourse of dispossession and perennial enmity is amplified by an identification of 
Azerbaijan with its larger Turkic neighbour, the Republic of Turkey. The term „one nation, two states‟ is 
used at an official level to describe the relationship between the two states and peoples.  Moreover, Azeri 
politics and society sees common cause with Ankara in its attempts to counter-act efforts by Armenians 
towards international recognition of the 1915 Genocide.  In fact, while, in recent years, some debate has 
opened up within Turkish society on the 1915 events, the dominant interpretations in Baku are almost 
uniformly orthodox in their unconditional acceptance of official Turkish nationalist historiography.   
66
 Armenian elites tend to designate the buffer zone around Karabakh as „liberated‟ territories, and often 
link the return of Azeri refugees to Karabakh and these surrounding areas to the unlikely return of 
Armenian refugees to Azerbaijan, while Azeri nationalists – including former presidential advisor Vafa 
Quluzade – argue that the Karabakh Armenians should move to Armenia if they want to achieve their self-
determination (Day.az, 2009b; Grigoryan, 2008; Movsesyan, 2007) 
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continued belief in the legitimacy of raw military force, and Russia‟s view of the 
Caucasus as an inalienable part of its identity, that lies at the core of the Caucasus‟ 
predicament today; in combination with the Russia factor, the Karabakh problem is the 
Gordian knot preventing the transformation of this region from a revisionist conflict 
formation into at the very least a thin security regime. 
Azerbaijan‟s relations with Georgia, on the other hand, form a stark contrast to the 
dysfunctional discursive „shouting match‟ between Baku and Yerevan.  Georgia is 
unequivocally seen as a „strategic partner‟ of Azerbaijan in the official discourse, almost 
always within the context of transportation corridors and pipelines, of economic 
cooperation, and a shared interest in territorial integrity67, a mutually beneficial 
partnership sometimes contrasted with Armenia‟s exclusion and isolation from regional 
projects (I. Aliyev, 2004c).  Again, while there are potential problems emanating from 
Azeri minorities in Georgia and Georgian-populated regions within Azerbaijan, as in the 
case of the Armenian-Georgian relationship, these are usually either omitted, or 
interpreted as an opportunity to deepen cooperation between the two states.  Similarly, 
within broader discourse, the narrative concentrates mainly on the confluence of 
economic or strategic interests of two sovereign states rather than a common or 
collective Caucasian identity (Rustamov, 2008); if that is, at all, referred to, it is mostly 
in the context of common oppression by the Russian and Soviet Empires68.  As I shall 
argue in a later chapter, the differing attitude towards Russia displayed in official 
pronouncements and broader discourse is striking in Azerbaijan, with mainstream 
media and even former high-ranking officials (like Vafa Guluzade) now taking a much 
more openly anti-Russian line than the Azeri government, putting the latter in a rather 
awkward position during the August 2008 events.  Then, in contrast to the Armenian 
public discourse, Azerbaijan‟s was far more sympathetic to Georgia: similarly to 
Armenia, the Azeri leadership had to balance a tightrope between two states it 
described as „strategic partners‟, with its society clearly choosing sides. 
The absence of alternative discourses of national/state identity are quite noticeable in 
Azerbaijan: this is, no doubt, due to the long hold on power of the Aliyev clan – since 
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 As is clearly visible in the discourse of both Ilham and Heidar Aliyev, throughout both their presidencies, 
and of Azerbaijan‟s diplomatic service (e.g. H. Aliyev, 1994; I. Aliyev, 2005b, 2006b; Republic of 
Azerbaijan, 2008a). 
68
 Most of the problems regarding Georgia‟s Azeri minority centre on their underprivileged status within the 
Kvemo-Kartli region (the Borchalu region in Azeri) adjoining Tbilisi. In fact, there were disturbances 
involving its Azeri inhabitants in 1989, and the minority does regularly complain of the region‟s socio-
economic underdevelopment, perceived cultural neglect and under-representation in state structures 
(Day.az, 2008b, 2009a; Ibragimov, 2009; Valiyev & Valiyev, 2005).  Occasionally, sharper criticism of 
Georgia, including ominous accusations of „Armenian-style‟ territorial ambitions (Teymurkhanliy, 2009), 
can be heard within Azeri society at large, but that kind of discourse remains firmly in the minority.  For a 
fuller assessment of Georgian-Azeri relations, see below.  
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1993 – and the relatively repressive nature of the Azeri regime.  While there was a 
difference in terms of pragmatism and geopolitical orientation between Elchibey‟s 
Popular Front and Aliyev Sr. and Jr. (the former being much more pro-Western, with 
significant pan-Turkist elements), there has been a general constancy and consensus 
in the official line propounded regarding Azeri national identity, a peculiar mix of Turkic 
nationalism, belief in a secular Islam, and Caucasian indigenousness.  Crucially, there 
is little divergence on the place of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in this identity. The 
2001 „Charter of Four‟ seems to have been widely accepted as a blueprint for a 
nationally consolidated policy, and not one single mainstream political party or politician 
in Azerbaijan advocates, or has ever advocated the recognition of Karabakh‟s 
independence; even the possibility of a referendum on independence limited to the 
population of Nagorno-Karabakh proper is overwhelmingly rejected (Eurasianet.org, 
2006).  A split as observed around 1997 in neighbouring Armenia has never 
materialised, although according some Aliyev did accept the possibility of Karabakh 
establishing a non-hierarchical relationship with Azerbaijan during the 2001 Key West 
negotiations, only to renege on the commitment on his return to Baku69.   
Most of the alternative discourses concerning Azerbaijan‟s attitudes towards Armenia 
are instrumental in nature, questioning the government‟s policies in attaining the return 
of Karabakh to Azerbaijan, rather than the goal itself of regaining control of the territory.  
On the extreme side, there are groups like the Karabakh Liberation Organisation – 
uniting refugees and IDPs from within and around Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as 
members of the Azerbaijani „intelligentsia‟ – who advocate an immediate suspension of 
the Minsk Group negotiations and an instant resumption of hostilities with Armenia.  
More mainstream opposition parties also insist on a restoration of Azeri control over the 
territory, with all maintaining the possibility of military action, albeit with differing 
degrees of urgency (Ismailzade, 2008).   
For instance, in the run-up to the 2003 presidential elections, some, like Isa Gambar 
and the Yeni Musavat parliamentary opposition, stressed armed force only as a last 
resort, while Ali Kerimli of Elchibey‟s Popular Front party emphasised United Nations 
resolutions and the efforts of the Azeri diaspora.  Others – like the National 
Independence Party of Etibar Mammadov – took views more reminiscent of the KLO‟s 
rash stance (BBC Monitoring, 2003c).  On the other, liberal extreme, most of the 
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 While such claims should be approached with considerable scepticism, Aliyev‟s pragmatic background, 
and his general public discourse, suggest such a scenario would at least have been possible.  Aliyev‟s 
longtime advisor appears to have admitted as much in an interview published by the Azerbaijan Diplomatic 
Academy, by suggesting the elder statesman was prepared to exchange territory with Armenia and agree 
to the Minsk Group proposals on such a „common state‟ before finally backing off (Azerbaijan in the World, 
2008, p. 2).  See also De Waal (2003) and BBC Monitoring (2002). 
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discourse emanates either from smaller NGOs, or from the active Azeri „blogosphere‟, 
where more liberal elements concentrate more on the democratic failings of the Aliyev 
regime, and maintain a discourse that, rather than emphasising the ethnic narratives of 
massacre and dispossession, concentrates on the democratic credentials of the 
Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (1918-1920) as a pioneering model for the Muslim 
world, a kind of discourse that can also be found within the most moderate arm of the 
Azeri executive, the foreign ministry and its Diplomatic Academy70.   
Georgia:  An Uneasy Partner to Two Enemies 
Georgia‟s National Security Concept (Republic of Georgia, 2005) (see also appendix, 
p. 292) does not pull any punches: from the very beginning, it makes clear the 
country‟s wish to achieve full membership of both NATO and the European Union, 
defining Georgia as “an integral part of the European political, cultural and political 
area”.  It continues with an enumeration of the country‟s national values: 
independence, freedom, democracy and the rule of law, prosperity and security.  These 
values are then operationalised in terms of national interests, including: 
1. Ensuring territorial integrity 
2. Ensuring national unity and civil accord 
3. Regional stability 
4. Strengthening Freedom and Democracy in Neighbouring States 
5. Strengthening the State’s Transit Function and Energy Security 
6. Environmental Security of the Country and the Region 
7. Preserving National and Cultural Uniqueness 
Two things stand out in the remainder of the document, when concentrating on threats 
and policies:  first, Georgia‟s fear of disintegration and internal unrest, and, second, its 
interrelated, intense and absolutely explicit securitisation of its northern neighbour, 
Russia.  Both of these issues will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters 
dealing with state cohesion and regional great power penetration: with Georgia looking 
primarily northwards (at threats) and westwards (at solutions to these threats), it does 
seem its immediate neighbours – Armenia and, to a far lesser extent, Azerbaijan – play 
only a subordinate, instrumental role in its security policies.  Georgia‟s main 
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 One alternative youth group in particular, “Ol!” (“Be!”) seems to be popular among the well-educated, 
pro-Western elite in Azerbaijan.  Although tiny and politically marginal, it is very well-organised and 
technically literate, aiming to instil a spirit of “non-violence, tolerance and modernity” in its adherents, 
explicitly using the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic as a role model (see www.ol-az.org).  It, and similar 
groups, very much remain the exception in a country where „civil society‟ as such remains 
underdeveloped. 
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securitisations are directed elsewhere, and relations with its Southern Caucasian 
partners seem to be mostly subsidiary to these principal security perceptions71. 
The concept does make a distinction between the two neighbours, in spite of trying to 
maintain a balance by including both under the common sub-heading “Partnership with 
Armenia and Azerbaijan”: in the body of the text Baku is designated a “strategic 
partner”, while relations with Yerevan are described merely as a “close partnership”.  In 
the case of Azerbaijan, collaboration in the fields of transportation and energy naturally 
features prominently, as does cooperation “in the political and security spheres, as well 
as in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.” The document continues: “Partnership of 
Georgia and Azerbaijan in GUAM and participation in the EU's ENP and NATO's PfP 
program contribute to harmonization of security interests and elaboration of common 
positions on various strategic issues.”   The section on Armenia is more reserved, 
concentrating on Georgia‟s role as a transit country for Armenian trade and stating 
Tbilisi‟s support for Armenia‟s involvement in the EU‟s ENP and NATO, more distant 
than the common path towards Euro-Atlantic integration described in the paragraph on 
Azerbaijan.  The section also identifies the Karabakh conflict as a major threat to the 
stability of all states in the region, and calls for the emergence of a common economic 
space and a single market. 
This pattern – whereby good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia are valued, 
with a thinly disguised preference for Azerbaijan – is well-grounded in the broader 
official security discourses that have emanated from the Georgian state since 
independence.  Tbilisi‟s development of its „strategic partnership‟ with Azerbaijan 
started under Gamsakhurdia, and came to full fruition with the building of the BTC 
pipeline in 2001-2003.  Naturally, and as can be inferred from the NSC, one obvious 
instrumental reason is the immense opportunity Georgia‟s geographic position offers as 
an alternative transit route for Caspian hydrocarbon reserves, and much of the 
cooperation occurs within the issue-areas of energy and transportation72.  Collaboration 
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 This does not invalidate my characterisation of the South Caucasus as a separate RSC, provided these 
securitisations of Russia are seen as interactions between the regional and systemic levels of analysis.  As 
I already mentioned in chapter 6, this characterisation is to some extent an analytical choice, dependent 
upon the view of Russia as a great power penetrating the RSC rather than an inseparable part of the RSC. 
Moreover, considering the history of the region since the fall of the Soviet Union, it would be counter-
productive to reify the Russian presence in this RSC by including it in the regional level;  its withdrawal 
from the region would at least have to be seen as a possibility, a point somewhat reinforced by the 
Georgian NSC, many of whose policies and assumptions are precisely predicated on a diminished 
Russian role in the South Caucasus.  
72
 A short overview of the bilateral agreements between Georgia and Azerbaijan would confirm this 
impression.  There are, of course, the major agreements on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Kars-
Tbilisi-Baku railroad, but these are supplemented by a whole slew of other treaties dealing with 
transportation, trade and communications.  There is some co-operation in security matters (mostly dealing 
with pipeline security), and cultural issues (concerning ethnic minorities on each others‟ territory), but 
compared to the „Great Silk Road‟ project, these remain quite limited in nature (MFA Georgia, 2009). 
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with Azerbaijan is often defined as part of a common move towards the Euro-Atlantic 
area, a way of addressing the one securitisation that disproportionately drives much of 
Georgian foreign and security policy: of the Russian Federation as a threat to Georgian 
statehood and identity73.  The relationship between Georgia and Azerbaijan is further 
reinforced by a common interest (together with Moldova) in restoring their territorial 
integrity: obviously, an important referent object in the official security discourse of 
successive Georgian governments.  Within the post-Soviet sphere, both countries are 
on the same side of that issue, in principle at least.  While Tbilisi remains prudent in not 
linking its particular problems to the Karabakh issue too directly (see below), it does 
support Azerbaijan‟s territorial integrity in international fora (for instance, voting for a 
2008 UNGA resolution reaffirming the same) (UNGA, 2008), all the while avoiding any 
explicit, direct statements prejudicing the negotiations process between its two 
neighbours one way or the other.   
The Georgian press, electronic media, and political pundits, similarly tend to emphasise 
their country‟s role as an important transit hub for both neighbours, while also 
displaying a perhaps more visibly pro-Azerbaijani tilt in their discourse: the „strategic 
partnership‟ with Baku thus seems to be well-grounded within more widely held societal 
attitudes74.  These discourses remain mostly at an instrumental level, however: 
cooperation is justified mostly in terms of confluences of interests and policies rather 
than common identities or values.  While there are formalistic references to a common 
Caucasian home and Georgian-Azerbaijani brotherhood (BBC Monitoring, 2004b), 
these remain on the margins (or are, at best, event-driven); the nationalist exclusivism 
that seems to be typical of the Caucasus does rear its head on occasion, even in 
Georgian-Azeri relations, but seldom manages to creep up the list of priorities.   
Tensions regarding alleged discrimination of the ethnic Georgian minority in 
Azerbaijan‟s Kakhi, Belakani and Zakatala regions (Kikacheishvili, 2008; RFE-RL, 
2003) and the territorial dispute surrounding the David Gareji monastic complex, while 
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 Gamsakhurdia signed a partnership agreement with Azerbaijan in December 1990, one full year before 
the formal dissolution of the USSR.  Shevardnadze, meanwhile, saw the construction of pipelines from 
Azerbaijan over Georgian territory as crucial to the country‟s development (BBC Monitoring, 2003a), while 
Saakashvili clearly accorded the project a political, emancipatory role vis-à-vis Russia, as a means 
towards both political and economic security (Imedi TV, 2005; Saakashvili, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 
2006d).   
74
 Thus, several of the interviewees questioned by the author expressed a commonly held view in 
Azerbaijan of the Karabakh conflict as an unnecessary complication thwarting co-operation (and the 
expulsion of Russia) within the Southern Caucasus, also revealing an irritation at Armenia‟s strong pro-
Russian/anti-Turkish stance.  
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as a rule not affecting core official discourse, do at times surface in both state‟s 
presses and media75.   
Georgia‟s relationship with Armenia, by contrast, seems to be more problematic 
(Shirinyan, 2008), not so much on an inter-state, as at an inter-societal level.  
Armenians played a major role as a significant other in the formation of Georgian 
national consciousness in the 19th century (Suny, 1994); their compact presence in the 
Georgian region of Javakheti has moreover been viewed with distrust by Georgian 
nationalists because of Armenians‟ perceived pro-Russian stance, and Armenian 
nationalists‟ territorial claims (see also following chapter).  There is a significant amount 
of suspicion in the societies of both sides of the border: accusations of cultural 
misappropriation, forced assimilation and forcible demographic change in Armenia and 
Javakheti are echoed by talk of Russian-inspired unrest and separatism in Georgia 
(BBC Monitoring, 2007c, 2008c).  On an inter-state level, both governments take great 
care to control the situation, defining it largely as a socio-economic issue, and as 
Georgia‟s internal affair (MFA Georgia, 2006); at least in public, their discourses largely 
coincide, with the Georgian and Armenian governments pushing for the greater 
integration of the Armenian minority into wider Georgian society and, as mentioned 
above, even the Armenian president calling on the local Armenians to work for 
integration by learning the Georgian language (Armenpress, 2007; BBC Monitoring, 
2004c, 2007a).  That having been said, there is a significant amount of distrust in the 
societies of both sides of the border: talk of Russian-inspired unrest in Georgia (BBC 
Monitoring, 2007c, 2008c) and – in an alarming echo of the earlier stages of the 
Karabakh conflict – of cultural misappropriation, forced assimilation and forcible 
demographic change in both Javakheti and Armenia (See also following chapter). 
Fundamentally differing views on the principles of territorial integrity and self-
determination are a second element of potential friction between these two neighbours.  
Although both states try to stress the „uniqueness‟ and specificity of their respective 
situations (BBC Monitoring, 2004a), as a rule avoiding any statements or acts which 
could be interpreted as manifestly going against their neighbour‟s interests, it is 
nevertheless clear that in places such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and 
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 The dispute over the David Gareji monastic complex was a particularly sensitive moment in Georgian-
Azeri relations.  Of considerable historical-cultural value to Georgia and situated in Azerbaijan according to 
borders drawn in Soviet times, its transfer to Tbilisi‟s control was demanded by the leadership of Georgia‟s 
orthodox church; the Georgian government, for its part, proposed territorial swap, which was firmly refused 
by the Azeri side.  Soviet-era historiography also came into play when Azeri historians insisted – to the 
Georgians‟ dismay – that the monuments on their side of the border were, in fact, Albanian (Edilashvili, 
2007; Roks, 2007; Rustavi-2, 2007).  Not to be outdone, one newspaper in Yerevan has implied that 
inscriptions in the monastery are, in fact, Armenian (Golos Armenii, 2009).  Saakashvili and Aliyev finally 
decided to resolve the issue discreetly, through an intergovernmental commission (Saakashvili, 2007b). 
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Abkhazia, these interests conflict directly: Armenia and Georgia have fundamentally 
differing views on the balance between these fundamental principles of international 
law.  The Georgian government actively condemned the recognition of Kosovo‟s 
independence by Western states as an assault on the principle of territorial integrity, 
and was followed in its condemnation by the overwhelming majority of political groups 
(Civil Georgia, 2008; Mze TV, 2008; The Messenger, 2008a, 2008b). On the Armenian 
side, meanwhile, views on the recognition were almost uniformly positive.  The 
government performed a cautious balancing act, on the one hand welcoming the 
application of the principle of self-determination in the Kosovar case, while, on the 
other hand, maintaining the rhetoric of „uniqueness‟ (Oskanian, 1999, 2007).  The 
press, meanwhile, was more unequivocally enthusiastic, along with the self-styled 
government of Nagorno-Karabakh proper (MFA Mountainous Karabakh, 2008b). On 
this societal level, the principle of territorial integrity has been noticeably paramount in 
Georgian (and Azeri) public thought, with self-determination dominating Armenian 
international political discourse. 
Third, the fundamental „vectors‟ of Armenian and Georgian foreign and security policy 
clash quite radically, with Armenia following an explicitly pro-Russian course, while 
Georgia gravitates strongly towards NATO, and, by implication, Turkey.  These 
divergent grand strategies are usually tolerated in official circles and much of the 
media: the line adopted by both governments is that third parties should not influence 
their mutual relationship.  There is a strong realisation on both sides of an 
interdependence between the two states: Armenia needs Georgia for transportation 
links to the outside world, Georgia needs Armenia in order to counteract separatist 
tendencies in Javakheti, and both sides have so far been able and willing to largely 
resist pressure from allies to go directly against each other‟s interests.  Azerbaijan has 
not been able to coax Georgia into joining its blockade of Armenia, although it did 
obtain Georgia‟s assurance that Azeri cargo would not be transported to Armenia; and 
Armenia has so far tried to maintain a cautious, but potentially costly neutrality in 
Georgia‟s troubled relationship with Russia.  The question is, of course, whether both 
sides can maintain this position in light of potential demands from their strategic 
partners, and more strongly diverging discourses in both their societies, with distinctly 
„unfriendly‟ articles regularly appearing in both countries‟ media. 
Tellingly, both the Georgian and Armenian governments refrained from taking actions 
or making statements that might be construed as being aimed against the other during 
the August 2008 war: the Armenian president maintained an almost-eerie silence 
throughout most of the conflict, probably for fear of offending either his state‟s main 
conduit to the outside world (Georgia), or his strategic partner, Russia, and eventually 
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expressed condolences and offers of humanitarian help for both sides (Abrahamyan, 
2008; E. Danielyan, 2008b), while still participating in the collective condemnation of 
Georgia during the CSTO summit later that year (Russia & CIS General Newswire, 
2008a, 2008b).  Armenia also refrained from recognising Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian independence, despite the obvious implications for Mountainous Karabakh, 
and only criticised Georgia mutedly or indirectly in the following weeks (Black Sea 
Press, 2008; E. Danielyan, 2008a).  The contrast between the two country‟s media, 
however, was dramatic.  Armenian pro-government publications and broadcasters took 
a very explicit pro-Russian stance (taking over the rhetoric on „genocide‟ being 
committed in Ossetia), and the leader of the main opposition group, Ter-Petrosyan, 
harshly criticised Tbilisi‟s actions in an interview (A1Plus, 2008a, 2008b; Khachatrian, 
2008a).  Meanwhile, there were media reports in Tbilisi – originating from Azeri 
sources, according to one interviewee – of Russian planes using Armenian bases to 
bomb targets within Georgia (Gruziya Online, 2008); many ordinary Georgians also 
saw the Armenian efforts at repairing the Poti-Tbilisi railroad during the conflict as 
entirely self-interested, rather than a show of solidarity (personal observations). 
Overall, the impression one gets from an analysis of Georgian security discourse on 
Armenia confirms what is already indicated within Tbilisi‟s National Security Concept: 
that relations with Yerevan, while friendly, are less close than those with Baku.  Again, 
these friendly relations are largely based on instrumental considerations: there is very 
little, if any talk of shared values or a shared identity in the Georgian-Armenian case.  
Both in terms of values and policies there are a few potential “stress-points” (Javakheti, 
strategic FP vectors, views on international norms) that could misalign interests in the 
future, although the realisation that both nations are „doomed‟ to enjoy good-
neighbourly relations tempers this risk to some extent76.  The relative precariousness of 
Georgian-Armenian relations is then reflected in the broader discourse within Georgia, 
and the lack of „groundedness‟ of official Georgian (and Armenian) pronouncements of 
„friendship‟ and „cooperation‟ in wider societal discourse, where distrust of each others‟ 
intentions is at times clearly visible.  Combined with a deeper-seated anti-Armenian 
element in traditional Georgian ethnic nationalism, the potential for securitisations of 
the southern neighbour crystallising into state policy remain somewhat more 
pronounced than in the case of Georgian-Azeri relations. 
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 As one Georgian newspaper commentary puts it: “Historically speaking Georgia and Armenia are 
'doomed' to enjoy good-neighbourly relations and this has been and should be the precondition of stability 
in the Caucasus, in particular the South Caucasus region. Much could therefore be achieved, if only these 
two countries were left to get on with it.” (The Messenger, 2009).  See also Jgharkava (2009). 
 172 
Conclusion: The South Caucasus RSC as a Revisionist Conflict Formation 
How would one then characterise the amity/enmity variable within the Southern 
Caucasian RSC?  From a macro-perspective, material conditions and the visible 
behaviour of different units – as expressed through their government policies – have 
already strongly indicated the region‟s status as a revisionist conflict formation.  These 
regional „surface features‟ are indeed confirmed from the micro-perspective of regional 
security discourse.  To recap, revisionist conflict formations, situated at the conflictual 
extreme of the amity/enmity spectrum, are defined by mutually exclusive values and 
identities on the argumentative side of security discourse, and an acceptance of armed 
force as a legitimate policy tool on the instrumental side.  The units within such RSCs 
securitise each other as threats to their fundamental values and identities, and see 
„war‟ as a natural extension of regional politics.  The intensity and entrenched nature of 
conflict within such regions far exceeds that of „status-quo conflict formations‟, where 
disagreements are based on conflicting material interests rather than incompatible 
identities. 
As the preceding discussion makes abundantly clear, at least two of the three units 
within the RSC in question do have such fundamentally divergent self- and world-
views.  Armenia and Azerbaijan have perceptions of history and territoriality that cannot 
but be a source of constant conflict, unless both governments and their underlying 
societies fundamentally redefine the very essence of their collective being.  Their 
differing discourses over the conflict over Karabakh at the official level are radically 
mutually exclusive: just as one can‟t be „a little bit pregnant‟, Karabakh falls under 
either Armenian or Azeri sovereignty.  The Armenian leadership‟s steadfast insistence 
(post-1998) not to allow the territory to fall within Azerbaijan‟s jurisdiction, and the Azeri 
government‟s correspondingly unwavering promise to restore control have become a 
major factor in both regimes‟ (highly deficient) legitimacies.  Moreover, this particular 
aspect of their discourse is firmly rooted in the ideational realities that pervade both 
their societies: in both states, governments have fallen over the Karabakh issue, which 
is rooted in the broader narratives of history and territorial and normative definitions of 
state- and nationhood. 
On the Armenian side, there is a palpable fear of allowing a repetition of 1915, seen 
among others in terms of territorial loss, amplified by the Turkic identity of the „other‟.  
Azeri identity presents a curious mirror image: defined, as it is, by a perception of 
Russian-sponsored Armenian encroachment of traditional Azeri lands, including 
Karabakh.  Both states‟ and societies‟ dominant historiographies are fundamentally 
incompatible: the historical territories of „Greater Armenia‟ and „Greater Azerbaijan‟ 
overlap in dramatic fashion, adding mutually exclusive definitions of territoriality to 
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incompatible constructions of identity as drivers of conflict.  Alternative discourses that 
could destabilise these self-definitions have been sidelined in both states: Ter-
Petrosyan‟s idea of „civic‟ rather than „ethnic‟ nationalism, rejecting expansive notions 
of territoriality, has largely remained on the margins of Armenian politics since his fall 
from power in 1998, while much of Armenian society clearly views the militarily 
obtained status-quo as an entirely legitimate solution to the issue.  Meanwhile, as the 
aggrieved party, the Azeri political landscape almost entirely lacks politicians rejecting 
military force as a policy option in the confrontation (quite on the contrary, the sabre-
rattling element remains an important aspect within the discourse); those elements of 
civil society that do, and maintain a correspondingly less virulently anti-Armenian self-
view, can almost exclusively be found in the blogosphere and around specific 
organisations aimed at fostering co-operation (Conciliation Resources, Caucasus 
Journalists‟ Network, and others....). 
Admittedly, the Georgian government‟s relationship to its two neighbours is somewhat 
different, marked, as it is, by mutual recognition.  At least on an official level, Georgia‟s 
identity (its territoriality) is, in toto, not seen as being endangered by either Armenia or 
Azerbaijan, both of whose governments explicitly recognise their neighbour within its 
internationally still overwhelmingly recognised borders, including Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  More than that, some of the co-operation between Azerbaijan and Georgia 
(especially regarding transportation routes and energy security) could be seen as 
taking on characteristics of a security regime: witness both governments cooperation 
within GUAM, their co-ordination of pipeline and energy security, amplified by frequent 
references to shared interests and a strategic partnership.  This does not, however, 
diminish the overall nature of the Southern Caucasus as revisionist-conflictual.   
Firstly, Georgia‟s good relations with Azerbaijan have not led to a broad-based, deep 
type of cooperation: clearly, both countries‟ collaboration is mostly limited to one-two 
issue-areas (mostly economic), and there are no broader permanently institutionalised 
frameworks of cooperation, especially in light of the recent ineffectiveness of the 
GUAM grouping.  There is, moreover, a fundamental difference between Georgia‟s 
explicit pro-Western stance and Azerbaijan‟s „balanced‟ policy that, crucially, has 
started describing Russia as a „strategic partner‟ to the oil-producing state.  Secondly, 
Georgia does have threats to its fundamental identity from de-facto statelets in the 
Southern Caucasus and the main external player within the region, Russia, again 
creating intra-regional security relationships that are based on fundamental non-
recognition and incompatibilities (albeit from the point of view of state incoherence and 
great power penetration – see following chapters). Thirdly, its good official relationship 
with Armenia is still fragile, as it lacks „grounding‟ in the discourse of society-at-large.  
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Ethno-nationalist groups in Armenia clearly and unequivocally regard Javakheti as 
„historical Armenian lands‟ that were left to Georgia by a quirk of history, and are now 
subjected to misrule by Tbilisi; and the Georgian view of Armenia(ns) as a potential 
Russian „fifth column‟ within the Caucasus is still quite widespread.  To some extent, 
government policy in both states thus goes against the nationalist reflexes prevalent 
within both societies.   
As is clear from the previous paragraphs, amity/enmity in the Southern Caucasus is 
indelibly entwined with developments at the levels above and below the regional.  Its 
revisionist-conflictual nature is firmly interlinked with the weakness of at least two of its 
recognised units – Georgia and Azerbaijan – whose fragmentation has resulted in the 
emergence of three de-facto statelets.  The significance of the involvement, from the 
systemic level, of great powers in regional security interaction was also hinted at 
above, primarily through Russia‟s effects on amity/enmity.  Accordingly, the next two 
chapters will try to map the effects of state weakness and great power penetration on 
discursive regional security interaction, in preparation for a „grand finale‟, where 
interactions between the levels (regional/sub-state/systemic) will be explored, and the 
prospects for change – through the „stability‟ of the existing discourses – will be 
assessed. 
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CHAPTER 8: STATE INCOHERENCE IN SOUTHERN 
CAUCASIA 
From the distant vantage point of the macro-perspective, the Southern Caucasus is 
clearly plagued by state incoherence, in both its horizontal and its vertical forms.  Two 
of its constituent states – Georgia and Azerbaijan – have fragmented, spawning three 
secessionist statelets.  What‟s more, the level of corruption and political instability in all 
three recognised states strongly indicates their vertical inherent weakness:  within all 
societies in the region, there seems to be a lack of consensus on whether and how 
their respective states can act as the exclusive providers of security through legitimate 
force, a lack of consensus that comes to the fore whenever the state fails to, however 
temporarily, muster the force to paper over such differences.  The question is whether 
this deep structure of state incoherence is borne out in the subjective discourses on 
(in)security that pervade these different states and societies: why and how are the 
states securitised as threats, either by well-defined ethnic groups, or by their societies 
as an indeterminate whole?  The next few sections will try to answer these questions 
by, in turn, looking at these discourses within the recognised states, their unrecognised 
„offspring‟, distinct ethnic minorities that have not broken away, and their societies in 
their totality, so as to form a clear micro-perspective picture of the webs of 
securitisation underlying both horizontal and vertical state incoherence.   
As in the previous chapter, I shall be using the different states‟ national security 
concepts as my analytical starting-points, and subsequently delve into the underlying 
discourses of the societies concerned.  In Armenia, the effort will almost entirely centre 
on identifying vertical weaknesses in the relationship between state and society; in the 
cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia, the chapter will have to deal with horizontal 
weaknesses as well, looking at the official discourse, but also at the diverging 
narratives that split the underlying societies and drive the various secessionisms in the 
region.  As this deals with the issue of divergence, this will necessarily involve 
contrasting the discourses in the metropoles with those in the secessionist units; and 
much of the analysis will take place in the Copenhagen School‟s political and societal 
sectors, the former concerned with the safeguarding of a state‟s ideology and 
institutions, the latter centred on securing minorities‟ identities and values.  Here, it 
serves to remind oneself of the fundamentally dissonant historical and political 
narratives that exist throughout the Southern Caucasus: this is a region where very few 
periods, monuments, territories remain beyond contention.  The narratives presented 
here will therefore be intensely subjective, and, unless specifically stated otherwise, the 
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historical claims and contradictory accusations will be those of regional actors alone, 
presented in the context of securitisation and counter-securitisation.  
Armenia, and the Blessings (?) of Homogeneity 
The Republic of Armenia stands out in the region in terms of its homogeneity.  Over 
95% of its population is ethnic Armenian (Republic of Armenia, 2001), and the spectre 
of disintegration along ethnic lines is therefore comfortably absent from its definition of 
national security objectives and threats.  Minority problems are, not surprisingly, hardly 
mentioned in its NS concept, especially because, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the one minority that Armenians did traditionally securitise – the Turkic Azeris – had 
been expelled before the attainment of independence.  Among the enumeration of 
interests and policies, one finds a cursory reference to “fully integrating and protecting 
all ethnic and national minorities residing in Armenia” as part of the requirements of 
maintaining the state‟s independence.  In the construction of a new quality of life and 
morale in the Republic, the document moreover declares an aspiration towards 
“protect[ing] the historic, spiritual, cultural heritage and the ethnic identity of the national 
minorities living in Armenia”.  There is little, if any, securitisation of ethnic minorities in 
this respect, either within Armenia‟s elite or within its broader population, reflective of 
the fact that the country‟s largest ethnic minority – the Yezidis – make up a territorially 
indistinct and well-integrated group of at most 1.5% of the population (Asatryan & 
Arakelova, 2002)77.   
This allows the security concept to concentrate almost exclusively on other domestic 
problems that might be seen as potentially weakening the state.  Apart from the above-
mentioned requirement of integrating national minorities, the interest in maintaining the 
independence of the republic thus also requires effective governance, democracy and 
civil liberties, and human rights.  Within the section on internal threats, the dangers 
faced by Armenia in terms of these goals are enumerated: among others, a 
“deterioration in the system of public administration and declining trust in the judiciary”, 
insufficiencies within the political system and deficient democratic consolidation, and 
polarisation are all seen as potentially endangering the stability of the republic.  In 
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 Relations with Armenia‟s other ethnic minorities – Assyrians, Greeks, Molokan Russians, and others – 
have traditionally been good as well.  The relationship between the Armenian state and religious minorities 
has, however, been problematic: non-traditional denominations, especially Jehovah‟s witnesses, gained a 
foothold in Armenia during the 1990s, and were securitised both as threats to Armenia‟s national church, 
and to the combat-readiness of the armed forces (as members are not allowed to engage in any military 
activity whatsoever).  These concerns have ebbed away in recent years, with the sect‟s registration and 
the adoption – under severe European pressure – of a stringent law on alternative service (Amnesty 
International, 2008; E. Danielyan, 2006).  In the highly patriarchal societies of the South Caucasus, and 
with homosexuality widely perceived as an affliction or disease, sexual minorities also remain a target for 
harassment, blackmail and discrimination  (United States Department of State, 2011a, pp. 59-61; 2011b, 
pp. 45-46; 2011c, pp. 78-79).  
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response, the document continues, the domestic security strategy should aim for 
efficient public administration (in turn necessitating increased levels of state 
governance, a solid political system, democratic values and civil society), the rebuilding 
of the armed forces, the liberalisation of the economy and the promotion of a “new 
quality of life and morale”. 
As would be expected, official Armenian discourse does at least pay lip service to the 
principles of good governance, human rights and democratisation.  All presidents since 
independence – Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, Sargsyan – have clearly stated their 
intention of building a democratic state under the rule of law, and, as a member of the 
Council of Europe since 2001, Armenia has taken on specific commitments to that 
effect (Council of Europe, 2009; RFE-RL, 2001).  The instability of the Armenian 
political system (detailed in chapter 6) clearly indicates their successive failures to 
construct a state recognised by all (or, at the very least, almost all) Armenians as the 
guarantor of their security through the monopoly of legitimate force.  Armenian officials 
of all political persuasions have, when necessary, explained the democratic 
deficiencies in Armenia since at least 1995 in terms of either the difficulty of introducing 
structural changes in times of crisis (Ter-Petrosyan, 1996), or the specificities of the 
“Armenian mentality” (E. Danielyan, 2003), or in terms of foreign conspiracies trying to 
manipulate the Armenian political scene (Zakarian, 2002).  The fact, however, remains 
that Armenian society remains plagued by a dangerous split in its discourse on the 
state and its role in providing the ultimate public good: security. 
Large swathes of the Armenian public do not trust state structures to be either 
effective, or representative of their values and interests, clearly disbelieving the 
government‟s rhetoric on democracy, and good governance.  Pro- and anti-government 
groups, including the press, appear to live in parallel universes where perceptions of 
the state are concerned.  The audiovisual broadcast media (almost all of them 
government-controlled) and the pro-establishment written press, for instance, hardly 
ever broach the sensitive subject of high-level corruption, while the narrative 
encountered among supporters of the opposition is that of the state being entirely 
subservient to and controlled by clan interests.  As revealed in several opinion polls, 
trust in the judiciary and official law-enforcement – so important in upholding law and 
order, and, as a consequence, security in any society – is extremely low78.  
Conversations with ordinary Armenians and independent analysts often reveal a deep 
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 In this respect, the opinion polls carried out by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC Data 
Initiative Team, 2007a) indicate consistently low levels of trust in the ability of state institutions – the police, 
public prosecutors, human rights ombudsmen – as providers of security, certainly when compared to 
interpersonal relationships (family, friends, neighbours).  
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distrust of the state as an opaque, repressive threat to normal life; „security‟ is seldom 
associated with Armenia‟s official structures, with whom it seems better to avoid 
interaction to the maximum extent possible.  Quite on the contrary, many Armenians I 
encountered expressed the opinion that „this could not go on for much longer‟, that it 
would „erupt‟ at some point, and laid bare their disillusionment with a system that is 
perceived to be the product of corrupt officialdom and organised crime, with one 
specific layer of the population seen to stand well above the law79.   
The inability of Armenian society to agree on the „rules of the game‟ governing the state 
is made particularly obvious in periods leading up to and following elections.  In this 
sense, the 2008 presidential ballot was particularly traumatic.  The securitisation of the 
state as a threat rather than a means towards security by a significant part of society 
translated into significant support for Ter-Petrosyan, with the latter‟s open equation of 
the Karabakhi-Armenian leadership as a foreign (Tatar-Mongol) occupation regime and 
“banditocracy” (“avazakapetut‟yun”) providing the clearest expression of these 
perceptions (Ter-Petrosyan, 2007b, 2008).  While the pro-government media have, 
almost invariably, towed the official line blaming the opposition for the deadly March 
2008 clashes, the plight of dozens of activists arrested during and after the 
disturbances – and described as „political prisoners‟ by their sympathisers – were the 
focus of opposition discourse until their release in a nation-wide amnesty in mid-2009 
(Marianna Grigoryan, 2009; G. Mkrtchyan, 2008).  Armenian society and its elites and 
counter-elites remain deeply split in their perceptions of the state, depriving that state 
of its stabilising function as the „collective strategy of survival‟ mentioned in chapter 3, 
and necessitating regular projections of brute force into society by the state.   
To be fair, this is not particular to the regime in power at any given time.  All post-
independence governments of the Republic of Armenia have been distrusted by their 
population as corrupt and self-serving, of turning state security into regime security, as 
is so often the case in incoherent states.  Levon Ter-Petrosyan lost his popularity soon 
after his overwhelming 83% win in the 1990 presidential elections, to date, the only 
ones with more or less unquestioned legitimacy (Ishkanian, 2008).  The economic 
collapse that followed, including a near-famine in 1992-1993, the accompanying 
poverty and corruption, and his generally distant and aloof style soon alienated him 
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 Interviews, personal observations.  During one opposition demonstration observed by myself in July 
2008, one former prime minister described in detail how a small number of government-connected 
oligarchs skim the remittances of their compatriots through illegal cartels controlling the importation of 
basic necessities: a recurring narrative in broader society.  The Armenian press often speculates on the 
reason why these prominent and wealthy figures – who are also often members of parliament with 
underworld nicknames – end up in relatively low places on the lists of the country‟s biggest taxpayers, 
published yearly by the finance ministry (A. Galoian, 2006; M. Mkrtchyan, 2009). 
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from the population (Bremmer & Welt, 1997), many of whom still associate him with the 
cold, dark winters without electricity or heating during much of his presidency80.  The 
rigged 1995 constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections, and the falsified 
1996 presidential elections also destroyed his democratic legitimacy, and, over the 
longer term, severely damaged many Armenians‟ faith in the representative nature of 
their state, a distrust that continued in the Kocharyan years, despite an improvement in 
the economic situation (IFES, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004).  Most Armenian citizens 
outside the structures of state power see a republic incapable almost from the very 
inception of instituting democratic rule and providing security at the most basic level, 
irrespective of the particular regime in power at a given time.  The distrust between 
rulers and ruled is so intense that ordinary Armenians seldom, if ever, believe their 
government to act in the state interest (rather than for private gain)81.  
The Republic of Armenia‟s vertical weakness is, very much, a structural matter of long-
term state legitimacy, rather than a short-term one of regime legitimacy per se.  The 
state, along with its political elites, has shown itself unable to create mechanisms that 
offer a consensual way of resolving the many debates and disputes on security.  One 
of the most significant consequences of this situation is the political instability that 
accompanies any attempt by a government to solve the most important of all security 
issues confronting the state: the Karabakh conflict.  As regimes tend to be seen as 
illegitimate and self-serving, and the political process is perceived as manipulated and 
unrepresentative, a plethora of groups – representing „intellectuals‟, war veterans, 
oppositionists – can act as an alternative centre of legitimacy and challenge the 
government, securitise it as a threat to national security.  This is what happened in 
1998, when the Yerkrapah – a union of Karabakh war veterans – played a crucial role 
in dislodging Ter-Petrosyan from the presidency (see previous chapter).  Under current 
circumstances, any government prepared to compromise on the matter would therefore 
be faced with a choice between endowing its efforts with a democratic seal of approval 
(thus risking its fall from power) or forcing through a settlement.  Both choices would 
certainly seem unpalatable to any regime in Yerevan. 
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 A fact used, rather crudely, by the pro-government Kocharyan/Sargsyan camp in pre-election 
propaganda in 2007-2008.  Establishment newspapers duly reminded the population of how bad things 
were in 1991-1995 in articles and interviews (Respublika Armeniya, 2008; Vardanyan, 2007); the extent of 
distrust between state and citizenry is such, however, that local power outages in the 2008 pre-election 
period were also interpreted by some as part of this campaign (personal observation). 
81
 The extent of the public‟s distrust and disillusionment is revealed in public opinion polls (ACNIS, 2006a, 
2006c; CRRC Data Initiative Team, 2007a).   
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Azerbaijan: Tolerator or Assimilator? 
Armenia‟s eastern neighbour and political arch-rival, Azerbaijan, was horizontally 
fragmented even before it became an independent state, in 1991: in contrast to 
Armenia, Baku is confronted with a geographically concentrated ethnic minority that 
has securitised the centre sufficiently to choose an alternative „strategy of survival‟, in 
the form of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.  To treat the conflict around that 
enclave as purely territorial and inter-state – as was the case in the preceding chapter 
– would simply obscure the reality that, to this day, the inhabitants of the enclave itself 
define it first and foremost as a successful attempt at decolonisation and self-
preservation from Azerbaijan.  A thorough understanding of the Armenian-Azeri conflict 
would therefore also require an examination of the sub-state security dynamics 
between the Karabakh Armenians and Baku in the context of Azerbaijan‟s coherence, 
which might also be affected by relations between the centre and its numerous other 
minorities.  Vertically as well, the micro-perspective confirms what is suggested at the 
material, macro-level: the Republic of Azerbaijan is inherently weak, its ostensible 
stability upheld, in no small part, through a combination of repression and cooptation, 
depending in part on the possibilities offered by its oil riches. 
The pervasiveness of the Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan‟s security concept (2007) was 
already amply discussed in the previous chapter‟s section on Azeri-Armenian relations.  
From that document, it is clear that Baku defines the conflict over the area mostly as a 
territorial one between two states, generally ignoring the role of the Karabakh 
Armenians themselves in collectively rejecting rule by Azerbaijan in the years leading 
up to and following the demise of the Soviet Union.  There is also an oblique 
securitisation of other potential ethnic or religious groups that might become the target 
of “attempts by certain extremist elements to instigate ethnic and religion-based 
tension” in Azerbaijan.  “Separatism, ethnic and religious extremism in all their 
manifestations are capable to undermine the foundations of the State and society and 
constitute a potential source of serious threat to country's national security,” the 
concept continues within the section identifying „threats‟.  In response, the section on 
domestic security policy describes the “preservation and promotion of the environment 
of ethnic and religious tolerance in the country” as one of the key tasks of Azerbaijan‟s 
government.  The concept also declares its adherence to liberal-democratic norms of 
good governance, stating that “the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and achieving social justice will provide valuable support in 
combating attempts against the performance of the State functions and the realization 
of the national interests.”  
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Azerbaijan‟s constitution provides minorities and their native tongues with a special 
status82, although there have been expressions of concern by the Council of Europe 
(2004) at the perceived circumscription of these rights in the 2002 law on the state 
language.  Azeri leaders, in particular, do their best to strengthen the (self-)image of 
their country as a multi-ethnic, pluralist and democratic state.  Ilham Aliyev regularly 
reinforces these credentials through visits to minority villages and cultural centres 
throughout the country (I. Aliyev, 2004b, 2005f, 2005g).  The peaceful co-habitation of 
Muslims, Christians and Jews is often referred to by opinion leaders, and in this 
respect, Azerbaijan, and Azeris are constructed as an example to the world (e.g. I. 
Aliyev, 2005d; Orudzhev, 2003).  Armenian-Azeri relations are, of course, a glaring 
exception to this image of peaceful cohabitation, with intense mutual securitisation not 
only generating the enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also underlies 
Azerbaijan‟s current fragmentation.  And while relations between the Azeri state and 
most of its non-Armenian minorities appear to be comparatively placid, they do not 
remain without pitfalls: there are latent potential problems with the country‟s Avar, 
Lezgin and Talysh minorities that, in conjunction with Islamic radicalisation, have 
elicited some concern in official circles in Baku  (Kotecha, 2006). 
The deep and widespread mutual securitisations of Armenians and Azeris were already 
referred to in the previous chapter, in the context of Armenian-Azeri inter-state 
relations.  But this focus on inter-state relations did not address the internal dynamics 
that led to the fragmentation of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  In fact, the Karabakh 
conflict is as much about the mutual distrust between an ethnic minority and its 
metropolis as the intense mutual fear between two nations due to incompatible 
historiographies or territorial identities.  Nowadays, many Azeri leaders and 
commentators place the Karabakh conflict within a broader narrative, defining it 
primarily as one between Armenia or „the Armenians‟ as a worldwide group, and 
Azerbaijan, over a piece of land.   Even at the highest levels of government, the 
Karabakh Armenians‟ specific agency is overshadowed by the wider narrative context 
of a supposed age-old Armenian attempt to create a „Greater Armenia‟ through the 
territorial conquest of Azeri territories (see H. Aliyev, 2003).   
This amalgamation of Karabakh Armenian separatism with Greater Armenian 
“chauvinism” serves to obscure the specific and local securitisations of Azerbaijan by 
the Karabakh Armenians, securitisations that uncomfortably contradict the dominant 
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 Article 21 of that constitution – on the official state language – “…ensures free use and development of 
other languages spoken by the people”.  Article 45 guarantees everyone‟s right to “use his/her mother 
tongue.  Everyone has the right to be educated, carry out creative activity in any language, as desired” 
(Republic of Azerbaijan, 2002). 
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Azeri narrative of tolerance and multi-ethnic harmony. While at least partially motivated 
by pan-Armenian nationalism, specific local grievances do play a part in the Karabakh 
Armenians‟ insistence on secession from Azerbaijan, and in their societal securitisation 
of Baku as a fundamentally hostile, colonial, even “genocidal” power (Kaufman, 2001, 
pp. 52-55).  Quite simply, if this is a conflict over territory, it is one where a large 
majority of the population within that territory bears virtually no trust towards one of the 
sides in the dispute, and sees independent statehood as the only guarantee for 
cultural, and even physical survival. 
The Karabakh Armenians‟ fears emerged from their perceived persecution, colonialism 
and discrimination by the authorities in Baku, from pre-Soviet times till the end of the 
Karabakh conflict.  The fierce clashes in the 1905-1906 Armeno-Tatar War are 
remembered to this day, as is the massacre and expulsion of the Armenian population 
from the region‟s old capital, Shushi/Shusha by Azeri forces, in 1919.  When 
reminiscing about Soviet Azeri rule, Karabakh Armenians also refer to such issues as a 
biased, anti-Armenian judiciary, the exploitation of Karabakh‟s natural resources, lack 
of capital investment, encouragement of Azeri immigration (and Armenian emigration) 
through surreptitious administrative and economic pressures, and the largely fictitious 
nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast‟s cultural autonomy to justify their demands for 
independence from Baku83. From the February 1988 mass demonstrations (Malkasian, 
1996, p. 5) to the October 1991 referendum (MFA Mountainous Karabakh, 1991), over 
events like Sumgait, Black January, Operation Ring, to the ethnic cleansing of much of 
Nagorno-Karabakh‟s Armenian population by Azeri forces in 1992, the securitisation of 
Azerbaijan has only hardened in the Karabakh Armenians‟ collective mindset, 
becoming ever-more institutionalised84.   
These charges of discrimination during Soviet times are rejected outright by the Azeri 
side, by pointing to official Soviet statistics indicating a high standard of living within the 
region relative to other parts of the Azerbaijan SSR (Azimov, 2009, pp. 261-263; MFA 
Azerbaijan, s.d.-b).  Of course, the Azeri narrative of the modern-day conflict also 
denies or minimises the Karabakh Armenians‟ allegations of anti-Armenian pogroms 
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 Many such complaints were already apparent in an appeal sent by Karabakh Armenians to Nikita 
Khrushchev, in 1964 (MFA Armenia, 2009). 
84
 „Black January‟ refers to events in Azerbaijan‟s capital in January 1990, when widespread pogroms of 
the remaining Armenian population were followed by a mass evacuation, and a bloody intervention by the 
Red Army.  „Operation ring‟ denotes the expulsion and deportation, in the spring of 1990, of the Armenian 
villagers living just north of the Mountainous Karabakh border.  The actions by Azeri and central Soviet 
troops were widely viewed in the territory as a precursor to a similar campaign within its boundaries.  By 
the autumn of 1992, Azeri armed forces had moreover conquered, and ethnically cleansed, most of the 
territory, and were only a few miles away from the capital, Stepanakert, before the tide turned definitively in 
the Armenians‟ favour (De Waal, 2003, pp. 87-95, 113-118, 194-211).   For a comprehensive Karabakh 
Armenian view of the conflict timeline, see MFA Mountainous Karabakh (2008a), Agadjanian et al. (2007) 
and the Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (s.d.). 
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and ethnic cleansing from 1988 to 1991, mirroring the Armenian narrative by pointing to 
the sufferings of Armenia‟s and Nagorno-Karabakh‟s Azeri populations, and even 
alleging an Armenian hand behind anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan at the 
beginning of the conflict (Agayeva, 2010; Azimov, 2009, p. 264; MFA Azerbaijan, s.d.-
a). The granting of the “highest degree of self-government” to Nagorno-Karabakh‟s 
population is already presented as a major concession on Azerbaijan‟s part, in 
conjunction with the return of all IDPs, the direct control by Azerbaijan of today‟s „buffer 
zone‟, and the acceptance by Nagorno-Karabakh of Azeri sovereignty (H. Aliyev, 
1996a, 1996b, 2001; I. Aliyev, 2004c, 2005a, 2009).  The Karabakh Armenians are 
usually ignored as political actors in their own right, as apparent in Baku‟s adamant 
refusal to negotiate with the „separatists‟ as long as they do not accept Azeri rule; in 
this, Azerbaijan‟s approach contrast sharply with Georgia‟s, where subsequent 
governments have negotiated directly with the secessionists and the Saakashvili 
government actively engaged the populations of the breakaway territories through 
public diplomacy (see next section).  
With independent statehood seen as an established – if unrecognised – fact, these 
offers of the „greatest degree of autonomy‟ in conjunction with „security guarantees‟ are 
rejected out of hand in Stepanakert.  Karabakh‟s Armenian population simply does not 
subscribe to the official Azeri self-view of itself as a harmonious multi-ethnic society (as 
opposed to mono-ethnic Armenia).   Instead, Baku is seen as a great „assimilator‟ of 
indigenous, „really Caucasian‟ peoples, and, thus, a real and present danger to 
Karabakh‟s Armenian identity (Interviews, August 2009. See also Kotenyok, 2006; 
Melik-Shakhnazaryan & Khachatrian, 2007; Panarmenian.net, 2008; Zargaryan, 2009).  
If anything, Karabakhi discourse is less flexible on issues such as the return of 
conquered (“liberated”) territories around the enclave, or the return of Azeri refugees to 
these territories or Mountainous Karabakh proper.  Apart from demanding the 
Stepanakert‟s direct participation in the Minsk Group talks, both official and broader 
discourse is very reluctant to even consider these possibilities, viewing them as a loss 
of a vital buffer zone against potential Azeri aggression or a possible introduction of a 
„fifth column‟ into or around Karabakh (Interviews, August 2009; Asbarez, 2009; 
Balayan, 2007; A. Danielyan, 2009). What Job (1992) has called the „insecurity 
dilemma‟ – pushing minorities towards a rejection of the metropolis because of the 
existential fears associated with the loss of a claim to sovereignty – is, clearly, in full 
operation here.  
While Mountainous Karabakh‟s fragmentation from Azerbaijan is, indeed, the latter‟s 
most clearly visible and complex horizontal fissure, there are other potential pressure-
points in which ethnic issues might come to play a centrifugal role, in particular among 
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non-Armenian minorities, portions of which have been securitising the central 
authorities for some time. The main problem seems to come from overspill between 
Russia‟s restless Caucasus region and Azerbaijan‟s northern districts, home to 
sizeable Lezgin, Tsakhur and Avar minorities who stand in close contact with their 
ethnic kin in Dagestan, and who, on occasion, display nationalistic stirrings.  Quite 
recently, in 2008, there was a rather disquieting episode when a number of 
organisations purportedly representing these ethnic groups published an appeal to ‟all 
people of good will‟ accusing the Azeri government of discrimination; on another 
occasion, an organisation claiming to speak for the ethnic Avars within Azerbaijan 
accused Baku of “genocide” in a plea to the president of Dagestan.  Around that same 
period, a conference was organised in Moscow on Lezgin history during which 
pamphlets were distributed accusing the Azeri authorities of „ethnocide‟.  „Sadval‟, a 
Lezgin nationalist organisation has been active in northern Azerbaijan since the early 
1990s, when there was considerable tension between Lezgins and other minorities, 
among others connected to the drafting of soldiers for the Nagorno-Karabakh war and 
difficulties in maintaining cross-border contacts with ethnic kin in Dagestan.  It has 
toned down its demands considerably (from outright independence to greater 
autonomy within Azerbaijan), and appears to have little support among the broader 
Lezgin population despite lingering fears among some of perceived assimilatory 
policies (Fuller, 2008a, 2008b; Kavkaskii Uzel, 2008; Matveeva & McCartney, 1998; 
Rossia3.ru, 2008). 
In Southern Azerbaijan – the site of a short-lived self-proclaimed republic in 1993 – 
there are occasional and relatively isolated expressions of discontent among the ethnic 
Talysh, at times leading to repressive measures on the part of the authorities.  A 
„Talysh-Mugan‟ Republic was set up by Alikram Gumbatov, an ethnic Talysh officer, 
during the chaos surrounding the collapse of the Karabakh front in 1993, but was, 
according to observers, as shallowly rooted as it was short-lived: Talysh nationalism 
does not appear to be a potent force, because of either fear or disinterest (Kotecha, 
2006, pp. 33-36).  The Azeri government is occasionally still accused of hard-handed 
methods in the region: in one recent episode, Novruzali Mamedov, the editor of a 
Talysh-language newspaper, died in prison after having been sentenced to a long 
prison term on charges that the Committee to Protect Journalists has called 
“fabricated” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2009; RFE-RL, 2009).  But all in all, 
unrest among the Talysh, and other ethnic groups that could pose problems has 
remained within comfortably manageable levels.  Azerbaijan‟s remaining minorities are 
either too geographically indistinct or small to pose a potential threat to the coherence 
 185 
of the state85; there always remains, however, a latent potential for unrest that could 
not be plausibly ignored by Baku, in addition to the ever-present fear that minority 
tensions might be manipulated by Armenia, Russia or Iran (see following chapter). 
In terms of its vertical (i.e. ethno-territorially indistinct) coherence, the macro-
perspective chapter suggested that Azerbaijan has remained largely ostensibly stable 
since the violent repression of anti-government protests following the 2003 presidential 
election.  However, there were clear indications of the Azeri state‟s highly deficient 
legitimacy, and, hence, its inherent weakness: Azerbaijan has consistently been 
included among the most corrupt states of the Former Soviet Union following 
independence, and in terms of fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights, the 
country‟s score is the lowest in the Southern Caucasus.  The problem from a micro-
perspective, however, is precisely that discourse contradicts the „birds-eye view‟ of 
Azeri society:  the limited body of survey data would suggest Azerbaijan is actually 
more, not less legitimate than its two Western neighbours, Armenia and Georgia86, and 
Azerbaijan‟s media, both printed and electronic, retain an overwhelmingly pro-
government stance, although knowledgeable outside observers attribute this to 
informal mechanisms of government control, based on an “elaborate web” of patronage 
and corruption (Walker, 2008, p. 6).   
This apparent contradiction between the macro- and micro-perspectives is not 
surprising:  correctly identifying securitisations within authoritarian societies is known to 
be challenging (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 12), and the macro-perspective certainly suggests 
one should tread carefully where discourse within Azerbaijan is concerned.  The crucial 
question to be posed here, therefore, is whether this ostensible stability and the prima-
facie legitimacy of Azerbaijan‟s state institutions are a result of the application of force 
by the state aimed at disguising legitimacy gaps (by restricting free speech and 
contestation), rather than the result of more deeply held attitudes within society. I shall 
argue the former, for the following reasons: first, the combination of co-optation and 
repression shown to be applied by the Aliyev regime in the macro-perspective chapter 
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 The country‟s tiny Udi minority, estimated at about ten thousand and centred around the town of Nij, 
deserves special mention here.  The Udi are widely seen as the direct descendants of the Caucasian 
Albanians, speaking a modern version of the latter‟s language and, remarkably, adhering to the Armenian 
Apostolic faith.  Because of their religion, and the similarity of their names to Armenian ones (ending in –
yan), they have been subject to various pressures, prompting some to emigrate to Russia (Clifton, Clifton, 
Kirk, & Ljøkjell, 2005).   
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 The CRRC survey on Azerbaijan finds Azeris have a surprisingly high level of confidence in their state: 
52.8% of respondents trust parliament, as opposed to 21.1% in Georgia, which is widely acknowledged to 
be the most democratic/least authoritarian state in the region).  The discrepancies in perceptions of the 
legal system (44.1 vs. 19.5%) prosecutor‟s office (65.7% vs. 34.7%) and government (52.3% vs. 21.9%) 
are, similarly, inexplicably large (CRRC Data Initiative Team, 2007b, 2007c).  But, as some commentators 
on the region have convincingly pointed out, such surveys regularly underreport the depth of distrust and 
discontent prevalent within authoritarian post-Soviet societies (Coalson, 2009). 
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itself indicates that stability and regime legitimacy are not as spontaneous as it may 
seem: a legitimate state does not need de-facto censorship, physical repression and 
direct economic co-optation to maintain control over its society.  Second, the 
institutionalised corruption also apparent from the macro-perspective is in itself an 
indication of a rejection of the state as a collective strategy of survival in practice, if not 
in discourse: if the state is legitimate, most of its citizens will willingly respect the norms 
and rules that form part of its institutional arrangements.  And third, returning to the 
discursive, micro-perspective, elite and counter-elite discourses, where they are visible, 
still exhibit the kind of fundamental rifts and mutual auto-securitisations that are typical 
of inherently weak states87.   
Opposition politicians regularly describe the legal system as a threat to ordinary, 
upstanding Azeri citizens rather than a tool against criminality (Caucasus Journalists' 
Network, 2004), something typical of other Southern Caucasian states as well.  Others 
lament the current hereditary Azeri “dictatorship‟s” inability to live up to the democratic 
ideals of Rasulzadeh‟s Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920), a point of 
reference for many opposition supporters (Asgarov, 2009). Accusations and counter-
accusations of subservience to foreign interests similarly figure in the discourse of anti- 
and pro-government groups (BBC Monitoring, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e; Morning 
Star, 2002).  The electoral process – so central to an aspiring democracy‟s status as a 
„shared strategy‟ – is seen as hopelessly skewed, and therefore subjected to frequent 
boycotts (or threats thereof) over the years (BBC Monitoring, 2009a; Fuller, 2008f). 
There is also a micro-regional element in the confrontation between government and 
opposition (albeit one which is less prominent than in Armenia), with Aliyev seen as the 
leader of the „Nakhichevani‟ clan (Sidikov, 2004)88. 
It is certainly justified to ask oneself whether the Azeri state and regime would be able 
to maintain their ostensible stability in the absence of large-scale co-optation and 
repression.  In Baku, stability could very well be argued to be more the result of a 
targeted application of state resources than that of a smooth functioning of an 
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 For an excellent source of Azeri English-language articles from an opposition perspective, see 
http://azerireport.com/. 
88
 On a final note, while Azerbaijan remains a thoroughly secular society, observers have in recent years 
also seen a growth in the number of „independent‟ Islamic and more radical Salafi Islamist groups, with the 
perceived corruption of established religious and secular authorities a major driver in their growth.  While 
still well-contained, marginal, and mostly peaceful, the intersection of this religious dissent with ethnically 
specific grievances in border regions, especially in the north, has led to acts of violence, notably in the 
2008 events surrounding the Abu Bakr mosque, in Baku.  Regions bordering Dagestan are especially 
vulnerable because of their cross-border contacts with one of Russia‟s most restive republics, where the 
Sharia Jamaat, a group aiming to create a pan-Caucasian emirate, remains active, and the danger of 
ethnic and religious grievances „cross-pollinating‟ remains.  However, while the state does remain vigilant 
as to the activities of such independent groups, seasoned observers of Azerbaijan do not believe Islamism 
to pose an imminent systemic threat (Fuller, 2008c; Fuller & Bakir, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2008c, 
p. 11; Jamestown Foundation, 2008; Sattarov, 2004; Wilhelmsen, 2009). 
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elite/counter-elite consensus on the legitimacy of state institutions as arbiters and 
guarantors of security.  It is reasonable to argue that Azerbaijan‟s stability could 
become seriously challenged in the absence of such legitimate institutional 
mechanisms, once the state is faced with intra-elite rifts that remain insoluble in the 
face of insufficiently legitimate institutions, or if it loses its ability to co-opt and repress.  
Combined with the country‟s fragmentation into a rump Azerbaijan and a Republic of 
Mountainous Karabakh, this means the Southern Caucasus‟ largest and most populous 
state can safely be described as horizontally fragmented, and vertically ostensibly 
stable but inherently at least as weak as, and perhaps weaker than, both of its 
neighbours, as evidenced by the totality of macro- and micro-perspective factors 
enumerated previously. 
Georgia: Between Fragmentation and Weakness 
Moving westward, the Georgian National Security Concept (Republic of Georgia, 2005) 
is certainly reflective of the Georgian state‟s recent efforts at developing an inclusive 
identity, one that could provide the basis for a shared „strategy of survival‟ for Georgia‟s 
multi-cultural society.  As in Azerbaijan, the restoration and maintenance of the 
country‟s territorial integrity and the return of (mostly Georgian) IDPs and refugees 
feature prominently in the document; in two ways, however, the document‟s discourse 
differs fundamentally from that of its Azeri counterpart‟s.  First, it is not so much the 
separatist groups/nations, as an ethnically unrelated third party – Russia – that is 
intensely securitised as an outside manipulator and instigator, something I shall return 
to in the next chapter.  Second, there is an – albeit reluctant – acceptance of the de-
facto authorities within the separatist regions as interlocutors towards a solution, which, 
in Georgia‟s eyes, should include broad autonomy under its sovereignty. Apart from the 
securitisation of “aggressive separatist movements inspired from abroad”, the security 
concept specifically provides for “negotiations with the de-facto authorities”, albeit on a 
status based on broad autonomy and a respect for Georgia‟s territorial integrity.  In the 
case of South Ossetia, the concept advocates offering broad autonomy and a 
commitment to the non-use of force; in the case of Abkhazia, it proposes working within 
the UN-based „Group of Friends‟ process.  Such direct references to dialogue with 
separatist entities would be unthinkable in neighbouring Azerbaijan89.   
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 Apart from those parts of the NSC referring to the need for national re-integration, Georgia has also 
adopted an extensive „National Concept on Tolerance and Civic Integration‟, detailing a raft of minority 
rights (Republic of Georgia, 2009).  But while certainly relevant to relations with minorities in „rump‟ 
Georgia, its adoption following the „August War‟ (and recognition by Russia of both breakaway territories) 
makes it at best a theoretical exercise in relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
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Broader government discourse also differs dramatically from Azerbaijan‟s, constantly 
engaging with all minorities in the country, including those that have broken away, 
through intense public diplomacy.  These conflicts are not reduced to territorial disputes 
or age-old, almost Manichean struggles between competing nations: the narrative on 
the Georgian side is, rather, one of great power infringement and manipulation, in the 
absence of which these „brotherly‟ minorities would be inevitably drawn towards 
prosperous and democratic Georgia (rather than corrupt and authoritarian Russia), 
over the objections even of their de-facto authorities. Especially following the „Rose 
Revolution‟, there was a clear effort at directly engaging the populations of both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, over the heads of their „de-facto‟ administrations (see below).  
„Public diplomacy‟ was made an explicit part of the remit of the Office of the State 
Minister for Reintegration (Republic of Georgia, s.d.), and Saakashvili regularly 
addressed the publics of both separatist entities, with offers of economic development, 
good governance and generous political autonomy, interspersed with the occasional 
sentence in the minority language (see Saakashvili, 2004a, 2004b; Saakashvili, 2008). 
Saakashvili‟s approach differs considerably from that of his predecessors.  The 
country‟s first post-Soviet president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, routinely described 
Georgia‟s ethnic minorities as unreliable „guests‟, resident at the pleasure of their 
Georgian hosts, to be expelled at the slightest hint of treasonous (read „pro-Russian‟) 
behaviour.   Gamsakhurdia is described by several authors as “messianic” and 
“paranoid” (Cohen, 2004; Kaufman, 2001, p. 115), and one of his major speeches as 
leader of the anti-Communist opposition – a 1990 lecture entitled “The Spiritual Mission 
of Georgia” – excels in its combination of religious mysticism and nationalist 
exceptionalism (Gamsakhurdia, 1990).  Throughout the period between 1989 and 
1993, Georgian discourse was dominated by a virulent populism that securitised 
minorities as an alien imposition and an imminent threat to the country‟s survival, 
resulting in ethno-centric discriminatory policies (English, 2008; S. Jones, 1994; 
Kaufman, 2001, p. 110; Nodia, 1996).  All Georgian (and non-Georgian) individuals 
interviewed by the author firmly rejected this approach, and the so-called „Zviadists‟ 
today represent only a very small proportion of the country‟s political landscape. 
After the collapse of the Gamsakhurdia presidency and the consolidation of his rule, 
Shevardnadze certainly tempered the official narrative, and at least formally 
acknowledged the need for an inclusive, civic understanding of Georgian citizenship; to 
little avail, however.   Shevardnadze‟s tenuous hold on power in during his first years in 
power complicated the elaboration of a consistent policy towards the separatist entities, 
and early attempts to forcibly reintegrate Abkhazia in 1992-93 served to discredit any 
claims he might have had to greater „tolerance‟ and „cosmopolitanism‟ as Gorbachev‟s 
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former foreign minister, at least in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali (Akaba, 2000, pp. 80-81).  
Shevardnadze also tended to see the Ossetian and Abkhazian problems as issues of 
elite inter-state „high politics‟, to be resolved through patient and discreet high-level 
diplomacy rather than emotional appeals to the local populations, intense public 
diplomacy, or active policies at promoting their integration into public life, an approach 
criticised by one prominent Georgian scholar (Nodia, 2005a, pp. 47-48).   And indeed, 
comparing Shevardnadze‟s and Saakashvili‟s discourses, the latter‟s emphasis on 
Georgia‟s ethnic diversity, the need for a civic (rather than ethnic) understanding of 
citizenship, and for direct public diplomacy towards minorities is far more explicit – and 
flowery – than in the case of his predecessor: Shevardnadze, true to his past as a 
Soviet elder statesman, concentrated mostly on the technicalities of constitutional 
reform or high-level, inter-elite negotiations, all the while avoiding Gamsakhurdia‟s 
ethno-nationalism, and Saakashvili‟s emotionalism  (By way of contrast, see BBC 
Monitoring, 1994; Saakashvili, 2005a). 
In the end, neither Shevardnadze nor Saakashvili have succeeded in reuniting 
Georgia.   The former‟s increasingly visible frustration at the inability of the 
„international community‟ and, notably, Russia to provide for reunification with either 
South Ossetia or Abkhazia led to a marked deterioration in Georgian-Russian relations 
towards the end of his presidency, discussed in the following chapter. Saakashvili‟s 
forceful public diplomacy also didn‟t succeed in tackling the entrenched securitisations 
in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia before the policy was, in effect, brought to nought 
by the August War.  The re-assertion of central authority over Ajaria in 2004 through 
the expulsion of the pro-Russian Abashidze clan served as an early sign of 
encouragement for the Saakashvili administration (see Saakashvili, 2005a), followed 
by only limited successes in the remaining breakaway regions, first among them the 
defection of Dimitri Sanakoyev, a former South Ossetian prime minister to Tbilisi‟s side 
(Peuch, 2007)90.  But the crucial difference between Ajaria on the one hand, and South 
Ossetia/Abkhazia on the other was the absence of an ethnic factor in the former.  The 
province‟s main ethnic minority, the Ajarians, are Muslim Georgians who had not 
developed an ethnic identity distinct from their brethren in „rump Georgia‟ during the 
Soviet and post-Soviet periods (Cornell, 2002b, pp. 273-274; International Crisis 
Group, 2004b).  And, as elsewhere in the Caucasus, the historically generated and 
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 In Abkhazia, the picture was somewhat different: although significant numbers of Georgian-Megrelian 
refugees had gradually been allowed back into the southern Gal(i) district of the breakaway entity, and 
Georgian troops took control of the Kodori gorge until 2008, the self-proclaimed authorities in the area held 
uniformly fast onto their claims to independence (Fuller, 2007; Interfax, 2006; Kucera, 2007).  The election 
of Sergei Bagapsh in 2004, apparently against Moscow‟s wishes, did give some in Tbilisi cautious (but 
vain) hope that fear of Russia would drive the Abkhaz back „into the fold‟. (Anjaparidze, 2004; Blagov, 
2004; Peuch, 2004a). 
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ethnically driven societal securitisations outlined below were essential to any 
understanding of the breakdown of relations between Georgia and its breakaway 
regions; and in spite of these initial successes, these securitisations remained intact in 
both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. 
In Abkhazia, existential fears were based on a deeply, historically rooted fear and 
distrust of Tbilisi, found in the extensive narratives on Georgian aggression and 
encroachment since at least the early 20th century: within Abkhazia, Georgia was, and 
still is very much perceived as a colonial power aiming at the demographic dilution and 
assimilation of Abkhaz culture, in continuation of policies started by the Georgian 
Democratic Republic of 1918-1921, intensified in the wake of Stalin‟s decision to 
subordinate the territory to the Georgian SSR, in 1931.  The Georgian wars against the 
Abkhazian People‟s Soviet in 1918-1921, the importation of thousands of Mingrelian-
Georgian91 immigrants, and the general persecution of Abkhaz culture in the final years 
of Stalin‟s rule are remembered to this day as part of a long-standing policy of 
Georgianisation (Akaba, 1996; Khodzhaa, 2007; Kvarchelia, 1998; Lakoba, 1999).  
While these repressions decreased in intensity in the post-Stalin era, Abkhazians 
charge that the authorities in Tbilisi always continued applying various pressures to 
lessen the position of the titular ethnic group in favour the Georgian Mingrelians, 
perceived discriminations that led to periodic demonstrations and petitions demanding 
the (re)attachment of the autonomous republic to the Russian Federative Soviet 
Socialist Republic, or a restoration of its pre-1931 status as a full union republic in its 
own right92.  
Most of these Soviet-era Abkhaz appeals were “given short shrift” by the authorities in 
Moscow (Fowkes, 2002, p. 77); but „perestroika‟ and „glasnost‟ opened another 
opportunity to openly voice such grievances, and thus, Abkhazian demands for full 
union republic status resurfaced in June of 1988, when sixty intellectuals signed the so-
called “Abkhazian letter” (Kotlyarov, 1994) to the central authorities in Moscow.  One of 
the central securitising acts on Abkhazia‟s road to independence, it accuses Georgian 
nationalists – from the early Mensheviks, through Joseph Stalin, to the contemporary 
Georgian Communist Party – of a decades-old attempt at „Georgianising‟ Abkhazian 
culture through cultural repression, administrative tricks, demographic manipulation, 
and historical falsification.  The document caused an outcry in Tbilisi, where the 
                                               
91
 The Mingrelians (or Megrelians) are a distinct Georgian sub-ethnos numbering about 500,000.  In 
everyday life, they speak an unwritten South Caucasian language, related to but distinct and unintelligible 
from standard Georgian, and mainly inhabit the country‟s western province of Samegrelo.   
92
 A comprehensive collection of such Soviet-era petitions and letters from Abkhazia can be found in 
Kotlyarov (1994) 
 191 
Writers‟ Union quickly tasked a number of intellectuals with drafting a response 
(Miminoshvili & Pandzhikidze, 1990), which, rather predictably, in turn accuses the 
Abkhaz authors of falsifying history, trying to sow discord between the Abkhaz and 
Georgian peoples who had lived together since centuries, if not millennia, in successive 
politically and culturally Georgian Abkhaz states.   
As in the Armenian-Azeri case, the diverging interpretations of history93 apparent in 
these conflicting documents are co-constitutive of fundamentally incompatible 
identities, essentially divergent views of what „Abkhazia‟ and „Georgia‟ represent, and, 
finally, incompatible „national projects‟ (Coppieters, 2002; Nodia, 1998).  To many 
Georgians, Abkhazia is Georgian by virtue of the Georgian „high culture‟ of its historical 
elites, and an uninterrupted Georgian presence since antiquity.  To the Abkhaz – in the 
words of one separatist leader – “Abkhazia is Abkhazia”, with a distinct ethnic identity, 
to be preserved and defended against its “mini-empire” adversary, Georgia (Lakoba, 
1995).   Additionally, as elsewhere in the region, past history serves as a guide to the 
present and a harbinger of the future: “It seems that history truly moves in a circle”, 
writes one Abkhaz author before comparing 1992-93 with the Abkhaz experience 
during the Menshevik-Georgian repressions of 1917-1920 (Akaba, 1996, p. 11).  With 
such radically divergent perceptions of history forming the longer-term backdrop, a 
series of concrete occurrences in the Soviet and immediate post-Soviet periods has 
served to entrench fear and distrust within both populations.  From the creation of 
Aidgylara (the Abkhaz national movement), over events surrounding the Abkhaz State 
University in Sukhumi in 1989 to the short but intense war in 1992-93 (ironically, under 
the „moderate‟ Shevardnadze), subsequent events „proved‟ to both sides that the other 
desires Abkhazia without themselves, through ethnic cleansing and “genocide”, if 
necessary (Anchabadze, 1999; Nadareishvili, 2007; Zhorzholiani, Lekishvili, Toidze, et 
al., 1995, pp. 83-96).  
Since 1993, both in the discourse of political elites and in discussions between Abkhaz 
and Georgian scholars, no-one has been able to resolve the fundamental contradiction 
between the Georgians‟ wish for reunification (and corresponding fear of 
disintegration), and the Abkhazians‟ fear of subordinating themselves to a hostile entity 
– and their resulting insistence on secession – for many years at the cost of near-total 
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 As elsewhere in the Southern Caucasus, the convoluted nature of local history allowed, and still allows 
both sides to stick to entirely contradictory narratives.  The Abkhaz argue for an uninterrupted – and largely 
exclusive – presence of their ethnic group in Abkhazia since at least antiquity, disturbed by the influx of 
Georgians or the forcible „Georgianisation‟ of Abkhazians since the 19th century (Achugba, 2006; Akaba, 
1996).  The Georgians arguments vary, although all end up stressing the Georgian nature of Abkhazia 
(see Gamakhariya & Gogiya, 1997; Hewitt, 1993, pp. 274-275; Khoshtariya-Brosse, 1996; Nodia, 1998, 
pp. 25-26; Zhorzholiani, Lekishvili, Toidze, & Khoshtaria-Brosset, 1995). 
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economic isolation (Coppieters, Nodia, & Anchabadze, 1998a, p. 177).  According to 
one Abkhazian deputy foreign minister, in 1999, the Abkhazian side saw Tbilisi refusal 
to contemplate a confederal „common state‟ solution as proof that Georgia would never 
accept anything less than the province‟s legal subordination, and concluded, therefore, 
talks would be pretty much useless (Interviews, August 2009): two attempts by Abkhaz 
and Georgian scholars to discuss possible constitutional solutions to the conflict 
(Coppieters, Darchiashvili, & Akaba, 2000; Coppieters, Nodia, & Anchabadze, 1998b) 
exposed the diverging perspectives between the sides: Georgians stressed federal 
solutions implying subordination to a centre, while to the Abkhaz, equality and 
recognition stayed a top priority (see Adzhindzhal, 2007; Akaba, 2000, p. 88; Chirikba, 
2009; Kvarchelia, 1999).  
These fundamental contradictions are exacerbated by the Abkhazians‟ firm realisation 
that they constituted a mere 18% of the territories pre-1993, and their resulting 
resistance to the return of Georgian refugees and IDPs, most of whom are 
characterised as „combatants‟, and consequently beyond the scope of any right of 
return (Achukba, 2006)94.  Abkhazia‟s recognition by the Russian Federation has 
moreover clearly removed any doubts the Abkhaz elites might have had as to their de-
facto state‟s viability.  In fact, following this recognition, other issues and potential 
securitisations have emerged: Russia‟s potentially overwhelming dominance of the 
local economy, or demands by those (relatively substantial) non-Abkhaz ethnic groups 
(Armenians, Russians) that have remained in the country, and still outnumber the 
Abkhaz themselves. In interviews, officials thus expressed concern that the Armenians 
would be demanding equal funding for the preservation of their culture, something that 
could pose a potential problem.  During my visit to the region (August 2009), there was 
also ongoing wrangling over Abkhazia‟s citizenship law, and the nature (ethnic or civic) 
of the state‟s national ideology (Goble, 2009).  After recognition by Russia, the Abkhaz 
opposition has also grown increasingly apprehensive at the threat of cultural 
assimilation, and perceived Russian economic encroachment into the country (BBC 
Monitoring, 2009b; Regnum, 2009; Simonyan, 2009). 
There are parallels and differences between the situations in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  There is a long pre-modern history of interaction between Georgians and 
Ossetians both within and beyond the areas that now comprise the self-declared 
                                               
94
 Some Mingrelian refugees have actually returned since 1993, notably to the southern Gali district.  This 
was explained by officials in Sukhumi by the fact that the Georgian population in that area had not 
participated in hostilities during the war; in other places, Georgians had made themselves complicit in 
crimes against the Abkhaz state and population, and could therefore not be designated as „refugees‟ under 
international law (Interviews, August 2009).   
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republic, but, while definitely conflicting (Shnirelman, 2001, pp. 350-380), 
historiographies on both sides don‟t appear not quite as convoluted and contradictory 
as in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Armenian-Azeri cases95. And as elsewhere in the 
Southern Caucasus, contemporary narratives of enmity are greatly influenced by 
experiences at the start and the end of the 20th century, but in the South Ossetian 
case, grievances seem to have emerged much more recently than in either Sukhumi or 
Stepanakert.  In Soviet times, South Ossetia‟s titular nation did not display the 
existential fears observed in Abkhazia and Karabakh through the regular appeals to the 
centre observed elsewhere, and the region remained mostly tranquil, certainly 
compared to restless Abkhazia.  One prominent Russian analyst has thus suggested 
that the South Ossetians became separatists “against their will”, due to 
Gamsakhurdia‟s counterproductive policies rather than any long-standing grievances 
(Markedonov, 2008).  And indeed, looking at the official discourse during the „war of 
laws‟ that preceded the breakdown of the Soviet Union, when Tbilisi and Tskhinvali 
(and Sukhumi) were engaged in tit-for-tat legislation aimed at enhancing or 
safeguarding their perceived constitutional rights, the picture one gets is one of 
gradually escalating securitisation between Georgians and Ossetians.  The referent 
object of security for Ossetians is, initially, their economic and cultural welfare, to be 
ensured through an upgrading of the territory‟s autonomous status; gradually, it 
becomes their physical survival, to be safeguarded through outright secession 
(Volkhonskii, Zakharov, & Silayev, 2008, pp. 177-244).   
Eventually, in 1991-92, this complex cycle of securitisations and counter-securitisations 
escalates into open warfare, during which both sides stand accused of major violations 
of international humanitarian law (Human Rights Watch, 1992); in Ossetian discourse, 
a link is quickly made with the Menshevik atrocities of 1920, when Georgian troops 
went on the rampage in the region, allegedly killing about five thousand Ossetians and 
displacing tens of thousands (Zasseyeva, 2007)96.  Ossetian historical grievances were 
arguably not as intense as in Abkhazia to begin with; the securitisations contained 
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 The main divergence centres on the exact period of the Ossetians‟ settlement in the Southern 
Caucasus, with South Ossetians stressing the local presence of their presumed Alan, Sarmatian and 
Scythian forefathers since ancient times (Bliyev, 2006, pp. 15-32; Dzugayev, 2007), and Georgians 
arguing the case for large-scale immigration since the 12th-13th centuries, and, especially, during the last 
two-three centuries of Russian and Soviet domination (Topchishvili, 2005; Zhorzholiani, Lekishvili, 
Mataradze, Toidze, & Khoshtaria-Brosset, 1995).  The South Ossetians‟ claim to ancient local statehood 
also does seem to be less prominent and clear-cut than their Abkhazian or Karabakhi Armenian 
counterparts‟ (see Presidentrso.ru, 2008). 
96
 In fact, the South Ossetian parliament‟s 1991 appeal to Russia‟s legislative body asking for reunification 
with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation explicitly refers to the two “genocides” inflicted by 
Georgia, “in 1920 and from 1989 onwards” (Volkhonskii, et al., 2008, p. 202).  That ultimate marker of 
existential fear becomes established within the South Ossetian narrative from that time, as argued by a 
local author (Pukhayev, 2006).  Both North and South Ossetia demanded the recognition of these 
“genocides” by the international community in 2006 (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2006; Ossetia.ru, 2006), while many 
Ossetian websites have entire sections dedicated to them (see osinform.ru, osgenocide.ru). 
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within the “Abkhazian letter” occurred much earlier (in 1988) and were, arguably, more 
forceful, using words like „assimilation‟ and „dissolution‟ from the very start.  
Nevertheless, as in Abkhazia, the negotiations process was unable to square the circle 
between the Ossetians‟ insistence on secession and Georgia‟s unbending commitment 
to its territorial integrity; on the contrary, in 2004, the region seemed on the brink of 
renewed armed conflict (International Crisis Group, 2004a).  But significantly – and 
unlike what happened in other South Caucasian separatist entities – serious fissures 
did emerge within the South Ossetian elite, in 2006. After a power struggle between 
rival factions, one group led by a former separatist Prime Minister, Dimitri Sanakoyev  
could clearly envisage living within the reformed Georgia of Saakashvili, agreeing to 
co-operate with the central authorities in a „provisional administration‟ for the province, 
and eliciting furious denunciations from Tskhinvali (BBC Monitoring, 2006, 2007b; 
Corso & Owen, 2006).  The extensive inducements aimed at luring Ossetians away 
from the separatist regime – including the Russian-language „Alania‟ TV station, 
monetary compensation for defectors and, rather more bizarrely, a concert by the 
1970s disco group, Boney M., of „Rasputin‟ fame – could ultimately not prevent the 
overwhelming majority of ordinary Ossetians from describing him as a traitor; 
Sanakoyev‟s influence did not go much beyond becoming a serious irritant for the 
Tskhinvali regime (as he himself recently admitted), before his complete sidelining in 
the aftermath of the 2008 war (Barry, 2008; Corso, 2008). 
That conflict has brought to nought all of Tbilisi‟s past efforts at luring the secessionist 
regions back into the fold; the war itself has reinforced the perception in both separatist 
regions of Tbilisi as an existential threat, while recognition by Moscow has dramatically 
increased the viability of separation as a strategy of survival.  With the expulsion of 
almost all Georgians from Ossetia, and of all Georgian forces from Abkhazia – 
including the Kodori gorge – both Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, now safely under Moscow‟s 
protection, reject the possibility of any kind of reunification with Georgia.  In fact, the 
secessionists use the contrast between Saakashvili‟s rhetoric of „peace‟ and „tolerance‟ 
and his “aggression” in August 2008 to underscore Tbilisi‟s unchanging fundamentally 
malicious intentions (Interfax, 2009; s.n., 2009a, 2009c).  South Ossetia is moreover 
certainly more comfortable with Russian protection than Abkhazia: its government had 
already called for reunification with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation on 
several occasions before the war (Interfax, 2008b; Khairullin, Pavlikova, Dzhanayev, & 
Yeremjan, 2006), while the matter had not been under serious consideration in 
Sukhumi.  Quite on the contrary, while the Abkhaz remained wary of excessive 
Russian influence (see above), Moscow had to pressure Kokoity into a rather 
humiliating about-turn after his calls for the territory‟s inclusion into the Russian 
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Federation, in September 2008 (Barry & Cowell, 2008); he was still suggesting the 
creation of a „union state‟ with Russia in 2009 (Prime-Tass, 2009).  In both entities, 
however, a return to Georgian sovereignty is deemed out of the question. 
Georgia‟s horizontal weakness does not end in its fragmentation into a rump and two 
separatist entities.  While the tensions following the downfall of Gamsakhurdia between 
the Mingrelians and other Georgians have largely dissipated97, the Armenian and Azeri 
minorities in, respectively, Javakheti and Kvemo-Kartli continue to look unfavourably at 
a number of policies instituted by the Tbilisi government, most importantly, the 
requirement that all holders of government office master the Georgian language.  The 
lack of knowledge of the state language among rural Armenians and Azeris has led to 
their under-representation in the country‟s political structures, leading to charges of 
discrimination.  These minorities regularly interpret socio-economic problems as the 
result of wilful negligence by the central authorities, and both ethnic groups remain 
wary of perceived attempts by these authorities to change the ethnic make-up of their 
regions.  Lohm (2007), and Wheatley (2004), for instance, report that disputes in 
Javakheti centre on, among others, history, the ownership of architectural monuments, 
continued fears of demographic change and ethno-linguistic assimilation, a constant 
perception of discrimination, coupled with a deficient political culture, provocative 
reporting by the media, and Georgian fears of disintegration98.  All of these factors were 
amplified by the economic dependence of Javakheti‟s population on the Russian 
military base at Akhalkalaki, a major bone of contention between Tbilisi and Moscow 
until its closure in 2006: a large proportion of the servicemen stationed there were local 
ethnic Armenians, and the bases provided both civilian employment and custom for 
agricultural supplies, apart from being seen, in the traditional Armenian vein, as 
„protection‟ from Turkey (Gusep, 2005). 
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have so far worked to ease tensions among „their‟ ethnic 
groups, and official Tbilisi is trying to allay the concerns of both Armenians and Azeris 
through a comprehensive strategy aimed at improving their socio-economic situation 
and Georgian language skills (Interviews, August 2008).  But the securitisation of 
                                               
97
 The downfall of Gamsakhurdia, a Mingrelian, led to several armed insurrections in the province during 
the early 1990s, followed by bloody reprisals by pro-Shevardnadze forces (MacFarlane, Minear, & 
Shenfield, 1996, p. 12; Rotar, 1998), and lingering fears of secessionism (RFE-RL, 2000).   Tensions 
between the Mingrelians and other Georgians seem to have dissipated for now, with the overwhelming 
majority of the group continuing to identify themselves as Georgian (International Crisis Group, 2008d, p. 
8).  
98
 The Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad passing through the region is also seen as a potential threat, with local 
Armenian fears of a Turkish influx seemingly amplified by the closure of local Russian bases and a 
possible return of the Meskhetian Turks, who had been deported from the area following World War Two 
(Pentikäinen & Trier, 2004, pp. 17-19).  For a moderate Armenian argument in favour of autonomy, see 
Minasyan (2006, 2007). 
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Russia and the fear of disintegration tends to limit the central government‟s policy 
options by turning any demand by these ethnic minorities for cultural rights (i.e. 
recognition of Armenian or Azeri as a regional language) or regional autonomy into a 
potential starting-point for the emergence of Russian-inspired separatism. A recent 
report lauds the Georgian government for its efforts to overcome the relative isolation 
of both the Armenian- and Azeri- inhabited regions of Georgia, while at the same time 
faulting it for not addressing “the predominantly authoritarian dynamic” that defines 
local state-society relations, thus leaving ethnic divisions vulnerable to exploitation by 
Russia (Wheatley, 2009, p. 55). Considering the lingering tensions between Georgia 
and its former imperial master, the incomplete nature of the regions‟ democratisation 
and Georgia‟s perennial fears of disintegration indeed provide fertile ground for future 
destabilisation, and further horizontal fragmentation. 
In terms of its vertical strength and stability, Georgia‟s record is, at best, mixed.  
Although the violent implosion of the early 1990s remains a distant, but cautionary 
memory, the country‟s political system has never been able to produce an ordered 
transition of power since independence.  The Shevardnadze era that followed the 
chaos of Gamsakhurdia‟s presidency did provide a measure of stability, albeit one 
based precariously on the typical mixture of authoritarianism, co-optation of 
criminalised elites, widespread corruption and forged elections still seen in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan; at its core, Georgia‟s political-constitutional system remained 
unequivocally weak (Wheatley, 2005, pp. 103-170).  The Rose Revolution seemed to 
herald a new start: immediately following the ouster of Shevardnadze, a new 
technocratic elite seemed to unite Georgia‟s population behind a major state-building 
project based on European values and civic responsibility that was well-funded by the 
West.  As Saakashvili boasted in 2005, Georgia was “a beacon of freedom for the 
whole world”; this was, he continued, its “spiritual mission”, its “special role in its 
relation to humanity” (Saakashvili, 2005a), in a possible oblique corrective reference to 
the well-known „spiritual mission‟ speech by his hapless predecessor, Gamsakhurdia 
(see above).  More moderate variations on this theme became a mainstay of Georgian 
official discourse after the Revolution. 
The initial post-revolutionary euphoria and unity have, in recent years, given way to 
ever-increasing contestation: the revolutionary leadership has gradually fragmented, 
with the dissenters‟ accusations of corruption and authoritarianism echoing the 
language heard in Baku and Yerevan. The first splinters appeared in the broad 
coalition soon after 2003, and observers of Georgian politics sounded their concerns 
on the authoritarian potential of Saakashvili‟s administration only a few years into his 
first term (Fuller, 2005; Nodia, 2005b).  By 2008, sharp criticism of the Georgian 
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government was no longer the exclusive purview of a few divided minor opposition 
parties or of isolated individuals who had publicly fallen out of favour (like former 
defence minister Irakli Okruashvili and oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili)99: opposition 
figures included a former foreign minister (Salome Zurabishvili), Saakashvili‟s former 
Human Rights ombudsman (Sozar Subari), and, most prominent of all, Nino 
Burjanadze, the erstwhile speaker of parliament and, together with Saakashvili and the 
late Zurab Zhvania, member of the triumvirate considered the driving force behind the 
Rose Revolution100. 
While Saakashvili and his party did win the 2008 presidential and parliamentary 
elections, an increasingly prominent element within the elite no longer sees the 
political-electoral process as legitimate, and increasingly sees the street as the 
legitimate road towards regime change. Burjanadze thus accuses the current 
administration of abusing the war for propagandistic purposes and instituting an 
authoritarian state in one open letter (Burjanadze, 2008), while charging Saakashvili of 
establishing “a Soviet-style regime”, before deploring the naïve tendency of outsiders to 
dismiss the Georgian opposition as „radicals‟ (Burjanadze, 2009).  Former ombudsman 
Subari, on his part, speaks of a death squad operating within Georgia‟s interior 
ministry, and of the violent anti-opposition crackdown of November 2007 in justifying 
his move towards the opposition (Fuller, 2008d).  Zurabishvili, for her part, accuses the 
U.S. State Department‟s Matthew Bryza of stealing the opposition‟s victory in the 
January 2008 elections by prematurely recognising an allegedly fraudulent election 
(Zourabichvili, 2009, p. 8).  In terms of state legitimacy, Georgia‟s discourse is now 
moving closer to that of its two neighbours; after a period of elite consensus on the 
state-as-common-strategy, Georgia seems to be weakening vertically, increasing the 
potential for future destabilisation in spite of continued opposition fragmentation and 
popular apathy (Fuller, 2008e; Whitmore, 2009).  
Georgia is, without a doubt, the most fragmented and horizontally weak of the three 
recognised Southern Caucasian states, something clearly visible from the material, 
macro-perspective, but also glaringly obvious when one looks at the deeper discourses 
pervading its, and its fragments‟, societies, since the fall of the Soviet Union and 
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 Accused by the authorities of plotting a coup in the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections, 
Patarkatsishvili officially gained little over 7% of the vote running under the slogan “Georgia without 
Saakashvili is a Georgia without Terror!” (Asatiani, 2007; Corso, 2007; s.n., 2008a).  The opposition has 
consistently rejected the results of both elections held in 2008 as fraudulent. 
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 Oppositionists (and ordinary Georgians) interviewed in August of that year admitted to the success of 
the Saakashvili government in improving administrative efficiency, and reducing petty (though certainly not 
high-level) corruption.  But the government was also accused of abusing administrative resources during 
elections, stifling the freedom of the electronic media and interfering in the judicial system by several 
prominent former allies, who also compared the Georgian regime explicitly to Vladimir Putin‟s (a 
particularly insulting comparison in the Georgian context at that time). 
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before.  Their persistent divergence comes despite recent efforts on the part of the 
Georgian government to overcome the securitisation of the centre in minority-inhabited 
regions of the country, efforts whose mixed results were almost entirely neutralised by 
the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.  And while Georgia seemed to be the most promising 
state in terms of vertical strength in the aftermath of the 2003 Revolution, recently, it 
has started displaying all of the markers of illegitimacy and vertical weakness visible 
within its neighbours, through the sharply divergent discourses of its elites that 
increasingly view the regime as a threat, and the political process as superfluous.  All 
of this cannot, however, be seen in isolation from the role that the great powers in 
general, and Russia in particular, play within the region: Georgia has been the place 
where many of their conflicting interests have collided.  It is to this issue, of great power 
penetration, that I shall turn in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9: THE GREAT POWERS AND THE 
SOUTHERN CAUCASUS 
This final empirical chapter will examine great power penetration in the Southern 
Caucasus from the micro-perspective, as outlined in the theoretical and methodological 
chapters. First organized according to individual great powers, this chapter‟s first 
sections will focus on the subjective factors driving the different powers‟ presences in 
the region, looking at the motivations undergirding these involvements.  A subsequent 
section will then investigate the dependence of the regional units‟ discourses on these 
involvements: the attitudes of regional states towards the great powers.  In combination 
with the macro-perspective provided in chapter 6, I shall then be able to classify the 
Southern Caucasus‟ patterns of GPP into one of the different categories laid out 
theoretically in chapter 4: hegemony; unipolar, cooperative multipolar or competitive 
multipolar penetration; and disengagement.  By then, this chapter will have provided a 
detailed, multi-faceted, material, subjective and intersubjective map of great power 
presence in the Southern Caucasus. 
Russia: Of Geopolitics and Empire 
As shown in the macro-perspective chapter, Russia‟s material involvement in the 
Southern Caucasus is both long-standing and intense.  While its military involvement 
has been reduced in rump Georgia – much against its will – it has strengthened its 
military presence in the country‟s two breakaway regions, while maintaining its strong 
defence ties with Armenia.  Regardless of differences within the sphere of „high 
politics‟, Russia still has important levers over the economies of all former Soviet 
republics within the RSC, either through direct investments, or through the control of 
strategic export routes.  The Russian Federation therefore remains a major material 
player in this RSC. 
The subjective motivations driving this presence of Russia‟s in the Southern Caucasus 
are correspondingly deep-seated; after all, as the former imperial power (in the guise of 
the Soviet Union and, before that, Tsarist Russia), its relationship with the region would 
rightly be assumed to be more elaborately developed and historically grounded than in 
the case of the more distant United States and the EU.  Naturally, there are the cold 
considerations of national interest stemming from the region‟s inherent characteristics 
as motivators of regional penetration.  But Russia‟s connection to the Caucasus might 
also be argued to be more profound, with the region forming part of its identity and self-
view as, quintessentially, a Eurasian great power.   
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This self-view is tied to a particularly geopolitically coloured strain of strategic thought 
that has permeated Russian (and Soviet) state and society – with varying intensity – for 
the past two centuries.  Most contemporary authors dismiss the traditional distinction 
between „Slavophiles‟ and „Europhiles‟ in Russian political thinking as outdated. 
Instead, they often identify three or four such intellectual strands in the immediate 
aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Empire: the pro-Western liberalism of the „Zapadniki‟ 
(Westernisers), the moderate nationalism of Russia‟s post-Soviet bureaucratic-
industrial establishment, and Dugin‟s (2000) radical neo-Eurasianism at the extreme 
left and right of the country‟s political spectrum (and, sometimes, other, minor strains, 
like the mystical Russian national-liberalism of isolated intellectuals like Solzhenitsyn). 
These paradigms of Russian strategic thought each have different assumptions of 
Russia‟s place in the world, as a Western or Eurasian state, part of Western civilisation 
or a civilisation in and of itself. Shared by all, however, is a conviction that this place is 
in the top tier, as a great power or „velikaya derzhava‟: the vast majority of Russia‟s 
political and intellectual elite advocates the maintenance of Russia‟s position as a great 
power as a matter of overwhelming importance, whether through the adoption of 
Western norms, or through the maintenance of a Eurasian geopolitical or civilisational 
specificity101.  Also typical of Russian foreign policy thinking is a strong geopolitical 
slant: in contrast to the West, mainstream, non-Westernising Russian policymakers 
and commentators tend to have a far more territorial and realist, zero-sum view of 
international politics. (Clover, 1999; Ingram, 2001; Kerr, 1995; Legvold, 2007; Light, 
1996; Richter, 1996; G. Smith, 1999; Tuminez, 1996).   
The Zapadniki and their pro-Western liberalism enjoyed only a brief and tenuous spell 
as the dominant mode of thought during the first years following the collapse of the 
USSR, before being eclipsed by a more moderate-nationalist policy, especially after 
statements by Boris Yeltsin and his entourage in February 1993, widely identified as a 
crucial turning point in post-Cold War Russian strategic thinking102. During that month, 
Russia‟s then president famously declared the Former Soviet Union – including, 
naturally, the Southern Caucasus – a space of exclusive Russian responsibility; and, 
starting from that date, the Russian Federation pushed for the United Nations to 
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 Tsygankov (1997; 2003) provides some of the more nuanced – and particularly interesting – distinctions 
within Russian strategic thought, among others distinguishing between Westernisers and 4 different 
variants of Eurasianism, of differing intensity: expansionist, civilizationist, stabilisers, and geo-economists.. 
102
 In effect, Moscow was asking for a blanket authorisation to organise peacekeeping missions according 
to its own will.  Such authorisation was never granted; nevertheless, in all Foreign Policy and National 
Security Concepts (since the first FPC was devised in 1993), the CIS has played an important role as 
Russia‟s „zone of special responsibility‟, and it is clear from policy practice (if not explicit discourse) that 
Moscow perceives the region as its rightful exclusive zone of influence. (Light, 1996; A. C. Lynch, 2001; 
Richter, 1996, pp. 88-89; Shearman, 1997, pp. 10-12; Tuminez, 1996, p. 59) 
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formally recognise its right to maintain stability within that zone, through military 
intervention if necessary.  The 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, adopted later that year is, 
in fact, quite explicit on the matter of using military force within the CIS as a means of 
keeping the states of the “near-abroad” in line (Trofimenko, 1999, pp. 80-81).  It also 
presages the arguments used by Moscow during the August 2008 war: “The outcome 
of this process will largely be determined by our ability to firmly assert the principles of 
international law, including respect for minority rights, and to establish good-
neighbourly relations through persuasion or even – in extreme cases – by using power 
methods.” (Russian Federation, 2005a, pp. 28-29). 
As argued by Mankoff (2009, pp. 11-51), these most basic tenets of Russian foreign 
policy have remained quite stable ever since – especially in the former Soviet space – 
despite considerable vacillation and inconsistency in the specifics of broader 
policymaking during the 1990s (MacFarlane, 2006, pp. 44-46).  As liberalism waned – 
even before the removal of Kozyrev in 1996  – Russian foreign and security policies 
took a decisively nationalist turn under the foreign- and prime-ministerships of Yevgeni 
Primakov (1996-1999), very much a product of the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy, 
and, arguably, the Kremlin‟s most Eurasianist-inspired post-Cold War senior 
policymaker to date (Clover, 1999, p. 10; Thorun, 2009, pp. 34-35).  With the advent of 
Putin in 1999, the idea of Derzhavnost gradually became more exclusively prominent 
and entrenched (along with its domestic equivalent, Gosudarstvennost, the idea of a 
strong, paternalistic state); but now, it was combined with a particular emphasis on 
Russia‟s natural resources as a source of power, and the stated need to integrate the 
Federation into the world economy.  Often referred to as the economisation of Russia‟s 
security and foreign policies, and, according to Balzer (2005), presaged by Putin‟s 
doctoral thesis, this seems to have become virtually unassailable as the Kremlin‟s 
worldview (Lo, 2003)103.  
Even if the actual rhetoric has recently been somewhat „modernised‟ to fit Moscow‟s 
claim to contemporary, „normal‟ great power status, the underlying message remains 
the same, particularly where the CIS is concerned.  The 2000 National Security 
Concept (Russian Federation, 2005c; s.n., 2000) specifies “Russia‟s national interests 
consist in ensuring the sovereignty and enhancement of Russia‟s position as a great 
                                               
103
 One crucial text setting the tone for this resurgence of great power politics as part of Russia‟s national 
ideology and strategic thought was Putin‟s „Millennium Manifesto‟, in which he attempted to define the 
elusive „Russian idea‟: in effect, the state ideology of the Russian Federation (see particularly Putin, 2005, 
pp. 227-228).  Thorun (2009) has argued that, under Putin‟s presidency, Russian geostrategic thinking 
underwent a shift from what he calls „pragmatic geoeconomic realism‟ during the early years, to „cultural 
geostrategic realism‟ in the later period, the latter stressing the notion of the CIS as a distinct cultural „pole‟ 
dominated by an independent great power. 
 202 
power.” (p. 131) NATO expansion and a “decline of integration processes” within the 
CIS are identified as “main threats in the international sphere” (p. 134).  The Foreign 
Policy concept of that same year (Russian Federation, 2005b) also puts emphasis on 
Russia‟s role in establishing a multipolar world (with Russia as one of the poles).  
Furthermore, “to form a belt of good-neighbourliness along the perimeter of Russia‟s 
borders” is one of the policy‟s priorities (p. 90).  “Practical relations with each of them 
should be developed with due consideration of their respective openness to 
cooperation and readiness to acknowledge, in due manner, the interests of the Russian 
Federation, and in particular to guarantee the rights of Russian compatriots.”(pp. 97-
98).  These themes are broadly repeated in the 2009 National Security and 2008 
Foreign Policy Concepts, the latter of which, according to Mankoff (2009, p. 13), has 
retained 80% of its predecessor‟s content “verbatim” (Russian Federation, 2008, 2009).  
They are also echoed in the five principles of Russian foreign policy104 enunciated by 
President Medvedev in 2008. 
Against this backdrop, three of the four motives enumerated in chapter 4 drive Russia‟s 
involvement in the Southern Caucasus: its inherent characteristics (material interest), 
its role as a part of Russia‟s great power identity (shared identity), and, on the margins, 
„universalised values‟ (or, at least, Russian interpretations thereof).  The Southern 
Caucasus is valuable to Russia by virtue of its geostrategic location, as a buffer to its 
vulnerable south, but also as an important lever in maintaining a „zone of privileged 
interests‟ (Trenin, 2002, 2009) within the CIS – particularly Central Asia – through the 
control of energy reserves and transportation routes.  It is significant in upholding a 
self-view as a great power because of the dense historical and cultural links that tie the 
Russian federation to it, and because of the damage any challenge to Russian 
dominance would be seen as doing to Russia‟s great power status.   Finally – 
rhetorically at least – Russia‟s presence in the Southern Caucasus is portrayed as the 
continuation of a centuries-old „mission civilisatrice‟, as part of the great-power 
responsibility to uphold universal values in an exclusive zone of influence where 
stability and legality are seen as dependent on its own good-will.  This translates into a 
range of political, military and economic imperatives that have marked Russian policy 
towards the region since the mid-1990s, clearly visible in the material aspects of its 
regional involvement: maintaining a military presence, and a political predominance 
within the region. 
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 Respect for international law, insistence on multipolarity, avoidance of isolation, protection of Russian 
citizens and regions of „special interest‟ (Reynolds, 2008; Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin, 2008b).   
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The Southern Caucasus as a whole is strategically important to Russia by virtue of the 
most important inherent material characteristic that drives the former imperial power‟s 
political involvement: its location in the immediate proximity to its territory.  First, the 
Southern Caucasus is seen in Moscow as inextricably tied to the survival of the 
Federation itself, both as a coherent state and as a great power, through its extensive 
political and cultural links to the fractious republics to the north of the mountain range.   
The border between north and south is blurred at best, and highly permeable, and the 
sight of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan free from Russian domination may set an 
attractive precedent for the northern autonomous republics that periodically gravitate 
towards secessionism (Baev, pp. 246-252; Markedonov, 2007; Nalbandov, 2009, pp. 
30-31)105.   A degree of political influence over southern Caucasia is thus seen as 
important to the Russian federation for its physical survival, allowing it to manage 
security in the ever-restless North Caucasus. 
Furthermore, in terms of military geography, the geopolitically sensitive Russian elite 
views losing the South Caucasus to NATO as the loss of a vital territorial buffer.  In 
terms of military geography, the South Caucasus – and Georgia in particular – is 
important in its position on the Black Sea littoral, as pointed out as early as in 1993 by 
Russia‟s then defence minister, Pavel Grachev (BBC Monitoring, 1993); while Russia‟s 
presumed „search for warm waters‟ has at times lapsed into cliché (Caldwell, 2007, p. 
281; Rieber, 2007), in combination with Ukrainian independence and the Orange 
revolution, Russia‟s hold on the Black sea littoral has become precarious indeed.  
Rather than being simply a matter of losing Sevastopol without the possible backup of 
Ochamchira (now largely addressed through the recent extension of Russian basing 
rights in the Crimea), Russian analysts have expressed fears of being encircled by 
NATO within the CIS proper (Herd, 2005; Makarychev, 2009, pp. 42-49).  This, in 
addition to the political logic discussed above, drives Russia‟s insistence on a military 
presence and political preponderance within the region (Alexandrova-Arbatova, 2008; 
Black, 2000, pp. 221-242; Williams & Neumann, 2000, pp. 374-387). 
However, the „refined‟, economised version of Derzhavnost seen in Russia today goes 
beyond the overt military and political spheres: it defines economic levers – and control 
over energy resources and transportation routes in particular – as crucial instruments 
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 The involvement of the Federation of Mountain Peoples in the war in Abkhazia, the presence of North 
and South Ossetia, the activity of Chechen rebels in Georgia‟s Pankisi gorge and the interaction between 
jihadists on both sides of the Russian-Azeri border attest to its permeability.  Russia‟s reluctance in 
recognizing Abkhazia‟s and South Ossetia‟s independence likewise originated in concerns for the Northern 
Caucasus; no doubt outweighed by the knowledge that both entities would remain utterly dependent on 
Moscow‟s goodwill. Russia‟s concern at Georgia‟s plans to use a Russian-language channel (First 
Caucasus) to broadcast across „its‟ Caucasian republics apparently led to the suspension of broadcasts by 
Eutelsat in 2010, reportedly under pressure from Gazprom (RFE-RL, 2010). 
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of policy, both domestically and abroad.   The „Energy Strategy of Russia Until 2020‟, 
adopted by the government in 2003, thus specifically states: “Russia controls 
considerable reserves of energy resources, as well as a powerful fuel and energy 
industry, which forms a base for its economic development and an instrument for its 
domestic and foreign policies. The role of the country in global energy markets largely 
determines its geopolitical influence” (Russian Federation, 2003, p. 4).  Russian 
policymakers are acutely aware that the region‟s position between Europe and Central 
Asia gives Russia the opportunity to control energy routes out of its „near abroad‟, 
towards the West.  And considering Russia‟s reliance on energy and raw materials for 
its future economic development and strategic reach, this latter factor should not be 
underestimated (Baev, 2001, pp. 1-9). Control over Caspian energy resources is 
central to Russia‟s motivations in the Caucasus, and recent Russian policy has clearly 
been aware of the strategic value of exclusive control over energy routes in bolstering 
Russian power and influence in both its „near‟ and „far‟ abroad (Myers Jaffe & Manning, 
2001; Perovic, 2005; Yazdani, 2006).  Simply put, for much of the post-independence 
period, Russia has been concerned at the possible loss of Central Asia and the 
Southern Caucasus to the West through their decreased dependency on its goodwill 
for their hydrocarbon exports, quite apart from resenting the resulting reduction of 
leverage at the systemic level106.   
All above-mentioned factors are mainly based on an instrumental logic of material 
interest, aimed at maintaining the position of a great power so central to Russian 
national identity (see chapter 4).  But the value of the Southern Caucasus to Moscow 
could be described as something marginally more than a geographic buffer, transit 
space or springboard by virtue of coldly calculated interest.  In fact, the significance of 
this region to the derzhava could be argued to go beyond the purely instrumental, with 
this region becoming essential to the great power identity of the Russian Federation, in 
effect forming part of the values and identities to be safeguarded, of the referent object 
of security itself.   The Southern Caucasus might be seen as not only being important 
to Russia‟s survival because of an „objective‟, material characteristic inherent to the 
region – hydrocarbon reserves, proximity, strategic location – but also because of its 
symbolic value to Russia‟s self-view of great power status and territoriality.  The 
derzhava must have a territorially definite sphere of influence, a civilisational area 
underlying a shared identity (Mankoff, 2009, p. 12), of which Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
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 Russia‟s active promotion of pipeline routes that cross its territory – like South Stream, North Stream, 
and Blue Stream – in opposition to ones that avoid it – like the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian pipelines in 
particular – fit into this strategy of maintaining a gas monopsony in Central Asia and a gas monopoly in 
Europe (Ericson, 2009; Mangott & Westphal, 2008).  For a selection of essays by Russian policymakers 
and commentators on policies in the Caucasus, see also Niedermaier (2008, pp. 423-562). 
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Georgia have become an inextricable part over two almost uninterrupted centuries of 
domination.  Without these territories of the „near abroad‟, Russia‟s claim to great 
power influence is deficient, at least in the highly territorialised and geopolitical 
approach that permeates Russian foreign policymaking (Mark, 1996, pp. 144-146; 
Suny, 2007)107. 
In addition, Russian analysts, commentators and policymakers often combine this 
particularist form of self-identification with reference to universalised values, at least 
rhetorically.  The universalist civilising mission (Tishkov, 2005) of imperial Russia‟s 
Christian Orthodoxy or the Soviet Union‟s Communist Internationalism seems to have 
transformed itself into one of „peacekeeping‟ and upholding universal norms within 
Russia‟s civilisational area and sphere of special responsibility.  Official discourse 
stresses Russia‟s role in maintaining stability and tackling conflict throughout the CIS: 
Russian „peacekeeping‟ after the first Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts is a case in point.  
Military intervention during the 2008 war with Georgia was also extensively justified 
through references to various international norms, including international humanitarian 
law.  The recognitions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were likewise defended through 
extensive references to certain interpretations of international legal norms, with Russia 
cast in the role of their protector.  This a stance that certainly contradicts Moscow‟s 
general insistence on pluralist norms, non-interference and sovereignty on the systemic 
level, and therefore could be argued to be almost entirely instrumental (Allison, 2009), 
but it nevertheless forms integral part of Russia‟s security discourse.  
To recap, Russia‟s involvement in the Southern Caucasus is driven by three of the four 
major motivating factors behind great power penetration enumerated in chapter 4: 
material interest, shared identity, and, to a lesser extent, universalised values.  The 
region is valuable to Moscow by virtue of its geostrategic location; it is significant in 
maintaining its great power identity because of the dense historical and cultural links 
that tie the Russian federation to it, and because of the damage any challenge to 
Russian dominance would be seen as doing to Russia‟s great power status.   Finally, 
Russia‟s presence in the Southern Caucasus is often presented as the continuation of 
a historical civilising mission in contemporary guise.  The links between the Russian 
Federation and its southern neighbours run deep; but since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
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 The 2008 Georgia war could therefore also be seen as an assertion of Russia‟s great power status, 
even in light of its dubious strategic success.  The relative ease with which Russia distributes Russian 
citizenship to the residents of Georgia‟s breakaway regions, and, in fact, the recognised Southern 
Caucasian republics could be argued to indicate an element of mutual identification (Littlefield, 2009), 
although there clearly was an element of instrumental expediency as well.  Consider, moreover, references 
to the “historical and spiritual heritage” of a “common civilization area” by foreign minister Lavrov (States 
News Service, 2008). 
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Russian power in its perceived back yard has been challenged from the West, the 
subject of the following section. 
The Caucasus and the West: Oil, Gas, Pipelines….and a Bit of Democracy. 
The West‟s material involvement in the Southern Caucasus was extensively 
documented in the macro-perspective chapter.  On the part of the United States, it 
encompassed its active involvement in the region‟s pipeline politics, the provision of 
development aid to all the recognised states of the region (and, indeed, Nagorno-
Karabakh), and – at least during the G.W. Bush presidency and following the Rose 
Revolution – growing military links with Georgia, a key ally and, for Washington at 
least, a potential NATO member.  In the European Union‟s case, the Southern 
Caucasus now forms part of its European Neighbourhood Policy, after previously 
having received financial assistance through programmes like TACIS; the EU is 
moreover active in the promotion of alternative transportation corridors within the 
regions through TRACECA and a number of existing and planned fossil-fuel pipelines.  
These objective involvements are driven by the largely material subjective motivations 
of both Western entities in the RSC. 
The United States 
Washington‟s engagement with the Caucasus has been predicated on the region‟s 
value in terms of cold calculations of material interest and systemic strategies, 
combined with some universalist elements (democracy-promotion) within the discourse 
justifying engagement.  In contrast to Russia, the United States does not have 
extensive historical ties to the region that could be said to tie it to its own self-
perceptions of identity.  Save for the near-assumption of a mandate over Armenia 
immediately following World War One, the „world‟s only superpower‟ has been a 
newcomer to the South Caucasus. Subsequent post-Cold War National Security 
Strategies have clearly indicated the importance of energy security, and both 
policymakers and analysts have plainly identified the Caspian basin, including 
Azerbaijan, as a strategically significant source of hydrocarbons in the 21st century108.  
Another material factor driving US involvement is the region‟s strategic geopolitical 
location, in close proximity to Iran and on crucial supply routes to Afghanistan. A further 
– systemically driven – motivation has been the United States‟ general concern with the 
emergence of a reconstructed Soviet empire, addressed through the strengthening of 
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 Both the 1998 and 2002 National Security Strategies (NSS) explicitly identify the Caspian basin‟s 
hydrocarbon reserves as a means of enhancing the United States‟ energy security (USA, 1998, p. 32; 
2002, p. 20), while the 2006 NSS welcomes the Rose Revolution as bringing “new hope for freedom 
across the Eurasian landmass” (USA, 2006, p. 2). 
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the sovereignty and statehood of states throughout the CIS, usually combined with a 
universalist effort towards their democratic transformation and liberalisation. 
A material interest in the Caspian‟s hydrocarbon reserves has driven much of United 
States policy towards both Azerbaijan and Georgia during the past two decades, with 
both countries, but Georgia in particular, gradually moving up in prominence on the list 
of American foreign policy priorities. As early as during the administration of George 
Bush Sr., policymakers and strategists were aware of the historical and potential 
significance of the Caspian as a source for carbon fuels109; as, in subsequent years, 
offshore oil prospecting confirmed Soviet-era projections of large oilfields off the coast 
of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, securing American participation in their exploration 
became an important priority.   Georgia‟s value as an increasingly realistic alternative 
to Russian export routes out of the Caspian basin was acknowledged throughout the 
1990s110, but with the construction of the BTC pipeline, the country‟s status as an 
indispensible export route of Azeri and Central Asian hydrocarbon reserves became 
sealed, leading in turn to its upgrading to what Sergei Lavrov has somewhat 
denigratingly called a „pet project‟ of the Bush administration (De Borchgrave, 2008).  
Also, in terms of its inherent material value, apart from its status as a transit corridor 
and repository for oil and gas, the Southern Caucasus has also been seen in terms of 
its location on supply routes to the theatre of operations in Afghanistan (Banusiewicz, 
2010), and its proximity to aspiring nuclear power Iran, although Azerbaijan has 
repeatedly excluded the possibility of any participation in military action against the 
Islamic Republic (AFP, 2006, 2007). 
The United States‟ involvement has also emerged from a system-level concern to 
counter-act the potential re-emergence of a reinvented Soviet empire – especially in 
the 1990s – often combined with a universalist drive towards democratisation and 
liberalisation.  Statements by policymakers during Congressional hearings confirm that 
subsequent US administrations defined the region not only in terms of its role in 
providing a transit corridor for Caspian energy resources, but also as a crucial barrier 
against the reconstruction of a resurrected Soviet Union, through the formation of 
strong, sovereign and democratic states firmly integrated into the global economic 
system (see various congressional hearings from 2000 to 2008, in particular Federal 
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 As Secretary of State under G.H.W. Bush, James Baker visited Kazakhstan even before the formal 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, in September 1991, leading to allegations (and strenuous denials of) 
conflicts of interest for both himself and the then-ambassador to Moscow, Robert Strauss; both Texans 
had previously been deeply involved in the oil industry (Heilbronner, 1991).  
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 As apparent in statements of various senior administration officials before Congressional committees 
and sub-committees during the period (Federal News Service, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 
1998b). 
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News Service, 2008).  The later push towards Georgian NATO membership was also 
rhetorically justified in terms of democratisation and Georgia‟s sovereign prerogative, 
among others during a high-profile state visit by G.W. Bush (see BBC, 2005).  Although 
direct confrontation with Russia was always downplayed, clearly, there was an element 
of geopolitical thinking at the centre of this democracy-promoting attitude: as a member 
of NATO, a democratised, stable (and, although that was of secondary importance, 
reunified) Georgia would provide the much sought-after corridor between the West and 
the hydrocarbon riches of the Caspian basin, apart from countering the possibility of 
Russian neo-imperial temptations111.  
The mainly material, and partially systemic and universalist nature of United States 
interest in Georgia and Azerbaijan seems clear-cut; there is, however, an added 
complexity to Washington‟s perceptions of interest in the Caucasus affecting links with 
the region‟s most openly pro-Russian state, Armenia.  Despite the country‟s excellent 
relations with Moscow (and Tehran), the presence of a powerful Armenian diaspora 
lobby in Congress has led all US administrations to maintain good relations with 
Yerevan.  Armenian-American relations have invariably been described as „friendly‟ in 
spite of Yerevan‟s clear strategic orientation towards Moscow.  As one US diplomat 
stationed in Yerevan explained, Washington understands Armenia‟s historically 
conditioned perceptions of insecurity, and its inability to break its relations with both 
Russia and Iran112.  Action by diaspora groups in Congress – which contains a large 
and influential Armenian caucus – ensured Armenia remained the largest per-capita 
recipient of foreign aid in the world, after Israel, for much of the 1990s113.  Domestic 
considerations are a factor in US policy to the region; quite plausibly, Armenia would 
not be receiving the kind of attention it is receiving today on Capitol Hill, and, to a 
lesser extent, in Foggy Bottom and on Pennsylvania Avenue, in the absence of the 
Armenian-American community. 
The European Union 
This region is important to Brussels in two ways: similar to the United States, it sees 
the Southern Caucasus in terms of strategic material interests, as a source of and 
                                               
111
 A 1997 Foreign Affairs article by Zbigniew Brzezinski arguing for NATO expansion into the FSU and 
support for states like the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan in the face of an unreformed Russia‟s 
imperial temptations fits well into the subsequent US policies in the region.  It produced an outcry in Russia 
(Black, 2000, p. 234; Brzezinski, 1997). 
112
 Interview with a US diplomat in Yerevan, August 2008.   
113
 Although not quite as powerful as their pro-Israel counterpart, AIPAC, or, in fact, the large and 
influential oil lobby, the ANCA and Armenian Assembly have for many years been able to limit aid to 
Azerbaijan (against the express wishes of successive administrations), and have, annually, substantially 
increased the proposed allocations in the foreign aid budgets for both Armenia and Mountainous 
Karabakh.  This influence is largely based on ethnic Armenian populations in electorally significant states, 
like California, New Jersey and Michigan (King & Pomper, 2004; Newhouse, 2009, pp. 88-90; Paul, 2000). 
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transit corridor for Caspian hydrocarbons (European Union, 2008b, p. 5).  Secondly, 
quite separately from this fact, while expansion into Turkey and the Former Soviet 
Union remains a contentious issue, there has nevertheless been a realisation in 
Brussels that the European Union may expand towards the immediate proximity of the 
Southern Caucasus, creating a steadily increasing interest in promoting its stability 
through the diffusion of „European‟ values.  Energy and stability (through good 
governance and conflict-resolution) are thus the themes governing EU motivations in 
the region114.  The 2007 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instruments 
accordingly list a wide range of explicit objectives, centred on promoting good 
governance, democratisation, regional cooperation and conflict-resolution in all three 
states, in addition to energy collaboration in the specific case of Azerbaijan (European 
Commission, 2007b, pp. 16-23; 2007c, pp. 19-27; 2007d, pp. 19-27).   
While the BTC pipeline itself was mostly promoted by the United States, Europe has 
committed itself to some degree to other transportation and communications networks 
that are aimed primarily at diminishing its energy dependence (Baran, 2007) on Russia.  
Thus, both TRACECA and INOGATE have been defined in Brussels as projects of high 
strategic importance, with the former building overland transportation/communications 
links to Central Asia (the official website talks of the „restoration of the historical Silk 
Road‟ (TRACECA, 2010)), the latter aimed at integrating energy production and 
transportation networks in the Caspian and Black Sea basins and Europe (INOGATE, 
2010).  Gas pipelines connecting the Caspian hydrocarbon reserves to Europe over 
Turkey have been identified as „priority projects‟ in legislation passed by the European 
Parliament and Council in 2006 directed at, among others, ensuring energy security 
(European Union, 2006a).  While not explicitly mentioned in official documents, the 
clear implicit objective is to diversify sources away from Russia over Turkey and 
Georgia, among others through the Nabucco pipeline, running from the Caspian to 
Austria, tapping, among others, into the vast Shah Deniz field and Turkmenistan‟s 
natural gas reserves115. 
Meanwhile, the variety of post-Cold War programmes that tried to implement Europe‟s 
declared commitment to bringing standards of governance in the Southern Caucasus 
to European levels gained in coherence with the inclusion of the three recognised 
regional states in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  As often revealed in the 
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 As noted by the European Union‟s 2003 Security Strategy (European Commission, 2004, pp. 10-11).  
And another ENP policy paper (European Commission, 2007a, p. 7). 
115
 The 2009 report of the co-ordinator of „Project of European Interest NG3‟ –Nabucco – contains thinly 
veiled references to Russia and Gazprom (Van Aartsen, 2009, pp. 4-5), and most official pronouncements 
tend to follow this discreet pattern. 
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various documents governing relations with these states, the European efforts are seen 
in tandem with criteria and conditionalities set forward by the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE, and fit into an ENP that sees its principal priorities – conflict-resolution, 
democratization, good governance, legislative harmonisation, regional integration and 
economic development – first and foremost in terms of its beneficial effects in creating 
a zone of stability around the Union (European Commission, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; 
European Union, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d).  Some have noted the rather limited practical 
impact of these various, mostly technical programmes (MacFarlane, 2004; Nuriyev, 
2007).  Europe nevertheless maintains significant „soft power‟ over the region‟s elites 
and counter-elites, who seldom fail to rhetorically underline their commitment to 
„European values‟, which the projects centred on TACIS and its successor, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), aim to instil (see below). 
Europe‟s motivations resemble the United States‟ – material interests centred on 
energy security, and universal liberal-democratic (“European”) values, with the added 
dimension of geographic proximity116 – but in the absence of hard, military power, much 
of its leverage remains limited to the pressures of the conditionalities related to the 
ENP and its considerable soft power.  There is an additional Mars/Venus moment in its 
co-ordination with American policies, in that there is far less consensus within the 
Union on the extent to which Russia‟s regional interests should be challenged directly, 
among others through NATO expansion, disagreements that came to the fore in the 
run-up to the August 2008 war in the discussions surrounding the initiation of a 
Membership Action Plan with Georgia during the Bucharest summit earlier that year 
(Gardiner, 2008; Wild, 2008).  But apart from these disagreements in means, the 
overall strategic aims of the EU and the US coincide to a great extent, making 
references to „the West‟ as a common denominator for these two powers quite 
appropriate.  And, partly as a consequence, despite the largely economic and „soft 
power‟ aspects of Europe‟s regional involvement, its various programmes throughout 
the CIS have elicited distrust among ruling circles in Moscow, who, true to form, tend to 
view these entanglements in geo-political and geo-economic terms (Costea, 2010; 
Lobjakas, 2009; Sopinska, 2009).   
                                               
116
 Shared identity seems to play little part in Europe‟s attitudes towards the Southern Caucasus.  The EU 
remains at best ambivalent regarding the theoretical possibility of expansion in the distant future, and one-
sided references to possible EU accession are more frequent in the Southern Caucasian states 
themselves, especially Georgia, which explicitly puts EU membership alongside its NATO aspirations (see 
below).  The expansion of the ENP to the region does not point towards such a possibility, considering the 
inclusion therein of incontrovertibly non-European states like Morocco and Tunisia; in fact, the ENP has 
been described as aiming to create a stable „semi-periphery‟ between Europe proper and the outside world 
rather than prepare states for future membership (Marchetti, 2006; Palmer, 2006). 
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Turkey, Iran and the Weight of History 
Turkey 
Turkey and Iran were the two final external actors in the Southern Caucasus mentioned 
in the macro-perspective chapter; the former‟s strategic location as the natural transit 
point for Central Asian carbon reserves remains one of the main drivers of its policies 
towards the Southern Caucasus, while Iran‟s material involvement has been limited to 
interregional trade, and some energy cooperation with Armenia.   Turning its territory 
into a major transit and transportation hub at the crossroads of a north-south and east-
west axis has figured among Ankara‟s most important regional material interests since 
at least the mid-1990s (Aydin, 2003, pp. 150-155; Robbins, 2003, pp. 302-310; 
Winrow, 2004).  This has produced two distinct (and apparently contradictory) vectors 
in Turkey‟s policies: on the one hand, co-ordination with the West in securing the 
Caucasus as an alternative transit route for Caspian hydrocarbons, within the wider 
context of Turkey‟s EU candidacy and NATO membership; on the other hand, 
increased trade and co-operation with Russia, among others in developing north-south 
pipelines ensuring its own energy needs.  While the emphasis was mostly on the 
former during much of the 1990s, the coming to power of the AK-party in 2003 has 
meant a major shift towards rapprochement with Russia in the Southern Caucasus, 
particularly after the transition towards a „neo-Ottomanist‟ foreign policy under the 
influence of the current foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu.   
This recent Neo-Ottomanist turn – with its active re-engagement with formerly Ottoman 
dominions in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus – is very much seen as a 
departure from the non-interventionism of „orthodox‟ Kemalist foreign policy 
(encapsulated in the maxim „Peace at home, peace in the world‟).  First advocated in 
post-Cold War Turkey by the late prime minister, Turgut Özal, its objective is not so 
much dominance as the creation of a zone of stability (or of „zero problems‟) in 
Turkey‟s immediate neighbourhood through the addition of „strategic depth‟, required 
for the maintenance of regional power status and possible because of Turkey‟s 
historical and cultural legacy and geopolitical position between the West and the 
Muslim world.   This redefinition of Turkey‟s strategic identity has brought about a 
pragmatic improvement in Russian-Turkish relations, which were marked by a mixture 
of competition and cooperation since the end of the Cold War; their cooperative 
aspects have definitely become dominant in recent years117 (Murinson, 2006; Torbakov 
& Ojanen, 2009).   
                                               
117
 Turko-Russian ties in the Southern Caucasus have come a long way since May 1992, when Ankara 
threatened Armenia with military action in response to Armenian advances into the Azeri exclave of 
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Shifting threat perceptions between Russia and Turkey have been „permissive factors‟ 
in the development of close relations, with Moscow no longer concerned about Ankara 
as a threat to its interests in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the 
dissipation of the great ambitions of the early 1990s, and Turkey no longer fearing 
Russian ambitions outside the former Soviet space with the disappearance of the 
USSR.  Russia now is Turkey‟s largest individual trading partner (Gül, 2009), both 
states have been irritated by unilateralist American policies in their respective 
neighbourhoods (Iraq, the „Near Abroad‟), and both increasingly define themselves as 
being „between‟ West and East, especially with the coming to power of the AKP and 
Turkish disillusionment with the EU accession process (Hill, 2003; Hill & Taspinar, 
2006; Torbakov, 2007; Winrow, 2009).  These factors have gradually superseded the 
many differences that existed between the countries in the 1990s, including Chechnya, 
the status of the PKK, and the Bosporus straits (Sezer, 2000, pp. 63-68).  Within the 
Southern Caucasus, they have led to a shared interest in the maintenance of stablity, 
resulting in Turkey‟s famed (but now moribund) „Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform‟ initiative, first mooted by Demirel in 2000, then by Prime Minister Erdogan in 
the immediate aftermath of the 2008 war (Fotiou, 2009; Gultekin Punsmann, 2009). 
Turkish foreign and security policies towards the FSU have been largely based on 
hard-nosed material interest; but the Neo-Ottomanist turn mentioned above already 
points to the importance of shared identity as an additional, broader driver of policy.   
Specifically relative to the Southern Caucasus, however, there are three additional, 
tightly interconnected ways in which this region plays a role as part of Turkish identity, 
generating securitisations that are argumentative rather than purely instrumental, i.e. 
securitisations that drive the objectives of policy rather than their means.  First, a large 
part of Turkey‟s population originates from the South and North Caucasus, and their 
diasporas – notably of Abkhazians and Azeris – contribute to shaping Turkish 
discourse and policy towards the region118.  Second, close ethno-linguistic affinities 
have combined with Turkey‟s national identity, „Pan-Turkism‟ and a shared historical 
enmity towards Armenia to create a close, culturally driven political bond between 
                                                                                                                                         
Nakhichevan (whose international legal status is subject to a Turkish guarantee), provoking dire Russian 
warnings of a possible escalation towards “World War Three” (International Crisis Group, 2009, pp. 18-19; 
Sezer, 2000, p. 65). 
118
 The presence of a large and vocal Abkhaz diaspora creates close ties between Turkey and the largely 
unrecognised republic and regularly disturbs the otherwise good relations between Tbilisi and Ankara, 
despite a long-standing Turkish preference for the principle of territorial integrity.  While it is difficult to 
estimate exact numbers, the number of Turks of Northern Caucasian extraction (including the Abkhaz and 
the ethno-linguistically related Circassians) is estimated at 2-3 million (Çelikpala, 2006, pp. 431-436&441; 
Kaya, 2004, p. 224).  And quite apart from ethnic sympathies between two Turkic nations, the “organised 
and self-conscious” Azeri community in Turkey does play a role in maintaining the close relationship 
between Baku and Ankara (Robins, 1993, p. 597).  The political role of the predominantly Muslim Laz, who 
live on both sides of the Georgian-Turkish border and speak a language related to Mingrelian, has been 
rather limited in comparison (Naegele, 1998). 
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Ankara and Baku, encapsulated in the dictum „One Nation, Two States‟ (see chapter 7 
and below).  Third, Turkey‟s troubled relationship with Armenia is directly connected to 
the deep-seated insecurities that have plagued Turkish society since the establishment 
of the Republic known as the „Sèvres syndrome‟, a pervasive, irrational fear within 
Turkish society of dismemberment by other great powers and regional rivals (Göçek, 
2008; Guida, 2008).  Combined, these factors have both shaped and restricted the 
policies of subsequent governments in Ankara, especially concerning relations with 
Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
The overrunning of territories surrounding the enclave by Armenian forces in 1993 led 
to the closing of the border between Turkey and Armenia.  Subsequent Turkish 
governments have consistently put forwards three distinct conditions for a re-opening: 
first, the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan, second, the recognition by 
Armenia of the current interstate borders through a re-affirmation of the treaties of Kars 
and Moscow and, third, an end to the world-wide Armenian campaign for recognition of 
the Armenian Genocide. Attempts to normalize relations usually elicit a broad 
nationalist backlash, and fierce resistance on the part of Azerbaijan, which has grown 
adept at influencing Turkish public opinion in the matter (International Crisis Group, 
2009).  On the other hand, as Cornell (1998b, pp. 63-67) points out, a variety of factors 
(including its EU aspirations and both Western and Russian reactions) mitigated 
Turkey‟s ability and willingness to lend Azerbaijan unconditional support during the „hot‟ 
phase of the Karabakh conflict. 
Iran 
In the Southern Caucasus, as in the rest of the FSU, Iranian political influence has 
remained insignificant in comparison to other external actors – hence the shortness of 
this section – despite initial expectations of a post-Cold War Turkish-Iranian regional 
rivalry.  The Caucasus does feature in Tehran‟s matrix of security perceptions and 
interests, mainly through the existence of an independent Azerbaijan, which is very 
much seen as a threat to Iran‟s territorial integrity through its possible influence on the 
Islamic Republic‟s large ethnic Azeri minority, concentrated in the Northwestern parts 
of the country (Cornell, 1998a, pp. 55-59; Shaffer; Tarock, 1997b, pp. 188-190) 119.  
                                               
119
 In the early years of independence, fears of separatism were intensified by Elchibey‟s open ideological 
commitment to a unified Azerbaijan (Cornell, 2010, p. 70), subsiding somewhat with a mellowing of such 
rhetoric under the more pragmatic Aliyevs.  The Iranian authorities thus made a point of quickly resettling 
refugees from the Karabakh conflict on the Azeri side of the border (lest they encourage irredentism on the 
Iranian side) (Cornell, 1998a, p. 56), and it took many years for Tehran to agree to the opening of an Azeri 
consulate in the Azeri-populated city of Tabriz, in 2005, after much prodding from Baku.  Although relations 
have improved significantly in recent years, Iranian sensitivities are still regularly piqued by often open 
calls for unification in the independent and opposition press, and Tehran continues to view interactions 
across the border with a weary eye, especially in light of Azerbaijan‟s military and intelligence cooperation 
with Israel (Bourtman, 2006).  Iran also actively trades with Azerbaijan, and has some very limited religious 
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Iran thus tilted towards Christian Armenia during the Karabakh war, and remains a 
major alternative supplier of energy – and, more generally, a trading partner and 
transportation corridor – for the blockaded country.   
Tehran also interacts with the region on matters related to the Caspian, and shares 
with Moscow a common distrust of Western penetration in the region. Russia and Iran 
have moreover co-operated on a host of issues, ranging from the status of the 
Caspian, over bilateral trade, to arms exports and the development of Iran‟s nuclear 
programme, specifically in the construction of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr 
(Freedman, 2000; Tarock, 1997a; Vakil, 2006, pp. 56-59).  While some have referred to 
the early emergence of a „Russian-Armenian-Iranian axis‟, its own limited resources 
and the sensitivity of the larger powers to Iranian influence have largely kept it out of 
direct and effective regional involvement. 
Turkey and Iran penetrate the South Caucasus by virtue of their historical and ethnic 
links to the region, and their geographic proximity.  Ankara‟s views of the region are 
conditioned by its material interest in positioning itself as an energy gateway at an 
important crossroads of the Eurasian landmass, and its close identification with the 
ethnically similar Azeris, amplified by the recent activist foreign policy in its geopolitical 
neighbourhood; these links are, conversely, weighed down by a problematic 
relationship with Armenia, and a cautious deference for Russian strategic interests.  
Iran‟s concerns are more limited, and focused mostly on the societal threat posed by 
Azerbaijan to its territorial integrity.  But great power penetration is not simply a one-
way street: the states within an RSC react to the involvements detailed in the previous 
sections.  Accordingly, the next section will look at how these great power involvements 
affect the security discourses of the regional actors themselves. 
The Fears and Hopes of Small States 
As indicated in chapter 4, the „discursive dependence‟ of these units on the penetrating 
great powers is one final element in the picture of great power penetration.  How do the 
three main units of the Southern Caucasus perceive the presence of the great powers 
in the region? Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia each have displayed quite distinctive 
approaches to Russia, the United States, EU, Turkey and Iran.  Since their 
independence, Yerevan has been seen as consistently pro-Russian, defining the 
former imperial power as an indispensible protector, a strategic partner in all issue-
areas, from military to economic.   After the short rule of the pro-Western – and some  
                                                                                                                                         
influence various Shi‟ite Islamic foundations that very much form the subject of suspicion on the part of 
Baku.  Relations with Georgia remain minimal (Sadegh-Zadeh, 2008).   
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say pan-Turkic – Abufaz Elchibey (Hyman, 1997, p. 351; Ismailzade, 2004, p. 2), 
Azerbaijan has generally kept its options open by pursuing a balanced policy, 
developing relations with the West, especially in the field of energy and transportation, 
while maintaining quite close economic and, increasingly, military and political ties with 
Moscow.  And save for an interlude during the early Shevardnadze years, when the 
former Soviet foreign minister tried to establish a modus vivendi with Moscow, 
Georgia‟s orientation has been clearly pro-Western, culminating in the unabashed 
NATO aspirations of Mikheil Saakashvili.  The relative prominence of the great powers, 
the alignments of the different units, and the effects of great power penetration on 
perceptions of distributions of power will be the particular focal points of this final 
discussion. 
Armenia 
Historically, Armenians‟ relations with Russia run deep.  In fact, Russia‟s role as a self-
proclaimed „protector‟ of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire (combined with 
occasional periods of cultural repression, as in the late 19th-early 20th centuries) played 
an important role in the emergence of modern Armenian nationalism (Suny, 1993, pp. 
31-51).  Soviet-era propaganda presented the Soviet takeover of the independent 
Republic of Armenia in 1920 as having saved Armenia from certain annihilation at the 
hands of Turkey‟s Kemalist forces while conveniently forgetting that these forces were 
at that time allied with the Bolsheviks (Hovannisian, 1973; Mason, 2005), a narrative 
that is still widespread today.  And in spite of a short hiatus in the few years that 
preceded Armenia‟s formal independence – when Moscow‟s role in preserving 
Karabakh‟s status within the Azerbaijan SSR came to the fore – this view of Russia as 
an underwriter of Armenia‟s survival still holds: a strategic alliance with Russia is seen 
as an essential cornerstone of Yerevan‟s national security, an indispensible guarantee 
in an otherwise hostile regional environment (Mirzoyan, 2007, pp. 34-90; Papazian, 
2006, p. 239). 
As the Armenian National Security Strategy clearly states, Russia, together with the 
CSTO, is the “main pillar of the Armenian Security System […].  The Russian military 
presence in the Caucasus is an important factor for Armenia‟s security.”  In the 
country‟s Military Doctrine, bilateral military relations with Moscow are described as a 
“strategic partnership”, and provision is made for the creation of „permanently 
combined forces‟120. The discourse and policies of subsequent Armenian presidents, 
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 Relations are undergirded by a raft of agreements stipulating co-operation in issues ranging from air-
defence to the operation of the Medzamor nuclear plant, so strategically crucial to the republic‟s economic, 
and indeed, physical survival (Daly, 2009). Tellingly, Armenia‟s borders with non-FSU states are today still 
guarded by Russian border troops (ARKA News Agency, 2009), and the status of Russia‟s bases in the 
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from Levon Ter-Petrosyan to Serj Sargsyan, has been adamantly pro-Russian.   With 
very few exceptions, Armenia‟s clear strategic orientation has received very little 
criticism from opposition circles, with the current leader Ter-Petrosyan careful to solidify 
his pro-Moscow credentials through criticism of Western hypocrisy regarding Armenia‟s 
democratisation and clearly pro-Russian pronouncements on regional security 
matters121.   
Armenian state and society therefore seem to have no problem with Russia‟s view – 
expounded above – of the Southern Caucasus as its „back yard‟; with an alliance with 
Turkey out of the question, and with Karabakh at the top of Yerevan‟s security agenda, 
Armenia‟s policies are seemingly irremediably skewed towards Moscow because of 
limits imposed by issues of identity, the argumentative aspects of securitisation.  
Yerevan has to toe Moscow‟s line, even if the great ally maintains „strategic‟ relations 
with archrival Azerbaijan and has itself pointedly refrained from openly taking sides in 
the dispute after the end of overt hostilities in 2008122.  Providing another divergence of 
interest between Armenia and the Kremlin, as seen in the previous chapters, Yerevan 
is also reluctant to see Georgia destabilised, but save for some leverage over its 
neighbour‟s Armenian minority, its ability to influence events and counteract Russia is 
limited indeed. 
Yerevan‟s staunch pro-Russian stance has not, however, been seen as antithetical to 
the maintenance of good relations with the West by subsequent Armenian 
governments.  The current National Security Strategy talks of co-operation with NATO, 
and describes the development of relations with the EU as a „priority direction‟ for 
Armenia through the ENP.  Again, all presidents since independence have been careful 
to maintain good relations with both the United States and the EU, a policy that was 
                                                                                                                                         
country – whose presence was initially confirmed for 25 years through a wide-ranging Russo-Armenian 
Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid signed in 1997 (Russian Federation, 1998) – has never 
been in doubt. Very few mainstream voices have moreover expressed concerns over the fact that, under 
Kocharyan, much of Armenia‟s strategic industries – including the telecoms, energy and military sectors – 
have come under Russian control (Socor, 2006).  Serj Sargsyan is equally seen as staunchly pro-Russian, 
closely co-ordinating his moves towards Turkey with Moscow. 
121
 This was clearly visible in the series of interviews conducted by the author in the summer of 2008.  Very 
few of the Armenian interviewees, whether pro- or anti-government, questioned Armenia‟s pro-Russian 
strategic orientation, in marked contrast to Georgia, where Russia is intensely securitised across a broad 
spectrum of the political and intellectual class.  The same could be observed during Armenian opposition 
rallies in July-September 2008, where speakers and ordinary participants were uniformly pro-Russian, 
especially in their reactions to the Russo-Georgian war (see also chapter 7). 
122
 President Medvedev called Azerbaijan a „strategic partner‟ during a visit to the country in 2008, during 
which a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation – including military cooperation – was signed (Assa-Irada, 
2008b).  The line taken by Foreign Minister Lavrov on the Karabakh conflict has been one of diplomatic 
ambiguity, at best.  When asked, the head of Russia‟s diplomatic corps has quite consistently argued that 
territorial integrity and national self-determination are equivalent principles in international law; however, 
after the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the specificity of Georgia‟s breakaway regions as 
opposed to Azerbaijan‟s and Moldova‟s was stressed, together with a thinly veiled warning that this was 
dependent on the continued non-use of military force (Arminfo, 2005; BBC Monitoring, 2010; Russia & CIS 
General Newswire, 2008c). 
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subsumed in 1999 by then foreign minister Vardan Oskanian under the term 
„complementarity‟: Armenia‟s relations with various regional players would develop 
according to issue-specific convergences of interest, in a complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive way (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1999, 2000, 2002; M. A. 
Weinstein, 2004).  Thus, Armenia could have a strategic military relationship with 
Russia, growing economic integration with the European Union and still receive 
considerable development assistance from the United States under the Millennium 
Challenge programme, while relying on Iran for some of its energy and transportation 
needs (Mikaelian, 2009).   Its leadership therefore saw no contradiction between its 
close relations with Russia on the one hand, and its support for U.S.-led operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, or the NATO peacekeeping effort in Kosovo (E. Danielyan, 
2010).  But recent developments – including an extension of Russia‟s base rights till 
2044, and the expansion of the Russian military‟s role in Armenia‟s defence have 
elicited rare expressions of concern in broader society – and put in question the 
sustainability and credibility of Yerevan‟s „complementary‟ foreign policy (Giragosian, 
2010; Krikorian, 2010). 
Georgia 
In stark contrast to Armenia‟s reliance on Moscow as a guarantor of its security, one of 
the most important threads running through Georgia‟s National Security Concept 
(Republic of Georgia, 2005) is the securitisation of Russia as a threat to its survival. In 
the section on threats, the document speaks of “aggressive separatist movements, 
inspired and supported from outside Georgia”, in an only thinly veiled reference to the 
former imperial hegemon.  It identifies the extension of Russian citizenship to the 
residents of breakaway regions as a potential pretext for intervention.  The Russian 
military bases are no longer a direct threat to Georgia‟s sovereignty, it claims in 2005, 
but pose a risk to the country‟s national security until their final withdrawal (completed 
in 2007, at least in „rump‟ Georgia, with new bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia now 
posing a renewed threat).  Not surprisingly, since the Rose Revolution, Georgia‟s 
relationship to the great powers has shifted towards the West in the most dramatic way 
possible. “The Concept underlines the aspiration of the people of Georgia to achieve 
full-fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU), and to contribute to the security of the Black Sea region as a 
constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system.”, it reads in its introduction.  In the 
section on policies, it calls Georgia a “geographic, political and cultural part of Europe”, 
and welcomes both NATO and EU enlargement into the former Soviet space. 
No other state in the Southern Caucasus securitises the Russian Federation and 
aspires to membership within the „Euro-Atlantic community‟ with quite the intensity 
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apparent in these formulations: these two elements form the centre-piece of Tbilisi‟s 
security and foreign policies.  And they enjoy the overwhelming support of both the 
elites and the population at large: if anything, the opposition to Saakashvili has been 
even more pro-Western than himself (despite criticising the president of mismanaging 
relations with Moscow), and opinion polls general find a comfortable majority of 
ordinary Georgians in favour of integration with the West123.  Attitudes towards Russia 
are marked by fundamental and deep-seated perceptions of threat: the dominant 
Georgian narrative on its northern neighbour is one based on a history of imperial 
domination, centred on traumatic events like the forcible incorporation of the 
Democratic Republic of Georgian into the Soviet Union in 1921, the lethal dispersal of 
the April 1989 independence demonstrations and the subsequent Russian support for 
separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are, in any case, seen as artificial Soviet 
creations124.  Russia is often depicted as an essentially imperialistic and authoritarian 
entity, which is unable to countenance the possibility of Georgian unified, independent 
and democratic statehood. 
Moscow‟s perceived role in prolonging the separatist conflicts in Georgia – after, in 
Georgian eyes, having instigated them in the first place – has played a crucial role in 
the re-intensification of this deep-seated mistrust.  Shevardnadze certainly attempted to 
„correct‟ the destructively virulent anti-Russian stance of his short-lived predecessor, 
Gamsakhurdia, but this correction was also based on an oft-expressed hope that this 
would lead Russia into pressing for reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The 
return and strengthening of Georgia‟s westward tilt during the years preceding the 
Rose Revolution was therefore accompanied by claims that Russia was, at best, 
showing disinterest in a solution to these frozen conflicts as Tbilisi seemingly lost hope 
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 Opinion surveys carried out in 2008 show the difference in popular attitudes towards NATO in the three 
recognised states of the Southern Caucasus.  Asked as to their opinion of their country‟s membership in 
the alliance, a full 87% of Georgians polled said they „fully‟ or „somewhat‟ supported that option in 2008 
(72.5% expressed their support during a referendum earlier that year).  By contrast, the corresponding 
figure was only 48% in Azerbaijan, and a mere 27% in Armenia (RIA Novosti, 2008a; s.n., 2009b).  None 
of the analysts, policymakers and opposition leaders interviewed during 2008 opposed Georgia‟s 
membership of NATO, although one – a former foreign minister – criticised Saakashvili for „mismanaging‟ 
relations with Moscow.  Other opposition leaders – including Khaindrava, Zurabishvili and Alasania – have 
repeatedly stated their pro-Western line (Akhmeteli, 2008; Interfax, 2008a; Vignansky, 2007).  The 
government regularly uses accusations of pro-Russian activity as a de-legitimising argument in its 
interactions with the opposition, as in the immediate aftermath of the November 2007 clashes (Saakashvili, 
2007a). 
124
 References to 1921 occur regularly in Saakashvili‟s presidential speeches and statements, especially 
between 2006 and 2008.  The overall impression among both policymakers and analysts interviewed in 
August that year was that Russia was fundamentally opposed to Georgia‟s very existence as an 
independent state, and was in effect operating a modern version of the „Brezhnev doctrine‟ by opposing 
democratisation.   Many interviewees depicted Russia in very unflattering terms, with one newspaper 
editor describing it as a „wild beast‟ running amuck, to be caged as quickly as possible.  Discourses in 
Tbilisi contrasted dramatically with those in pro-Russian Yerevan, where most interviewees (including 
opposition members) did not see a contradiction between democratisation and a pro-Russian strategic 
orientation. 
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on co-operation with Russia as a means of restoring its territorial integrity (see BBC 
Monitoring, 2000), its prime security concern since the early 1990s.  Shevardnadze 
started Georgia‟s westward turn, but, as seen in the previous chapter, with the Rose 
Revolution, state policy and discourse have become much more unambiguous.  
Georgia hoped that a combination of NATO membership, democratisation and 
economic development  – among others, as a transit corridor for Caspian hydrocarbons 
– would cause the breakaway regions to gravitate towards Tbilisi, guaranteeing the 
state‟s independence and territorial integrity125.  In light of Moscow‟s above-mentioned 
regional perceptions and priorities, the deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations – 
from about 1999, when Moscow started accusing Tbilisi of aiding Chechen rebels 
(Geyer, 2000, p. 65) – could not be described as surprising. 
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan, finally, sits somewhere between Armenia and Georgia in its attitudes 
towards the great powers, although it seems to have greatly improved its relations with 
its former imperial master during the past decade, particularly after the August 2008 
events.  The National Security Concept refers to the need to develop mutually 
beneficial relations with other countries, but “overdependence” is very much seen as a 
threat, perhaps in a thinly veiled reference to the Russian Federation.  Relations with 
Turkey, Russia and the United States are all described as „strategic partnerships‟. 
“Integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other 
institutions constitutes the strategic goal of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” it states, but as 
is clear from the text this refers to individual programmes for non-members rather than 
outright membership: EAPC, PfP in the case of NATO, the TACIS, the ENP and 
TRACECA in the case of the EU.  The concept refers to the 2006 memorandum of 
understanding on “Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy” between the European 
Union as undergirding mutually beneficial co-operation in that field, particularly in 
“ensuring the diversification of […] energy sources and transportation routes”. 
This multi-vector approach – walking a tightrope between good relations with Russia 
and expanding ties with the West – has guided Azeri foreign policy since the advent to 
power of the Aliyev clan in 1993 after the ouster of the unabashedly pro-Western and 
anti-Russian Abufaz Elchibey.   Azeri policymakers are clearly very conscious of the 
                                               
125
 Although Shevardnadze was more cautious than Saakashvili in expressing his views on NATO 
membership, seeing it as a longer-term aspiration rather than an immediate goal, he was already pushing 
for the expansion of military links to the United States under the Train and Equip Programme, and 
threatening not to renew the mandate of Russian peacekeeping troops in the breakaway territories, in 
addition to demanding the closure of Russian military bases, over which agreement in principle was 
actually reached as early as in 2000.  By mid-2003 he was already unambiguously referring to NATO 
integration as guaranteeing Georgia‟s independence (BBC Monitoring, 2003b; Interfax, 2003). 
Saakashvili‟s style might have been less nuanced, the logic of his policies could just as well be described 
by these statements. 
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foreign policy options opened by their carbohydrate resources, and an „independent 
foreign policy‟ which refuses to clearly choose sides, and exploits these options to the 
full has been a priority for a long time.   Thus, while the energy industry and BTC 
pipeline certainly increased co-operation with the West, during the past decade, 
relations with Moscow have improved markedly as policymakers in Baku correctly 
perceived the increased insistence of the Kremlin on deference for its „special interests‟ 
in the FSU, even while its self-confidence was amplified by growing oil revenues 
(Midgalovitz, 2003)126.  Russia‟s continuing close relations with Armenia, and its crucial 
military aid to the arch-enemy during the 1991-1994 Karabakh war were rather 
pragmatically „forgotten‟, a fact helped by Moscow‟s continued official recognition of the 
territory as part of Azerbaijan, which was seemingly also able to allay Russian fears of 
an excessive westward lurch (Mite, 2006; Parsons, 2006)127.   
That having been said, Azeri society at large displays far more distrust and criticism of 
Russia than its policymaking elite128.  While „raison d‟état‟ has certainly led Baku to 
fine-tune its relationship with Moscow, this stance is certainly not grounded in the 
prevalent societal discourse, whose anti-Russian tendencies certainly came to the fore 
during the 2008 August War: reminded of the strategic vulnerability of its export routes, 
Baku was exceedingly cautious in its attempts not to antagonize Russia, but most of 
the local press coverage was unabashedly pro-Georgian129.  There is, however, a 
crucial difference with the situation in Georgia, in that Russia is not involved directly in 
the Karabakh conflict, as is the case in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and negotiations 
are held in a multilateral format, through the OSCE Minsk Group, jointly chaired by a 
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 Figures perceived as anti-Russian, like Vafa Quluzade, a prominent former presidential advisor with 
strong pro-Western tendencies, had already been removed from formal positions of influence (BBC 
Monitoring, 1999), and towards the second half of the decade, anticipating the language in the 2007 
National Security Concept, the Azeri head of state increasingly referred to his country‟s relationship with 
both the United States and Russia as „strategic‟ while also using the term for its energy cooperation with 
the EU (I. Aliyev, 2004b, 2005b, 2005e, 2006b, 2006d, 2006f, 2007a, 2007c).  Azerbaijan further 
downgraded its already vague EU and NATO aspirations, both in discourse and in practice, following the 
August 2008 war, which served as a stark reminder to Azerbaijan of the importance of Russia‟s goodwill in 
its ability to export oil (Eurasia Insight, 2009; s.n., 2008b).   
127
 This evolution of Azeri-Russian relations was rather accurately described by Ilham Aliyev (2004c) 
himself during an address at Chatham House. 
128
 The historical narrative regularly describes Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union as fundamentally 
hostile imperial powers, based on a litany of perceived injustices and infractions, including: large-scale 
immigration of Armenians into Azeri lands in the 19
th
 century; the March “genocide” of 1918:  the creation 
of Mountainous Karabakh as an autonomous region; „Black January‟; the participation of the 366
th
 
Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Red Army in the Karabakh War; and the alleged 1 Billion dollars in arms 
transfers to Armenia at that time. 
129
 Among others, see Today.az (2008a), Teymurkhanliy (2008), Day.az (2008a) and Mirkadyrov (2008a, 
2008b).  The opposition moreover initially decried the government‟s muted and delayed reaction to the 
crisis (BBC Monitoring, 2008a), although this was tempered later on by a more pragmatic acceptance of 
the regime‟s cautious stance, at least by a number of opposition figures (BBC Monitoring, 2008b).  The 
government, for its part, issued a simple statement recognising Georgia‟s territorial integrity at the very 
start of the crisis (Assa-Irada, 2008a), reverted to silence (Defence and Security, 2008), then limited itself 
to vague calls for reconciliation between the two belligerents, and a return to normalcy (Russia & CIS 
Presidential Bulletin, 2008a). 
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relatively efficiently cooperating USA, France, and Russia, all three disinterested in a 
thawing of this frozen conflict.  As a consequence, it is Armenia that is securitised 
much more heavily as the external aggressor, and much of the Azeri side‟s frustration 
at the slow progress of talks is directed at the Minsk Group chairs collectively rather 
than Moscow on its own, especially in the discourse of official Baku (BBC Monitoring, 
2001b; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1997; Ismayilov, 2008; Presse, 2001); 
accusations that a fundamentally hostile Moscow is behind the prolongation of the 
conflict are still heard in society at large, but the discourse there is far more ambivalent 
than in neighbouring Georgia. 
Two additional aspects of Azerbaijan‟s foreign and security discourse are its very close 
identification with Turkey, and its problematic links with Iran.  Relations with Ankara are 
guided by the regularly recurring rhetorical principle of „one nation, two states‟, and 
based on linguistic and cultural affinities between these two Turkic countries.  Apart 
from its role as a major trading partner and crucial transit corridor, Turkey‟s blockade of 
the Armenian border and almost-unquestioning support is seen as crucial in Baku as 
part of the effort at isolating archenemy Armenia130.  Relations with Iran are 
problematic, to say the least.  Elchibey‟s fierce anti-Iranian stance contributed to Iran‟s 
support to Armenia during the Karabakh war, and although official Baku generally 
refrains from stoking Iranian fears of Azeri separatism, society at large does display 
affinity with the ethnic brethren to „Southern‟ – Iranian – Azerbaijan, leading to 
continuing Iranian apprehensions (Priego, 2009; Shaffer, pp. 155-204). 
Conclusion: Patterns of Penetration in the Southern Caucasus 
How would one characterize the patterns of GPP in the Caucasus in terms of the 
typology elaborated in hapter 4?  The typology in question operated along two 
dimensions – polarity and amity/enmity – and thus generated a spectrum of 
possibilities ranging from hegemony, through unipolar, multipolar/co-operative and 
multipolar/competitive, to disengagement.  It is quite clear from the above that Russia, 
while certainly influential, has lost its position of hegemony over the past decade-and-
a-half, as the US and EU have successfully encroached on what was Russia‟s 
undoubted „home turf‟.  These three external actors feature to varying extents in the 
                                               
130
 Accordingly, when Ankara moved to normalise relations with Yerevan after years of negotiations within 
the context of its „zero-problems‟ policy, in the summer of 2008, ties came under considerable strain, with 
alarmed Azeri commentators and politicians accusing their Western neighbour of betrayal (Mamedkhanov, 
2008; Today.az, 2008b).  Yet even there, Azerbaijan has been able to show an ability to independently 
influence events: Baku‟s priority has been to ensure the linkage of this normalisation with a solution to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, something it has so far been able to accomplish with the aid of a Turkish 
domestic public opinion very much skewed in its favour (Kardas, 2009). 
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security calculations of the individual units and strongly shape the securitisations within 
the region, with Turkey, and, to a much lesser extent, Iran, playing a supporting role.   
Penetration in the region is, without a doubt, multi-polar and competitive, and it became 
so soon after the fall of the Soviet Union. While Russian policies in the early 1990s 
were clearly incoherent, they did aim, however crudely, for the retention of the region 
within Moscow‟s zone of influence.  The West, wary of provoking Russia, did involve 
itself economically in the Caucasus, but, crucially, political or military encroachments 
were rather limited, almost non-existent in fact.  In a way, the West‟s shared motivation 
– access to energy resources and their export through alternative routes – was still 
very much aspirational in the 1990s: Western economic involvement in Caspian 
oilfields did not necessarily affect Russia‟s fundamental interest in retaining control, as 
all main transportation links were still guarded by Moscow.  The degree of 
competitiveness increased considerably following the coming to power of Putin and 
George W. Bush in Moscow and Washington, respectively, and the decision to push for 
Georgian NATO membership after the building of the BTC pipeline. Just as Russia‟s 
foreign and security policies shifted towards a geo-political/geo-economic view of 
Derzhavnost, and put energy resources at centre-stage, Moscow saw both the United 
States and „Europe‟ encroaching on „its‟ back yard, economically, politically and 
militarily, without the prior co-ordination and deference seen during the 1990s.  
American troops were deployed in Georgia (unthinkable in the 1990s), the BTC 
pipeline became reality, and Georgia went through a regime change not sanctioned in 
Moscow.   
The competitive nature of great power relations is based on the clash between 
Russia‟s and the West‟s strategic priorities.  Geo-politically, the Caucasus is part of 
Moscow‟s perceived zone of „special interest‟, a buffer essential to the security of its 
vulnerable south, one that is to be subjected to „geo-economic‟ control of, among 
others, energy transportation routes.  It is, moreover to some extent part of a highly 
territorialised „great power‟ identity.  To the United States the Caucasus has been a 
barrier to a Russian imperial revival, and a geopolitically significant corridor for actual 
and potential military operations in Eurasia.  To „the West‟ in general, it has been 
perceived as the location of and transit corridor for ever-scarcer hydrocarbon reserves, 
with the added, marginal element of the universal liberal „civilising mission‟ shared by 
both these two Western powers.  Georgia – the one regional actor daring to go directly 
against the Derzhava‟s regional priorities – is where this clash of interests and 
identities came to a head in the years preceding the August 2008 war.  The picture is 
more nuanced in Armenia and Azerbaijan – the extra-regional actors have been able to 
co-ordinate quite effectively within the OSCE Minsk Group – but in the final analysis, 
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this is a region where, at least up to 2008, the overall pattern of GPP was one of 
multipolarity and competition.  The question of how these patterns of penetration 
interact with the relationships of amity/enmity between and the incoherence of regional 
states will be the central question of the next, concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 10: THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGIONAL 
INSECURITY COMPLEX 
The previous three chapters have, in turn, individually applied the three concepts that 
previously were the subject of a theoretical expansion within RSCT: amity/enmity, state 
coherence, and great power penetration.  Yet, as pointed out in chapter 5, the central 
aim of this thesis is to explore – using the Southern Caucasus as an example – how 
these three concepts interrelate; looking at these interactions is the goal of this 
concluding chapter.  The aim is to identify a „web‟ of co-constitution that links the three 
expanded variables, before attempting to evaluate the hypotheses proposed in chapter 
5 on the relationship between these three concepts, and, finally, weighing up the 
chances of this revisionist conflict formation evolving into a security regime.  This 
chapter is structured as follows.  Its first section will construct this network of 
interrelations between great power penetration, state incoherence and amity/enmity.  
The second will move towards evaluating the two hypotheses on the effects of state 
incoherence and great power penetration on amity/enmity.   The third, finally, will deal 
with the region‟s transformative potential, based on the notion of „discursive stability‟ 
introduced in chapter 2. 
The Southern Caucasus as a Web of Fear, Weakness and Power 
As was shown in the corresponding second chapter, the Southern Caucasus is a 
revisionist conflict formation.  From a macro-perspective, it is a region populated by 
units that often do not recognise each other‟s legitimacy, creating a slew of unresolved 
„frozen‟ conflicts.  From a micro-perspective, the security dynamic within the region is 
marked by security discourses that, on their argumentative side, constitute identities 
and values that are fundamentally incompatible, and on their instrumental side, include 
armed conflict as a legitimate means of securing these values and identities.  As I shall 
argue below, both these identities and values, and the idea of war as an acceptable 
instrument of politics, are also shaped by, on the one hand, the incoherence of the 
region‟s states, and, on the other, the role of great powers in the RSC.  The states‟ 
internal incoherence intertwines with and intensifies a wide variety of inter-state 
securitisations; the great powers, on the other hand, „distort‟ regional securitisations 
through their interactions with actors‟ identities or their effect on their instrumental 
calculations as to the utility of war.  States fear and distrust each other precisely 
because their historically constituted imagined territorialities overlap, while regional 
units‟ perceptions of external powers as potential allies or threats are strongly 
influenced by historical narratives underlying their identities, alongside the more 
conventional instrumental considerations of utility. Together, these different 
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components of the security dynamic constitute a type of enmity that, because of its 
convoluted nature, will be difficult to resolve any time soon. 
The Southern Caucasus RSC is revisionist-conflictual precisely because of a lack of 
recognition between its constituent units: the associated securitisations constitute 
actors‟ mutual perceptions in ways that dramatically intensify regional security 
dilemmas.  One of the legally established states – Armenia – does not accept the 
legitimacy of another‟s – Azerbaijan‟s – borders, officially and explicitly.  In return, Azeri 
officials often reinforce the narrative within their society of Armenia as „Western 
Azerbaijan‟, an unjust quirk of history artificially created by the descendents of 19th-
century Armenian immigrants alien to the Caucasus.   Naturally, neither Georgia nor 
Azerbaijan accepts the right to exist of the RSC‟s unrecognised statelets – Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia – as legitimate sovereign states.  These non-
recognitions are not merely a matter of diverging technical legal interpretations or 
political expediency; they are based on the fundamentally diverging values and 
identities of the actors involved, clearly visible in their official discourses that are, in 
turn, constituted by the reified, essentialist narratives of history permeating all societies 
in the region. 
Armenian society perceives both Turkey and Azerbaijan – the „barbarian Turks‟ – as 
fundamentally hostile to its very existence; while the blunter expressions of this point of 
view have certainly been „sublimated‟ among its elite, its influence – among others 
clearly visible within the National Security Strategy and Armenia‟s historically informed 
strategic orientation – is undeniable.  Azeri society is deeply permeated by a 
conspiratorial historiography that expounds its relationship with Armenia and 
Armenians in terms of perennial intrigue and encroachment on Azeri lands.  Georgia is 
clearly very conscious of its fragility, and intensely securitises Russia as the primary 
driver behind its post-Cold War disintegration, while trying to maintain friendly relations 
with two neighbours that remain at each other‟s throats.   Needless to say, the three 
secessionist entities – Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia – define 
themselves and their legally precarious existences first and foremost in opposition to 
their metropolitan states.  In a word, in this RSC, incompatible identities and historical 
narratives are a breeding ground for the fears and securitisations that provide the 
teleological logic, that explain the goals of international political behaviour. The 
argumentative aspects of securitisation in the Southern Caucasus are fundamentally 
dissonant and diverging. 
On the Zwecksrationalität-governed instrumental side of security discourse, war is 
clearly seen as a legitimate means towards the national goals of regional actors 
 226 
conditioned by these above-mentioned identities.  Discourse in Armenian society 
centres on safeguarding the advantages won through victories on the battlefield in 
1990-1994, including, for most nationalists and the Karabakh elite, the ethnically 
cleansed Azeri-inhabited villages in the region proper and the „buffer zone‟, lest they 
become a springboard for a renewed 1915.  Azerbaijan backs up its enormous military 
budget with increasingly frequent, ominous reminders of its readiness to use force to 
overturn the de-facto status-quo; as in Armenia, the discourse of current and former 
officials sometimes even degenerates into advocating ethnic cleansing.  However 
contested the circumstances, Georgia did show its readiness to go to war to resolve 
conflict in August of 2008, admittedly after heavy provocations by the similarly militarily 
inclined South Ossetian side.  As in 1991-1994, the force of arms remains an always-
present tool of security policy for all actors in the region, notwithstanding their rhetorical 
adherence to „European values‟ in the appropriate fora. 
Furthermore, regional actors are quite willing to expend considerable limited means 
towards the attainment of their respective goals, be it secession for the unrecognised 
units (and their allies), or territorial reintegration for the recognised ones.  Armenians 
have endured decades of closed borders and exclusion from potentially lucrative 
regional energy and transportation projects for the sake of their ethnic brethren in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  Azerbaijan has spent billions of dollars of its oil wealth in a bid to 
make its threats to retake the region by force in response to a failed peace process 
more credible.  Georgia has suffered economically from its extremely strained 
relationship with Russia, formerly its most important trading partner (although this was 
to some extent offset by Western aid).  And for most of the past twenty years, the 
populations of all three unrecognised units have patiently endured international 
isolation and stunted development in the name of self-determination. To an outside – 
Western – observer, used to thinking in terms of economic utility-maximisation, much of 
this behaviour seems „irrational‟.  Why, instead of wasting so much time and resources 
on trivial national projects, don‟t these states see the point of co-operation and 
integration, with the not-so-far away European Union as a shining example? 
It is the normative acceptance of war as a legitimate means of resolving regional 
differences, together with the above-mentioned incompatibility of identities that 
ultimately leads to the characterisation of the region as a revisionist conflict formation.  
From the capitals of „civilised‟ and pacified Europe, the Southern Caucasus is often 
perceived as a miniature version of the Balkans, peopled with irrational nations unable 
or unwilling to see the light of cooperation and integration as opposed to competition 
and conflict.  The central insight of RSCT is, however, is of amity/enmity as a variable: 
the cultures of anarchy vary from one RSC to another, and with them, the rationalities 
 227 
that govern security interaction within.  Armenians, Azeris, Georgians, Abkhaz and 
Ossets are not irrational; their rationality functions towards ends that are differently 
defined, within a political-cultural context that is distinctly constituted and regionally 
specific.   
It is all too easy to forget that it took Europe two World Wars, a Cold War, and the loss 
of Empire to generate the norms and identities that rule its contemporary patterns of 
de-securitisation (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 352-356).  On the argumentative side, a 
complex European security identity has emerged, based in no small part on „meta-
securitisation‟, a securitisation of the past; in the Southern Caucasus, such collective 
identities are almost entirely lacking.  In terms of the distinction between the 
argumentative and instrumental aspects of securitisation, the supposedly „irrational‟ 
behaviour of local actors becomes exceedingly understandable.  Their allocation of 
resources, their „rationality‟ is subservient to fundamentally incompatible national 
identities, fundamentally incompatible because, as in pre-World War Two Europe, they 
are primarily defined in opposition to each other, with overlapping territorialities and 
inherently conflictual historical narratives.  The self-definition of Armenia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and the other unrecognised statelets doesn‟t fit: it occurs at the expense of 
the „other‟, and this fundamental incompatibility is what then governs instrumentality, 
what is seen as expedient and inexpedient in the region‟s societies and governments. 
Moreover, because conflict in the Southern Caucasus is largely based on the 
argumentative side of the securitisation spectrum, it will be intractable and 
unresponsive to changes in the material context, as argued in chapter two of this 
thesis.  If instrumental rationality is based on societies techno-scientific matching of 
means and ends, and the ends are fundamentally incompatible, traditional methods of 
conflict-resolution that are based on utility-maximising game-theoretical models (see 
Rapoport, 1974) will be limited in their effectiveness.  Conflict-resolution would not only 
involve appropriately matching actors‟ preferences; it would, in effect, involve actively 
changing these preferences at a quite fundamental, existential level.  And such 
fundamental („sedimented‟ in Wæver‟s terminology) value-systems are in their nature 
less susceptible to change through material pressures than issues that involve the 
identification of threats and means.  They structure the region and limit the agency of 
individual units and actors through their normative de-limiting of behaviour in ways 
largely impervious to material incentive or economic-utilitarian rationality. 
Enmity and the Vertical and Horizontal Incoherence of States 
This particular variant of culturally embedded rationality is moreover reinforced, both 
from above – the systemic level – and from below – the sub-state level.  The 
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securitisation by both Georgia and Azerbaijan of threats to their national securities 
emanating from separatist groups feeds directly into the regional patterns of 
amity/enmity, first and foremost, of course, because of the fragmented nature of these 
states, and their non-recognition of the secessionist statelets, which ipso-facto turns 
the region into a revisionist conflict formation.  But clearly, these securitisations also 
affect the relations between the three recognised states, quite visibly in the case of 
Azerbaijan (its „separatist groups‟ and Armenia are virtually inseparable), less so in the 
case of Georgia (its separatist-linked securitisations are primarily directed at Russia; 
but there is, no doubt, a wary distrust towards Armenia‟s links to Javakheti operating in 
the background as well).  More subtly, the vertical weakness of states in the region 
makes appeals to the fears and aspirations embedded in these incompatible nationalist 
narratives an ever-present temptation for dubiously legitimate governments seeking to 
prolong their stay in power. 
The „bundle‟ of securitisations related to horizontal state incoherence dominates 
security discourse in both of the region‟s fragmented states, Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
and is, again directly related to diverging discourses which have littered this region with 
territorial identities that overlap and historical narratives that make the emergence of 
shared state allegiances extremely difficult.  While Azerbaijan views itself as a model 
multi-national republic and Armenians as intruders and disturbers of that model, 
Nagorno-Karabakh‟s Armenians view the Azeri state as a great assimilator of 
subordinate peoples, a perennial massacrer of Armenians (in 1905, 1918-1920, 1988), 
even while the anti-Armenian discourses in Azerbaijan reinforce these perceptions. It is 
difficult to see how these two positions could be reconciled to form the „collective 
strategy of survival‟ necessary for the functioning of a single sovereign state.  The idea 
that, for instance, Armenians would accept Azeri sovereignty in exchange for the 
promise of economic advantages from Baku – posited by a number of Azeri analysts – 
was the subject of downright ridicule for my interviewees in Stepanakert.  
The same divergence of identities and narratives can be seen in Georgia: Tbilisi, 
Tskhinvali and Sukhumi have dramatically diverging views of history that underlie much 
of their intractable conflict.  Some Georgians – including, crucially, the first post-Soviet 
president – go so far as to consider the Abkhaz and the Ossets an alien factor, an 
intrusion into the Southern Caucasus from the north.  Early twentieth-century history – 
specifically, the Bolshevik-sponsored uprisings during the Georgian Democratic 
Republic – has moreover reinforced the perception of both these minorities as pro-
Russian elements.  In return, the Abkhaz and Ossets‟ view of recent history – including 
Soviet history – is a narrative of Georgian attempts at forcible assimilation and, 
especially in the Abkhaz case, colonisation.  Alignment with Russia is seen as a natural 
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protective measure by these „endangered‟ minorities against what has been called a 
„mini-empire‟.  Both sides of these discourses are in turn reinforced by the conflicts of 
the early 1990s: the ethnic cleansing and the resulting refugee flows (creating an 
added imperative for reunification), and the meddling by Russia (reinforcing the 
perception of threat emanating from Moscow and of the minorities as a „fifth column‟). 
Horizontal state incoherence ultimately feeds into and is reinforced by mutual 
perceptions between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the region‟s three de-jure units.  
Much of the tension emanates from the presence of Armenian minorities in Georgia 
and, of course, the Karabakh conflict itself.  The latter is indelibly enmeshed in the 
Azeri-Armenian inter-state relationship: for Armenian policymakers – who, have come 
to define „Armenians‟ in ethnic rather than civic terms – it is difficult to ignore the plight 
of their co-ethnics without seeming to endanger a crucial referent object in Armenia‟s 
security discourse.  In broader society, issues like Nagorno-Karabakh and Javakheti 
are very much seen in terms of „stemming a historical tide‟ of depopulation and 
Genocide, with 1915 naturally featuring prominently in the discourse.  Armenian 
narratives clearly present the limited territory of today‟s Republics of Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of centuries of injustice and oppression, and substantial 
Armenian minorities outside of its territory add a pressing contemporary element to this 
theme. 
Meanwhile, Azeri discourse makes virtually no distinction between its Armenian 
minority and the Republic of Armenia – preferring to view the Karabakh conflict in inter-
state terms, as the occupation of its territory by a neighbouring state – and pointedly 
refusing to initiate direct negotiations with Stepanakert. Azerbaijan‟s historiography 
very much looks like a mirror image of Armenia‟s.  Again, the issue is one of „stemming 
a historical tide‟, this time of Armenian encroachment and massacre in Albanian and 
Azeri lands: losing Karabakh – spoken of in almost-mythical terms in the historical 
discourse, as a cradle of Azeri culture – would be giving up one part of one‟s country to 
an ever-growing enemy.  This historical attachment to Karabakh is deeply entrenched: 
witness Aliyev‟s (alleged) retreat during the Key West negotiations in 2001, when the 
possibility of ceding control over Karabakh was abandoned by the veteran leader on 
his return to Baku (alluded to in chapter 7).  
In Georgia, attempts by Saakashvili to make Georgia‟s national ideology and state 
identity more accommodative to minorities by stressing civic rather than ethnic notions 
of nationalism have had little effect in relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, partly 
because conflicting historical narratives and competing identities are so entrenched, 
going beyond the immediate effects of 1991-93.  In any case, following the 2008 war, 
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the question of whether the Abkhazian and South Ossetian populations would have 
traded their independence for some kind of association with a liberal and democratic 
Georgia remains – for lack of a better word – academic.  The presence of 
geographically concentrated Azeri and, especially, Armenian minorities has also 
always been a cause for concern to authorities in Tbilisi, especially in the case of the 
Armenians because of, again, their long-time dependence on Russian bases for 
economic survival, reinforced by the historical perception of Armenians as a pro-
Russian element and potential fifth column.  In the case of the Javakheti Armenians, 
the risk of this sub-state level phenomenon encroaching on amity/enmity at the regional 
level by negatively affecting Georgian-Armenian relations is always present; but 
Yerevan – keenly aware of its dependence on Georgian transportation links to the 
outside world – has so far been able to maintain a pragmatic attitude to its ethic 
brethren across the border. 
All three recognised units are, moreover, vertically inherently weak: corrupt and 
unstable from a macro-perspective, highly dysfunctional from a discursive, micro-
perspective, through the absence of consensus on the state, and its political 
mechanisms as a „shared strategy of survival‟.   Any stability is, by and large, not the 
result of state legitimacy: in all three states, governing elites have to repress and 
marginalise oppositionist counter-elites that as a rule see the street as a valid form of 
political interaction, with most of the general population viewing the state and its 
institutions with distrust.  The extent of legitimacy, and the ability of the states to use 
repression/cooptation to compensate for a lack thereof varies from state to state and 
over time – with Azerbaijan‟s hydrocarbon reserves in particular giving the Aliyev 
regime a powerful tool for patronage – but the overall picture of vertical weakness, of 
legitimacy gaps camouflaged by state force remains in place. 
What‟s more, the vertical inherent weakness of states inevitably relates to both the 
amity/enmity and GPP variables.  In the absence of a liberal-democratic „collective 
strategy of survival‟, regional regimes must build their narratives of legitimacy not so 
much on the rule of law, but on their ability to realise the nationalist-mythological 
objectives they have set themselves. The aim of reunification is always at the top of 
any government‟s agenda in both Georgia and Azerbaijan, and no Armenian 
presidential candidate (including the „liberal‟ Levon Ter-Petrosyan) would consider not 
including the self-determination of Karabakh in their programmes.  Reintegration and/or 
reunification are thus not only relevant in terms of their effect on diverging strategies of 
survival that underlie vertical incoherence: they feed into patterns of amity/enmity by 
making diverging identities the basis for regime survival as well, in a region plagued by 
a lack of legitimate political process.   
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Moreover, the deficit of viable political mechanisms that would forge a legitimate 
consensus on matters of national security makes it difficult for governments to claim a 
mandate for compromise solutions that go beyond the requirements of narrow 
nationalism.  In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the democratic legitimacy of 
governments has been highly suspect for most of the post-Soviet period, and leaders 
can therefore not unambiguously argue they have the authority to bargain on behalf of 
their populations, something that has been seized upon by the opposition in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan especially.  And, because of the high level of securitisation that 
underlies the territorial conflicts, again, both elites and counter-elites employ the latter 
as highly effective means of mobilisation. 
As seen in the empirical chapters, the narratives that underlie both horizontal and 
vertical state incoherence also interact with the security discourses on GPP.  Georgian 
views of the break-up of their state in the early 1990s are infused with the narrative of 
Russian imperialism; their National Security Concept refers to this Russian role in 
fostering secessionism in only slightly oblique terms.  Accusations of pro-Russian 
sympathies are moreover often employed by the authorities in Tbilisi against opposition 
forces (most notably in the turbulent 2007/08 pre-election period).  While Azerbaijan‟s 
foreign and security policies are clearly based on a refusal to be bound by one 
particular alliance, a refusal to choose between the West and Russia, the idea that the 
Karabakh conflict was instigated by Russia and that Armenian victories were largely 
due to Russian support pervades the discourse of policymakers, analysts and the 
broader public (although it now diminishes the higher one climbs in the policymaking 
hierarchy).  The perception that Armenia is a Russian puppet without, in effect, the 
ability to make independent policy is common currency throughout Baku.  Meanwhile, 
elites and counter-elites in Armenia often interpret criticism of Armenia‟s human rights 
record and electoral process as being motivated by an intention to either pressure or 
reward Yerevan for concessions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Great Power Penetration and Amity/Enmity 
GPP interacts with the regional security dynamic in three ways.  Firstly, the particular 
pattern of GPP prevalent within the region – competitive multipolar – shapes the 
systemic structural context within which regional actors make their policy choices, or 
rather, translates this systemic context onto the regional level in region-specific form.  
Second, structural conditions within the RSC co-determine the specific policy choices 
made by the great powers, in light of the particular definitions of interest that underlie 
this pattern of GPP.  Third, the great powers‟ individual policy choices in turn shape 
both the calculations and perceptions of regional actors, through their links to the 
regional balance of power and their perceptions of interest and threat.  The result is a 
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complexly structured security constellation where securitisations at different levels 
intertwine and conspire to constantly recreate and sustain a revisionist-conflictual 
security complex whose enmities are reinforced from below and above, from both the 
sub-state and systemic levels. 
That GPP into the Southern Caucasus is multipolar and competitive was demonstrated 
in the previous chapter.  The Russian Federation has perhaps the most complex and 
long-standing links to the region, with economic and military-strategic assets, and a 
definition of interest that goes to the very core of its historically constructed identity as a 
great power, with the region forming part of its increasingly geo-economically defined 
„sphere of privileged interest‟.  This goes against the enduring aim of Western powers – 
the USA and EU – to tap and transport Caspian hydrocarbon resources over routes 
beyond Moscow‟s control.  Neighbouring regional powers – Turkey, Iran – play a role 
as well, the former as a NATO member, a transit corridor for hydrocarbons and, 
increasingly, an assertive regional player in its own right, the latter through its 
securitisations of Azerbaijan as a potential threat to its territorial integrity.   
This generally competitive picture must be somewhat nuanced: the great powers do 
share an interest in avoiding the type of long-term, large-scale conflagration that could 
endanger energy flows or create wider regional instability, apart from potentially 
feeding into higher-level interests operating at the systemic level through potential 
policy linkages with, for instance, strategic arms control or joint counter-terrorism 
efforts.  Despite its drama, the 2008 war was still a relatively contained and short-lived 
affair, with Moscow clearly wary of letting the instability in its soft southern underbelly 
affect the northern Caucasus, and Washington concerned with the potential interruption 
of the BTC pipeline so central to its regional interests.  Turkey also has an interest in 
longer-term regional stability, because of its physical proximity and its excellent 
bilateral relations with Russia.  But save for these important caveats, it is fair to state 
the general thrust, the inherent logic of great power interaction in the South Caucasus 
to be one of multipolar competition.  
That competition is largely – but not entirely – based on material interest, that is, 
characteristics inherent to the region that are relevant to the powers‟ definitions of 
security.  The great powers‟ motivations in the region are, on the whole, based on its 
instrumental, material value towards strategic objectives: the provision/control of 
energy supplies, transit to theatres of war in West Asia, stability in one‟s periphery are 
all aimed at bolstering the economic and societal securities of the powers involved.  
There is, however, an element of identity at play in their involvement as well: for Russia 
in particular, the Southern Caucasus is more than just a region, it is part of its self-view 
 233 
as a great power, of value as the derzhava‟s sphere of privileged interest.  Combined 
with a particularly geo-economic techno-scientific knowledge governing its instrumental 
rationality – based increasingly on economic control within this sphere of interest – this 
creates a particularly strong tie to the region.   
The fact that several great powers are involved in the Southern Caucasus, and that 
their overall relationship has been competitive, certainly affects the range of options 
open to both the recognised and unrecognised units within the region.  Azerbaijan is, 
clearly, a major beneficiary of this situation: its National Security Concept clearly 
outlines a refusal to „take sides‟, and its post-1994 foreign and security policies can be 
described as a non-committal and multi-vectoral balancing act, tilting towards either the 
West or (as was increasingly the case in the 2000s) Russia as conditions change.  One 
important material factor – its coveted oil and gas reserves – gives it the opportunity to 
play one of the sides off against the other as needed: apart from the competition over 
proposed hydrocarbon export routes, Baku is far less dependent on foreign aid for its 
political and military security – as defined in the NSC and reinforced in the discourse – 
than either Armenia or Georgia.    
In this multipolar-competitive GPP context, Armenia has allied itself firmly with Russia, 
mainly due to its strong securitisation of NATO member Turkey as an existential threat.  
Consequently, its options to vacillate and play off are far more limited: excluded from 
the major regional energy and transportation projects, and lacking any natural 
resources or industries that might be of interest to the other great powers, strategic 
sectors of its economy have, over the years, gone into Russian ownership, creating a 
dependency that leaves little room for manoeuvre.  Nevertheless, Yerevan‟s 
„complementary‟ foreign policy, introduces a very limited element of nuance and, at the 
very least, potential alternatives into the equation, perhaps a function of its large 
Western diasporas and a desire to keep its options open in case Russia is forced out of 
the region.  
Georgia, meanwhile, has used this multipolar competition to clearly side with „the West‟ 
in the hope of protection by NATO and eventual reunification.  Its major asset – or, 
depending on how one views it, liability – has been its position as an alternative to 
Russia for the transit of Caspian hydrocarbons from both Azerbaijan and, potentially at 
a later stage, Central Asia.  Its strained relationship and very strong securitisation of 
Russia as a threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty limit its options in re-
adjusting its policies: its discursive dependence on the West is considerable, and a re-
adjustment of regional GPP towards Russia – following, for instance, a loss of interest 
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by the West – would put the central thrust of its foreign and security policies under 
considerable strain, in effect requiring a paradigm shift in Georgian strategic thinking.   
The multipolar-competitive nature of GPP opens up and closes a variety of possibilities 
for regional units; the other side of the equation consists of the way in which great 
powers make specific policy choices based on regional structural constraints when 
shaping the specific ways in which they engage.   As alluded to above, these 
constraints take the form of the intra-regional patterns of securitisation that permeate it 
and shape its political culture and patterns of amity/enmity.  In cases where these 
securitisations are directed at the great powers themselves (Georgia-Russia/Armenia-
Turkey), these constrictions are obvious.  But intra-regional patterns of securitisation 
are relevant here as well: both on the regional and sub-state level, they consist of the 
fundamentally divergent discourses of identity that underlie the RSC‟s status as 
revisionist-conflictual, and to any power desiring some measure of control over the 
region, these provide a perfect opportunity to maintain a level of influence through a 
policy of „divide and rule‟.    
In this region‟s patterns of securitisation, Armenia‟s intense rivalry with Azerbaijan 
provides a central point of division: quite simply, it is the main reason why any 
meaningful tri-lateral cooperation between the region‟s three recognised units remains 
out of the question.  And, as long as it remains frozen, the conflict does grant Moscow 
a significant structural advantage in its stated aims of maintaining the Southern 
Caucasus RSC within its sphere of privileged interest.  Armenia cannot provide an 
alternative route for Caspian hydrocarbons and remains locked in its strategic 
relationship with Moscow, while Baku‟s oil exports are routed either through Russia 
proper or unstable and easily manipulable Georgia.  If there were successful 
cooperation between the three states outside of Russian control, the increased 
bargaining power stemming from co-ordinated policies would give regional actors a 
degree of independence that would seem unwelcome in Moscow. 
Russia‟s attitude towards the Karabakh conflict has therefore always been ambiguous.  
As a member of the Minsk Group, it has indeed ostensibly strived for a resolution of the 
conflict as an impartial mediator for the better part of two decades.  Although it 
supported Armenia during its war against Azerbaijan with generous supplies of 
weaponry, it now has excellent relations with both sides.  Commentators and analysts 
in both Tbilisi and Baku have alleged that it is fundamentally interested in a non-
resolution of the conflict as it provides it with leverage over both belligerent parties.  
And looking at the structural advantages gained by Moscow from that frozen conflict – 
in terms of an ability to maintain an influence over two fundamentally conflicted parties 
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and within a deeply divided region – the allegation that it is not interested in a 
resolution unless it occurs under its guidance and reinforces its regional position 
(through, for instance, the insertion of Russian peacekeepers or legal guarantees) 
doesn‟t seem that far-fetched. 
The multiple sub-state securitisations that fragment Georgia similarly provide ample 
opportunity for a continued Russian presence.  Georgian political leaders (including 
Shevardnadze and Saakashvili) have in the past accused Moscow of not being 
interested in the resolution of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see chapter 9).  
Again, the structural advantages of these conflicts are clear: for almost 20 years, they 
provided Russia with a guaranteed foothold in the South Caucasus, and a means of 
harassing the authorities in Tbilisi through the actions of proxies whose links with the 
FSB are only thinly veiled.  Especially in South Ossetia, and to a lesser extent in 
Abkhazia, the separatists would have very little freedom of manoeuvre indeed in the 
absence of Russia‟s tolerance or aid, depending on how one views Russia‟s role up to 
2008.  After the war, with the recognition of both entities, this de-facto situation has 
simply burst into the open. 
The mirror image of those structural side-constraints on policy operate for the West; 
Georgia‟s historically rooted securitisation of Russia makes it an obvious candidate as 
both an ally and a point of transit.  On their own, the material benefits of its position 
cannot account for that fact.  On the other hand, Armenia‟s securitisation of Turkey and 
its intense enmity towards Azerbaijan preclude the West from establishing extensive 
strategic ties with the land-locked country; provided, of course, that such ties would be 
desired in light of the probable irritation such a policy would cause in Baku, whose 
hydrocarbon reserves, after all, remain the West‟s primary point of interest in the 
region.   Here, behaviour by the Western powers and Russia seem to, increasingly, 
mirror each other as they respond to Azerbaijan‟s multi-vectoral policies with a similarly 
delicate balancing act, trying hard to curry favour in Baku without losing sight of other, 
competing regional interests: the ability to maintain an effective regional strategic 
presence for Moscow, and the avoidance of major regional conflict for both Russia and 
the West. 
The multipolar-competitive configuration of GPP sets up the systemic-regional 
structural context within which units make their choices, generally subservient to the 
identities and values that are their referent objects of securitisation.  The actual policies 
they then formulate towards the great powers are a joint product of this regional-
systemic structural context, and their perception how the individual great powers relate 
to these referent objects.  In the Southern Caucasus, regional units align themselves 
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with great powers based not so much on shared values, as on the basis of practical 
considerations of how such alignments affect the superior goals of national grand 
strategy; their prime consideration is the value of these alignments as counter-
measures against perceived, mostly regionally generated threats.  The fact that 
Moscow and the West are, to a large extent, in opposition within the Southern 
Caucasus, gives local entities a theoretical opportunity to bandwagon with the „camp‟ 
that enhances their regional position and secures their referent objects most effectively; 
the nature of their referent objects and the existing securitisations surrounding them act 
as side-constraints to the units‟ agency, pushing them in the direction of one particular 
side. 
GPP thus clearly helps shape the RSC‟s polarity by aiding entities that arguably would 
not be able to hold their own in the absence of great power penetration. Armenia could 
not resist Azerbaijan and Turkey if it were left exposed by Russia.  Georgia could not 
possibly defy Russia‟s aims in the absence of the Western alternative; conversely, both 
the South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities are acutely aware of their dependence on 
Russian goodwill, as clearly demonstrated in August 2008. This regional 
bandwagoning has reinforced the „frozen‟ nature of the conflicts in the region: it distorts 
the region‟s polarity, reducing incentives to compromise for different actors hiding 
behind „their‟ benefactors which are arguably not interested in resolving many of the 
regional conflicts in ways outside their control, at least, arguably, in the case of 
Moscow.  
Evaluating the Hypotheses 
What does this mean for the hypotheses proposed in chapter 5? The first proposition, 
asserted that horizontal state incoherence and overlapping territorial claims based on 
national minorities adjacent to but outside their nation-states have driven the South 
Caucasian RSC towards greater enmity since independence.  I hypothesised that this 
was due, from a micro-perspective, to both direct and indirect discursive processes: 
directly, the region is driven towards the highly inimical „revisionist conflict formation‟ 
category through the existence of de-facto states of dubious legitimacy, as a result of a 
failure of the fragmented recognised states to produce collective strategies of survival.  
Indirectly, enmity in the region is increased through the identification of regional units 
with secessionist minorities in neighbouring states, or through the instrumentalisation of 
such minorities for higher-level strategic aims; among others, by penetrating great 
powers.  Both factors strengthen the element of revisionism within the RSC, and 
hence, its status as a revisionist conflict formation. 
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Again, as discussed in chapter 5, the second hypothesis tied amity/enmity to patterns 
of GPP, proposing that the competitive nature of great power penetration has played 
an essential role in maintaining the „frozen‟ version of the revisionist conflict formation 
that has existed for most of the period under study in the Caucasus, through its effects 
on the instrumental security discourses in the region.  Any move of the RSC towards a 
security regime would only partially be facilitated by changes in these patterns of 
penetration, as these patterns of penetration have only limited effect on the region‟s 
clashing values and identities, as visible in the argumentative aspects of the security 
discourse.  
The first hypothesis – that the direct and indirect discursive processes behind 
horizontal state incoherence push the region towards enmity – has been proved correct 
beyond reasonable doubt.  The very absence of collective strategies of survival in the 
fragmented states, and the resulting fragmentation creates de-facto statelets which, 
lacking international recognition, turn the region into a revisionist conflict formation 
almost as a matter of tautology.  But more indirectly, the overlapping territorialities 
based on historical narratives also push the units‟ identities, and hence, their 
perceptions of security, towards conflict.  Armenia‟s ethno-nationalist (as opposed to 
civic-nationalist) definition of identity, and its strong identification with Armenian 
minorities in Nagorno-Karabakh and Javakheti are one example of how these 
territorialities create lasting tension and conflict, based not so much on material 
interests as on fundamental values and identities held by the different states and 
societies.    
Moreover, value/identity conflicts seem to provide ample opportunity for meddling by 
outside actors, as witnessed by the instrumentalisation by Moscow of Georgia‟s 
internal incoherence, and, arguably, the Armenian-Azeri conflict.  The previous section 
already discussed how the frozen conflicts in the region were maintained by Russia to 
secure a strategic advantage; while not directly increasing enmity in the Southern 
Caucasus RSC, these identity/value-centred securitisations further maintain the 
possibility of conflict precisely by opening up opportunities for outside interference, for 
their instrumental use by interested parties, making any decrease in the region‟s 
revisionist-conflictual nature even more unlikely.  Horizontal state incoherence is 
indeed one of the underlying causes of enmity in the Southern Caucasus, as 
hypothesised. 
The broader issue of how GPP affects amity/enmity within the South Caucasus RSC is 
more complex, and requires a few clarifications.  Importantly, the question here is not 
only the direct involvement of individual great powers acting as an efficient factor in 
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shaping patterns of amity/enmity.  Rather, the hypothesis refers to the patterns of GPP 
as passive, permissive shapers of regional conditions, setting the general context, the 
background within which argumentative and instrumental securitisations occur.   
Second, I need to be clear about the modifications that would be necessary to shift 
between the „conflict formation‟ and „thin security regime‟ categories of the amity/enmity 
spectrum, as opposed to jumping from „thick security regimes‟ to „security 
communities‟.   Chapter 2 clearly set out the characteristics of revisionist/status-quo 
conflict formations, thin/thick security regimes and loose/tight security communities. To 
recap, in „thin security regimes‟, narrow, formal agreements aim to minimise the 
chances of war between units that, while recognising each other‟s legitimacy, remain 
fundamentally distrustful of each other.  In thick security regimes, these agreements 
take on a larger array of issue-areas, become values in and of themselves, while 
security communities see the emergence of collective identities and near-complete 
mutual desecuritisation. 
Transitions within this spectrum necessitate changes in the units‟ instrumental and 
argumentative security discourses.  Thus, a transformation from revisionist to status-
quo conflict formation requires the emergence of compatible identities, while a 
transition across the border between status-quo conflict formations and thin security 
regimes is mainly affected by changes in the instrumental aspects of securitisation (as 
to the acceptance of war as a means towards security). Transitions to „warmer‟ forms 
of peace (thick security regimes, security communities) additionally require alterations 
in the security discourses‟ argumentative aspects (the inclusion of regimes in the units‟ 
value-sets, the emergence of collective identities).  The question thus becomes how 
patterns of GPP affect the instrumental as opposed to the argumentative aspects of a 
region‟s security discourses.  If variations in these patterns can be shown to influence 
transitions between the status-quo conflict formation and thin security regime 
categories, the hypothesis would be proven correct. 
In the discursively dependent southern Caucasus RSC, great powers are mostly seen 
as either means or threats to established values and identities.   Their immediate 
effects on the security discourses of the regional units seem to be clearly situated on 
the instrumental side. The particular configuration of GPP co-determines the choices 
open to regional units in combination with their perceptions of threat, and any great 
powers not perceived as such will be potential means towards greater security. The 
presence of several competing great powers – as is the case in the Southern 
Caucasus – allows regional units to augment their capabilities through alliances and 
bandwagoning, albeit subject to considerable structural side-constraints: in particular, 
the security exigencies of their identities and values. 
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Turkey and Russia are securitised as threats by, respectively, Armenia and Georgia.  
Russia and the United States/NATO are, by contrast, seen as means towards greater 
security by these same states.  In the absence of strong securitisations of either Russia 
or Western states, Baku has been able to pursue a more balanced policy, remaining 
non-committal to both „sides‟.   The main effect of Russia‟s alliance with Armenia has 
been to offset Baku‟s growing military power, and the perceived threats emanating from 
Turkey, in effect granting Yerevan an existential guarantee in the absence of which its 
position within the RSC would have been precarious, to say the least.  Russia‟s 
involvement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia similarly guarantees the continued 
existence of these statelets.  Georgia, meanwhile, clearly sees its growing association 
with NATO as, again, an existential guarantee, with the one difference that, not having 
attained full membership, it did not enjoy article V protection in August 2008.  With an 
independent source of power – hydrocarbons – Azerbaijan is much less dependent on 
exclusive Western or Russian help in enhancing its regional position.  Certainly, at the 
level of state discourse, the main emphasis seems to be on instrumental alliances with 
this or that power in function of the augmentation of relative power that it provides, 
subject to the fundamental values-as-referent-objects underlying the state. 
GPP thus distorts the polarity within a given RSC through these alliances and 
associations, and so indirectly shapes the views of different states on the practical 
utility of war as an instrument of policy.  Again, because GPP is competitive and 
multipolar in the Southern Caucasus, great power interventions lack fundamental co-
ordination (although there are clearly delimited areas of cooperation as, for instance, in 
the Minsk Group), allowing different regional units some leeway in their alignments.  
True, the existing securitisations of great powers as threat put considerable limits on 
this agency; but there is little doubt that the regional units would be far more 
constrained in their instrumental strategic choices under conditions of, say, unipolar 
penetration or multipolar-cooperative GPP.  
The picture becomes clear when one attempts a counterfactual exercise: given the 
security discourses existing in the region, and their discursive dependence on 
individual great powers and the particular pattern of penetration that shapes the 
regional environment, what would happen if, say, the region were penetrated by one 
single great power, or through a multipolar-cooperative pattern?  The extent to which 
such forms would constrain the options open to the different regional actors would 
merely depend on the willingness of the great power(s) to impose its (their) uniform 
solution on the different actors.  While it would certainly not guarantee outcomes, it 
would undoubtedly end up limiting the variety of options open to regional actors today, 
hampering the logic of Azerbaijan‟s multi-vectoral policy, and putting all regional states 
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before the choice of either resisting the one or collective great power(s) – at high cost – 
or complying.  
The main point is that the effects of such co-ordinated GPP would largely be limited to 
the instrumental portion of the regional security discourse, to the units‟ perceptions of 
relative power that ultimately underlie their view of war as a rational policy tool.  Co-
ordinated action imposing or facilitating a peace in Nagorno-Karabakh or North Ossetia 
and Abkhazia would substantially increase the relative costs of continued armed 
conflict, especially for those units with strong dependencies on an outside power.  
Resisting a solution imposed by Russia, or the great powers acting in concert would be 
well-near impossible for the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians, and similarly so for the 
Armenians, who would no longer be able to turn to alternatives to bolster their 
positions, while Azerbaijan would no longer enjoy the possibility of vacillation.   Hard 
choices would have to be made by all regional units.  Even in the absence of direct 
coercion, unipolar or cooperative-multipolar patterns of GPP would facilitate the 
provision of great power guarantees underpinning any thin security regime, again 
skewing units‟ instrumental discourses in the direction of compliance. 
Then does the systemic level have no or little effect on the units‟ argumentative 
discourses, their values and identities?  It is admittedly difficult to see how whether a 
region is penetrated by one or several co-operating great powers would make a 
difference as to the identities and values of regional units, at least in the short term. In 
this case-study, it is clear that the most fundamental identities and values relating to 
national and state identity – and, ultimately, conflict – are largely internally generated, 
based as they are on nationalist narratives that emerged in the early 20th century, and 
were very imperfectly suppressed in Soviet times, only to re-emerge after the end of 
the Cold War.  The extent to which outright Soviet domination failed in deliberately 
supplanting these national identities with the artificially constructed Homo Sovieticus 
ideal is remarkable in that respect: in fact, for all the talk of brotherhood of nations, 
competing national identities were unwittingly reinforced in a dramatically essentialised 
form with all the unintended consequences that entailed (see also chapter 1). 
Patterns of GPP thus mainly affect the instrumental discourses of the regional units: 
their acceptance of war as a means towards security.  Does that confirm my second 
hypothesis?  Thin security regimes do not suppose trust between the parties: they 
simply imply the abrogation of war as a policy tool for practical, rational reasons, the 
relevant security regime being only shallowly internalised, and supplemented by 
verification procedures.  But what the Southern Caucasus shows is the continuing 
relevance of incompatible, divergent identities to the possible emergence of such 
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regimes; in the absence of the mutual recognition, a thin security regime upheld from 
the systemic level would be far from self-sustaining and complete.  A security 
arrangement between adversaries that still don‟t trust each other, but accept each 
others‟ right to exist (and not much more) would be different from one where surviving 
incompatible identities would drive potential belligerents at each other‟s throats at the 
slightest lessening of great power coercion.   
So while patterns of GPP definitely do play a relatively important role in the transitions 
between conflict formations and thin security regimes, their effect must be put in the 
proper perspective: the stability of resulting regimes will also be shaped by the 
compatibility of identities, and that is mainly a regional-domestic affair.  What is also 
clear is that the role of global factors culminates in the „colder‟ ranges of the 
amity/enmity spectrum, with „warmer‟ forms of peace – thick security regimes, security 
communities – being constituted to a much greater extent by profound changes in the 
argumentative sections of the security discourses, over which patterns of penetration 
have little effect.  So, while patterns of GPP do have a comparatively more important 
effect on the emergence of thin security regimes through their influence on instrumental 
discourses, the regional and domestic levels remain an important factor there, as in 
warmer forms of amity, through their role in shaping the argumentative aspects of 
security discourse. 
There is, however, one point of nuance. While patterns of GPP may not have an effect 
on argumentative security discourses, the individual regional involvements of great 
powers do (albeit in a longer-term and indeterminate manner).  As seen in chapter 8, 
the rhetoric (though not the practice) of „democracy‟, „good governance‟ and „human 
rights‟ has certainly permeated the region since its release from the Soviet Union in 
1991, highligting the role of „European‟ or „Western‟ values in shaping the identity of 
elites and counter-elites in the region, beyond the lip-service paid to them by various 
leaders. The conditionalities of OSCE and Council of Europe membership do seem to 
have some constraining effect on the discourse (and, to a much lesser extent, practice) 
of governments, who try to bolster their rickety internal and external legitimacies by at 
least some measure of demonstrative compliance. Meanwhile, „European values‟ 
infuse the narratives of opposition movements and counter-elites in all three 
recognised states, and even unrecognised units like Abkhazia.  The notion that 
integrating with Europe would make the region a more „civilised‟ place does feature in 
the less nationalist portions of all regional societies‟ narratives, apart from being implicit 
in their official discourses, as evidenced through their place in all three NSCs. 
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The one regional unit identifying most with these values in its official discourse is 
Georgia; talk of democracy and human rights has a slightly hollower ring to it in rather 
more clearly authoritarian Armenia and Azerbaijan.  More relevant to the construction 
of new, compatible identities, Saakashvili in particular tried to introduce a more liberal, 
civic form of nationalism along with his pro-Western orientation.  It must be said that 
there were some successes in reshaping ethno-centric thinking in Georgia, judging by 
comparisons between local surveys and popular attitudes in Yerevan and Baku.  But 
even in Tbilisi, the move towards this form of nationalism, and the desire to conform to 
NATO standards and conditionalities regarding democratisation was instrumental, still 
subject to the over-archingly vital identity of Georgia as a unified state that includes 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, come what may.   The imperative of unification remained 
intact, and acted as one important driver of the August 2008 war, which nullified any 
integrating effect such civic nationalism might have had, quite apart from severely 
discrediting Tbilisi‟s stated adherence to „Western‟ norms. 
More broadly, there are clearly elements within the elites and counter-elites of all 
Southern Caucasus units that ascribe to the idea(l)s of the European Union and the 
Council of Europe, and „the West‟ in general, as a potential remedy for the region‟s 
woes.  The notion that the conflicts within the region could be resolved through growing 
co-operation and interdependence between the existing units – even in the absence of 
formal peace agreements – is one that recurs regularly, especially (and not 
accidentally) in entities (like Armenia) contented with the status-quo131.  Such 
interdependence and trade would, the argument goes, make the borders between 
states or the formal sovereignty of unrecognised regions much less relevant to their 
interaction (similar to what happened in Eastern Europe following EU expansion).  This 
logic also drives the importance given – especially by Western-funded NGOs – to 
track-two diplomacy in the region.  The underlying idea is to foster interaction between 
parts of the different units‟ civil societies.  Prominent examples include programmes 
fostering social and cultural exchanges between Azeris and Armenians, and Abkhaz 
and Georgians by Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org) and International Alert 
(www.international-alert.org), bilateral initiatives including visits by delegations of 
diplomats and intellectuals in Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert (Broers, 2010), and 
„Social Innovation Camps‟ organised around participants in the region‟s emerging 
„blogosphere‟ (sic-caucasus.net) . 
                                               
131
 Interviews, Yerevan, Tbilisi (2008) and Sukhumi (2009).  The goal of a „common market‟ in the 
Southern Caucasus is also explicitly mentioned in Georgia‟s National Security Concept (see chapter 7). 
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It must be stressed, however, that these initiatives are quite limited in their effects.  Any 
participants are mostly drawn either from officialdom, or from a highly select, usually 
westernised stratum of a civil society that is quite weak in all units of the RSC.  Any 
desecuritisations that might occur through these interpersonal contacts would still have 
to be seen in terms of drops in an ocean of mutual fear and suspicion.  There are no 
broad-based peace groups in any of the South Caucasian societies, no meaningfully 
pervasive counter-discourses to the narrow nationalisms that pervade the region, 
except, as argued above, in the highly dubious case of Georgia.  And this brings us 
back to my hypothesis on the relationship between the systemic level and the level of 
enmity within RSCs.   
If the great powers and the system-level have effects on the values and identities that 
drive conflict and are, in their common and collective forms, essential for the „warm 
peace‟ of thick security regimes and security communities, that link is distant and 
extremely indeterminate, certainly in comparison to the instrumental threats/means 
discourses that are much more linked to identifiable material conditions and an 
instrumental form of rationality.  The point is not so much that the systemic level, and 
great powers with „soft power‟ are irrelevant; rather, the processes that underlie 
changes in values and identity are to a far greater extent dependent on intra-regional 
and domestic factors; in view of the complexity of identity- and value-formation, 
systemic factors therefore prove far less directly relevant to the choice of ultimate ends 
than the identification of threats and means, and thus, the emergence of „warmer‟ 
forms of amity.   
Towards a Security Regime? 
The Southern Caucasus RSC is revisionist-conflictual.  In other words, on their 
argumentative side, divergent security discourses of its units tend to dismiss the 
existing status quo through their non-recognition of other units‟ legitimacy.  On their 
instrumental side, equally divergent discourses continue to view war and armed conflict 
as a legitimate and practically relevant means of securing states‟ referent objects.  The 
final question I put myself at the start of this thesis was the possibility of this RSC 
moving from the „revisionist conflict formation‟ part of the amity/enmity spectrum to 
„security regime‟, thin or thick.  For that to occur, the units within it would have to, first, 
recognise each other‟s legitimacy, and, secondly, war would have to be subject to long-
term restrictive regional normative mechanisms.   Are there any prospects of this 
occurring?  In terms of the general framework employed here, the question to ask is 
whether and how the state discourses underlying the status of the region as revisionist-
conflictual could be destabilised, either from below, from within the states‟ societies, or 
above, through pressures emanating from the systemic level of the great powers. 
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In the following paragraphs, I shall broach this question by looking at the stability of the 
regional security discourse, at rigidities reinforcing the conditions of extreme enmity, 
and instabilities potentially transforming these into something more amicable.  What 
has shaped the state discourses on security in this revisionist-conflictual way?  The 
first, most obvious rigidity can be found within the societies themselves. As seen 
throughout the thesis, the divergent discourses of enmity are firmly rooted in all 
societies in the region, which are imbued with an ethnic nationalism marked by 
essentialist and mutually exclusive identities, one that sees war as a logical way of 
enhancing state policy.  As pointed out above, there is no tradition whatsoever of large-
scale pacifist movements (similar to „Peace Now‟ in Israel); external efforts to promote 
such movements remain marginal at best.  There is no major pan-Caucasian 
movement advocating regional integration, based either on economic expediency or a 
shared „Caucasian‟ identity.  Any talk of region-wide co-operation stumbles on the 
deep-rooted enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and even Georgian-Azeri 
cooperation remains largely at a superficial, rhetorical level, confined in practice to the 
issue-areas of transportation and energy.   
The necessary conditions for the emergence of a security regime „from below‟ through 
the destabilisation of dominant narratives are thus lacking; all the more so because of 
the continued incoherence of the states in the region, which, as I argued in the 
previous sections, is a major impediment to amity, both in its horizontal and vertical 
forms.  With the divergent „strategies of survival‟ underlying the fragmentation of both 
Georgia and Azerbaijan so deeply rooted in the societies of the breakaway states, 
there is truly minimal hope of pressures from below facilitating re-unification.  And, as 
was pointed out above, the democratic deficit that underlies the vertical legitimacy of all 
units in the region, again, diminishes incentives for governments to reconsider their 
adherence to incompatible, essentialist identities and war as a continuation of policy by 
other means.  Nationalist rhetoric acts as an „Ersatz‟-legitimacy, and the weakness of 
civil societies further diminishes the chances of internally generated change. 
Could such compatible identities or normative limitations on war be imposed from 
above, from the systemic level?  As argued in the previous sections and chapters, the 
competitive-multipolar pattern of GPP provides a backdrop where regional units can 
bolster their relative power through alliances with great power „sponsors‟, and, at least 
in theory, a change in these patterns would have a limiting effect on the options open to 
them, at least in their instrumental policies towards incompatibly defined ends.  The link 
between GPP and value-based argumentative discourses is far more convoluted and 
tenuous than that between these penetrations and instrumental discourses.  How 
would a change in the patterns of GPP affect the chances of a security regime in the 
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RSC, through the dominance of the region by one single great power, or co-operation 
between these great powers, or in other words, the emergence of hegemony, unipolar 
and multipolar-cooperative forms of GPP? 
Of course, outright hegemony by any great power would supersede and suppress the 
„native‟ securitisations in the Southern Caucasus RSC, by definition. If Moscow 
managed to restore a situation of „overlay‟, this would remove much of the current 
usefulness – for Moscow at least – of maintaining frozen conflicts; in fact, a resolution 
would be seen as a priority for any power obtaining such comprehensive control over 
the region. Such a re-imposition of Russian hegemony – one that supersedes and 
suppresses all local patterns of securitisation – remains extremely unlikely.  First, it is 
clear that Russia does not currently aim for such an eventuality; while it certainly has a 
„geo-economic‟ view of its „sphere of special responsibility‟, its foreign policy clearly 
does not seek at the kind of total control that marked the Soviet Union‟s relationship to 
Eastern Europe during the Cold War.  While it certainly aims for the economic re-
integration of the former Soviet space, and for the maintenance of friendly, pro-Russian 
regimes in „its‟ region, that does not imply the kind of influence that would entail 
overlay.  In any event, it would be difficult to see how the traditionally more anti-
Russian societies in Georgia and Azerbaijan could ever accept such an eventuality; it 
would require considerable repressive force on Moscow‟s part, aside from the 
necessity of overcoming the very real material interests of the West within the region.  
A return to the past thus seems implausible. 
The opposite extreme would consist of the West gaining an exclusive and 
comprehensive foothold, through NATO and EU expansion, and either a transformation 
of Russian priorities away from the current geo-economic, moderately Eurasianist 
world-view and/or an implosion in Moscow‟s power. But this eventuality seems even 
less probable than that of a restoration of Russian hegemony.  The Southern 
Caucasus‟ importance to Russia – both in terms of identity and interest – was 
extensively pointed to in Chapter 9; it would take some kind of calamity resembling the 
situation in the early 1990s for Russia to give up its pretensions to a region with which 
it has maintained so complex a relationship for so long.   Its interests in the region are 
clearly greater and deeper than the West‟s, and simple geographic proximity amplifies 
its ability to project power into it.  Besides, Western interests in the region, while 
significant, would most probably not justify the effort such an exercise in overlay would 
require. 
Hegemony is a very extreme form of great power involvement, one that in effect 
severely limits the anarchy of a given RSC.  Less extreme, unipolar or multipolar-
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cooperative forms of GPP would not involve the suppression of regional patterns of 
securitisation, thus not addressing the problem of divergent argumentative discourses.  
But an assertion of unipolar penetration by either the West or Russia, or 
comprehensively co-operative penetration by the Western powers and Russia might at 
some point impose certain intermediate solutions on belligerents in the region by 
making war a normatively still acceptable but practically irrational choice.  Such 
changes in patterns of GPP would limit the array of options open to the countries within 
the region: with Georgia dependent on the West, Armenia dependent on Russia, and 
Azerbaijan dependent on its ability to play off West against East in their striving for its 
oil reserves, at least some of the recognised powers would see the costs of counter-
acting one single or several co-operating powers rise exponentially in the case of 
unipolar or multipolar-cooperative GPP. 
Unipolar outcomes in the patterns of GPP are only marginally less unlikely than 
hegemony for reasons parallel to the ones brought against the possibility of hegemonic 
dominance by one single power: in the absence of unforeseeable „events‟, none of the 
powers currently penetrating the region would seem to be in any way willing to 
withdraw from it completely, considering their firmly grounded interests.  The possibility 
of co-operative multipolar penetration as a possibly facilitating factor for the emergence 
of an imperfect security regime would require either a change in the well-grounded 
contradictory fundamental interests driving these powers, or some sort of mutual 
accommodation (based on linkages with higher-level, systemic interests, for instance).  
It would also necessitate a readiness of these great powers to co-ordinate their policies 
in the region across a wide variety of issue-areas, expending considerable resources in 
an effort to counter-act the strong intra-regional dynamics that ultimately sustain the 
various conflicts there, conflicts that, as we have seen, are not the result of „rational‟ 
calculations, but of clashing identities and values.   
Even in the unlikely event of unipolar or co-operative-multipolar GPP, these identities 
and values would thus continue to diverge in any foreseeable timeframe: any resulting 
security regime would be extremely imperfect and heavily dependent on long-term 
outside involvement. It is difficult to see how any kind of great power intervention could 
consciously „manufacture‟ the required compatibility in identities, as argued in the 
previous section.   In any case, such an attempt would require an extremely long-term 
commitment on the part of a great power (as the recent experience in the Balkans has 
shown), and co-ordinated action by a group of fundamentally inimical great powers 
over such a long period seems far-fetched and laced with uncertainties.  Both the 
divergent identities governing the behaviours of recognised states would have to be 
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addressed, as well as the inability of fragmented units to generate the collective 
strategies of survival required for coherent statehood: a tall order indeed. 
The two remaining sources of potential change would be material factors and, if you 
will, the „joker in the pack‟: human agency.  Could the one material variable that RSCT 
does recognise – polarity – be a driver for the emergence of a security regime? In the 
narrow case of Georgia and the secessionist units, it is difficult to see how a change in 
power relations could ever bring back Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Tbilisi‟s 
control without enormous costs in terms of Moscow‟s credibility.  But the one major 
indigenous variable affecting the broader polarity of the South Caucasus is the 
presence of hydrocarbons, oil and gas; and one could extrapolate as to its effects, 
boldly assuming the absence of „corrective‟ great power intervention.  Its main effect 
has been on the changing balance of power between the region‟s two largest 
belligerents – Armenia and Azerbaijan – and the one inter-state conflict impeding 
trilateral co-operation between the region‟s recognised units.  One of the possibilities 
might thus be identified in the changing indigenous balance of power between 
Armenia/Karabakh and Azerbaijan.  This would involve either the Armenian side 
desisting from separation in reaction to Azerbaijan‟s ominous threats, conscious of its 
inability to win any future war.   Or, conversely, it could consist of Azerbaijan, over the 
longer term, losing the perceived advantage emanating from its hydrocarbon reserves, 
thus grudgingly accepting the existing status quo. 
Yet, Armenia‟s armed forces and polity more generally seem confident of their ability to 
win any future conflict because of the perceived corruption within the Azeri army and 
the powerful advantage granted Armenian forces through their defensive position in 
notoriously difficult terrain.  Added to that comes its construction of Azeris as aiming to 
eradicate the Armenian presence in Karabakh over the longer term, if given any type of 
control: rationally, war is therefore a preferable bet over this perceived certainty.  As 
the ICG (2007) has pointed out, combined with growing Azeri confidence, and the 
dependence of Azerbaijan‟s political stability on oil-funded co-optation, with 
Azerbaijan‟s oil production scheduled to peak in 2012, this might actually push Baku 
towards military action before its oil advantage runs out, rather than seeking 
accommodation with Yerevan. 
All of the above indicates to what extent political-cultural change in the Caucasus is 
impeded, by attitudes within societies, the structure of GPP, and the material realities 
within the region.  Especially in the absence of full mutual recognition, the most likely 
outcome in the short term will thus be a continuation of the region‟s revisionist 
conflictuality.  Under such circumstances, a limited form of great power management 
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based on the one shared interest of all great powers in the avoidance of large-scale 
conflict would probably be the best hope for at least some modicum of stability.  Such a 
region- and issue-specific concert of the great powers would maintain a light-touch 
approach to maintaining stability and avoiding a thawing of the conflicts in the region 
through intelligent balancing, and threats and inducements.  The region would remain 
conflictual, war would still be seen as a legitimate method of conducting inter-state 
politics in the absence of formal security-enhancing mechanisms, but targeted 
interventions by the great powers might at the very least make it more impracticable for 
all sides, Armenia and Azerbaijan in particular.  Even today, a flare-up around 
Nagorno-Karabakh in particular would probably be met by intense diplomatic efforts 
aimed ending hostilities as soon as possible, considering the undoubted effects such 
an armed conflict would have on the interests of all great powers involved if allowed to 
occur or continue unchecked. 
However, structural theories like RSCT – and IR generally – tend to under-estimate the 
role of human agency as it is, by definition, unquantifiable and unpredictable.  But 
admittedly, the structure of the Southern Caucasus militates massively against positive 
change in its culture of anarchy; bringing about such change would indeed be quite a 
difficult task.  A „Schuman/Adenauer moment‟ would require unprecedented vision, 
alongside reciprocation and co-ordination from the most important actors within the 
region; it would not be sufficient for one statesperson or group with the required vision 
to remould underlying societal attitudes to take power in one republic, it would have to 
be a co-ordinated occurrence to work. Any such person or group – even if they 
succeeded in taking power – would have to contend with the fossilised attitudes and 
securitisations marking their respective states and societies.  And his or her chances 
for success would be greatly increased if these dominant ideologies and value-systems 
had been comprehensively discredited through „events‟, like a comprehensive defeat in 
war, or economic collapse/stagnation, and if structural conditions at the very least 
moved towards something more conducive to change, through, for instance, a change 
in the patterns of GPP towards benign unipolarity or co-operative multipolarity. 
It took Germany two defeats, and the providence of the allies who did not transform it 
into Morgenthau‟s agricultural economy, to generate the generally pacifist and 
Europeanist identity that marks its political culture today.  Could something similar to 
the combination of military defeat, the Soviet menace, American aid, and French and 
German statesmanship create similar shifts in the patterns of securitisation in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan or Georgia?  The shift in values/identities (argumentative discourse) and 
legitimate means (instrumental discourse) required for a transformation towards a self-
sustaining security regime rather than security community would be less profound than 
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those seen in post-War Europe.  It would simply require an acceptance of each other‟s 
legitimacy rather than a collective identity, and a management of the regional 
securitisations rather than full-scale de-securitisation (the latter being a characteristic of 
the more demanding, and regionally even more implausible, security community).   
The seeds for such mutual recognition are certainly there.  As pointed out in the 
introduction, there have been previous attempts within this region to create an 
integrated political-economic space.  Even if they were short-lived and doomed to 
failure, they could, one day, act as important precedents.  Looking into the past, there 
are the long periods when the predecessors to the entities that today make up the 
Southern Caucasus formed a more or less integrated cultural space; looking into the 
future, regional cooperation and integration can be amply justified by the enormous 
economic advantages that would result.  While these positive arguments from a pre-
nationalist past and a potential post-nationalist future have been largely marginalised in 
the narratives that exist in the region today, they do lay dormant in groups that operate 
at the fringes of regional civil society, and could, at some point, provide the basis for 
the construction of alternative identities that create a better regional „fit‟, helped along 
by expedient events and the courage of visionary regional statespersons that is today 
so very much lacking. 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis started out as a theoretical exercise aimed at an expansion of RSCT, and 
its subsequent application to two issues: first, the micro-perspective workings of 
several hypotheses regarding the relationship between state incoherence and the 
patterns of GPP and the level of conflict within a region; second, the potential for the 
emergence of a security regime within the Southern Caucasus RSC.  The preceding 
nine chapters have, hopefully, provided a sufficient answer to all the questions posed 
at the beginning of this endeavour, even if, as in most social-science exercises, many 
questions remain. 
RSCT‟s amity/enmity variable was expanded as a spectrum encompassing six distinct 
types, based on macro- and micro-perspective criteria.  Whether or not an RSC was 
classified as a revisionist or status-quo conflict formation, a thin or thick security 
regime, or a loose or tight security community depended on certain epiphenomenal 
elements – like the presence of armed conflict, of treaties, of supra-national institutions 
– and discursive components within the patterns of securitisation: the convergence or 
divergence of discourses in either their argumentative (identities/values) aspects, 
and/or their instrumental aspects (techno-scientific knowledge).  The chapter also 
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introduced the notion of discursive stability: whether or not the dominant narratives of 
security within a given society were contested by powerful counter-narratives with the 
potential of superseding them, giving some indication as to the possible movements 
across the spectrum of a given RSC. 
State (in)conherence was elaborated upon in the same objective/intersubjective vein, 
through an initial distinction between its vertical and horizontal variants, as well as 
ostensible stability and inherent weakness.  The significance of both state power and 
legitimacy, and the complex interactions between them both in constituting the stability 
and weakness of such states was also pointed out: while inherent weakness was 
connected to a low level of legitimacy, it was argued that ostensible instability resulted 
from an inability of a given state and society to maintain the force-legitimacy 
equilibrium: a fine-tuned balance between the force required to repress alternative 
„strategies of survival‟ and the ability of a given society to accept these applications of 
state power as legitimate.  The resulting typology of state incoherence included weak, 
unstable and collapsed/fragmented states, with the final two (differentiated according to 
vertical and horizontal weakness respectively) the result of the permanent inability of a 
state to apply legitimate force. 
Great power penetration, finally, was expanded through a re-articulation of the notion of 
„great power status‟ in its objective, subjective and intersubjective elements, with great 
power status emerging from a material ability to project power beyond one‟s own RSC, 
a subjective definition of interest that substantially reaches beyond that region, and an 
intersubjective acceptance as a great power by one‟s peers.  The interaction between 
the systemic and regional levels was similarly conceptualised as comprising objective, 
subjective and intersubjective aspects: the physical presence of a great power in an 
RSC, subjective definitions of interest linking a great power to the RSC, and the 
intersubjective „patterns of GPP‟ that result in the aggregate.  These patterns could be 
classified along a spectrum situated between hegemony and complete disengagement: 
from unipolar through cooperative-multipolar to competitive-multipolar, with both the 
individual great power involvements and the patterns themselves affecting the logic of 
anarchy governing a region. 
The above discussion shows how these expanded concepts were subsequently 
employed to answer the several question asked at the beginning of this thesis.  First, 
by providing an intricate, combined micro-perspective and macro-perspective view on 
state incoherence, great power involvement and regional conflict-proneness.  
Secondly, by providing a clear overview of conditions within the Southern Caucasus 
RSC.  Thirdly, by extrapolating the present towards possible future scenarios, 
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indicating that, rather than an abstract exercise for its own sake, RSCT, properly 
conceptualised, can provide myriad insights into the regionally specific functioning of 
International Relations, while at the same time contributing new, potentially fertile 
theoretical and methodological viewpoints to the field of Area Studies. 
But what are the broader implications of this expansion?  Two important insights come 
to mind: firstly, the overwhelming importance of regionalised diversified paradigms of 
international relations and international security.  Despite tremendous progress in that 
direction in the past two decades, IR and IS are both still too dominated by models and 
approaches that remain stubbornly systemic.  But if there is one central insight that 
constructivist and other post-positivist approaches have provided in this period, it is that 
there is no such thing as rationality, only rationalities, subject to differing „logics of 
anarchy‟.  In the absence of proper contextualisation, the allegedly universal insights 
provided by „elegant‟ rationalist theories of IR remain an empty box that must be filled 
with the regionally specific identities and values to which rationality is always 
subservient in real-world politics. 
A second important – and related – insight is the extent to which applied and applicable 
theories and methodologies of IR must necessarily be eclectic and pluralist to be of any 
practical value to real-world policymaking and scenario-building.  The era where 
parsimony and quantification could provide practically valuable insights to the study of 
the discipline is well and truly over.  This is obviously the case for purely ideational 
phenomena like amity/enmity, but also for more complex realities, like state 
incoherence or great power penetration.  The interpretation of ideas, of how states 
make anarchy what it is in their environs, must find its proper place at the very pinnacle 
of the discipline; simplistic law-like statements that treat the subject-matter of IR as 
dead, reactive matter distinct from its social environment can no longer stand 
unchallenged in their dominance, especially in the policymaking communities across 
the Atlantic, in the one still remaining superpower.  On the other hand, maintaining the 
other extreme by limiting oneself to an ever-flowing and assumedly self-standing 
discourse can only give a partial view of reality, disconnected from the material forces 
and realities and their real-world effects. 
The arrogance of the universal and systemic was perhaps best illustrated in the failure 
of the regional strategies and state-building exercises of that superpower in the Middle 
East and beyond.  It shows how, without the proper contextualisation, inflexible and 
narrow scholarship generating universal claims can have real detrimental effects on the 
real world; on the other hand, the humility that comes with the rejection of absolutes 
and a readiness to puncture rigid boundaries between different approaches leads to an 
 252 
acceptance of the fundamental complexity that the social realm of International 
Relations ultimately represents.   In combining neo-realism with securitisation theory 
and introducing a regional tier between units and system, RSCT has gone a long way 
in both directions, providing the possible spine for the construction of region-specific 
theories that capture peculiarity while still grounding themselves in a measure of 
universal truth. 
Different „rules of the game‟ prevail in conflict formations, security regimes, and security 
communities.  Human behaviour has been „captured‟ in each of these categories 
through universalist rationalist theories – like structural neo-realism and institutional 
neo-liberalism – that do give an insight into the workings of international politics and 
international security: but instead of being mechanically transposed from the universal 
realm, they must be inserted into the cultures of anarchy constituted by the prevailing 
discourses and narratives of a particular region. A deeper awareness of regional 
cultural specificities – one that would perhaps be closer to the frame of mind of an 
anthropologist than an economist or quantitative political scientist – would do away with 
the Western-centric notion of generic „man‟ acting according to equally generic 
„reason‟.  Regions function according to their specific rationality, and which universal 
theory applies in a particular case depends on the extent to which regional instrumental 
and argumentative discourses conform to the assumptions that a particular theory 
makes on the drivers of human action. 
The one perspective that the previous one hundred thousand words have largely left 
out has been an explicitly critical one.  Perhaps understandably so, as speaking truth to 
power is not RSCTs primary objective.  Yet, responsible scholarship always requires a 
critical, reflective eye that, in the best traditions of E.H. Carr, disassembles the realities 
of power behind existing narratives and tentatively projects visions of a better world.  In 
trying to objectively answer the question as to the potential transformation of the 
Southern Caucasus RSC, the version of RSCT presented here may not have directly 
pursued a transformative or emancipatory agenda, but has at least attempted to lay 
bare those bottlenecks and complications that make this region as conflictual as it is 
today.  And, in the unlikely event that its conclusions ever reached the region‟s political, 
economic and intellectual elites – who, for far too long, have adhered to ideas and 
notions that can only be described as retrograde and self-destructive – they would no 
doubt, not make comfortable reading. 
While, indeed, their agency in this matter is limited due to the complicated and 
interconnected nature of the RSC‟s material and ideational realities, there is no such 
thing as determination, even within the complex truths presented here.  There is still 
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space and time for Adenauers and Schumans to emerge in a region whose problems 
and promise are equally immense, to build upon the kernels of counter-discourse that 
reject the coarse, essentialist and at times absurd nationalist dogma that permeates its 
historical-ideological narratives.  De-securitisation is possible, however difficult it may 
be.   
During my fieldwork in the region, and my conversations with local actors, there were 
those who accepted established narratives without doubt; crucially, there were also 
those who looked upon their region with a sense of questioning and criticism.  All too 
often, the intellectually bankrupt ideas of the former have been taken into account by 
Western scholars and practitioners in misplaced deference for „local sensitivities‟.  If we 
can draw one lesson from the previous body of theory and empirics, it is that these 
narratives do not deserve such deference: they are the equivalents of the bigotry that 
kept Europe in perennial conflict up to 1945, and deserve nothing less than the 
systematic ridicule and relentless criticism that „truth to power‟ requires in this case.  
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APPENDIX 
 
1. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia (2007) 
 
Appendix  
of RA President Decree NH-37-N 
of February 7, 2007 
 
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
(approved at the session of National Security Council at the RA President office on 
January 26, 2007) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA 
 
The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia is a system of state policy 
aimed to guarantee state, public, and individual security, sustainable development and 
the maintenance of the Armenian identity. It is implemented through the development 
and execution of a unified state policy based on an all-inclusive system of democratic 
values for all spheres of life.  
 
The National Security Strategy is subject to further amendment in order to better 
address the domestic and international situation and to address the changing security 
threats and challenges, as well as to reflect the needs related to the effective 
implementation of the aims of this document.  
 
The main guarantees for the implementation of the National Security Strategy are:  
 
- an efficient system of governance; 
- the rule of law; 
- a consolidation of democratic values; 
- an independent and impartial judiciary; 
- combatability of the armed forces;  
- efficient security and law-enforcement structures; 
- foreign policy ensuring effective international engagement; 
and,  
- comprehensive social justice.  
 
I. FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
ARMENIA, FACTORS AND POLICIES OF SECURITY GUARANTEE, THREATS 
AGAINST IT  
 
1. FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA  
 
The fundamental values of the National Security of the Republic of Armenia are: 
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INDEPENDENCE. The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign, democratic state, based on 
the principles of social justice and the rule of law; 
 
PROTECTION OF THE STATE AND ITS POPULATION. The Republic of Armenia 
guarantees the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the state, and 
ensures the physical safety of its population;  
 
PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. The Republic of Armenia aspires to 
expand and develop its level of international engagement, and to promote peace and 
security in both the regional and global context; 
 
PRESERVATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY. The Republic of Armenia strives to 
preserve and develop the identity of the Armenian nation, within both Armenia and 
throughout its Diaspora;  
 
PROSPERITY. The Republic of Armenia aims to secure a higher quality of life for all of 
its population through sustainable development.  
 
2. FACTORS AND POLICIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY GUARANTEE  
 
The factors and policies serving the fundamental values of national security include:  
 
INDEPENDENCE  
- consolidating efficient governance supported by a stable constitutional order, through 
efficient and transparent state institutions and public administration; 
- enhancing and protecting democracy and civil liberties; 
- safeguarding all human rights and fundamental freedoms;  
- fully integrating and protecting all ethnic and national minorities residing in Armenia; 
- strengthening and consolidating all elements of a market economy, while promoting 
science-based, innovative, export-oriented industries;  
and,  
- ensuring the reliability, security and safety of energy, transport and communication 
infrastructure.  
 
SECURITY OF THE STATE AND POPULATION 
- maintaining modern and professional armed forces and an efficient security and law-
enforcement structure; 
- engaging in the global effort to combat transnational threats such as international 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their related 
components, organized crime, human trafficking and the illegal drugs trade, and 
production and import of low-quality food products; 
- forming favorable environment for the present and future generations; 
- maintaining an efficient utilization of natural resources, with comprehensive 
environmental regulation and protection; and, 
- integrating into international structures for the monitoring and prevention of natural 
and man-made disasters, adopting a reliable early-warning alert system to preempt 
and prevent natural and man-made disasters, and to ensure urban security and public 
safety. 
 
PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
- consolidating Armenias international standing and credibility, pursuing lasting peace 
and security in the region, and a deeper engagement in international security, including 
participation in international peacekeeping operations. 
 
PRESERVATION OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY  
- developing and implementing a comprehensive concept of ArmeniaDiaspora 
relations, with a broader mobilization of the potential of the Armenian Diaspora;  
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- promoting and fostering Armenian studieslanguage, literature, history and culture as 
factors ensuring continuity of national spiritual heritage and symbolizing national 
identity; 
and, 
- enhancing the Armenian national culture along with preserving the elements of its 
distinguishing national features, aware of universal cultural values and developments, 
including the promotion of Armenian cultural heritage abroad.  
 
PROSPERITY  
- eradicating poverty;  
- implementing a social policy aimed at protecting the vulnerable segments of the 
Armenian population; 
- developing and implementing competitive and efficient science and education 
policies, with a special focus on developing innovative technologies; 
- providing more inclusive and effective healthcare meeting highest international 
standards;  
and, 
- ensuring conditions for the development of spiritual and cultural potential of the 
individual and society.  
 
3. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY  
 
Threats to national security are defined as events, actions, or the absence thereof, that 
may threaten the existence of the Armenian state, society, family or individual. Such 
threats may emanate from domestic (internal threats) or foreign (external threats) 
sources. 
 
The key issue of the National Security of the Republic of Armenia is the settlement of 
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  
 
Since attaining independence at the end of the 20th century, Armenia has been 
engaged in a difficult process of transition which is the source of its main domestic 
threats.  
 
The National Security of the Republic of Armenia has also been faced with the 
emergence of several new inter- and intra-regional threats. Inter-regional threats stem 
mainly from unresolved ethnic and armed conflicts in neighboring states, whereas intra-
regional threats are rooted in a clash of interests of the main powers in the region.  
 
EXTERNAL THREATS  
 
USE OF FORCE. The Republic of Azerbaijan continues to pursue an aggressive policy 
of militant posturing that explicitly threatens the Republic of Armenia and the Republic 
of Nagorno Karabakh. Despite numerous factors preventing such development, openly 
militant statements articulated at the highest level, cause to consider them as direct 
threats. In light of the heightened threat environment, there is an additional danger that 
the Republic of Turkey, a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, may also pose an additional 
threat. Taking into consideration the universally known provisions of international law, 
the Republic of Armenia considers the trade and transport blockade imposed by Turkey 
and Azerbaijan as a use of force against the Republic of Armenia;  
 
ETHNIC CONFLICTS, INTERNAL UNREST AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN 
NEIGHBORING STATES. Such destabilizing developments may create a more diverse 
set of security threats for Armenia, from the disruption and disintegration of transit 
infrastructures to the spillover of ongoing military actions from neighboring states;  
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DISRUPTION OF TRANSIT THROUGH NEIGHBORING STATES. The disruption of 
both the TbilisiSukhumi railway and the road from Georgia into Russia has posed a 
significantly negative impact on Armenia. The imposition of broad international 
economic sanctions on Iran would also directly threaten the National Security of the 
Republic of Armenia;  
 
WEAKENING OR INEFFICIENCY OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES. It is the 
understanding of the Republic of Armenia that membership in a strategic alliance 
necessitates that all alliance members are inherently prohibited against adopting any 
action that violates the interests of the other alliance members. The Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) should, therefore, clarify the regulations regarding its 
involvement in the cases of military aggression directed against a member state;  
 
TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME. International terrorism in all its forms, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and narcotics, money laundering, and 
human trafficking, each constitute a direct threat to the Republic of Armenia;  
 
ENERGY DEPENDENCE. Armenia, with a scarcity of natural resources, is dependent 
on external energy supplies. Recent reforms, however, have led to more efficient 
energy relations both domestically and with Armenias main energy supplier, the 
Russian Federation, thereby easing Armenias energy dependence;  
 
ARMENIAS ISOLATION FROM REGIONAL PROJECTS. Armenian participation in 
regional infrastructure projects is of a great significance and, in this respect Armenia 
highly values the regional TRASSECA and INOGATE programs of the European Union 
(EU). Armenia also sees Azerbaijans effort to isolate Armenia from such regional 
development programs as a direct threat;  
 
DECLINE OF NATIONAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY IN THE ARMENIAN 
DIASPORA. The Republic of Armenia attaches a great importance to the preservation 
of the national identity in the Armenian Diaspora. Well-organized and efficiently 
integrated Diasporan communities are important contributions to the overall increase in 
Armenias international involvement. Any weakening of the Armenia-Diaspora ties and 
the absence of mutually enriching contacts may threaten the fundamental values of the 
National Security of the Republic of Armenia;  
 
EPIDEMICS AND NATURAL DISASTERS. The outbreak and spread of life-threatening 
epidemics globally and in neighboring regions, as well as natural or man-made 
disasters, may threaten the National Security of the Republic of Armenia.  
 
INTERNAL THREATS  
 
DETERIORATION IN THE EFFICACY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
DECLINE IN TRUST IN THE JUDICIARY. The Republic of Armenia is engaged in a 
transitional process of an active reform. Any deterioration in the efficacy of public 
administration and any decrease in the speed or scope of its reform effort are seen as 
potential threats to national security. The effectiveness, impartiality and independence 
of the judiciary are crucial for Armenia and, along with the efficacy of public 
administration, are essential considerations to sustain public trust; 
 
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. The current state of inadequacy 
among the political parties threatens the national security and the internal 
democratization and development of political parties is a key prerequisite for the 
consolidation of democracy in the country;  
 
INSUFFICIENT LEVEL OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION. Continuity and 
effectiveness of democratic systems of governance are at risk in all of the countries in 
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transition. Direct threats in this regard include an inadequate protection of human 
rights, shortcomings in electoral procedures and performance, and insufficient inclusion 
and engagement of civil society; 
 
POLARIZATION. The inadequate and incomplete provision of social security, 
significant levels of poverty, insufficient or unequal access to all aspects of professional 
training, health and social services, and emerging intolerance, comprise traditional 
challenges for all states in transition. Despite Armenias demonstrable progress in 
addressing these challenges, they remain significant risk factors for overall national 
security; 
 
URBANIZATION. The level of urbanization in Armenia was already quite significant 
during the Soviet period and has only continued since independence. This increase in 
urbanization stems mainly from a combination of inconsistencies in the labor market 
and a rural-urban division in access to education and living conditions, most notable in 
the capital. The continuation of this trend of urbanization constitutes a threat to the 
national security, as it results in a pattern of overly compact inhabitation and settlement 
in the areas prone to seismic activity, a deterioration of the demographic balance in 
rural areas, and a depopulation of border villages; 
 
CHALLENGES FROM THE MARKET ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL-BUDGET 
MANAGEMENT. An insufficiently competitive economic environment, an inadequate 
regulation of natural monopolies, and an underground or shadow economy and large 
cash flows, each pose a serious risk factor for the country. The Republic of Armenia 
strives to maintain consistent rates of high economic growth and, to foster liberalized 
trade, seeks to develop small and medium enterprises and attraction and safeguard 
foreign investment;  
 
INADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE. The Republic of Armenia faces a daunting 
challenge to construct and extend additional road links, provide reliable and safe water, 
and develop telecommunications networks and other related infrastructure;  
 
LOW LEVEL OF SCIENCE AND EDUCATION. Education is a traditionally important 
priority for Armenia. Inefficient administration in the science and education sectors, 
inadequate levels of international engagement and collaboration, and insufficient 
access to professional education are threats to national security;  
 
INADEQUATE INTELLECTUAL AND NATIONAL EDUCATION. The education of 
national morals and tenets of patriotism should start at home and continue through all 
levels of formal education. An insufficient awareness of national ideals, respect towards 
the state and its institutions, and individual morality, including healthy living, the 
traditional role of the family, and the misinterpretation of the national identity, threaten 
national security;  
 
NEGATIVE DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS. The Republic of Armenia sees a low national 
birthrate, disappointing indexes of health, mortality, life expectancy and the quality of 
life, unregulated and illegal migration, especially among the educational, scientific and 
cultural workforce, as demographic threats to national security;  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES. The Republic of Armenia recognizes the importance of increasing the 
efficient use and protection of the countrys mineral and natural resources, especially its 
water and forest resources. The preservation of Lake Sevan and the properly regulated 
utilization of its natural resources are priority elements of the environmental policy of 
Armenia; 
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EPIDEMICS AND DISASTERS. The outbreak of epidemics, devastating earthquakes 
and other natural and man-made disasters pose potential security risk factors.  
 
The National Security Strategy serves as the basis for any policies that the Republic of 
Armenia may develop and implement to prevent and overcome threats and risks to 
national security, and provides a guide to guarantee the sustainable development of 
the Armenian state and the society.  
 
II. DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY 
 
The sustainable and secure development of the Republic of Armenia calls for greater 
efficiency in governance, establishment of democratic values and continued economic 
growth. In recognition of the above, Armenia has undertaken a comprehensive reform 
process. The implementation of these reform programs is supported by the 
preservation of the Armenian national identity, through a full utilization of national 
potential and is supported by and based on international best practices. Thus, any 
failure or delay in the reform effort is a direct threat to the National Security of the 
Republic of Armenia. 
 
The implementation of these reforms is ensured through an integrated national policy 
and is reflected by the Armenian Constitution, its obligations under international 
treaties, legislation, presidential decrees and regulations, and all governmental 
decisions and supporting sub-legislation.  
 
 
1. EFFICIENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
 
Goals: an increased level of state governance, with a solid system of the political 
system, the establishment of security and the protection of democratic values, first and 
foremost all human and civil rights, and the development of a civil society.  
 
Institutional reforms are aimed at the strengthening of a democratic state, the effective 
functioning of the bodies of public administration, the independence and impartiality of 
the judiciary, a consolidation of the system of local self-government, the wider inclusion 
of civil society in the decision-making and monitoring processes, and an intensification 
of the fight against corruption, especially bribery. In this respect, Armenia has initiated 
a number of long-term state programs, most notably an anti-corruption strategy, sound 
administrative justice and innovative e-governance projects.  
 
One of the national security-related priority programs is the creation of an efficient 
disaster management system.  
 
The Republic of Armenia considers a strategic reform of judiciary as one of the key 
priorities for the establishment of a durable constitutional order, the rule of law, and for 
the effective functioning of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
government. These reforms are further aimed at the protection of human and civil 
rights, and the protection of the state, society and individual against illegal actions.  
 
2. BUILDING THE ARMED FORCES  
 
Goals: the creation of a military capability able to defend and resist any aggression or 
incursion, to guarantee the physical safety, sovereignty and independence of the 
people of the Republic of Armenia, and to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state.  
 
Efficient and modern Armenian Armed Forces must always be prepared to repulse any 
threat and guarantee the military security of the Republic of Armenia. The priorities and 
goals of the defense of the Republic of Armenia are to be established and formulated in 
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a separate document on military doctrine. A defense strategy is the basis of the 
activities of the Armenian Armed Forces.  
 
The Republic of Armenia consistently adheres to the principles of civilian control and 
democratic planning within the defense budget process.  
 
The Republic of Armenia recognizes the inability of an individual state to address the 
modern challenges alone, and aspires to engage in active military-political cooperation 
with both the states of and beyond the region. The Armenian military holds an 
important place as a contributor and partner in international peace and security efforts.  
 
All defense reforms and cooperation serve the interests of the Republic of Armenia and 
are not aimed against any third party or country.  
 
3. LIBERALIZING THE ECONOMY  
 
Goals: sustainable economic growth, the development of small and medium 
enterprises, energy independence, and the creation of an open and attractive business 
environment.  
 
The respect and protection of private property and entrepreneurship are long-held 
facets of the traditional Armenian culture, and have been reflected in reform policies 
aimed at creating favorable conditions for rapid economic growth.  
 
Armenia has focused on promoting the development of small and medium enterprises, 
in recognition of their invaluable role in the establishment of a democratic society and 
the preservation of traditional family ties.  
 
The key priorities in fostering sustainable economic growth include:  
 
- promoting market economic relations; 
 
- consolidating competition; 
 
- achieving macroeconomic and financial stability, developing financial system; 
 
- enhancing financial intermediation; 
 
- improving a competitive business environment, with a significant decrease in the 
shadow economy and the dollarization;  
 
- preventing monopolization within sectors of the economy, including the efficient 
administration and supervision of natural monopolies; 
 
- implementing a long-term program of investment promotion; 
 
- introducing more balanced territorial and sectoral social and economic development, 
with an effective administration of infrastructure; 
 
- promoting technology-oriented and environmentally sound industries;  
and, 
 
- promoting exports.  
 
The Republic of Armenia identifies the need to implement reforms focused on 
individual branches of industry and sets the following priorities:  
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- to pursue greater energy independence through a diversification of energy supplies 
and production, the creation of new sources of energy, including nuclear energy, and to 
develop a stable and reliable export-oriented energy system; 
 
- to promote the sustainable development of transport, through the integration of 
Armenia in regional transit routes and networks, while striving to effectively lift the 
blockade of Armenia; 
 
- to introduce sound environmental practices, with the proper and prudent utilization of 
all natural resources, including water, to preserve Lake Sevan and its surroundings, to 
restore and preserve forests, ensure the safe use of nuclear power, supervise the 
storage of hazardous chemicals, radioactive material and waste, and to introduce an 
early-warning alert rapid-reaction and disaster management system for natural and 
man-made disasters, including the raising of disaster awareness and public 
preparedness; and, 
 
- to ensure biological safety and food security, including an increase in agricultural 
production and food processing capacity, the improvement of the import-export balance 
in agricultural trade, compliance with international food safety standards, the 
implementation of new, inclusive regional development projects, with a special focus on 
the border and highland areas, and an increase in agricultural efficiency through the 
introduction of new modern technologies.  
 
4. NEW QUALITY OF LIFE AND MORALE  
 
Goals: poverty eradication, higher living standards over the long-term, the consolidation 
of social justice and an elimination of societal polarization, the modernization of 
education and science, with greater access to education, and continued cultural and 
intellectual development. 
 
The policy priorities in the fields of social security, education, intellectual and cultural 
developments include:  
 
- consolidating the state based on social justice; 
 
- establishing and promoting public accord; 
 
- addressing the social needs of the population, with greater access to social services; 
 
- improving social standards through the creation of new jobs and the establishment of 
a social insurance system; 
 
- improving the system of pensions, raising the minimal pension to internationally 
accepted standards; 
 
- addressing the negative demographic situation; 
 
- regenerating the professional community, especially in the fields of science and 
education, as a prerequisite for sustainable economic and public development.  
 
Therefore, the Republic of Armenia aspires to:  
 
- implement a long-term state policy aimed at empowering the countrys scientific 
potential, restructuring educational system to comply with European standards and to 
meet the social and economic needs of the state, introducing modern education 
technologies; 
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- translate the body of academic knowledge for the use in Armenia, engage academia 
in all areas, including defense, in order to achieve more efficient modernization; 
 
- prevent the brain-drain;  
 
- increase the role of the Armenian as a language of the national identity and of the 
state language; 
 
- effectively protect intellectual property; 
 
- create a favorable environment for the preservation and reproduction of universal and 
national values, national traditions, and standards of cultural and intellectual heritage; 
 
- ensure increased access to cultural values; 
 
- support the spiritual, moral, social and cultural activities of the Armenian Apostolic 
Church; 
 
- prevent any threat to the cultural and intellectual identity and moral values of the 
Armenian people; 
 
- engage in greater cooperation with other states in order to preserve Armenian 
cultural, spiritual and historic monuments located within their territory; 
 
- protect the historic, spiritual, cultural heritage and the ethnic identity of the national 
minorities living in Armenia; 
 
- integrate into the international information area, to ensure professional promotion of 
Armenia and the Armenians, and to counter disinformation and propaganda; 
 
- promote relevant information about Armenia and all branches of Armenian studies 
through the Internet, with the creation of relevant Armenian websites; 
 
- promote sustainable and balanced urban development, including creation of 
harmonious biosphere and fostering of proportionate territorial density of population, 
and incorporating considerations of seismic vulnerability, especially in Yerevan;  
 
- create a more efficient healthcare system, through the promotion of healthy living, the 
regulation and monitoring of medication and related medicinal supplies, the prevention 
of diseases, especially radiation sickness, biological terrorism and substance abuse, 
and the early diagnosis of disease and their treatment, with a focus on the protection of 
mothers and infants and pre-natal care.  
 
III. THE REPUBLIC OF NAGORNO KARABAKH 
 
The just and peaceful resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is a key issue for the 
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, which is the guarantor of the 
safety and security of the population of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh).  
 
The parties to the conflict have each assented to the mediation by the Organization for 
Security and Cooperations (OSCE) Minsk Group and continue to support the Minsk 
Group co-chairing states (France, the Russian Federation, and the United States) in 
their effort to support a negotiated resolution to the Karabakh conflict. The Republic of 
Armenia appreciates the high level of expertise of those involved in the negotiations 
and does not deem it necessary to consider or accept declarations made by other 
international organizations or their possible involvement.  
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The Republic of Armenia advocates a peaceful and compromise-based solution to the 
conflict.  
The legal aspects for the foundation of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh are sound 
and not in question. The position of the Republic of Armenia is based on the principle 
that any final solution or final document should be approved by the Karabakh side and 
Armenia is ready to accept only a resolution which would affirm the irreversible reality 
of the existence of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.  
 
Nagorno Karabakh should have a geographic link to Armenia and its security should be 
guaranteed. 
 
Azerbaijans militant policy vis-à-vis Nagorno Karabakh and its readiness to opt for the 
military solution of the problem are direct threats to the security of Armenia. Under such 
circumstances, Armenia needs to have an army with increased defense capability to 
guarantee its security. The main priority of the army is to safeguard the inviolability of 
the borders of the Republic of Armenia and to be the guarantor of the physical safety of 
the peoples of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.  
 
IV. EXTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY  
 
Armenia implements an external security strategy based on the following basic 
principles:  
 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
The foreign policy of Armenia is based on a partnership approach that seeks to 
simultaneously develop relations with all states in the region and with states with 
interests in the region. Such a policy is aimed at maintaining an overall balance in the 
region. The positive trends in the dialogue and cooperation among the major powers 
and the consolidation of the international community to combat terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are conducive to Armenias pursuit of its 
foreign policy of complementarity.  
 
ENGAGEMENT 
Armenia is actively involved in both regional and international integration and regards 
itself as an equal partner in such processes. Armenia sees its engagement and 
participation in these international developments as being in conformity with Armenian 
interests. Armenias strategic partnership with Russia, its adoption of a European model 
of development, mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran and the United States, 
membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and its intensification of the cooperation with the 
NATO alliance, all contribute to the consolidation of the potential of Armenias policy of 
complementarity.  
 
There are three layers of Armenias external security strategy: the international, regional 
and pan-Armenian.  
 
 
1. INTERNATIONAL 
In order to keep pace with international developments, and to better address their 
positive and negative trends, the Republic of Armenia has adopted a strategy of 
promoting its national interests through international integration and active 
engagement. Such a strategy demands active participation in current international 
developments and intensive multilateral, multi-layer and bilateral policy.  
 
The main directions of the strategy of integration/engagement are:  
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- participating in global security efforts, particularly, fight against terrorism and 
peacekeeping operations; 
 
- participating in international arms control regimes;  
 
- active engaging in major international organizations;  
 
- developing relations with global centers of power and countries with interests in the 
region;  
and, 
 
- participating in European and post-Soviet integration.  
 
1.1. MILITARY-POLITICAL COMPONENTS OF THE EXTERNAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY  
 
Armenias military cooperation with individual states and membership in international 
and regional security structures, and its active participation in their programs, are 
aimed only at consolidating the security of the country. The main components of 
military-political security include:  
 
- bilateral relations with Russia, with defense and technical military cooperation, 
through a strategic partnership between the two states; 
 
- participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; 
 
- bilateral military cooperation, particularly with the United States and Greece; 
 
- cooperation with the NATO alliance;  
and, 
 
- engagement in activities of international security organizations, such as the OSCE, 
which guarantee open and transparent arms control regimes.  
 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION (CSTO) 
Armenia is a founding member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 
The aim of the CSTO is to collectively prevent and, if necessary, repulse a military 
threat against any of its participating states.  
 
Armenia views its participation in this organization as a component of its security, 
which is exercised through various levels of ties between its member states. The 
military component of the CSTO provides privileged conditions for the supply of the 
military equipment to CSTO member-states, which is a key priority for Armenia.  
 
The intensification of the military component of the CSTO is aimed at the establishment 
of mechanisms for military cooperation and for an effective way to exchange 
information and address international threats, such as terrorism and trafficking in arms 
and drugs.  
 
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)  
Armenia strives to establish intensive relations with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.  
 
Armenias active participation in the PfP is important both in terms of the necessity for a 
significant level of relations with European security structureNATOand for the 
development of bilateral relations with the United States and other allies, but also for 
Armenias policy of European integration.  
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Armenia is intensifying its political dialogue with NATO, and is establishing compatible 
military units, such as the current peacekeeping battalion, capable of participating in 
NATO peacekeeping operations. Armenia is also a part of NATOs Planning and 
Review process.  
 
The successful implementation of the PfP Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) will 
foster the greater modernization and efficiency of the Armenian defense system and 
will bring it in closer conformity with the defense systems of advanced states, including 
their armed forces.  
 
1.2. MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
 
UNITED NATIONS 
 
Since acquiring UN membership in 1992, Armenia has fully adhered to the universal 
values of the United Nations, such as the protection of human rights, democracy and 
rule of law as an integral constituent of the state ideology, and has both actively 
participated in various activities of the organization and cooperated with many bodies, 
subsidiary organs and structures of the United Nations organization.  
 
Through its continued participation and practical contribution to the international fight 
against terrorism and to several UN peacekeeping efforts, Armenia will assist 
international security and stability efforts.  
 
While Armenia attributes great importance to the leading role of the United Nations in 
maintaining international peace and security, it also believes that the new geopolitical 
realities of today demand a reform of the organization in order to better address new 
challenges.  
 
EUROPEAN STRUCTURES  
 
a. EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
The development and consolidation of Armenias relations with the European 
structures, and with the European Union (EU) above all, is a priority direction for the 
countrys foreign policy.  
 
The further intensification of the countrys diverse cooperation with the EU will promote 
the consolidation of democracy, strengthen the rule of law, and protect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.  
 
In addition, the development of relations with the EU, as a major global economic and 
political power, broadens Armenias trade and economic links and supports the 
countrys economic development.  
 
Through its regional initiatives, the EU promotes a favorable environment for the 
establishment of lasting stability and cooperation in the South Caucasus region. 
Armenias inclusion in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is a major step forward 
toward European integration.  
 
Establishment of close relations with the EU serves Armenias long-term interests.  
 
 
b. COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
Membership in the Council of Europe affirmed Armenias place in the European family 
and its commitment to develop itself as a country in adherence to European political, 
legal, cultural, and human rights standards.  
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Armenia highly values the readiness of the Council of Europe to promote the inter-state 
and civil society contacts in the South Caucasus and considers it an important factor 
for the fostering of regional cooperation, conflict resolution and regional security.  
 
 
c. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE) 
Armenias participation in the OSCE is important for the promotion of peace and 
security, and for the expansion of the principles of democracy and rule of law.  
 
The role of the OSCE, and its Minsk Group, the mediating body engaged in the 
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, makes the OSCE an especially important 
organization for Armenia.  
 
Armenias active involvement in the three main dimensions of the OSCE, the politico-
military, the economic and environmental, and the human, are important factors for the 
security and stability of the country. 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) 
 
Armenia is a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
is an active contributor to the development and implementation of its cooperation 
programs. Such a policy serves the economic, humanitarian, political, military and other 
interests of the country.  
 
The CIS promotes the economic, social and humanitarian ties between its members 
and is making an effort to establish greater cooperation in various domainsin the 
politico-military arena, the security of external borders, in combating international 
terrorism and in fighting organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration.  
 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Armenia is greatly interested in its further integration into international economic 
organizations and more active participation in their economic activities. The countrys 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a major step in this direction.  
 
The continued close and successful cooperation between Armenia and the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and their sizable assistance to Armenia, 
have been a significant contribution to the efficiency of reforms in Armenia.  
 
Armenia also participates in the activities of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC).  
 
 
1.3. BILATERAL DIMENSIONS OF EXTERNAL SECURITY 
 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Although Russia includes a part of the Caucasus, ArmenianRussian relations go far 
beyond the regional level. The importance of Russias role for the security of Armenia, 
the traditional friendly links between the two nations, the level of trade and economic 
relations, Russias role in the Nagorno Karabakh mediation effort, as well as the 
presence of a significant Armenian community in Russia, all contribute to a strategic 
partnership.  
 
The foundation for this strategic partnership was established through a Treaty on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the Declaration on the 
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Collaboration towards the 21st Century. Both these agreements and a bilateral 
agreement on defense cooperation, including within the framework of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), serve as the main pillars of the Armenian 
security system.  
 
The Russian military presence in Caucasus is an important factor for Armenias security 
and for the preservation of the political and military balance in the region. The Republic 
of Armenia and the Russian Federation jointly guard the Armenian borders and 
cooperate in air defense.  
 
Armenia attributes a great importance to its cooperation with Russia in the areas of 
defense, military-technical relations, energy, transportation, regional stability and 
security, and in the improvement of the legal status of the large number of Armenians 
residing in Russia.  
 
THE UNITED STATES 
The relationship between Armenia and the United States is continuing to develop 
dynamically, both because of the important U.S. role in regional and global military-
political and economic processes and international relations and due to the diverse 
U.S. assistance provided to Armenia.  
 
Armenia and the United States closely cooperate in the implementation of democratic 
reforms in Armenia. Bilateral economic cooperation and commercial ties continue to 
expand and the U.S. holds an increasingly significant share in foreign investment in 
Armenia.  
 
The U.S. is a co-chair of the OSCEs Minsk Group and contributes to seeking a 
mediated resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Armenia also values the efforts 
of the United States in establishing greater stability and security in our region and to 
promote regional cooperation.  
 
Armenia has also partnered with the U.S. in the fight against international terrorism, 
peacekeeping operations, as well as in the confronting the challenges of proliferation 
and other global security related issues.  
 
The Armenian Diaspora, through its various organizations and centers in the United 
States, has contributed to the development of bilateral relations between Armenia and 
the United States.  
 
EUROPEAN STATES 
Armenias bilateral relations with the European states are part of its overall process 
toward European integration. Economic and social development, European integration, 
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, regional stability and development of 
regional cooperation are each high on Armenias bilateral agenda. Implementation of 
this agenda would only promote the intensification of the trade links, facilitate access to 
the European market, and encourage foreign investment in Armenia. 
 
Armenia is interested in the diversified development of relations with its European 
partners, and has specifically identified the consolidation of bilateral political and 
economic ties as a priority. Cooperation in international organizations and the 
existence and positive potential of significant Armenian communities in some European 
states serve as additional contributions to the promotion of mutually beneficial 
cooperation.  
 
Armenia also values the lessons from the Eastern European countries experience and 
its consideration in its reform processes.  
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MIDDLE EAST 
Relations with the countries of the Middle East are important for Armenia given both 
the regions proximity and the impact of developments in the Middle East on broader 
international politics.  
Reflecting Armenias centuries-old links to the countries of the Middle East, there are 
still numerous Armenian communities throughout the region, that have long contributed 
to the social, political, economic and cultural development of the region and its 
constituent states.  
 
Armenia will continue to develop its relations and cooperation with its traditional partner 
states in the Middle East and will strive to give new impetus to developing trade and 
economic relations with the Arabic countries of the Gulf and the Mediterranean regions.  
 
ASIA AND PACIFIC 
Armenia has intensified and broadened its relations with the countries of the Asia-
Pacific region in general, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) member states in particular. In terms of developing both a bilateral and 
multilateral framework, Armenia has identified the increasing international role of major 
ASEAN countries, particularly China, India and Japan, their economic potential and 
progress, as well as opportunities for cooperating with these countries within 
international organizations.  
 
2. REGIONAL  
 
Both Armenias relations with its neighbors and developments in the region serve as 
basic factors for the Armenian security.  
 
Armenia continues to advocate regional cooperation, seeks the creation of regional 
security system, and advocates the promotion of constructive relations among all 
neighboring states. Armenia also notes the challenges posed by the unresolved 
conflicts and disputes between the states of the region, and the absence of common 
and unified mechanisms for security, stability and communication.  
 
In this way, the key to resolving the conflicts in the region, to solving the disputes and 
overcome historic difficulties, and to preventing the emergence of dividing lines in the 
region and their negative consequences, is through dialogue and cooperation.  
 
The regional directions of the Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia include:  
 
- consolidating regional stability, establishing, restoring and developing mutually 
beneficial bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation; 
 
- further developing neighborly relations by implementing diversified programs of 
cooperation with Iran and Georgia;  
 
- resolving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan; 
 
- seeking a normalization of relations with Turkey; 
 
- consolidating democracy throughout the region;  
and, 
 
- engaging in international economic projects focusing on the region. 
 
 
2.1. BILATERAL DIMENSIONS OF EXTERNAL SECURITY 
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ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN  
The development of traditional neighborly relations between Armenia and Iran is based 
on a number of shared realities: shared borders, historic and cultural ties, and mutual 
economic interests. 
 
Armenias main southern transit route passes through Iran as does Armenias strategic 
access to Asia and Middle East, a reality only exacerbated by the blockade of Armenia 
imposed by its two neighboring states.  
 
The two countries have significant interests in energy cooperation and are currently 
implementing several joint projects aimed at providing Armenia with important 
alternative sources of energy.  
 
Armenia appreciates the balanced position which Iran, as a major actor both in the 
region and within the Islamic world, has adopted regarding the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict.  
 
Armenia seeks to continue to develop its cooperation with Iran in the energy sector, 
and is pursuing policies designed to expand bilateral trade, establish new 
communications, and to effectively utilize the existing potential.  
 
Armenia also values Irans engagement in various processes in the South Caucasus 
region and regards it a factor contributing to maintaining balance and stability in the 
region. 
 
GEORGIA 
Armenia has traditionally enjoyed friendly relations with Georgia which have 
contributed to the maintenance of overall stability in the region.  
 
Georgia is an important regional partner for Armenia and is seen as a partner for 
Armenia, with the expansion of the existing high-level bilateral cooperation rooted in 
the long-term strategic interests of both countries.  
 
Armenia is mostly interested in the stable and secure development of Georgia and 
would welcome a lasting peaceful resolution of existing conflicts in Georgia. Such a 
resolution would allow Armenia to benefit from the vital transit links through Georgia 
and would promote the restoration of the Tbilisi-Sukhumi railway, a consideration with 
particular significance for both Armenia and the region as a whole.  
 
The existence of a large, well-established Armenian community in Georgia brings 
added importance to relations between two countries. The two governments have 
engaged in fostering cooperation aimed at improving the social and economic situation 
of the Armenian population of Georgia, including the Armenian community of the 
southern Georgian region of Javakhk.  
 
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
There are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. The establishment of 
normal diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey is hampered by preconditions 
set forth by the Turkish side.  
 
Armenia has long advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations without any 
precondition and will continue its efforts to surmount the obstacles and improve the 
bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey.  
 
Armenia aspires for the universal recognition and condemnation, including by Turkey, 
of the Armenian Genocide, and sees it both as a restoration of an historical justice and 
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as a way to improve the overall situation in the region, while also preventing similar 
crimes in the future.  
 
The unnatural character of bilateral relations and the closed border by Turkey threaten 
the Armenian security and hamper its lasting development. The absence of normalized 
relations adversely affects the stability of the region as a whole and impedes the 
development of regional cooperation.  
 
The normalization of ArmenianTurkish relations would decrease the risk of new dividing 
lines emerging in the region and would help to create a more conducive environment 
for the final settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  
 
Armenia closely follows Turkeys accession negotiations with the European Union and 
hopes that the process will avoid any application of double standards. Armenia 
stresses that the lifting of the Turkish blockade of Armenia, which has acquired special 
importance in view of Armenias inclusion in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 
will be an important condition in the negotiations between Turkey and the EU. 
 
AZERBAIJANI REPUBLIC 
Diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have not been established due 
to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan has adopted a policy aimed at the 
exclusion of Armenia from all projects of regional cooperation.  
 
Azerbaijan continuously refuses to open its communication routes with Armenia and 
denies all Armenian and international initiatives to engage in bilateral cooperation in an 
attempt to exert pressure on Armenia regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  
 
Armenia believes that the bilateral and regional cooperation could build confidence and 
have a serious positive impact on the overall situation. Armenia will continue its 
confidence building efforts and to this end will encourage cooperation, contacts and 
visits on every level.  
 
3. ARMENIA DIASPORA RELATIONS 
 
The wide range of issues comprising ArmeniaDiaspora relations presents a significant 
component of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia. In sheer 
numbers, the Armenian Diaspora exceeds the overall population of Armenia; it is 
geographically diverse and stems largely from the exodus of Armenians to safety 
during the Genocide and related forced deportations. The Armenian Diaspora is well 
integrated within their host countries of residence and is active in many areas of 
political, economic and social affairs of those countries. The largest Diasporan 
communities are presently located in the Russian Federation, the United States, 
France, Iran, Georgia and in some Arab countries. Majority of the Diasporan 
Armenians are non-Armenian citizens.  
 
In order to consolidate relations with its Diaspora, the Republic of Armenia focuses its 
efforts on preventing the assimilation and loss of lingual and cultural identity among the 
Armenians living abroad. Additionally, Armenia embraces all systemic demonstrations 
of Diaspora involvement in the solution of vital problems facing Armenia and Nagorno 
Karabakh.  
 
The integration of the Armenian nation offers a serious degree of economic and cultural 
potential, especially as a means to promote trade, tourism, preservation, development 
and publicizing of the cultural heritage. 
 
The preservation and intensification of ties with the Diaspora also creates a unique 
bridge between Armenia and the international community, as Armenian community 
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organizations worldwide support the development of bilateral ties with different 
countries, and foster Armenias global integration and consolidation of democracy.  
 
The Armenian Apostolic Church, through its capacity as the national church, also has 
an important mission in the integration of the Armenians and the development of the 
nation.  
 
 
CONCLUDING PROVISIONS 
 
The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia serves as a guideline for the 
determination of the main directions, challenges and priorities of the countrys domestic 
and foreign policy. Further revisions of the National Security Strategy should address 
the changing nature of dynamic internal, regional and global developments, altered 
situation and political priorities.  
 
Any declarations made on behalf of the Republic of Armenia and by its state officials 
should preserve the wording, intent and the spirit of the National Security Strategy.  
 
In order to ensure the overall consistency of the decisions adopted by the state and 
administrative authorities of the Republic of Armenia, such decisions should be in 
accordance with the provisions of the National Security Strategy.  
 
The provisions of the National Security Strategy are exercised on the basis of the 
development of guidelines and action plans in the areas of foreign policy, defense, 
economy, food security, energy, environment protection, the safety of communications 
and information, demography, science and education, and intellectual and cultural 
developments. These guidelines are elaborated by the Government of the Republic of 
Armenia in accordance with the provisions of Articles 85, 86, and 89 of the RA 
Constitution.  
 
CHIEF OF STAFF  
OF THE RA PRESIDENT    A. GEVORKYAN 
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2. National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2007) 
 
Approved by Instruction No. 2198 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
on 23 May 2007 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Azerbaijan has a centuries-long history of statehood and established the first ever 
democratic Republic in the East in 1918. Azerbaijan lost its state independence in 1920 
only to restore it in 1991 in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The people 
of Azerbaijan benefiting from the opportunity to foster greater democratic values have 
chosen the path of building a modern democratic State based on its national statehood 
traditions, historical and cultural heritage. 
 
In the early years of its independence the young Republic faced the military aggression 
of Armenia, internal instability, hardships of a transition period and other serious 
challenges. Nevertheless, the Republic of Azerbaijan under the leadership of its 
national leader Heydar Aliyev overcame all the difficulties and, having succeeded in 
identifying and following a consistent approach to strategic development, is now 
transforming into an economically and politically dynamic modern State and 
consolidating its global and regional position. In this latter regard, Azerbaijan is 
becoming an important and in many cases a decisive country to cooperate with in the 
Caspian-Caucasus region, and plays an indispensable role in the realization of the 
regional energy and transportation projects. The ultimate goal of this overall strategy is 
to ensure the prosperity, sustainable development and well-being of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan and to contribute to maintaining security and stability in the whole region. 
 
The National Security Concept (hereinafter the "Concept") is a set of goals, principles 
and approaches to the policies and measures, which underline the independence, 
territorial integrity and democratic development of the country, integration into the Euro-
Atlantic area as the strategic choice, and multidimensional and balanced foreign policy, 
as well as are directed at the protection of the individuals, society and State in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan against internal and external threats. 
 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
 
The security environment of the Republic of Azerbaijan is derived from a set of factors 
which affects the protection of the State sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of 
borders, national interests, and ensuring sustainable development, values of the 
people and their prosperity. 
 
Geographically located at the crossroads of the West and East, the Republic of 
Azerbaijan has embraced the positive elements of various civilizations. The Republic of 
Azerbaijan shares the European values and as an inalienable component of the Euro-
Atlantic security architecture contributes to the security of this area. At the same time, 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, as part of the Islamic world, shares the progressive 
heritage and spiritual values of the Islamic civilization. 
 
The currently unstable region where the Republic of Azerbaijan is located has vast 
potential and opportunities, which can be used effectively for development in a friendly 
and cooperative manner with regional and wider international partners. The rich natural 
resources of the Republic of Azerbaijan open perspectives for the country's prosperity 
and national welfare and transform the country into an important energy source and a 
crucial integral part of the international energy supply system. The development of 
international transportation and communication corridors, including the construction of 
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oil and gas pipelines, already contribute to the development of the economy of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and of its partners, and is a salient example of regional 
cooperation. 
 
This geographic location provides important advantages, but is also a source of a 
number of the security challenges facing the country. The most important and vivid 
example of such challenges is the aggression committed by neighbouring Armenia 
against the Republic of Azerbaijan, as a result of which a considerable portion of the 
country was occupied and approximately one million Azerbaijanis were displaced or 
became refugees. The aggression was accompanied by serious crimes against peace 
and humanity, including genocide and terrorist acts against the citizens of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan, whilst the occupied territories provide fertile ground for illegal activities 
pursued by transnational organized criminals, including international terrorist groups. 
Azerbaijani historical, cultural and archeological monuments on the territory of the 
present-day Armenia and in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan were 
massively destroyed, its natural resources were plundered and the environment was 
damaged. The aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan is a major determinant of 
the country's security environment and is a key factor in the formulation of the National 
Security Policy. 
 
At the same time, the existence of such threats in the security environment of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan as international terrorism, illegal migration, trans-national 
organized crime, human and drug trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction set certain tasks for the country. 
 
 
2. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 
 
The national interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan consist of a set of fundamental 
values and goals of the people of Azerbaijan, as well as the political, economic, social 
and other needs necessary for the prosperity of the individuals, society and State. They 
are identified as follows: 
 
• Protection of the State's independence and territorial integrity, ensuring inviolability of 
its internationally recognized borders; 
 
• Preservation of the unity of the people of Azerbaijan, and promotion of the national 
consciousness; 
 
• Establishment of the civil society, ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; 
 
• Strengthening the performance of State institutions and ensuring security of the 
people through developing democratic and civil society institutions, and by maintaining 
the rule of law and public order; 
 
• Fulfilling international obligations and contributing to global and regional security and 
stability through development of cooperation aimed at integration into the value-shared 
international organizations; 
 
• Creating favourable conditions for attracting foreign and domestic investment to 
develop a market economy, improve its legal basis and ensure economic stability; 
 
• Ensuring the future development of the people of Azerbaijan, providing decent living 
standards and well-being for the population through efficient use of natural resources, 
sustainable economic development, environmental protection, and increasing 
educational, scientific and technological potential; 
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• Consolidating solidarity and national identity based upon the values shared by the 
Azerbaijanis around the world; 
 
• Preservation of the cultural-historical heritage and spiritual values of the people of 
Azerbaijan and their enrichment through universal values, development of the 
language, national consciousness, patriotism, national dignity and the intellectual 
potential.  
 
 
3. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 
 
Elimination or containment of threats to the national security are among the major tasks 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
 
The threats to national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan are as follows: 
 
3.1. Attempts against the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
constitutional order of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
Every State has the right, according to international law, to protect itself against open 
and covert activities aimed at undermining its independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and constitutional order. The aggressive policy of Armenia against the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan is a vivid example of 
such threats. 
 
Despite reforms in the rapidly developing economy, and other important 
accomplishments, the aggression of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan 
continues to create serious social and political impediments. This problem, with trans-
regional implications, represents a major threat to the national interests of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan. 
 
Regardless of the outcome of the conflict resolution process, persistence of the 
ideology of mono-ethnic statehood, ethnic cleansing practices and territorial 
expansionism of the Armenian State policy will inevitably continue to affect negatively 
relations between the two States also in the future. 
 
In addition, attempts by certain extremist elements to instigate ethnic and religion-
based tensions in the Republic of Azerbaijan cannot be disregarded. 
 
3.2. Actions undermining the ability of the State to ensure the rule of law, maintenance 
of public order and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
 
In the early 1990s the Republic of Azerbaijan faced a number of aspects of this threat. 
Attempts by certain domestic and foreign circles, striving to undermine the democratic 
system in the Republic of Azerbaijan, to hinder the performance of State functions 
remain among the possible actions threatening national security. 
 
3.3. Separatism, ethnic, political and religious extremism 
 
Separatism, ethnic and religious extremism in all their manifestations are capable to 
undermine the foundations of the State and society and constitute a potential source of 
serious threat to country's national security. 
 
3.4. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
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Proximity to the regions harboring major terrorist groups and proliferation problems are 
potential security threats. Possibility of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or 
their production technologies for terrorist activities may exacerbate these threats. 
 
3.5. Regional conflicts and transnational organized crime 
 
The "uncontrolled" areas, which emerged as a result of continuing occupation of a part 
of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by Armenia, and the unresolved conflicts in 
neighbouring countries provide fertile ground for trans-national organized crime and 
other illegal activities.  They are considered among major threats to the security of the 
country and of the region as a whole. 
 
Outbreak of conflicts in the regional countries represents also a threat to the Republic 
of Azerbaijan. Regional conflicts may seriously harm the external economic relations of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan and cause large-scale influx of refugees as well as increase 
transnational criminal activities such as the illegal arms trade, human and drug 
trafficking and other illegal activities. 
 
3.6. Actions against energy infrastructure of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
Revenues generated from the development and transportation of the energy resources 
constitutes a valuable asset for the economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Therefore, 
attempts to undermine this sector of the industry through political means or by inflicting 
physical damage to the related infrastructure are among potential threats. 
 
3.7. External political, military or economic dependence 
 
In tune with the present trend in the international environment for more integration and 
cooperation, the Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in establishing mutually beneficial 
relations with other countries. Political, military or economic overdependence of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan in international relations, however, is among the threat factors 
which may potentially impede realization of its national interests. 
 
3.8. Economic destabilization 
 
As a result of the challenges associated with the armed aggression, transition to 
market economy and integration into global economic system during the first years of 
independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan went through severe economic crisis in the 
first half of the 1990s. Despite these odds, the Republic of Azerbaijan persisted in 
transitioning to the market economy, created favourable conditions for foreign 
investment and achieved considerable accomplishments, particularly in the energy 
sector. It is at the same time aware of the risks of overdependence on the fast growing 
oil and gas revenues which may disrupt macro-economic stability and subsequently 
leave the country vulnerable to the impact of the global and regional economic crises. 
 
3.9. Inadequate professional human resources 
 
As a result of socio-economic hardships during the first years of independence, the 
education sector experienced serious difficulties, such as insufficient funding and 
structural problems. The negative consequences of this setback are felt even today. 
Failure to developing and effectively managing a modern education system capable of 
ensuring education and training at all levels necessary for the development of the 
national professional workforce and of the governing sector may have negative 
consequences for the overall development of the Republic of Azerbaijan in a long-term 
perspective. 
 
3.10. Regional militarization 
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The excessive accumulation of armaments and weapon systems in the region 
undermines regional stability and may distort the military balance between the regional 
countries. A military build-up exceeding reasonable national security purposes, 
including the foreign military bases lacking effective control mechanisms, may create 
concerns about intentions and result in a regional arms race. Another aspect is that 
such increased military build-up may drain the limited economic resources to be 
allocated for socio-economic development and undermine mutual confidence between 
the regional countries. 
 
3.11. Environmental challenges 
 
The environmental problems in the Republic of Azerbaijan are a result of the decades-
long old-fashioned oil production methods mainly in the Absheron Peninsula and in the 
Caspian Sea in order to meet the Soviet Union's energy needs in disregard of 
environmental consequences. 
 
Furthermore, mass destruction of the flora and fauna in the territories of Azerbaijan 
occupied by Armenia, including the wide-scale fires on these lands, has become one of 
the acute environmental challenges for the country. 
 
A considerable portion of the sources of drinking water supply of Azerbaijan is situated 
in neighbouring countries and their exposure to intensive pollution by chemical, 
radioactive and other harmful substances in the territories of these creates problems in 
drinking water supply for the population. Furthermore, the technologically obsolete 
Metsamor nuclear energy station located in the seismic zone in Armenia is a source of 
a threat for the whole region. 
 
Environmental pollution, degradation of the agricultural soils, irrational use of natural 
resources, lack of proper recycling of industrial and household wastes are sources of 
serious problems. 
 
The environmental problems negatively affect economic and social life, threaten the 
public health and prosperity of the nation and create a burden for the governmental 
institutions. 
 
 
4. MAIN DIRECTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 
 
As a sovereign State, the Republic of Azerbaijan formulates and implements a National 
Security Policy which aims at the containment and elimination of threats in the current 
security environment and at the realization of the national interests of the country by 
making use of domestic and foreign policy means. 
 
The National Security Policy takes into account the multidimensional character of 
threats, which tend to blur the dividing line between external and internal security and 
require adequate multifunctional measures. 
 
4.1. Promotion of security by foreign policy means 
 
4.1.1. Restoration of territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
The territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan shall be united, inviolable and indivisible. 
Restoration of its territorial integrity by making use of all means laid down in 
international law is a key objective of the National Security Policy of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. 
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Occupation of territories and ethnic cleansing practices are contrary to universal and 
European values, as well as to the principles and ideals of peace, democracy, stability 
and regional cooperation. 
 
Efforts of the Republic of Azerbaijan aimed at the settlement of the conflict with 
Armenia are 
not confined only to reaching political agreement between the two States, but as soon 
as such an agreement is achieved they will be directed at establishing lasting peace 
and mutual understanding between the two peoples. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is committed to the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the 
framework of the OSCE Minsk Group with a view to eliminating the consequences of 
the aggression against it and ending the occupation of a part of its territory. 
 
The legal and political grounds for the settlement of the conflict are based upon the 
norms and principles of international law as reflected in the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 adopted in 1993, as well as the 
appropriate documents and decisions of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. These 
documents reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the 
internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
 
The settlement should be on the following basis: 
• Withdrawal of the armed forces of Armenia from all the occupied territories of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan; 
• Restoration of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Azerbaijan in these territories; 
• Return of the forcibly displaced Azerbaijanis to their native lands; 
• Elaboration within the framework of a lawful and democratic process of the legal 
status, which would ensure peaceful coexistence of the Azerbaijani and Armenian 
communities of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and its high level self-rule within the 
Republic of Azerbaijan; 
• Establishment of conditions for restoring the communications and socio-economic 
growth of this region in the framework of the overall economic development of the 
country and of the regional integration processes. 
 
Issues related to violation of the norms and principles of international law in the 
territories occupied by Armenia as well as the illegal activities in these territories are 
under the constant attention of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan 
will continue to use available political and legal means to investigate and appraise the 
facts concerning the destruction of the cultural and historic heritage and distorting 
original features of the Azerbaijani settlements in the regions of Armenia, which used to 
be inhabited by the Azerbaijanis and in the occupied territories of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. In this context, unlawful settlement, exploitation and misappropriation of the 
natural resources in the occupied territories will receive particular attention. 
 
Integrated activities and consistent measures shall be undertaken with a view to 
coordinating, both domestically and in the international arena, the activities and efforts 
of governmental structures and civil society related to the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan; prosecuting the genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed against the Azerbaijanis during the aggression against the Republic of 
Azerbaijan and occupation of a part of its territory; conducting comprehensive and 
thorough study of the "Armenian question"; revealing the truth and bringing it to the 
attention of the international community; and ensuring international legal appraisal of 
the conflict. 
 
4.1.2. Integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures 
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Integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other 
institutions constitutes the strategic goal of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of 
Azerbaijan views its partnership with the Euro-Atlantic structures as a means for 
contributing to security, economic prosperity and democracy in the whole Euro-Atlantic 
area. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan works together with NATO to eliminate instability, conflicts 
and threats in European and the Euro-Atlantic area and, proceeding from the principle 
of the indivisibility of security, is determined to share the burden of building a common 
security system in Europe and in its own region without discrimination on geographic or 
political grounds. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan fully utilizes available partnership mechanisms with NATO 
within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and NATO's "Partnership for 
Peace" programme. In this regard, the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) is an 
important instrument for strengthening cooperation with NATO in short and medium-
term perspectives. IPAP will be further used as a mechanism for reforming security 
sector of the Republic of Azerbaijan to meet NATO standards, as well as for developing 
political dialogue. 
 
Proceeding from the recognition of necessity to deepen its integration into the 
European area, the Republic of Azerbaijan has established a multi-faceted relationship 
with the European Union. Cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the 
European Union is carried out within the "Technical Assistance for CIS" (TACIS), 
"Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia" (TRACECA) and some other programmes. 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and 
the European Union, which is effective since 1999 provides a favourable framework for 
political dialogue, support for development of democracy, economic cooperation as 
well as encouraging of investments. 
 
Inclusion of the Republic of Azerbaijan into the "New Neighbourhood Policy" of the 
European Union and within this policy framework implementation of the Azerbaijan-
European Union Action Plan adopted in 2006 strengthens political dialogue, develops 
cooperation in the sphere of political, economic and institutional reforms and creates a 
basis for raising cooperation to a qualitatively new level. 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding on "Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy" 
signed in 2006 between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the European Union will 
contribute to ensuring the diversification of the energy sources and transportation 
routes of the member-states of the European Union, development and modernization 
of the energy infrastructure, efficient use of energy resources and development of the 
renewable energy sources in the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Close cooperation of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the European Union will 
contribute to the stability in the Caucasus and will promote the European values in the 
region. 
 
4.1.3. Contribution to international security 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is making sustained efforts to contribute to international 
and regional security by participating in joint efforts aimed at maintaining of 
international peace and stability. 
After the 11 September 2001 attacks the fight against terrorism became one of the 
most important issues of the international agenda. The Republic of Azerbaijan fully 
supports the struggle of the international community against terrorism and undertook a 
number of significant steps against the terrorist activities, disregarding whatever 
pretexts under which they were carried out. The Republic of Azerbaijan has made its 
airspace and airfields available in support of the international fight against international 
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terrorist organizations. The Republic of Azerbaijan also became a party to all 
conventions on combating terrorism at global and regional levels.   
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan makes efforts to stabilize the sensitive regions of the world. 
The Azerbaijani peacekeepers contribute to security by participating in the 
peacekeeping operation in the Serbian Kosovo province, in NATO-led operations in 
Afghanistan, and in Iraq as a part of the international coalition. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan, as a party to the relevant international arms control and 
non-proliferation treaties, fully supports the efforts to maintain international security. 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is seriously concerned about the weakening of the 
international non-proliferation regime and will continue to cooperate with the 
international community and the relevant organizations for the imposition of adequate 
controls. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is concerned by the fact that the arms control mechanism is 
not effective in its territories occupied by Armenia. Accumulation of a great number of 
armaments and ammunitions in these territories, which are beyond the international 
control, poses serious threats to regional peace. 
 
4.1.4. Cooperation with international organizations 
 
Active participation in the work of international organizations is of great importance for 
the security and foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Irrespective of their size 
and influence, the universal and regional international organizations increasingly play a 
more important role in addressing the new global threats. Thus, along with their 
contribution to the elimination and prevention of these threats, international 
organizations create opportunities for defending the national interests of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan in global politics. At the same time, the international organizations 
provide a suitable forum for attracting the attention of the partner countries to the 
security problems facing the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
 
From this perspective, the existence, development and adaptation to changes in the 
contemporary world of the universal and regional international organizations is 
important for the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan acknowledges the indispensable role of the UN, which it 
joined in 1992, in maintaining the international peace and security, and in promoting 
sustainable development and democracy. 
 
The interest of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the UN is not limited to the settlement of 
the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan shares the 
common values with the UN and expands its cooperation with this organization in the 
framework of human rights, economic and social development programmes. The 
Republic of Azerbaijan contributes to the struggle of the international community 
against terrorism in the framework of the UN and other organizations. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan supports the reforms within the UN aimed at increasing its 
operational capabilities, including strengthening the international law system and 
enforcing the adopted decisions with a view to responding more effectively to the 
challenges and threats of the 21st century. 
 
The OSCE, which the Republic of Azerbaijan joined in 1992, is the unique regional 
organization that embraces all the countries of the European Continent and determines 
the norms and principles regulating the relations between the countries and 
maintaining common security. The Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the 
OSCE constitute a principled political basis for ensuring regional peace and security. 
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From the viewpoint of the role the OSCE is playing in the resolution of the conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, cooperation with this organization takes a prominent 
place in the foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan is 
also cooperating with the OSCE in other areas. 
 
In view of the growing importance of the OSCE in the new political environment, the 
Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in increasing its role by undertaking appropriate 
reforms through active participation and with the good faith of all its members to raise 
the effectiveness of this organization, in particular with regard to respect for its 
principles. 
 
The cooperation of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the Council of Europe pursues the 
goal of integration into the European family of nations and of benefiting from the 
European standards and values. The Republic of Azerbaijan joined the Council of 
Europe in 2001 and in the framework of cooperation with this organization adapts its 
national legislation to the European standards. Azerbaijan signed and ratified the key 
document of the Council of Europe, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its protocols, on 25 January 2001 and 
25 December 2001 respectively. 
 
As a part of the Islamic world the Republic of Azerbaijan attaches particular importance 
to its activities within the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). After joining the 
OIC in 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan became an active participant in this 
organization. The OIC is a first international organization which recognized and 
condemned Armenia as an aggressor. The unequivocal and just position of the OIC on 
this vital issue created favourable conditions for promoting relations of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan with this organization. The Republic of Azerbaijan plays the role of the 
bridge between the civilizations and benefiting of both Eastern and Western cultures 
will continue to contribute to the dialogue among States and nations. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in maintaining cooperation within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and developing economic, political, legal 
and humanitarian relations with the CIS member-states on a bilateral basis. 
 
The organization "For democracy and economic development - GUAM" comprising 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine was founded in 1997 and was transformed 
into an international regional organization in 2006. GUAM unites the partner countries 
on the basis of common interests in the spheres of democracy, development and 
security. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan attaches special importance to joining efforts and 
developing a common approach of GUAM member-states towards the issues of vital 
importance for them, particularly in regard of resolution of the existing conflicts in their 
territories and combating aggressive separatism. 
 
The geographic area of the GUAM member-states, their current geopolitical and geo-
economic position plays an important role in Eurasia in particular in terms of the energy 
issues and transportation corridors. 
 
Implementation of the democratic and economic development concept of GUAM will 
positively effect the development of the member-states and their role in the 
international system. 
 
Cooperation with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) is one of 
the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan. BSEC was established in 
1992 in the format of Black Sea Economic Cooperation and in 1998 was transformed 
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into a regional organization with a view to promoting regional and sub-regional 
integration processes and economic cooperation in the area embracing the Black Sea, 
Caspian Sea and Mediterranean Sea. 
 
4.1.5. Regional cooperation and bilateral relations 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan pursues a multidimensional, balanced foreign policy and 
seeks to establish friendly relations with all countries on the basis of universally 
accepted norms and principles of international law, such as respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and non-interference in internal affairs. The 
Republic of Azerbaijan has established such relations with almost all countries of the 
world and is continuing to develop them. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan participates in joint efforts in addressing regional and global 
issues. Regional security, combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and ensuring energy security are among the priority areas. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan considers it important to take a number of steps for 
achieving peace and stability in the region. Foremost, the region should be free from 
weapons of mass destruction. Development of the regional relations in line with the 
nuclear non-proliferation norms of international law is a precondition for ensuring and 
strengthening stability at the regional and global level. 
 
Absence of foreign military forces in the region would contribute to the regional 
security. Regional security should be achieved through mutual recognition of and 
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the regional countries and by 
abandoning militarist and aggressive policies. 
The Republic of Azerbaijan will continue its efforts to ensure human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of Azerbaijanis living abroad, as well as to promote their 
national identity and values in conformity with the generally-accepted norms and 
principles of international law, international treaties to which the Republic of Azerbaijan 
is a party, and with national legislation, whilst taking into account the legislation of 
foreign countries concerned. 
 
4.1.5.1. Cooperation with regional countries 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan attaches great importance to the development of 
comprehensive relations with neighbouring countries. The Republic of Azerbaijan is 
committed to finding solutions to outstanding problems in bilateral relations in a 
mutually acceptable fashion and in conformity with international law. The Republic of 
Azerbaijan is interested in an early finalization of the talks on the delimitation and 
demarcation of the borders with neighbouring countries. 
 
Development of harmonious relations with other countries, especially those adjoining 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, is of great importance also for eliminating threats 
emanating from separatism, ethnic, political and religious extremism. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan views regional cooperation as an indispensable factor for 
maintaining peace and stability in the region. At the same time, the aggressive policy of 
Armenia is a major obstacle to comprehensive regional cooperation in the South 
Caucasus. It is unacceptable for the Republic of Azerbaijan to cooperate with Armenia 
until it abandons this policy. 
 
On the other hand, a trilateral strategic partnership and deepening cooperation 
between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey has developed into a factor of stability in the 
region. This cooperation, resulting in successful implementation of infrastructure 
projects such as Baku-Supsa, Heydar Aliyev Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export oil pipelines 
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and South Caucasus gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum), has increased the 
importance of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, contributed to the European 
and global energy security and laid the foundations for the new vital and secure energy 
source for Europe. 
 
Implementation of the geo-strategically important "Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway link" project 
is an important step in fostering and expanding regional cooperation and at the same 
time creates new global opportunities. 
 
Comprehensive relations with Turkey, which was the first country to recognize the 
independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and which plays a special role in ensuring 
peace and stability in the region, is of particular importance. Bilateral relations between 
the two countries sharing ethnic, cultural and linguistic affinity are further expanding 
and deepening at the level of strategic partnership. The contributions of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan and Turkey in implementing trans-regional economic projects and the 
efforts of Turkey directed at settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
indicate the coincidence of positions of the two countries and the advanced level of 
their cooperation. 
 
Promotion of comprehensive cooperation and partnership with Georgia is of great 
importance for the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan closely 
cooperates with Georgia in the framework of common interests of both countries, 
implementation of the regional energy and transportation projects and other areas of 
mutual interest, and will continue further developing bilateral strategic cooperation. 
 
Partnership of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine within the organization "For 
democracy and economic development - GUAM" is another example of regional 
cooperation. 
 
Partnership with Ukraine and Moldova is not confined only to the GUAM framework, 
but at the same time is developing on a bilateral basis in political, economic, 
humanitarian and other spheres. 
Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia constitute an important factor for regional 
stability and development. The Republic of Azerbaijan engages in a strategic 
partnership and cooperation with the Russian Federation both on a bilateral basis and 
in multilateral frameworks of European regional organizations, and in particular within 
the CIS in the political, economic, humanitarian, security fields, in combating organized 
crime and other areas. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in peaceful and good neighbourly relations 
with Caspian littoral countries and in joint participation in regional projects. The 
Republic of Azerbaijan enjoys close neighborly relations with the Caspian littoral States 
of Russia and Kazakhstan. Currently, one of the routes for transportation of the 
Azerbaijani oil from the Caspian Sea to the European markets via the Black Sea is the 
Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. In 2006 the Republic of Azerbaijan signed an agreement 
with Kazakhstan supporting and providing conditions for transportation of Kazakhstan 
oil from the Caspian Sea to the world markets through the "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan" 
system through the territory of Azerbaijan. 
 
These three Caspian littoral States have already reached agreement over division of 
the Caspian Sea bed. The Republic of Azerbaijan believes in reaching a similar 
agreement with its close neighbours of Iran and Turkmenistan, defining of the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea in the foreseeable future and using the Caspian Sea only for 
the peaceful purposes and for the prosperity of the littoral countries. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan attaches great importance to its relations with neighboring 
Iran. The relationship between the two countries, which share a common rich historical 
 283 
and cultural heritage, is one of the important objectives of the country's foreign policy. 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in promoting mutually beneficial relations with 
Iran in political, economic, cultural and other areas. 
 
4.1.5.2. Cooperation with non-regional countries 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is also interested in cooperation with other countries 
beyond the region. Foremost, the Republic of Azerbaijan cooperates with its strategic 
partner the USA in the framework of the UN and Euro-Atlantic structures, in the anti-
terror coalition, in combating global challenges and threats such as international 
terrorism, separatism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-national 
organized crime, illegal drug, arms and human trafficking, corruption and on a bilateral 
basis in political, military, economic, energy security spheres and in promoting 
democratic reforms. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan builds its cooperation with the European countries on a 
bilateral and multilateral basis and is interested in deepening integration into European 
economic and legal space and in implementing joint regional economic projects. It is 
important for the Republic of Azerbaijan to expand economic and political cooperation, 
in particular with the Baltic, East and South-East European States. Azerbaijan 
contributes to the policy of diversification of energy supplies and ensuring energy 
security in Europe and took a number of important steps in this regard. 
 
Relations with the Central Asian countries also constitute an important objective of the 
foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Further development of bilateral relations 
with the countries of this region is of particular importance. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in mutually beneficial cooperation with such 
leading countries of the Far East and South-East Asia as China, Republic of Korea and 
Japan. Active participation of these countries in the economic projects in the Republic 
of Azerbaijan, such as realization of the "Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia" 
(TRACECA) project, has laid solid foundations for the development of the potential of 
the bilateral relations. 
 
The emergence of new economic and political power centers in South-East and South 
Asia has expanded the foreign policy interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan into these 
regions. 
 
The relations of the Republic of Azerbaijan with Middle Eastern countries have big 
potential and the efforts aimed at developing bilateral relations with these countries will 
be continued. 
 
4.2. Strengthening of defense capability 
 
The defense capability of the Republic of Azerbaijan is one of the major assets for 
promoting national interests of the country. 
 
The defense policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan is aimed at developing and 
maintaining a democratically accountable defense capability based upon its national 
resources and appropriate to the current security situation. The Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan constitute the basis of the country's defense capability. 
 
The national defense policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan is based upon the following 
premises: 
 
• Peaceful coexistence with all countries; 
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• Respecting the sovereignty and independence of other countries, and non-
interference in their internal affairs; 
 
• Recognising the integrity and inviolability of international borders. 
• Strengthening international security; 
 
• Supporting a concept of defense sufficiency that takes into account the correlation of 
all relevant military postures. 
 
The main goals of the national defense policy pursued by the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
which takes into account the country's historical past, the security situation, the major 
objectives of democratic State building and the fact of the occupation of a part of its 
territory by Armenia are identified as follows: 
 
• Protecting the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan, restoring 
its territorial integrity and ensuring control over its territory; 
 
• Maintaining the capability of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan to 
mobilize and to conduct military operations for the purpose of preventing and repulsing 
foreign armed aggression; 
 
• Continuing to participate in the relevant mechanisms of the NATO's "Partnership for 
Peace" programme, promoting mutually beneficial military cooperation with NATO 
member-states and other partners on a bilateral and multilateral level; 
 
• Fulfilling the international legal obligations of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the 
defense field; 
 
• Contributing to international security through appropriate policies and arrangements. 
The national defense policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan is based upon the following 
principles: 
 
• Unity of command and control of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan and 
other armed units as envisaged by the national legislation and ensuring democratic 
oversight over all security forces; 
 
• Timely identification and assessment of military threats against the security of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan; 
 
• Sufficiency of forces, including reserves, means and other capabilities, together with 
adequate planning to ensure national security by military means. 
 
Practical activities to ensure national security by military means consist of an 
evaluation of basic military tasks, characteristics and objectives of likely wars and 
armed conflicts as well as identification of the dimensions of the potential threat, the 
situation of military and political forces and other factors threatening the military 
security of the country. These activities require also the elaboration of organizational 
principles of the Armed Forces and identification of ways to ensure their preparedness 
in preventing possible aggression. 
 
Another important element of the national defense policy is establishing the optimal 
correlation between the economy and defense and developing the national defense 
industry. 
 
Comprehensive development of international military-political and military-technical 
relations and cooperation is of particular importance in the process of strengthening the 
defense capability of the country. Integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system, 
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establishment of operational forces interoperable with those of NATO member-states, 
and participation in peacekeeping and crisis-response operations under the mandate of 
the appropriate international organizations are among the main objectives of the 
defense policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
 
Comprehensive defense of the territory and the citizens of the country is a requirement 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and should be ensured by all means. 
To this end, the Armed Forces and other armed units envisaged by the national 
legislation have each capability to fulfill their specific missions. 
 
The Armed Forces and other armed units of the State exercise the rights and carry out 
tasks and responsibilities stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
national laws, other normative-legal acts, as well as in international treaties on 
international humanitarian law to which Azerbaijan is a party. 
 
4.3. Promotion of security by domestic policy means 
 
4.3.1. Strengthening of democracy 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan has chosen the path of development of democratic 
governance and civil society as the only viable means to guarantee the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan managed to carry out important reforms in its legislative 
and economic systems despite the negative effects of the occupation by Armenia of a 
part of its territory continuing since the re-gaining of State independence. The citizens 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan enjoy the right of applying to the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, to the European Court of Human Rights and to the UN 
human rights treaty monitoring bodies. With a view to protecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the Ombudsman institution was established and the 
independence of the courts was ensured. The legislation protecting the freedom of 
expression and eliminating the State control over the media and abolishing the 
censorship was adopted. 
 
In the framework of ongoing democratic reform process, the Government focuses on 
further development of the election practices, improvement of the law enforcement 
mechanisms, ensuring transparency of the public agencies and of the recruitment 
process in these bodies, clarifying the competences of the self-governing municipal 
bodies and increasing their role in addressing local problems, as well as strengthening 
of the material-technical basis of the media and of the non-governmental organizations. 
 
The Government will continue its efforts to increase the democratic and civil control 
over all security structures, ensuring transparency of their activities, fighting effectively 
against corruption, further strengthening the accountability of public officials, whose 
duty is to serve the people, and providing members of the Milli Meclis with information 
about the activities of those officials in their spheres of competence and facilitating 
access of the broad public to this information through the media. 
 
Upholding the fundamental values of a democratic State, such as the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and achieving social justice will 
provide valuable support in combating attempts against the performance of the State 
functions and the realization of the national interests. 
 
4.3.2. Preservation of the environment of ethnic and religious tolerance 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan has always been an example of the peaceful coexistence 
of different peoples and religions. The State of Azerbaijan considers that a rational 
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national policy derived from the interests of the whole society, religious tolerance, 
ensuring the equality of all citizens before the law, the democratic rights and freedoms 
for the people and the opportunity to freely exercise their rights provide the best 
environment to prevent transformation of the risks into real threats and for their 
elimination. 
 
Preservation and promotion of the environment of ethnic and religious tolerance in the 
country is among the key tasks of the Government. The national policy of the State of 
Azerbaijan is based upon one of the main provisions of the Constitution, which 
stipulates that the Republic of Azerbaijan is a united and indivisible homeland for all 
citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
 
4.3.3. Scientific, educational and cultural policy and preservation of moral foundations 
 
The policy of preservation of the science, education and moral foundations of the 
people of Azerbaijan aims at the protection of the cultural heritage, material and moral 
values, means of satisfying cultural needs and scientific-technological potential against 
internal and external threats and at benefiting from progressive domestic and 
international developments. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan preserves the national cultural identity without overlooking 
the present trends of globalization of the world culture and creates opportunities to 
benefit from the global cultural heritage for the progress of its own national culture. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan, in line with its international obligations, preserves the 
historical and cultural monuments on its territory. 
 
Sustainable development of the country requires adequate well educated and trained 
professional human resources, as well as scientific-technological progress. For this 
purpose, the Republic of Azerbaijan is expanding cooperation with the developed 
countries, and benefits from international experience with a view to raising science and 
education to international standards and to introducing new technologies. The Republic 
of Azerbaijan designs and implements the long-term programmes of State policy on 
protection and development of the scientific potential. 
 
4.3.4. Economic and social development 
 
Ensuring sustainability of the economic development is a core principle of the 
Government's economic policy. This is a complex issue, which requires consideration 
of both the economic and social dimensions on an equal footing. To that end, the 
Republic of Azerbaijan intends to prepare and implement simultaneous and 
coordinated programs in both directions. 
 
It has been possible to keep moderate inflation rates, create a stable and predictable 
monetary market as well as to substantially increase the strategic monetary reserves of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan. Structural reforms in the public administration system have 
been implemented and most of the enterprises have managed to increase their 
efficiency by realigning their manufacturing to market demand. 
 
In order to prevent the threat of economic destabilization resulting from an 
overdependence on the fast growing oil and gas revenues, the need for an economic 
policy capable to ensure diversification has been recognized. 
 
Entrepreneurship has experienced noticeable development and progress has been 
achieved in the liberalization of the economy. Economic growth should be sustained 
through practical measures aimed at improving the living standards of the population, 
undertaking structural-technological modernization and realization of the competition 
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advantages of the country. Attainment of new achievements in socio-economic 
development also requires adherence to an integrated approach in carrying out the 
reforms, ensuring transparency in the privatization process, modernization of the 
economy and encouraging social change. 
 
The main goal of the regional economic policy within the country is to achieve the 
development of the non-oil sectors of the economy by efficient use of the potential of 
the regions, expansion of the production of manufacturing enterprises, stimulation of 
export-oriented goods production, further improvement of the living standards of the 
population through the development of the local entrepreneurship, increasing the 
employment rate, particularly through the creation of jobs for young people, and 
ensuring vibrant economic development of the country. 
 
Attraction of inward investment plays a vital role in the long-term sustainable and 
balanced development of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The required quantity and quality 
of inward investments can primarily be assured through support of private investments. 
In this regard creating a favourable investment climate is one of the key tasks. For this 
purpose attention will be devoted to the protection of private property rights, improving 
corporate management, creation of conditions for fair competition for all investors 
regardless of the forms of the property, further improvement of the normative and legal 
basis regulating investment activities, stimulation of the inflow of investments into the 
non-oil sector and the development of the regions. At the same time, operation of the 
Azerbaijani companies in foreign countries and their participation in international 
projects will be encouraged. 
 
Furthermore, particular attention will be devoted to strengthening the transit capabilities 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the East-West and North-South transportation 
corridors, to bringing modern technologies to the country and to the development of the 
information-communication systems. 
 
4.3.5. Enhancing internal security 
 
Ensuring internal security is one of the key tasks of the State. This also enhances the 
State capabilities to respond to international risks and threats. 
 
Reliable internal security can only be achieved in an environment of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, development of civil society and of social well-being. 
Ensuring internal security by preserving public order and fighting against crime and 
corruption are among the main responsibilities of the relevant governmental structures. 
Legislation, institutional reforms and practical measures are underway with a view to 
increasing the efficiency of the law enforcement agencies in addressing these issues. 
 
Intelligence and counterintelligence, being one of the crucial elements of the national 
security, will continue to play a significant role in ensuring the security of the State and 
its citizens. 
 
4.3.6. Reinforcing border security 
 
The sensitive geographic location of the Republic of Azerbaijan makes it vulnerable to 
such trans-border threats as international terrorism, illegal immigration, transnational 
organized crime, human and drug trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
As a result of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan 132 km of the international 
border with Islamic Republic of Iran and 733 km of the border with Armenia were 
seized by the latter. Lack of control over these borders creates fertile grounds for 
above mentioned crimes. 
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Existence of trans-border threats requires devoting particular attention to the border 
security of the country. A specific central governmental agency, the State Border 
Service, has been established to carry out effective border security policy. In the 
framework of the democratic State building process and in particular of the security 
sector reforms, the border security concept is being revised and the radical structural 
reforms aimed at transformation of the State Border Service from a militarized structure 
into a law enforcement agency are underway. A more effective border control system, 
established as a result of the reforms carried out in cooperation with NATO and other 
foreign partners, contributes to improving the mechanisms coordinating the possible 
supporting role and activities of the Armed Forces and other security structures in the 
border security. 
 
Border security becomes an increasingly important component of security of the oil and 
gas deposits and transport corridors. 
 
With a view to increasing the effectiveness of border security, normative legal acts are 
being adjusted to international standards, public administration is being improved and 
transparent budgeting system is being established. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is expanding its cooperation in the sphere of border 
security in the framework of NATO, the European Union, the International Organization 
for Migration, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Conference on 
Border Management and other international organizations, as well as with other 
countries on a bilateral and multilateral level. 
 
In order to advance reforms in this sphere the air and maritime control, search and 
rescue, and rapid response capabilities are being upgraded, the training system is 
being improved, land borders and control posts are being provided with modern 
equipment and transformation of the personnel into a professional corps is being 
accelerated. 
 
The reform and construction processes envisage inclusion of the currently uncontrolled 
portion of the borders into the common border security system after the resolution of 
the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and undertaking of the appropriate 
security measures on these territories. 
 
4.3.7. Migration policy 
 
Analysis of recent trends indicates that the rapid socio-economic development of 
Azerbaijan, the expansion of the international energy and transportation 
communications and the geopolitical position of the country have accelerated the 
migration processes. This requires adaptation of migration policy and improvement of 
the management of migration processes to take into account the national interests 
aimed at development of the country and ensuring its security. 
 
A State Migration Policy for 2006-2008 has been approved for the purposes of: 
 
• Implementing State policy in the field of migration; 
 
• Improving the national legislation to meet international norms and up-to-date 
standards; 
 
• Ensuring national security and sustainable socio-economic, demographic 
development; 
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• Making effective use of the workforce and even distribution of the population 
throughout the country; 
 
• Benefiting from the intellectual and labor potential of the immigrants; 
 
• Eliminating the negative consequences of an unregulated immigration flow and 
preventing illegal migration, including human trafficking. 
 
The State Migration Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan was established with a view 
to implementing the State Migration Policy, developing a management system to 
forecast and regulate migration processes, and to ensure coherence between the 
activities of relevant governmental agencies. 
 
Improvement of the mechanisms for regulating migration processes in the country 
requires formulation of effective immigration policy, strengthening the international 
cooperation, controlling emigration processes and creating of unified information 
database. 
 
4.3.8. Energy security policy 
 
Among the key activities aimed at ensuring the national security of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan are: 
 
• Development and exploitation of the existing and prospective oil and gas reserves in 
the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea; 
 
• Construction and installation of modern oil and gas platforms; 
 
• Identification and assessment of the threats to the main oil and gas pipelines and 
terminals and taking appropriate countermeasures. 
 
Also among the key tasks of the national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan are 
ensuring the security of energy transportation between the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea 
and the Mediterranean Sea via the Heydar Aliyev Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export oil 
pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline, as well as of the crucial facilities which 
ensure the geo-strategic and economic interests of the Caspian littoral States, and to 
this end managing and diminishing the growing risks. 
 
With the Heydar Aliyev Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline becoming operational 
in 2006, the Azerbaijani oil became an important factor in the world market. The 
geography of the pipelines delivering the Azerbaijani oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan 
and the gas to the Turkish Erzurum gas terminal creates certain security risks. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan implements integrated measures to prevent constructed 
and used energy production and transportation infrastructure from exposure to natural 
disasters, human induced technological accidents and sabotage. 
 
Due to the anticipated global energy supply crisis in the 21st century it was decided to 
develop alternative energy sources in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Given that Azerbaijan 
has a favourable number of sunny and windy days annually, energy needs of the 
country can be partially met by making use of power stations generating energy from 
wind, sun, biomass, lower mountain waters and by hydroelectric power stations. 
 
4.3.9. Transportation security policy 
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While stimulating steadfast and rapid economic growth, the rich energy resources of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan have turned into one of the major factors that determine the 
interests of various countries in the region and generate frictions in their relations. 
 
After gaining independence the Republic of Azerbaijan further developed its energy 
sector and created various transportation networks. Ensuring security of these 
transportation networks is one of the main tasks for the country. 
 
In order to ensure security of the international transport corridors and the pipelines the 
Republic of Azerbaijan pursues the following objectives: 
 
• Ensuring transport and transportation security; 
 
• Providing mobilization capabilities of the transportation system; 
 
• Strengthening security measures with a view to increase effective functioning and 
competitiveness of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia and North-South international 
transportation corridors; 
 
• Ensuring the reliability of the transport infrastructures protection system; 
 
• Identifying and eliminating external threats to the security of the transportation 
infrastructures; 
 
• Banning or controlling the circulation of the devices, which can be used in terrorist 
attacks against the transportation means and the infrastructure, including pipelines; 
 
• Preventing damage to the social and ecological environment during the construction 
and exploitation of the transportation facilities. 
 
These objectives should be reflected in the activities of the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, other security structures as well as relevant governmental 
bodies and necessary conditions for their implementation should be established. 
 
4.3.10. Emergency management and protection of environment and public safety 
 
Environment-related natural disasters and human induced technological accidents may 
endanger internal security through harming the well-being and property of the 
population. These hazards should therefore be considered within the broader security 
context. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan has established a special Ministry for Emergency 
Situations, responsible for formulation and coordination of measures for early warning 
of the emergency situations and for dealing with their consequences. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan cooperates on a bilateral basis with a number of countries 
for sharing of experience and exchange of information on the crisis management and 
prevention of emergency situations. Multilateral cooperation in this area is carried out 
through NATO mechanisms and the Republic of Azerbaijan will continue to make 
effective use of these opportunities. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan takes seriously the ecological problems and is aware of the 
emerging and potentially harmful threats, risks and challenges. Readiness against 
natural, human induced technological disasters and crisis situations and their 
prevention is among the key issues for the State. 
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The Republic of Azerbaijan implements active measures to prevent contamination of 
the population and its territory by radioactive, bacteriological and chemical substances 
and to avert their negative impact on the economy of the country. 
 
Protection of the strategic State facilities, including oil and gas production and refining 
enterprises, terminals, major pipelines, fresh water supplies, electric power stations 
and hydro-technical installations against natural and human induced technological 
disasters as well as terror threats is one of the key tasks for the State. 
 
Taking into account the diverse geographical and geological environment, the 
protection of the country's territory against natural emergency situations which may 
potentially cause destruction, such as earthquakes, mud slides, floods, avalanches, 
and hazards caused by mud volcanoes, as well as ways to handle their consequences, 
are all under constant attention. 
 
Safeguarding the rich flora and fauna in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
which has several climatic zones, is of utmost importance. 
 
Particular attention is devoted to eliminating the sources of environmental pollution, to 
tackling the ecological problems of the Caspian Sea, to the preservation and 
rehabilitation of its biodiversity, and to other relevant issues. 
 
Control over the usage of plant protection means (pesticides and biological agents) and 
timely quarantine inspections for early pest identification and treatments are key issues 
in ensuring food security. 
 
For the purpose of protecting public safety it is important to strengthen the medication 
quality control mechanisms and struggle against counterfeit medications. 
 
4.3.11. Information security policy 
 
Ensuring the national security policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the information 
sphere requires integrated measures to protect the State, public and individual 
information resources, as well as protection of national interests in information sphere. 
 
A national system and information infrastructure for the protection of the information 
and the State information resources in the country is being developed and 
strengthened for the purpose of ensuring the national security of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan in the information sphere. Credible and important data are being collected 
to ensure informed decisions by governmental structures and public officials. 
 
Key issues of this dimension of national security are increasing the coherence and 
effectiveness of the intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities and ensuring 
coordination in protecting classified information. The Republic of Azerbaijan will 
develop its national intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities and will continue 
improving its activities aimed at protecting classified information. 
 
Information security is regulated through improvement of the legal mechanisms for 
safeguarding State secrets and for ensuring a free flow of open information. Legal and 
administrative mechanisms will ensure individual rights and the democratic oversight 
over the activities of the governmental structures. 
 
 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
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Due to its strategic location, the Republic of Azerbaijan plays a significant role in the 
political and economic processes of the Euro-Atlantic area, as it is manifested in 
realization of the energy and transportation projects in the region. 
 
The security environment of the Republic of Azerbaijan is characterized also by the 
existence of such threats as armed conflicts, international terrorism, trans-national 
organized crime, illegal migration, human and drug trafficking, proliferation of the 
weapons of mass destruction, all of which are potential sources of a number of security 
challenges facing the country. 
 
The present Concept lays the basis for the national security policies of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, sets the tasks for the governmental structures and requires their coherent 
efforts for the protection of national interests. 
 
The Concept assesses the dynamic security environment of the country, the national 
interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan and indicates the main objectives of the national 
security policies. 
 
The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan will take the appropriate measures to 
ensure implementation of the tasks identified in the Concept. 
 
The Concept will be regularly reviewed and updated in order to ensure more effectively 
the national security of the country through the internal and foreign policies of the 
State. 
 
The Concept sets forth also a basis for elaborating the military doctrine, foreign policy 
strategy, defense review, economic concept, culture, science, education, health, 
transportation strategies and other policy documents related to different areas of 
State's activities. 
 
The other conceptual documents in security field to be elaborated subsequently should 
reflect consensus across the society, be realistic and, together with this Concept, be 
capable to contribute to the strengthening of democracy, establishing the rule of law, 
developing the civil society, creating an effective and democratically controlled security 
sector and assist achievement of sustainable economic development and social 
progress. 
 
 
 
 
  
 293 
3. National Security Concept of the Republic of Georgia (2005) 
 
“Georgia's citizens' firm will is to establish a democratic social order, economic 
freedom, a Rule of Law based social state, to secure universally recognized human 
rights and freedoms, to enhance the state independence and peaceful relations with 
other peoples.” 
Preamble to the Constitution of Georgia 
 
Introduction 
Georgia is at an important stage in its centuries-old history. Georgia regained its 
independence in 1991, after seven decades of occupation. Since then, it has 
undergone a period characterized by internal conflicts supported from outside of 
Georgia, and by political and economic instability. Nevertheless, the people of Georgia 
have made an unequivocal decision to build a democratic and free state that ensures 
the rule of law, human rights, security, prosperity of its citizens and a free market 
economy. 
The Rose Revolution of November 2003 once again demonstrated that democracy and 
liberty are part of the Georgian traditional values that are of vital necessity to the 
people of Georgia. Georgia, as an integral part of the European political, economic and 
cultural area, whose fundamental national values are rooted in European values and 
traditions, aspires to achieve full-fledged integration into Europe's political, economic 
and security systems. Georgia aspires to return to its European tradition and remain an 
integral part of Europe. 
The National Security Concept of Georgia is the keystone document that presents a 
vision of secure development of the state and of fundamental national values and 
interests.  It describes threats, risks and challenges to national security and sets major 
directions of national security policy. The Concept underlines the aspiration of the 
people of Georgia to achieve full-fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and to contribute to the security of 
the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system. 
The Government of Georgia shall implement the National Security Concept through 
relevant long-term measures that will safeguard fundamental national values and 
national interests by adequately addressing security threats, risks and challenges to 
national security. 
The National Security Concept shall serve as the basis for all strategies and plans. 
Along with any revision of the Concept, relevant strategies and plans should be 
updated as well.  
2. Fundamental National Values of Georgia 
Georgia's fundamental national values are the foundation of Georgian Statehood. 
Protection of fundamental national values is of ultimate importance to the very 
existence and security of Georgia, and to the security and prosperity of its citizens. 
Georgia will protect its fundamental national values by all available lawful means. The 
fundamental national values of Georgia are: 
2.1 Independence: Georgia is a sovereign, independent state that respects the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and expects the same from them. 
Georgia rejects the interference of any state in its domestic affairs. 
2.2. Freedom: The rights and freedoms envisaged in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms are fundamental national values of Georgia. Georgia 
guarantees the protection of universally recognized human rights and freedoms of all 
individuals and groups residing on its territory, respects their freedom of choice, and 
creates favorable conditions for the realization of every individual's opportunity. 
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2.3. Democracy and Rule of Law: Georgia adheres to universal democratic values and 
principles, based on which it is establishing a democratic system of governance. In this 
system, state authority is defined by law and separated among three branches of 
government. The Georgian political system guarantees a strong and independent 
judiciary. Georgia promotes the development of civil society and ensures freedom of 
the media. 
2.4. Prosperity: Georgia secures sustainable economic development based on 
democratically established and transparent rules. Through these rules, Georgia 
ensures the implementation of an effective social policy aimed at increasing the welfare 
of, and creating decent living conditions for, all citizens. Georgia fosters the 
development of a free market economy and creates favorable conditions for 
entrepreneurship, enhancement of foreign trade, and attraction of investments. 
2.5. Peace: Georgia aims at establishing good relations with every state based on the 
norms of international law. Development of friendly relations with neighboring states is 
of particular importance for Georgia. Georgia resolves all disputes by peaceful means, 
based on the norms of international law. A free, independent, united, prosperous, and 
peaceful Georgia will significantly contribute to strengthening regional security and 
stability. 
2.6. Security: Georgia aspires to guarantee security of the state, its institutions and 
citizens, within its internationally recognized state borders. While safeguarding security, 
Georgia adheres to the norms of international law.  
3. National Interests of Georgia 
 The national interests of Georgia derive from the contemporary  international and 
domestic setting. National interests are based on fundamental national values. The 
realization of national interests will ensure the stability and development of the state, as 
well as the prosperity, security and protection of rights and freedoms of the citizens of 
Georgia. Failure to protect national interests will endanger Georgia's fundamental 
national values. The national interests of Georgia are: 
3.1. Ensuring Territorial Integrity: Georgia is dedicated to restoring and maintaining its 
territorial integrity and ensuring the non-violability of its internationally recognized 
borders. Georgia will employ all available lawful means to resolve peacefully and justly 
all issues that might arise in the process of restoring the constitutional order on the 
territory of Georgia. 
3.2. Ensuring National Unity and Civil Accord: Georgia ensures protection of the 
interests, rights and freedoms of all ethnic and religious groups residing in the country. 
For this purpose, Georgia is building a society based on the principles of pluralism, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination. Georgia strives to foster respect for 
the Constitution among its citizens and to ensure their self-identification as citizens of 
Georgia. 
3.3 Regional Stability: Processes taking place in Europe are the foremost determinants 
of Georgia's security environment, although processes in the Middle East and Central 
Asia also have serious influence. Georgia attaches particular importance to 
developments within the Black Sea basin, the Caucasus and Russia. Maintenance of 
peace and security in this area, as well as peaceful resolution of existing disputes, is of 
vital importance to Georgia. Georgia contributes to the strengthening of the regional 
security system through cooperation in bilateral and multilateral formats. 
3.4. Strengthening Freedom and Democracy in Neighboring States and Regions: 
Georgia welcomes and contributes to the strengthening of democracy, free markets 
and civil society in neighboring states and regions, and considers them as important 
preconditions for ensuring regional stability and security. 
3.5. Strengthening the StateÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s Transit Function and Energy Security: Georgia 
attributes special importance to strengthening its transit and energy corridor functions. 
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Therefore, it actively participates in international energy, transportation and 
communications projects. Ensuring alternative energy and strategic resource supplies, 
as well as development of strategically important regional infrastructure, are connected 
to the maintenance of stability, economic growth and prosperity in Georgia. 
3.6. Environmental Security of the Country and the Region: The quality of 
environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources are closely related to 
public security and health. Taking into consideration Georgia's biodiversity and its role 
as a transit country, special importance is attributed to the ecological safety of large 
international and local projects. 
3.7. Preserving National and Cultural Uniqueness: Georgia, as a state with a centuries-
old history and rich cultural heritage, considers the preservation of cultural diversity and 
national identity as a necessary element for ensuring national security. 
4. Threats, Risks and Challenges to National Security 
4.1. Infringement of Georgia's Territorial Integrity: Aggressive separatist movements, 
inspired and supported from outside of Georgia, led to armed conflicts in the country 
that resulted in de facto separation of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of 
South Ossetia from Georgia, and loss of control over these territories by the Georgian 
authorities. This infringement of Georgia's territorial integrity is a major national security 
threat. 
Infringed territorial integrity is the main source of a number of other problems that 
undermine the political, economic and social stability of the country: up to three 
hundred thousand Georgian citizens were forced to leave their legitimate residences; 
Georgia's state borders remain undefined; uncontrolled territories host illegal militant 
groups, create conditions favorable to a variety of terrorist groups and provide fertile 
ground for contraband and transnational organized crime; and separatist regimes 
systematically violate human rights. 
Consequently, the infringement of territorial integrity, if not addressed in a timely and 
efficient manner, may endanger the existence of Georgia as a viable state. 
4.2. Spillover of Conflicts from Neighboring States: The potential spillover of conflicts 
represents a serious threat to Georgia's national security because it could destabilize 
the country. These conflicts may elicit provocations from other state and non-state 
actors, as has happened on a number of occasions over the Pankisi Gorge. The 
spillover of conflicts from neighboring states may also cause a large-scale influx of 
refugees into Georgia and create favorable conditions for transnational criminal 
activities and contraband. 
Lack of control over the state border of Georgia with the Russian Federation along the 
perimeters of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia 
exacerbates the above mentioned threat and creates further obstacles to deal 
efficiently with the problem. Prolonged, unresolved conflicts in neighboring states, and 
possible deterioration of stability in Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus, could 
drag Georgia into conflict. In addition, the Russian Federation's military presence on 
the territory of Georgia would be a risk factor to the stability of the country in certain 
circumstances. 
4.3. Military Intervention: While the likelihood of open military aggression against 
Georgia is low, cross-border incursions by state and non-state actors are real, and they 
threaten the security of the country. Georgia has faced infringement of its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity on numerous occasions in the form of systematic violation of 
Georgia's land, air and maritime space, and by sporadic military attacks.  
Illegal military and paramilitary formations in territories uncontrolled by the Georgian 
government and near the borders of the country considerably raise the possibility of 
renewed armed conflict and destabilization in Georgia. In this context, the ongoing 
process of granting Russian citizenship to residents of the breakaway regions of 
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Georgia is a potential threat because, in certain circumstances, it could be used as a 
pretext for intervention in Georgia's internal affairs.      
  
 4.4. International Terrorism: International terrorism is a considerable threat to the 
national security of Georgia, especially in view of Georgia's proximity to terrorist havens 
in neighboring regions. 
As an active participant in the international anti-terrorist coalition, Georgia may become 
a target of international terrorist attacks. These may be directed against strategic 
infrastructure such as international oil and gas pipelines and other states' assets 
located in Georgia. 
4.5. Contraband and Transnational Organized Crime: Unsettled conflicts in neighboring 
states, lawlessness in Georgia's separatist regions of the former Autonomous District of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and poor control of the state borders, add up to 
opportunities for contraband and transnational organized crime that seriously damage 
the national security and economy. These threats hinder establishment of law and 
order in the country, jeopardizing the stability of Georgia and the entire region. The 
possibility that Georgia's natural transit location could be misused in the commission of 
transnational crimes is also a tangible threat to Georgian security.  
4.6. The Russian Federation's Military Bases: Military bases of the Russian Federation 
located in Georgia are no longer a direct threat to Georgia's sovereignty. However, until 
their final withdrawal, they remain a risk to national security, and still negatively affect 
the security environment in Georgia. 
Georgia welcomes the transition of the Russian Federation's military bases to the 
"withdrawal regime" and believes that irreversible realization of the Joint Declaration of 
the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Russian Federation of May 30, 2005 will 
facilitate normalization of bilateral relations and strengthening of mutual confidence.  
4.7 Corruption and Inefficient Public Administration System: Lack of a democratic 
tradition of governance and mechanisms of checks and balances has led to an 
increase in corruption. During recent years, corruption has penetrated the public sector 
and become so systemic and dramatic that it jeopardizes the security of the state by 
draining its resources, undermining people's confidence in democratic values and 
institutions and hampering economic development, thus negatively affecting civic 
cohesion and social balance. Georgia's recent experience shows that corruption and 
inefficient state governance, if not tackled systematically and diligently, may become a 
threat to national security. 
4.8. Economic and Social Challenges: Without sustainable economic development, 
competitiveness of the national economy remains low. This underdeveloped economy 
is a serious challenge to the national security of Georgia.  
Backwardness of the national economy has brought about a decline in living standards, 
degradation of healthcare and education, deterioration of the demographic situation, 
increased unemployment and increase in those living under the poverty line. In turn, 
these conditions have resulted in the engagement of individuals in unlawful activities. 
Uneven social and economic development and the absence of a strong middle class 
widen the gap in living standards between different social groups. Moreover, social and 
economic disparities between the capital and the regions of Georgia further aggravate 
the situation.  This could trigger social tension and political extremism that may 
endanger sustainable development of the state, stability and national security. 
4.9. Energy Related Challenges: Dependence on energy imports from mainly one 
country, where free market and property rights are not secured, as well as 
underdevelopment of local energy sources, unstable energy supply and poor technical 
conditions of energy infrastructure render Georgia vulnerable and create conditions for 
foreign leverage. Energy related challenges, if not addressed in a timely and efficient 
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manner, may endanger not only economic development, but also the national security 
of Georgia. 
4.10. Information Related Challenges: Georgian national security may be put at risk 
because of the absence of a cohesive national information policy, weakness of 
infrastructure implementing such policy, and public administration based on insufficient 
and incredible information. In addition, the existence of an unsatisfactory classified 
information protection system, the possibility of illegal access to state information 
systems with the purpose of acquiring or destroying information, and a likelihood of 
conducting large scale information attacks on Georgia from outside countries represent 
serious challenges to national security.  
4.11. Environmental challenges: Deterioration of Georgia's natural environment, 
including natural and man-made hazards, could eventually endanger its natural 
environment, the well being of its citizens and its biodiversity. Georgia's location in a 
seismically active area increases its vulnerability to natural disasters. Terrorist attacks 
against the energy infrastructure could also cause serious environmental damage in 
Georgia. Finally, the damage of major industrial assets in neighboring countries could 
cause significant environmental harm and other negative consequences in Georgia. 
5. Main Directions of Georgia's National Security Policy 
 The goals of Georgia's national security policy are to defend Georgia's national 
interests that are based on fundamental national values, to respond to national security 
threats, and to prevent risks and challenges from developing into threats or 
exacerbating existing threats. 
 5.1. Strengthening of Public Administration and Consolidation of Democratic 
Institutions 
 It is the firm will of the citizens of Georgia to build a free, democratic society and to 
create a transparent and accountable system of governance based on the rule of law 
and the equality of every citizen before the law. This system will become the guarantor 
of the rights and freedoms of all citizens without distinction, and will serve as a 
substantial basis for the further development of the country. 
 The Constitution of Georgia provides for separation of powers among the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government, which is the basis for the democratic 
system of governance. In parallel to reforming and optimizing the functioning of the 
government's legislative and executive structures, the judiciary and law-enforcement 
agencies are also undergoing profound reforms.  The Governmental Commission on 
Reforms in Public Administration is responsible for ensuring effective implementation of 
functional and structural reforms in public administration. The Strategy of Good 
Governance is being elaborated, aimed at perfecting the public administration system, 
increasing transparency of the public sector, increasing public involvement, 
establishing the rule of law, and securing the independence of each of the three 
branches of government. 
 Georgia attributes special importance to the establishment of an efficient system of 
local governance and self-governance.  In order to carry out reforms in this field and 
decentralize the state governance system, the State Commission on Good Governance 
and Reforms in Territorial Administration has been established. 
 Georgia guarantees the conditions for the development of the non-governmental 
sector and the mass media. This will contribute to the establishment of a strong and 
vibrant civil society and will increase the government's accountability to society. 
 Establishing a democratic system of governance is impossible without minimizing 
corruption in the public sector. Increasing the government's transparency and 
accountability and creation of a strong civil service with respective social guarantees 
will significantly downscale corruption. A number of significant institutional and 
legislative changes have already been implemented to strengthen mechanisms that 
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prevent corruption.  The National Anti-corruption Strategy, which sets forth relevant 
anti-corruption measures, has been elaborated and approved. Based on this strategy, 
the government will develop and implement an action plan that sets forth necessary 
measures, a timetable for their implementation and the agencies responsible. 
5.2. Strengthening State Defense 
Georgia is enhancing its state defense by strengthening its Armed Forces, reinforcing 
mechanisms of civilian defense, cooperating with the international community to 
promote world peace and security, and developing crisis management mechanisms. 
Georgia is carrying out large-scale defense reforms aimed at developing modern, 
efficient and sustainable armed forces in line with NATO standards. The reformed 
Georgian Armed Forces will have increased defense capabilities to counter military 
threats to national security and to participate in international anti-terrorist and peace 
support operations. They must also be prepared to assist civilian authorities in post-
crisis rehabilitation and management, maintaining law and order, and providing security 
for Georgian citizens. Defense reforms envisage not only structural changes, but also 
the modernization of armaments, equipment and infrastructure, and optimization of the 
number of troops required for particular missions. In the process of building the armed 
forces, Georgia attributes high importance to enhancing bilateral relations and the 
assistance provided by partner countries. 
The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO and the ongoing Strategic 
Defense Review are fundamental for the implementation and sustainability of these 
reforms. 
Establishment of effective democratic civilian control over the military is one of the 
central elements of the defense reforms. The Ministry of Defense has been 
transformed into a civilian agency headed by a civilian Minister. Functions and 
responsibilities are being divided between the Ministry and the General Staff. Public 
accountability of the defense system is guaranteed by the Parliament through its power 
to define state defense policy, approve the defense budget, monitor defense 
expenditures, adopt laws in the defense sphere, and carry out control over their 
implementation. 
The Georgian authorities consider it necessary to develop efficient reserve and 
mobilization systems to enhance Georgia's defense capability. At the same time, it is 
important to create a civil defense system to provide security for the Georgian people. 
Civil defense must serve as a supportive mechanism to the state defense system in 
case of a serious threat or crisis. It will prepare the civil population for defense and 
ensure the protection of material and cultural values by minimizing or eliminating 
consequences of crises or emergencies. 
By participating in multinational anti-terrorist, peacekeeping, search and rescue and 
humanitarian operations, Georgia acquires valuable experience, but more importantly, 
contributes to Euro-Atlantic security. Georgia, as a member of the international anti-
terrorist coalition, contributes to the establishment of peace and stability in different 
parts of the world. Georgian troops participated in the NATO led operations in 
Afghanistan; currently they are involved in NATOÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s operations in Kosovo, as 
well as in the stabilization mission in Iraq. 
Georgia is creating a crisis management system that will be able to prevent and 
respond to crises, manage post-crisis situations in a timely and efficient manner, and 
ensure prompt decision-making and implementation. The crisis management system 
will provide for coordinated actions of state agencies, as well as precise delineation of 
functions and responsibilities of the governmental, non-governmental, international and 
humanitarian organizations involved in the crisis management process. The creation of 
the unified and centralized crisis management system is underway at the National 
Security Council of Georgia. 
5.3. Restoration of the Territorial Integrity of Georgia 
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Infringed territorial integrity, that is, the existence of uncontrolled territories within 
Georgian borders, hampers Georgia's transformation into a full democracy. Therefore, 
reintegration of the state and restoration of the rule of law on the whole territory of 
Georgia is one of the top priorities of the national security policy. The state 
reintegration policy envisages participation of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous 
District of South Ossetia in developing the constitutional order of Georgia. 
The Georgian Government is committed to take timely and efficient measures aimed at 
peaceful settlement of the conflicts, based on the principles of international law, and is 
ready to ensure protection of civil, political, economic, social, religious and cultural 
rights of all ethnic groups residing on its territory. 
Georgia has given impetus to political dialogue with the de facto authorities of Abkhazia 
and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia on the political status of 
breakaway regions and separation of powers between the national and regional 
governments, based on the principles of Georgian territorial integrity and broad 
regional autonomy. 
Regarding the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia, the new proposal of the 
President of Georgia - Initiative of the Georgian Government with Respect to the 
Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict in South Ossetia -represents a solid foundation for 
confidence building and settling of existing disputes between the two sides. This 
initiative offers autonomous status to the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia 
and calls for renunciation of force.  It is based on the principles of self-determination of 
nations, cultural identity, minority rights, human rights, and freedom and equality of 
citizens as stipulated by the Constitution of Georgia. 
Regarding Abkhazia, the document drafted by the former Special Representative of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations to Georgia, Dieter Boden, under the UN 
auspices with the participation of Secretary General's Group of Friends (France, 
Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States)-Document on Basic 
Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sokhumi-creates a 
framework to guarantee a special status for Abkhazia, broad powers for its 
government, and the rights and interests of Abkhazia's multinational population. The 
activities of the Secretary General's Group of Friends and continuation of the Georgian-
Abkhazian peace negotiations within the Geneva framework are of high importance for 
resolution of the Abkhazian conflict. 
Returning internally displaced persons and refugees to their legitimate places of 
residence with full security guarantees should be ensured in accordance with the 
principles of justice, equality, human rights and freedoms, and the international law.  
In order to ensure successful settlement of these conflicts in accordance with the 
peace initiatives set forth by Georgia, more active involvement of the international 
community is required. This will end the monopolization of the peace process by one 
particular actor.  Georgia welcomes any proposal and initiative aimed at peaceful and 
fair resolution of the existing conflicts on its territory.  
5.4. Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union 
Georgia, as a Black Sea and South-Eastern European state, has historically been a 
geographic, political and cultural part of Europe. Therefore, integration into European 
and Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security systems is the firm will of Georgian 
people. Georgia welcomes NATO and EU enlargement and believes that integration of 
the Black Sea states into NATO and the EU will significantly reinforce the security of 
the Black Sea region as the South-Eastern border of Europe. Integration to NATO and 
the EU represents a top priority of Georgian foreign and security policy. 
5.4.1. Membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Georgia views NATO as an organization of collective defense that is the central 
mechanism for providing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Georgia's 
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cooperation with NATO contributes to strengthening of democratic values in the 
country, accomplishment of democratic reforms, especially in the field of defense, as 
well as establishment of a secure and stable environment. Membership of NATO would 
not only endow Georgia with an unprecedented degree of military and political security, 
but would allow it to contribute to strengthening the security of Europe, particularly the 
Black Sea region. Georgia has already proved its readiness to share the responsibility 
of the collective security by sending its troops to Kosovo and Afghanistan. 
On October 29, 2004, NATO approved Georgia's Individual Partnership Action Plan 
(IPAP). Implementation of IPAP is essential for NATO membership. IPAP 
encompasses complex reforms in political, defense, security, economic and other 
fields, which are necessary to develop Georgia into a stable democracy and a reliable 
partner for NATO. 
Georgia is implementing an action plan that outlines concrete measures for fulfilling 
IPAP. In order to facilitate the NATO integration process, various institutional reforms 
are underway. Georgia is fully committed to the irreversible implementation of the IPAP 
provisions, which are essential to Georgia's quest for a NATO Membership Action Plan. 
Georgia actively cooperates with NATO members and other aspirant states within the 
scope of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council. Georgia attributes special importance to bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
with NATO member states in the political, security and defense fields. 
5.4.2 Integration into the European Union 
Georgia views the EU as a community of nations that ensures the peace and prosperity 
in Europe. Georgia's cooperation with EU contributes to the implementation of 
democratic reforms and to strengthening the market economy and security of the 
country. Values and objectives shared by the EU are common to Georgia, which 
considers EU membership an important guarantee for its economic and political 
development. Georgia's accession to the EU will strengthen Europe by restoring the 
Black Sea region as a European trade and stability zone. 
The current legal framework for the relationship between Georgia and the EU is the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Objectives of the partnership include 
strengthening of political dialogue, market economy, democracy, trade, investment and 
harmonious economic relations, and providing bases for legislative, economic, social, 
financial, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation. Implementation of the 
National Program of Harmonization of Georgian Legislation with EU Legislation is 
underway within the framework of the PCA. 
In June 2004, Georgia was included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 
which represents an important mechanism for further movement with the European 
Union. The ENP provides opportunities to ensure the Ã¢â‚¬Å“four freedomsÃ¢â‚¬? of 
movement (goods, services, capital and persons), to increase efficiency of state 
institutions, and enhance scientific-educational cooperation with the EU. Moreover, 
there is an opportunity for cooperation in the fields of political dialogue, border 
protection, crisis management and the rule of law. 
Georgia attributes great importance to the elaboration and successful implementation 
of the action plan within the ENP in order to exploit fully all opportunities offered by the 
EU. After achieving tangible progress in socio-economic, institutional, legal and political 
spheres, Georgia intends to develop a format ensuring a higher level of integration with 
the EU until full membership becomes possible. Legal and institutional reforms are 
underway in Georgia according to EU standards. 
Georgia fully subscribes to the European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a 
Better World, and is ready to take part in its implementation. 
The assistance of the EU to Georgia through various projects under the Technical 
Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) program and EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia 
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(EUJUST THEMIS) has been instrumental in fostering Georgia's reforms in a variety of 
spheres.  
5.5. Strengthening Foreign Relations 
Foreign policy is one of the main directions of Georgia's national security policy, aimed 
at establishing a favorable international security environment for Georgia. In order to 
achieve this goal, Georgia cooperates with the international community in bilateral and 
multilateral formats. 
5.5.1. Strategic Partnership with the United States of America 
Georgia continues to develop its strategic partnership with the United States of 
America. From the very day Georgia declared independence, the United States has 
strongly supported development and strengthening of Georgia's statehood, democracy, 
defense capabilities and economy. The United States' continued support to Georgia 
through various forms of cooperation and assistance plans is instrumental to Georgia's 
pledge to become a full democracy with a viable market economy, and to its 
aspirations to move toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration. US administered 
educational programs play important role for Georgia since they are instrumental in 
increasing the level of education and qualification of Georgian students.  
Georgia's defense capabilities have significantly increased as a result of assistance 
programs conducted by the United States. The Georgia Train and Equip Program 
(GTEP) initiated by the US has proved to be a major success in the process of building 
the modern Georgian Armed Forces. The new Sustainment and Stability Operations 
Program (SSOP) is advancing Georgia's defense capabilities to a higher level. Units 
trained under these programs constitute the core of the Georgian Army. 
Georgia actively provides political and military support to the anti-terrorist coalition led 
by the US. Units trained under US assistance programs successfully fulfill their 
missions in anti-terrorist and peace support operations in and outside Georgia. 
Currently, Georgia has deployed up to 850 troops to support the US led stabilization 
mission in Iraq. 
5.5.2. Strategic Partnership with Ukraine 
The Rose Revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, as 
confirmations of the belief in common values of democracy and freedom, opened a 
new era in the relations between the two nations. 
The strategic partnership between Georgia and Ukraine is rooted in historically 
established friendly and good neighborly relations between the two nations. After the 
two countries regained independence, relations between them were institutionalized by 
the unprecedented 1993 Agreement between the Republic of Georgia and the Republic 
of Ukraine on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Georgia and Ukraine have 
established a partnership in different fields such as free trade, industrial cooperation, 
and military education and assistance. Georgia and Ukraine are dedicated to exploit 
fully the opportunities of the strategic partnership to the optimal mutual benefit. 
Georgia and Ukraine cooperate in the fields of foreign and national security policy, not 
only in bilateral format, but also in multilateral fora, such as the United Nations, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC), GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), Black Sea 
Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and others. 
Georgia would welcome Ukraine's possible participation in Secretary General's Group 
of Friends. 
Partnership with Ukraine on the way to NATO and EU integration is indispensable to 
Georgia. Georgia welcomes Ukraine's "Intensified Dialogue" with NATO and action 
plan within the EU ENP. Coordinated efforts in foreign and security policy between 
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Georgia and Ukraine will be mutually beneficial to both countries' bid for NATO and EU 
membership. 
5.5.3. Strategic Partnership with Turkey 
Turkey is a leading regional partner of Georgia that supports Georgia in its efforts to 
develop stable economic, political and military institutions. 
Since Georgia's independence, Turkey has been an important trade and economic 
partner for Georgia. Further enhancement of economic relations and successful 
implementation of joint regional transportation and energy projects, such as Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipelines are of strategic importance 
for Georgia and Turkey. It is also important to deepen cooperation with Turkey within 
the context of the Black Sea region. 
Turkey has been a valuable military partner for Georgia. Turkish assistance in training 
of Georgian troops, improving technical and logistical capabilities, and in modernizing 
military infrastructure has significantly contributed to the strengthening of Georgian 
Armed Forces. Turkey has also played an important role in educating military 
personnel by contributing to the development of Georgia's National Defense Academy 
and conducting various military educational programs. 
5.5.4. Partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan 
Historically established traditional good neighborly relations connect Georgia to 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia believes that it is of utmost importance to elaborate 
joint approaches about the future of the region. Deepening regional cooperation and 
establishment of a common economic space and single market would contribute 
significantly to the stability and prosperity of the region. 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict endangers stability of all states in the region. Georgia 
would welcome peaceful resolution of this conflict and more active involvement of 
international community in the peace process. This would strengthen and facilitate 
regional security and cooperation. 
Georgia aspires to deepen its partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of 
cooperation in spheres of mutual interest. Realization of large-scale economic projects 
also has the function of strengthening regional security by promoting cooperation and 
strong, long lasting business relationships.  
Georgia's relationship with Azerbaijan has developed into a strategic partnership. Joint 
energy, transportation and communications projects significantly contribute to the 
stability and prosperity of the two countries. Two major regional energy projects - the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline - not only 
have economic importance but also play a stabilizing role in the region. Once these 
projects become operational, alternative energy resources will be delivered to the world 
market. For this purpose, Georgia maintains close cooperation with Azerbaijan in the 
field of pipeline security. 
Georgia cooperates closely with Azerbaijan in the political and security spheres, as well 
as in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. Partnership of Georgia and Azerbaijan in 
GUAM and participation in the EU's ENP and NATO's PfP program contribute to 
harmonization of security interests and elaboration of common positions on various 
strategic issues. 
Georgia enjoys a close partnership with Armenia in all spheres of bilateral interest. 
Georgia believes that strengthening good neighborly relations and mutually beneficial 
cooperation with Armenia is in the national interest of both countries, and it contributes 
to strengthening traditional friendship, economic prosperity and political stability 
between the two states. 
Both countries should reap the benefits from the realization of joint economic, energy 
and transportation projects. Georgia believes that Armenia should benefit from 
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Georgia's transit location by transporting Armenian goods through its territory. Georgia 
and Armenia actively cooperate in BSEC. Georgia supports Armenia's involvement in 
EU's ENP and welcomes its stronger cooperation with NATO. 
5.5.5. Partnership with the Russian Federation 
Georgia aspires to build cooperation with Russia upon the principles of good neighborly 
relations, equality and mutual respect. Georgia would welcome transition of Russia into 
a stable democratic state with a functioning market economy and respect for European 
values. Democratization and foreign policy predictability of the Russian Federation 
would positively influence Georgia's and the regional security environment. 
Georgia expresses its readiness to intensify political dialogue, deepen trade, economic 
and socio-cultural relations, cooperate in solving regional conflicts, and to fight against 
terrorism and transnational crime with the Russian Federation. Georgia believes that 
conclusion of the framework agreement on friendship and cooperation will create 
favorable conditions for the improvement of relations between the two states. Georgia 
reiterates its commitment to sign the framework agreement without delay. 
The Russian Federation must fulfill the obligations undertaken at the 1999 OSCE 
Istanbul Summit regarding the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgian territory 
within the agreed timeframe. This will undoubtedly improve the relations between 
Georgia and the Russian Federation.  
5.5.6. Regional Cooperation within the Black Sea Region 
The Black Sea region is an integral part of Europe. The new European security system 
based on transformed European and Euro-Atlantic organizations cannot develop fully 
without establishing a reliable Black Sea Security system as an essential element of 
the whole Euro-Atlantic security. This is a unique opportunity for NATO and the EU to 
work together to assist Black Sea nations to secure sustainable regional stability and 
security. 
The security policy of Georgia is based on the principle that security in the Euro-
Atlantic area is indivisible, and that Georgia, as a Black Sea country, is an integral part 
of it. Georgia welcomes ongoing integration of the Black Sea countries into NATO and 
the EU, and firmly believes that Georgia's future lies with the more secure and stable 
Black Sea region and, consequently, with NATO and the EU. Membership of Georgia 
and other Black Sea states would secure what has become NATO's and EU's 
important southern flank. 
Georgia welcomes NATO's active participation in Black Sea security cooperation. 
Georgia attributes high importance to the involvement of NATO in the fight against 
illegal trade of weapons and drugs, trafficking in human beings, terrorism and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Black Sea.    
Strengthening cooperation with the Black Sea states is of utmost importance for 
Georgia. In this respect, Georgia attributes special importance to the cooperation in the 
following regional initiatives: 
5.5.6.1 GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova): Georgia regards GUAM as a 
regional organization of the partner states that are united on the basis of mutual 
interest in democracy, prosperity and security. Transformation of GUAM into a full-
fledged organization promoting economic and social development and democratic 
stability and security is of vital interest for Georgia. Implementation of specific projects 
under the US-GUAM framework program, such as Trade and Transport Facilitation and 
the Virtual Law Enforcement Center, contributes to enhancing cooperation between the 
member states in such fields as trade, transportation, law-enforcement, fight against 
international terrorism and organized crime, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
5.5.6.2 Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC): Georgia views 
BSEC as an organization providing considerable security and economic impact on the 
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region because of its serious economic potential and geopolitical importance. Georgia 
seeks to enhance cooperation within BSEC in such fields as trade, energy, 
communications, information technologies, transportation, and tourism and 
infrastructure development. 
5.5.6.3 By participating in the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 
(BLACKSEAFOR) and cooperating within the Confidence and Security Building 
Measures (CSBM) on the Black Sea (so-called "Ukraine Initiative"), initiatives aimed at 
enhancing peace and stability in the Black Sea area and increasing regional maritime 
cooperation, Georgia contributes to the security of the Black Sea region and to 
confidence building between the regional states. Georgia welcomes cooperation of 
BLACKSEAFOR with other partner states and international organizations that would 
contribute to strengthening stability and security in the Black Sea region. 
5.5.7. Inter-regional Cooperation 
Georgia actively cooperates with the Baltic Sea states on a wide range of issues. It is 
especially important for Georgia to share the Baltic experience of European and Euro-
Atlantic integration. The Baltic States' support for Georgia's aspiration to integrate into 
NATO and the EU is instrumental for the harmonization of national legislation and 
institutions, as well as for reform of the defense sector and other spheres of public 
policy. 
Georgia considers it very important to deepen political and economic cooperation with 
the states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and to secure their support for the 
reforms proceeding in Georgia. The participation of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland in the New Friends of Georgia group of countries 
contributes to Georgia's European aspirations. 
Georgia, as a natural link between West and East, pays a great deal of attention to the 
development of a close relationship with Central Asian states. The main goal of co-
operation with these countries is to promote the free flow and exchange of energy 
resources, goods and information between West and East. 
5.5.8. Forum for Multilateral cooperation: 
Cooperation with the international community in multilateral fora is an important priority 
of Georgian foreign and security policy. 
5.5.8.1. Georgia believes that the United Nations should have the leading role in the 
process of establishing and maintaining global peace and just  resolution of conflicts 
around the world. For this purpose, it is necessary to enhance effectiveness of the UN 
via comprehensive reform of its activities. Georgia also supports the UN's role in the 
elimination of social inequality and poverty, and in the amelioration of the effects of 
natural and ecological disasters. 
5.5.8.2. Georgia regards the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) as an important collective security organization that plays a significant role in 
promoting stability in Europe. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty remains the 
cornerstone for providing security in Europe. Georgia attributes special importance to 
the timely and irreversible fulfillment of the decisions of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul 
Summit. The Government of Georgia attributes particular importance to the assistance 
rendered by the OSCE in the process of strengthening democratic institutions and 
ensuring stability in Georgia. The Georgian government welcomes more active 
involvement of OSCE in the process of conflict resolution in the country. The now 
defunct Border Monitoring Operation had played an important role in ensuring stability 
at the Georgian borders. The OSCE has launched a new Border Guard training 
program, which Georgia considers very important, however, the border monitoring 
issue still remains problematic. Georgia cooperates closely with the international 
community to find a solution to this problem. 
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5.5.8.3. Membership of the Council of Europe is a good opportunity for furthering 
European values and norms in political, legal, cultural and social spheres.  Georgia 
adheres to the standards of the Council of Europe, which provide for the establishment 
of a democratic state with western values and norms. Georgia is dedicated to 
implementing the recommendations of the Council of Europe aimed at strengthening 
local and regional democracies, improving protection mechanisms for human and 
minority rights, and strengthening the rule of law in the country. 
Georgia attaches great importance to the participation of its members of Parliament in 
the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and OSCE, which it considers essential for 
consensus building at a political level. 
5.6 Fight against International Terrorism, Contraband and Transnational Organized 
Crime 
Georgia opposes any form of terrorism and acknowledges the growing threat of 
international terrorism and its new forms. The national anti-terrorist policy of Georgia 
aims at providing security for Georgian citizens and state and non-state institutions. 
To achieve this goal, Georgia is developing capabilities for fighting terrorism, including 
strengthening of special units of the armed forces and law enforcement agencies. In 
order to avoid the misuse of the Georgian territory for transit functions by international 
terrorists, the Government of Georgia is strengthening border protection and 
cooperating closely with neighboring countries in anti-terrorist activities. Other actions 
for fighting terrorism should include establishment of clearly defined procedures for 
investigation of terrorist acts, reinforcing the capabilities of anti-terrorist intelligence and 
counterintelligence, and identification of individuals involved in ordering and executing 
terrorist acts. 
By participating in multinational anti-terrorist operations, Georgia is acquiring valuable 
experience, but more importantly, contributing to the efforts of the anti-terrorist 
coalition. 
Particular importance is attributed to the protection of transport and energy 
infrastructure, particularly oil and gas pipelines. Georgia actively cooperates with other 
countries for effective accomplishment of this task. 
Georgia attributes high priority to taking specific robust measures in the fight against 
smuggling, illegal arms and drug trade, trafficking in human beings and other 
transnational organized crimes. Tackling these problems successfully requires political 
will, consolidated efforts, and reform of the relevant agencies. 
Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian leadership has demonstrated strong will 
to deal with these problems. Contraband and transnational organized crime have 
diminished significantly as a result of targeted state policy. This has been reflected in a 
drastic decline of the shadow economy, improvement of economic situation and growth 
of government revenues. 
In order to ensure the sustainability of this process, it is necessary to conduct specific 
reforms and adjust the legal framework more explicitly to the requirements of 
countering contraband, transnational organized crime and terrorism. It is important to 
streamline law enforcement institutions, decentralize law enforcement services and 
ensure coordinated activities of the relevant state institutions. However, without the 
restoration of constitutional order on the whole territory of Georgia and establishment of 
lasting peace in its neighborhood, addressing these threats and challenges will 
consume huge resources and efforts without eliminating Georgia's vulnerability to 
them. 
During the reform process, the Interior and Security Ministries have been modernized 
and united under the Ministry of Interior, thus eliminating duplication of functions, 
overlapping, and the lack of coordination between the two previously independent 
agencies. Intelligence services have also been streamlined, bringing counter-
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intelligence under the Ministry of Interior, while subordinating the Foreign Intelligence 
Department to the President of Georgia. Transformation of the State Border Protection 
Department from a militarized security force into a civilian border police service is also 
underway. Further reforms have to be undertaken, backed by external assistance 
programs to complete a setup of the institutional system of law enforcement that will 
guarantee implementation of the rule of law. 
5.7. Economic Security Policy 
The economic security policy of Georgia aims at providing the necessary economic 
conditions for ensuring Georgia's development and strengthening its national security. 
The ongoing process of economic recovery is a result of governmental policy aimed at 
achieving long-term sustainable economic growth based on free market principles.  
The priorities of Georgia's economic security policy are: 
   - strengthening macro-economic stability through improvement of the tax collection 
system, implementation of effective monetary policy, introduction of a medium term 
expenditure policy and efficient state debt management; 
   - development of the private sector and job creation through deregulation of the 
economy, stimulation of small and medium size enterprises, improvement of the 
investment climate and protection of private property rights;  
   - improvement of the investment climate in the agriculture sector and development of 
an agricultural land market; 
   - creation of a favorable business environment for development of traditional and 
innovative industry sectors; 
   - development of tourism  and full exploitation of  Georgia's capacities in this field; 
   - implementation of a regional policy aimed at reducing social and economic 
disparities between the capital city and the regions, provision of equal opportunities for 
regional development, including implementation of target programs aimed at the 
development of mountainous regions; 
   - development of basic infrastructure, modernizing Georgia's road infrastructure and 
realization of Georgia's comparative advantages - its transit, transport and 
communication potential;  
   - active participation in international economic projects, which would facilitate 
Georgia's integration into the global economy; 
   - development of Georgia's export potential; 
   - creation of conditions for fair competition and equal opportunities in business by 
prohibiting exclusive rights that might limit fair competition, especially in the 
communication and energy sectors. 
Since the Rose Revolution, significant progress has been visible in the economic 
sphere. The level of the shadow economy and corruption has declined, state budget 
revenues have significantly increased, a robust privatization process has started, 
salaries have been raised, and the process of infrastructure rehabilitation has started. 
Georgia is implementing these reforms based on the GovernmentÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Program. 
5.8. Social Security Policy 
In order to ensure social security and social cohesion of the Georgian population, 
Georgia is implementing a social security policy. 
The priorities of Georgia's social security policy are: 
   - eradicating extreme poverty and social exclusion, reducing poverty, improving living 
standards and facilitating the development of a strong middle class; 
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   - curtailing high unemployment, providing opportunities for employment, especially in 
regions, and increasing labor mobility;  
   - establishing a modern education system, ensuring primary and secondary 
education for every citizen of Georgia, improving the quality of higher education 
through its alignment with the requirements of the national and global labor market and 
conforming with international science and education systems;  
   - reforming pension and social protection systems, developing targeted social 
assistance programs, gradually covering arrears in pensions and other debts;  
   - reforming the healthcare system so that availability of high quality health care is 
guaranteed, developing an effective insurance market and promoting healthy lifestyles 
and environment;  
   - preventing socially dangerous diseases such as tuberculosis, AIDS and drug-
addiction. 
The Georgian Government has been pursuing an active social security policy. 
Important changes have already taken place: the education system is undergoing 
intensive and robust reforms, a significant portion of accumulated pension debts has 
been paid and social assistance programs are proceeding unimpeded. 
5.9. Energy Security Policy 
Georgia is a part of the East-West and North-South energy corridors, which is 
important for political independence and economic development of the country. The 
Georgian government realizes the role that Georgia plays as a component of the 
supply corridor of energy resources from Caspian and Central Asian regions to the rest 
of the world. The Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines are already 
functioning, whereas the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline will be operational in 2006. 
The Georgian government is committed to ensure efficient functioning of these 
projects. 
In order to ensure energy security and independence Georgia should conduct a policy 
aimed at diversification of energy generation and import sources, greater energy 
efficiency and creation of an energy crisis prevention and management system. For 
these purposes, Georgia should create favorable conditions for attracting foreign 
investments, enhance international cooperation in the energy sector, and actively 
participate in European and Western energy projects. 
The Georgian government has already started reforms in the energy sector. The short-
term priorities are: 
   - eradication of the energy deficiency;   
   - rehabilitation of energy infrastructure; 
   - liberalization of the energy sector and improvement of its financial conditions;  
   - privatization of the energy distribution system and certain hydropower stations. 
5.10. Information Security Policy 
Georgia realizes that effective public administration can only be ensured if the state 
information policy is cohesive and the decisions are based on credible information. 
Coherent and persuasive presentation of state positions, both internally and 
internationally, is an essential element of any state's national security. Georgia 
attributes considerable importance to the protection of classified information, legal 
regulation of security of information technologies, and protection of the critical 
information systems of the state. Moreover, secure flow of credible information before 
and during crises is a necessary precondition for successful crisis prevention and 
resolution. 
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In this respect, the Georgian Government is developing the legislative basis and 
infrastructure necessary for the improvement of the information technologies and 
secure flow of information. A Special Communications and Information Agency under 
the oversight of the National Security Council has been established. The establishment 
of the crisis management center with a situation room is underway at the National 
Security Council to facilitate unimpeded flow of information during the crises, inter-
agency coordination and coordinated management of crisis or emergency. 
5.11. Environmental Security Policy 
Georgia's environmental security policy is aimed at the protection of individuals and the 
environment through measures preventing substantial depletion of natural resources 
and environmental pollution and minimizing the consequences of man made and 
natural disasters. Special importance is attributed to large-scale industrial accidents 
and natural disasters, such as floods, landslides, avalanches and earthquakes. Regular 
risk assessments and public awareness campaigns must be carried out, and an 
efficient crisis prevention and post-crisis management system developed. 
The priorities of environmental security policy are: 
   - control over the sources of air pollution, prevention of pollution and degradation of 
agricultural soils, and radioactive waste and rocket fuel cleanup;  
   - food security; 
   - harmonization of Georgian legislation with United Nations and European 
environmental protection standards. 
The Government of Georgia acknowledges that provision of environmental security 
requires close regional and international cooperation. Successful cooperation among 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the field of environmental protection contributes to 
strengthening the ecological security of the region. 
5.12. Preservation of Cultural Heritage 
The Government of Georgia acknowledges that development in the cultural sphere is a 
necessary precondition for the nation's sustainable development and security. 
Georgia seeks to maintain and develop the nation's unique cultural heritage, which 
enriches the world's cultural heritage. In this respect, an active policy of preserving 
national cultural heritage, promoting modern and traditional Georgian arts, and 
protecting architectural and natural values is a must. Georgia is creating favorable 
conditions and guarantees for the preservation of the cultural heritage of national 
minorities residing on its territory. 
Georgia promotes and protects its state language and seeks to ensure respect for the 
Georgian language throughout the country. 
 
Conclusion 
  Georgia puts forward its National Security Concept for the first time since its 
independence. By this document, Georgia demonstrates to its people, and to the world, 
the very direction it will follow to build a strong society and state. The people of Georgia 
have made a firm decision to join the community of democratic nations that respect 
human rights and freedoms and the rule of law. 
 For these purposes, each ministry and agency of Georgia will elaborate a strategy 
within its field of competence and take immediate steps for its implementation 
according to specific plans. Only through such commitment and endeavour can the 
fundamental national values and interests set forth in this document be secured. 
 This document describes some steps Georgia is already taking and lays out an 
ambitious but necessary path ahead that derives from the aspirations of the Georgian 
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people. Georgia fully recognizes that following this path will take time, dedication and 
courage. However, in addition to the many challenges to overcome, there are 
opportunities from which to benefit. Through the commitment of the Georgian 
Government and people, and with the assistance of friendly countries, Georgia will be 
able to build a state that inspires pride in its citizens, is guided by the principles of 
peace and democratic values, and that will occupy a respectable place in the 
community of nations. 
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4. Maps 
Ethno-Linguistic Groups in the Caucasus 
 
 
 311 
Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Azerbaijan 
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Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Georgia 
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5. Notable Personalities in the South Caucasus 1988-2009 
ARMENIA: 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1945- ):  Founding member of „Karabakh Committee‟, 1st 
President of the Republic of Armenia (1991-1998) [Overthrown] 
Jirair Libaridian (1945- ): Advisor to President Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1991-1997) 
Raffi Hovannisian (1959- ): Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia (1992), 
Founder of Opposition „Heritage Party‟ and ACNIS Think-Tank. 
Vazgen Sargsyan (1959-1999): Defence Minister and Minister of State for Defence of 
the Republic of Armenia (1992-1998), Leader of „Yerkrapah‟ Paramilitary Organisation, 
Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (1999) [Assassinated] 
Karen Demirchyan (1932-1999): Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Armenia 
(1999) [Assassinated] 
Robert Kocharyan (1954- ): 2nd President of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh 
(1994-1997), 2nd President of the Republic of Armenia (1998-2008) 
Serj Sargsyan (1954- ): 3d President of the Republic of Armenia (2008- ) 
Vardan Oskanian (1955- ): Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia (1998-2008) 
 
AZERBAIJAN: 
Ayaz Mutalibov (1938- ): 1st President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1991-1992) 
[Overthrown, In Exile] 
Isa Gambar (1957- ): Acting President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1992), Opposition 
Leader, Musavat Party 
Abufaz Elchibey (1938-2000): 2nd President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1992-1993) 
[Overthrown] 
Heidar Aliyev (1923-2003): 3d President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1993-2003) 
Ilham Aliyev (1961- ): 4th President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2003- ) 
Surat Huseynov (1959- ): Warlord, Leader of Attempted 1994 Coup 
Vafa Quluzade (1940- ): Foreign Policy Advisor of the President of Azerbaijan (1990-
1999) 
Novruzali Mamedov (1940-2009): Ethnic Talysh Activist [Died in captivity] 
Ali Kerimli (1965- ): Leader of the (Opposition) Azeri Popular Front Party 
Alikram Gumbatov (1948-) : President of the (de-facto) Talysh-Mughan Republic 
(1993) 
Etibar Mammedov (1955- ): Leader of the (Opposition) National Independence Party 
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GEORGIA: 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939-1993): 1st President of the Republic of Georgia (1991-
1992) [Overthrown] 
Eduard Shevardnadze (1928- ): Acting Chairman of the State Council of the Republic 
of Georgia (1992-1995), 2nd President of the Republic of Georgia (1995-2003) 
[Overthrown] 
Jaba Ioseliani (1926-2003): Warlord, Leader of „Mkhedrioni‟ paramilitary organisation 
Mikheil Saakashvili (1967- ): 3d President of the Republic of Georgia (2003- ) 
Nino Burjanadze (1964- ): Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Georgia (2001-
2008), Opposition Leader (2008- ) 
Zurab Zhvania (1963-2005): Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Georgia (1993-
2001), Prime Minister of the Republic of Georgia (2004-2005) 
Arkadi ‘Badri’ Patarkatsishvili (1955-2008): Oligarch, Opposition Presidential 
Candidate (2007-2008) 
Aslan Abashidze (1938- ): Leader of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria (1991-2004) 
[Deposed] 
Salome Zurabishvili (1952- ): Foreign Minister of the Republic of Georgia (2004-
2005), Founder of the (Opposition) Georgia‟s Way party. 
Sozar Subari (1964- ): Human Rights Ombudsman of the Republic of Georgia (2004-
2009), Opposition politician 
Irakli Alasania (1973- ): UN Ambassador of the Republic of Georgia (2006-2008), 
Founder of (Opposition) Our Georgia-Free Democrats Party 
 
ABKHAZIA: 
Vladislav Ardzhinba (1945-2010): 1st President of the (de-facto) Republic of Abkhazia 
(1994-2005) 
Sergei Bagapsh (1949- ): 2nd President of the (de-facto) Republic of Abkhazia (2005- ) 
Sergei Shamba (1951- ): Foreign Minister of the (de-facto) Republic of Abkhazia 
(1997-2010), Prime Minister of the Republic of Abkhazia (2010- ) 
Raul Khadjimba (1958- ): Vice President of the (de-facto) Republic of Abkhazia (2005-
2009), Opposition leader 
 
SOUTH OSSETIA: 
Eduard Kokoity (1964- ): 2nd President of the (de-facto) Republic of South Ossetia 
(2001- ) 
Dimitri Sanakoyev (1969- ): Head of the Provisional Administrative Entity of South 
Ossetia (2007-) 
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NAGORNO-KARABAKH (See also ARMENIA): 
Arkadi Ghukasian (1957- ): President of the (de-facto) Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh 
(1997-2007) 
Samvel Babayan (1965- ): Commander of the Armed Forces of the (de-facto) Republic 
of Nagorno-Karabakh (1994-2000) [Arrested] 
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
ARMENIA 
Larisa Alaverdian, MP, Member of the Committee on European Integration/ Former 
Human Rights Ombudsperson 
Laura Bagdassarian, Director, “Region” Center, Caucasus Journalists‟ Network 
Gideon Dewhirst, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the United Kingdom, Yerevan 
Richard Giragosian, Director, Armenian Center for National and International Studies 
(ACNIS) 
Stepan Grigoryan, Chairman, Analytical Center on Globalization and Regional 
Cooperation 
Tony Halpin, Editor, Armenianow.com / Moscow Correspondent, The Times 
Alexander Iskandaryan, Director, Caucasus Institute 
Hovsep Khurshudian, Spokesperson, Heritage Party 
Sergey Minasyan, Analyst, Caucasus Institute 
Tigran Mkrtchyan, Researcher, Armenian International Policy Research Group 
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